9 EU Strategy for Africa
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13293/05
COM(05) 489
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| Commission Communication: "EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African Pact to Accelerate Africa's development"
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| Legal base | — |
| Document originated | 12 October 2005
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| Deposited in Parliament | 17 October 2005
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| Department | International Development
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| Basis of consideration | Minister's letter of 28 November 2005
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| Previous Committee Report | HC 34-i (2005-06), para 4 (4 July 2005), HC 34-v (2005-06), paras 3 and 4 (12 October 2005), HC 34-vii (2005-06), para 3 (26 October 2005)
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| To be discussed in Council | 13 December 2005 General Affairs and External Relations Council and 15-16 December 2005 European Council
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared; further information requested
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Background
9.1 The June 2005 European Council called for "the Council
to draw up a long-term global strategy towards Africa in the light
of the UN Summit with a view to the European Council in December 2005".
The European Commission's Communication on Africa is a core part
of this strategy, aiming to give the EU a comprehensive, integrated
and long-term framework for its relations with the African continent.
The Commission Communication
9.2 When we considered the Communication on 26 October, we noted
a number of major uncertainties to which the Secretary of State
(Hilary Benn) referred but upon which he did not dilate —
"other work by the High Representative"; and by the
Presidency; and by the "High Level Group on Migration".
It was unclear how this work was to be taken into account in the
final Strategy. Nor did he explain in what ways the draft Strategy
did not deal adequately with the issue of aid effectiveness. Or
what he meant by Europe needing "to ensure it plays its part
in influencing the wider international community". Such questions
suggested there was still a good deal to be done between then
and mid-December, and consultation with other Member States, MEPs
and civil society had only recently begun.
9.3 The importance of getting the Strategy right
was indicated by the fact that in 2003 the EU's development aid
to Africa was €15 billion, and is due to rise substantially.
Given the context and the number of uncertainties, we asked the
Secretary of State for clarification and to let us know the outcome
of the discussion at the 21-22 November "development"
General Affairs and External Relations Council, in good time before
the 15-16 December European Council at which it is envisaged that
will be adopted; and kept the document under scrutiny. He has
now done so in letter of 28 November 2005.
The Minister's letter
9.4 The Minister responds as follows:
"You asked about the different elements that
are feeding into the Strategy. The Commission Communication is
the main input. There is also a paper from the High Representative
covering peace and security elements of the EU-Africa partnership.
This paper has just been issued, and I attach it for your
information. It proposes ways to promote security and governance,
and suggests that the EU-Africa Strategy should be comprehensive
and emphasise coherence, inclusiveness and partnership. Related
to this is a Presidency note on peace and security that was discussed
in the EU Peace and Security Committee along with the High Representative's
paper. The High Level Group on Migration — a cross-pillar
working group that discusses both EU internal and external aspects
of migration — has also provided inputs and their discussions
fed into the GAERC conclusions.
"Member States based their views on all these
inputs. Debate was wide-ranging and took place in at least four
different Committees and Working Groups before being brought together
at the GAERC on 21-22 November.
"You also commented on the issue of aid effectiveness.
The main concern by Member States related to the inclusion by
the Commission of a proposal for a new action plan. Member States
felt this went beyond recent agreements in the Council on aid
effectiveness. But the GAERC stressed the need for early implementation
of the recommendations of the EU Working Group on Harmonisation
and the Paris Commitments on aid effectiveness, and support for
including these elements in the Strategy.
"You also queried the reference to "Europe
ensuring it plays its part in influencing the wider international
community". Member States and the European Parliament reaffirmed
the importance of the European Union continuing to set an example
to other donors - as it did earlier this year through increasing
aid volumes with half of the increase going to Africa. They also
wanted to ensure that the Strategy, while focused on Europe's
role, reinforced the importance of working with other international
donors.
"The GAERC discussions that I chaired on the
Africa Communication were broadly positive. Member States confirmed
specific priorities that they wished to see reflected in the final
Strategy. These included peace and security, and particularly
the replenishment of the EU's Africa Peace Facility;[17]
good governance; trade and economic growth; the EU-Africa infrastructure
facility; action against HIV and AIDS; increased funding for health
and education; the importance of African ownership; and the need
for implementation and monitoring. I attach the Council conclusions.
The first discussion of the Strategy will take place in Coreper
on 30 November. I will send you a copy once it is agreed.
"Finally, you rightly touched on the issue of
consultation. The Commission organised its own consultations on
their Communication with Africans and civil society. In addition
to consultations with UK civil society - principally through BOND[18]
- we organised a seminar for European civil society through the
CONCORD NGO network in Brussels on 19 October, which the Commission
and Council Secretariat also participated in."
9.5 The Secretary General/High Representative's paper
focuses on the contribution that Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) can bring
to the overall EU strategy. It argues that a review of strategy
is appropriate, for the following reasons:
- the shortcomings and failures
of past policies (doubling of people living on less than one euro,
conflicts and chronic instability in some parts of the continent);
- the new awareness of a close link between development,
peace and security and human rights (European Security Strategy
and the 2005 World Summit Outcome);
- encouraging signals coming out of Africa (the
creation of AU shows a determination by Africans to tackle Africa's
problem);
- changes within the EU (the development of the
CFSP and ESDP offers the possibility of developing a comprehensive
approach);
- the financial commitments by the developed world
mean more funds available for Africa; and
- the major challenges that the EU will meet over
the next 10-15 years — migration, energy, political Islam,
terrorism and climate change — also need to be addressed
in Africa.
9.6 Basic principles for a successful strategy are
laid down:
- Comprehensiveness:
measures in trade, aid and debt relief will need to be supported
by peace and security, and governance;
- Coherence: the need
to align the new Strategy for Africa with the Barcelona Process,
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Cotonou Agreement.
EU policy should aim for a trilateral partnership — EU,
UN, AU — with the UN Peace Building Commission to become
an important vehicle; plus more coherence with other donors, important
partners in Africa and new emerging powers like China;
- Partnership/Responsibility:
The strategy should be implemented in consultation with African
Partners: shared responsibility, mutual accountability and ownership,
going beyond the mechanics of the Cotonou agreement and deepening
dialogue at all levels;
- Regional approach:
The EU should adopt a regional approach, as in the Great Lakes
region; to include the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Sudan;
without stabilisation there, Africa as a whole will not meet the
Millennium Development Goals; and
- Inclusiveness: Development
and security both require the participation of a vibrant civil
Society; the EU should invest more in education, the role of women,
NGOs, etc.; questions of inequality, how to prevent exclusion
and reduce absolute levels of poverty should be addressed as contributions
to conflict prevention.
9.7 These translate into what he describes as "three
major clusters of action":
Building security:
ESDP is "one of the
key instruments the EU has at its disposal for Africa policy"
and "needs to be resourced accordingly".
Building governance:
with security problems being a manifestation of underlying political
problems, solutions can be found through:
- External pressure and mediation;
- Democracy-building;
- Economic governance: particularly via the African
Peer Review Mechanism;
- Human rights: the EU should support human rights
projects and strengthening African regional mechanisms for the
protection of human rights;
- Migration: both the EU and the AU have identified
migration as a key area of interest. "EU policy should help
address the push factors and contribute to the positive synergy
between migration and development";
- Conflict resources: Insecurity and armed conflict
are often linked to the mismanagement or the illegal exploitation
of natural resources. The application of existing initiatives
on conflict diamonds and transparency in the extractive industries
should be enlarged to other vulnerable sectors such as timber
and water as conflict resources, to include building the necessary
African capacity to manage and monitor them;
- Small arms and light weapons (SALW): supporting
regional initiatives to combat the illicit trade in SALW, promoting
the EU rules on arms exports as an international standard and
supporting the incorporation of minimum common standards of transfer
controls into a strengthened UN Programme of Action; and
- Terrorism: providing African partners with technical
assistance aimed at enhancing their counter-terrorism capacities
and legislation.
Building partnership:
"these policies make sense only if pursued in the closest
cooperation with African partners at all levels. Political dialogue
is the first and possibly the most important tool to prevent crises
and solve conflicts". In particular, better monitoring and
reporting is needed from African countries: a more structured
dialogue through local diplomatic missions under the Cotonou Agreement
and more regular reports on governance and human rights.
9.8 It has plainly informed the pithy Presidency
paper, which is at Annex 1 of this Report. But at this stage it
is unclear to what extent these two documents, along with the
Commission Communication, will be integrated into the final Africa
Strategy.
Conclusion
9.9 A number of further questions inevitably
arise. How will the Africa Strategy relate to the revised European
Consensus for Development, which we consider elsewhere in this
Report?[19] What
more will the Strategy do towards the achievement of its main
objective — attainment of the Millennium Development Goals
— given the work of other international organisation, and
particularly the proposals that will presumably emanate from the
UN Secretary-General's initiative on UN/AU collaboration? How
will the financing of these various initiatives be distributed
between the EDF, the Africa Peace Facility, the EU's budget and
Member States' contributions? Just how will the EU not only provide
resources but also bring pressure to bear on the African Union
and partner governments to deliver on the fundamentals of good
governance and economic reform?
9.10 We hope that the answers to at least some
of these questions will be clearer when the Secretary of State
sends us the final Africa Strategy, which we look forward to receiving
along with his further comments.
9.11 We now clear the document.
Annex 1: EU Presidency Paper
EU/Africa: Peace and Security
The EU will work with African states and institutions,
the UN, and other partners to support African efforts to enhance
security and stability on their continent; and address the root
causes of armed conflict and political and social crises in Africa.
To this end, the EU will:
- Pursue a joint EU-AU
agreement on support for African Peace and Security capacity,
including links with the UN;
- Provide support for the AU, Sub-regional organisations
and national governments in strengthening their mediation, analytical
and operational capacity; and in undertaking peacekeeping and
peace support operations. In particular, this will include: agreement
in principle on continuation of support for the Africa Peace
Facility to a value to be confirmed later; advisory, technical,
planning, training and logistical support; and support to the
development of the African Standby Force initially through the
AU-organised workshops;
- Maintain its financial and technical support
for the AU mission in Darfur; including through
a commitment to maintain the EU supporting action for as long
as the AU judges necessary; and its close political dialogue in
support of the Abuja peace talks, notably through
EUSR Haavisto;
- Further address the flow of Weapons,
including small arms that originate from outside Africa's borders,
which contribute to instability and prolonged conflict within
Africa. In particular, the EU will: encourage third-states to
associate themselves with the EU Code of Conduct; develop mechanisms
to exploit the information it has on illegal trafficking; consider
the possibility of restrictive measures to discourage transfers;
support the incorporation of minimum common standards of transfer
controls into a strengthened UN Programme of Action; and support
the early establishment of an international treaty to establish
common standards for the global trade in conventional arms;
- Further address Conflict Resources,
to help ensure that Africa's diamonds, oil and other minerals
fuel peace and prosperity, not war and suffering. (EU role in
Kimberley Process and support to the Extractives Industries Transparency
Initiative);
- Encourage the further development of transparent
and accountable democracy, including through a more coherent approach
to Election Observation Missions, taking account
of their relationship with parallel African efforts;
- Enhance conflict prevention programmes,
to help prevent African wars from starting; and improve its engagement
in post conflict reconstruction, so wars do not
restart after they end, in particular through: support to an effective
UN Peace Building Commission; support to coherent regional and
national strategies for DDR; implementation, in partnership with
the AU, sub-regional organisations and national governments, of
Security Sector Reform; and post-conflict reconstruction
efforts through long term financial, political and practical support;
and
- Develop and refine CFSP/ESDP instruments,
policies and activities, including, on a case-by-case
basis, by deploying EU Battlegroups in support of UN or AU peacekeeping
or stability objectives.
17 A €250 million financing set up by the European
Union in December 2003, to last for 3 years. Based on the principle
of African ownership, it supports African-led peacekeeping operations
in Africa as well as capacity building for the emerging AU security
structure. The AU is required to play a key role in the decision-making
process. The €250 million can be used to finance deployment
but under no circumstances to cover military and arms expenditure. Back
18
A network of more than 290 UK based voluntary organisations working
in international development and development education. Back
19
See para 8. Back
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