12 European Union Special Representative
in Macedonia
| (27248)
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| Council Joint Action appointing the European Union Special Representative in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
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| Legal base | Articles 14, 18.5, and 23(2) EU; QMV
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | EM of 1 February 2006 and evidence to the Committee on 8 February 2006
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| Previous Committee Report | None; but see HC 34-v (2005-06), para 42 (12 October 2005)
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| To be discussed in Council | 27 February 2006 General Affairs and External Relations Council
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared
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Background
12.1 EU Special Representatives (EUSR) are the face of Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) policy within regions where
the Council agrees that an additional EU presence on the ground
is needed to deliver the political objectives of the Union.
12.2 On 12 October 2005, we considered a Joint Action
setting out the mandate for the appointment of a new EUSR for
an initial four-month period. In his Explanatory Memorandum of
7 October 2005, the Minister of State for Europe in the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office (Mr Douglas Alexander) explained the context.
He said:
"While technical pre-accession issues are becoming
increasingly prominent, Macedonia remains vulnerable to extremism
and stability is fragile. Macedonia faces a number of challenges
over the next 6-12 months including possible spillover from Kosovo
final status discussions and the implementation of a sensitive
decentralisation agenda (one of the key aspects of the Ohrid Framework
Agreement — the peace settlement that brought to an end
the inter-ethnic conflict of 2001 in Macedonia by addressing ethnic
Albanian grievances). The Police Mission EUPOL Proxima's mandate
does not expire until December 2005 and will therefore require
continued political direction. In light of these factors, this
Joint Action sets out a mandate that will aim to establish and
maintain close contact with the government of Macedonia and with
the parties involved in the political process. In particular,
the EUSR will offer advice and facilitation in the implementation
and sustainability of the Ohrid Framework Agreement (the peace
settlement that brought to an end the inter-ethnic conflict of
2001 in Macedonia by addressing ethnic Albanian grievances), and
on practical aspects of decentralisation and give political direction
to the Police Mission, EUPOL Proxima. The EUSR ensures effective
co-ordination within EU bodies and with the International Community
in Macedonia".
12.3 He went on to say that there remained a need
for continued external support offering classic mediation between
different groups, including on security issues, in which the EUSR
is the primary delivery mechanism, and related the appointment
to the upcoming presentation of the Commission's opinion on Macedonia's
EU membership application on 9 November.
12.4 In a separate letter of 7 October, the Minister
explained a proposal to appoint the head of the European Commission
delegation as the EUSR in Macedonia. After reiterating the main
points in his Explanatory Memorandum, the Minister said:
"Given both the stabilisation and integration
challenges as set out above, the Council Secretariat and Commission
have proposed a 'personal union' of the EUSR and the Head of the
European Commission Delegation for an initial period of 4 months
(one individual to head up both offices). The new joint EUSR/Head
of Delegation will continue to report to, and be instructed by,
the Council on CFSP issues but will be responsible to the Commission
for areas of Community competence.
"This arrangement offers a practical, pragmatic
and cost effective solution to the specific requirements of Macedonia
at this time. Having one individual heading up both offices will
ensure that the Macedonian authorities receive one authoritative
message on both security and integration issues. However, as we
would want to consider the merits of any possible future proposal
for such an arrangement on its own terms, we have secured a Declaration
to accompany the Joint Action. This highlights that this proposal
is an exceptional measure and does not set a model for the appointment
of future EUSRs. Importantly, the declaration also notes the Council's
primacy in CFSP by stating the Council and Commission's agreement
that the EUSR will take instructions from the Council on CFSP,
with no caveats or exceptions".
12.5 We understood the "business case"
for the proposal in this instance, and were content to clear it
on the basis put forward by the Minister — "an exceptional
measure [which] does not set a model for the appointment of future
EUSRs". But we asked him, in good time before the proposed
mandate renewal, to let us know how it had worked in practice
and to confirm that there were no endeavours to extend the arrangement
in Macedonia or elsewhere, and said that were that not to be the
case, we would anticipate recommending any such extension for
debate.[37]
12.6 The Minister wrote on 27 January 2006, with
information and argumentation that is repeated in his 1 February
2006 Explanatory Memorandum. There, he argues the case for a 12
month extension of this arrangement, which is essentially the
same as in his earlier Explanatory Memorandum.
The Government's view
12.7 In support of the extension, the Minister says:
"The Government supports the extension of the
mandate for another 12 months. Our view remains that there is
still a strong case for maintaining an EUSR-function in Macedonia.
The country has made encouraging progress towards EU norms since
2001, and was rewarded with candidate status at the December 2005
European Council. However security and stability in Macedonia
cannot be taken for granted. Challenges include ensuring continued
implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement; overseeing the
transition from PROXIMA via EUPAT to Commission-led policing projects;
and crucially, monitoring the possible effects in Macedonia of
the Kosovo Final Status Process. There remains therefore a need
for continued external support offering classic mediation between
different groups including on security issues. The EUSR is the
primary mechanism for delivering this support.
"While Mr Fouere has only been in post for 3
months, the arrangements are working well on the ground. The messages
that Mr Fouere delivered as EUSR in the period leading up to and
after the European Council's decision to grant Macedonia candidate
status were both clear and unambiguous. As EUSR, Mr Fouere also
played an important role in establishing the new EUPAT arrangements
and overseeing the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement".
Conclusion
12.8 Our principal concern was not so much the
"business case", which we continue to find acceptable,
but about the implications. Given the overall situation in the
western Balkans and the "Near Neighbourhood", it is
not difficult to envisage other cases arising in which the common
sense answer is to combine in one office and person the delivery
of assistance and of the political objectives of the Union, notwithstanding
their separate Treaty bases — the former delivered by the
Commission under Titles XX and XXI of TEC and the latter under
Title V TEU. Would a good business case endanger that separation
and in effect pave the way for the de facto introduction
of a controversial component of the draft Constitutional Treaty,
with its proposals for ending such distinctions via a single EU
Foreign Minister and EU External Action Service?
12.9 The Minister for Europe gave evidence to
the Committee on this and other matters on 8 February 2006. We
asked him three specific questions:
1) Why does the Government think that a double-hatted
EU Special Representative is the right answer in Macedonia?
2) If Macedonia, why not elsewhere, when the EU
and the Commission are both engaged in political work and technical
assistance?
3) Is not this effectively the introduction of
a central component of the foreign policy elements of the Constitutional
Treaty?
12.10 We attach the discussion on these points
at Annex 1. In the light thereof, we are prepared to accept the
extension of this mandate on the present basis. But, as the Minister
points out, even if there are no concrete proposals on the table,
at least some Member States have "been looking at the possibility
of this providing a model for other areas, in particular in Bosnia
and Kosovo, where there is a similar congruence of Commission
responsibilities and Council responsibilities". He says that
any such proposal would need to be judged very carefully on the
basis of the individual circumstances, and that he would "be
looking for, if we were to reach the choice that it was an effective
response to the challenges we faced, exactly the same type of
assurances that we secured at the time of the mandate being written".
If and when any such proposal is put to us, we shall be looking
for the same assurances too.
12.11 We now clear the document.
Annex: Extract from Minutes of Evidence taken
on 8 February 2006
Witnesses: Rt Hon Douglas Alexander, a Member
of the House, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
Mr Tim Barrow, Deputy Political Director and Assistant
Director of EU (External), Mr David Frost, Deputy Director
of EU (Internal), and Ms Karen Pierce, Head of Eastern
Adriatic Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, gave evidence.[38]
Q1 Chairman: Minister,
welcome. We are delighted to see you at the European Scrutiny
Committee again. We have a fair bit we want to cover with you
so we will kick off. We might perhaps discuss European Scrutiny
and Defence Policy and CFSP more generally later on. First, why
does the Government think that a double-hatted EU Special Representative
is the right answer in Macedonia?
Mr Alexander: Firstly,
with your permission, Chairman, if I could just introduce the
cowitnesses supporting me in this appearance today. I have
David Frost, who is the Director of European Union within the
Foreign Office, and Karen Pierce, who is the leader of the Balkans
Team, and Tim Barrow, who deals with external European matters.
In terms of double-hatting, you will be familiar, of course, with
the correspondence and I have taken careful note of the letter
that the Committee has sent back to me. Firstly, I would say that
the view that we articulated, I articulated, in my letter to you
earlier last year, holds good, that we do not regard this as a
general principle but rather the specific circumstances meriting
consideration. I took careful note of the point that, in turn,
you replied, that you would be keen to have this discussion if
we were to extend the remit of double-hatting. The reason for
the extension, firstly, is that the timing of the arrangement
for the individual in question fell at a point only four months
prior to the normal period of renewal for Special Representatives,
so the sole significance of writing to you at this stage is the
fact that the mandate runs out at the end of February. Our experience
and our discussions with others lead us to believe that it has
been an effective approach that has been taken on the ground.
That being said, I enquired very carefully with officials, when
evidence came to us of the need to renew this mandate and the
choice was given to me, as to the basis on which this could be
differentiated from other situations with other Special Representatives.
Firstly, I think it is worth bearing in mind that the Balkans
do represent particular challenges to us, which are themselves
distinctive. It is hard to think of another area where there is
the intergovernmental aspect of the European Union work sitting
alongside so closely the Commission's work, in terms of supporting
other efforts within the Balkans, and the particular status of
Macedonia therefore I think merits particular consideration. In
terms of the effectiveness on the ground, we do believe that the
provisions that we secured in terms of the terms of reference
for the initial appointment were justified, and continue to be
justified, and we would be looking for similar assurances in terms
of the extension. We believe that provided adequate protection
to our interests, in terms of the intergovernmental nature of
the Council's business, and would avoid the kind of potential
concerns as to confusion of lines of accountability between the
areas of responsibility reporting upwards to the Commission and
the areas of responsibility reporting upwards to the Council.
Q2 Jim Dobbin: The Chairman
mentioned Macedonia specifically. If Macedonia, why not elsewhere,
when the EU and the Commission are both engaged in political work
and technical assistance? Could you elaborate on that?
Mr Alexander: We
have got no concrete proposals for other, similar situations,
in terms of double-hatting. I am aware that some Member States
have been looking at the possibility of this providing a model
for other areas, in particular in Bosnia and Kosovo, where there
is a similar congruence of Commission responsibilities and Council
responsibilities. My view on that, similarly to the view I expressed
specifically in relation to Macedonia back earlier last year,
was that those would need to be judged very carefully on the basis
of the individual circumstances. Also that we would be looking
for, if we were to reach the choice that it was an effective response
to the challenges we faced, exactly the same type of assurances
that we secured at the time of the mandate being written.
Q3 Chairman: Is not this
effectively the introduction of a central component of the foreign
policy elements of the Constitutional Treaty?
Mr Alexander: No.
I can assure you, I looked at this very carefully, both when the
original proposal came across my desk and then, subsequently,
when I wrote to you seeking support for the continuation of the
double-hatting arrangement in Macedonia. Firstly, it is based
on existing Treaty provisions. Secondly, it does not anticipate
the draft Constitutional Treaty. Thirdly, I think it can be very
clearly distinguished from the External Action Service, on the
basis that the External Action Service does require Treaty change
and would service a Foreign Minister. There has not been Treaty
change and there is not a Foreign Minister, so I think that explains
the great care we took and worked hard to secure, in terms of
the clear demarcation of responsibilities between the intergovernmental
part of CFSP and the areas of work that this individual does to
support the Commission in its efforts.
Q4 Mr Cash: Am I right
in saying that when you are dealing with joint actions, under
what was originally the Maastricht Treaty, that then takes away
the unanimity provisions in respect of activities that are taken
within that sphere of joint action, and thereby you can operate
thereafter by qualified majority vote? In respect of the question
of the relationship to the Constitutional Treaty, I know it was
intended that Javier Solana would become sort of the High Representative
and with all the panoply of power, and no doubt glory, that you
get from it. Nonetheless, in relation to our own concern, for
example, about what is going on in Palestine, etc., Hamas was
visited by Javier Solana, as I understand it, secretly. I just
wonder on what basis he was entitled to do that, and did the Government
take a view on it and, if so, was it authorised?
Mr Alexander: Firstly,
in terms of qualified majority voting, it does apply in this area,
and I will ask Tim to share with you the specific reference in
the Treaty[39] that does
bring it into operation. Specifically on the Macedonian double-hatting
issue, I think it is only fair to be clear with the Committee
that we did become convinced of the arguments that were put to
us last year, that it made sense, in the specific circumstances
of Macedonia, to have this arrangement, and therefore it was not
for us a policy disagreement with others, we were looking for
assurances in terms of how it would operate in practice. In terms
of the High Representative, he does have continuing responsibility
to the General Affairs Council, but you are right in recognising
that he would have had different responsibilities had the Constitutional
Treaty come into force and been ratified. I am not familiar with
the exact basis on which he travelled to the Middle East that
you refer to; if you want to provide me with the specific meeting
dates in question, of course I will make sure that an answer is
facilitated to you. I can assure you that Javier Solana, probably
more than anybody else in the European Union, is only too acutely
aware that the Constitutional Treaty has not been ratified and
therefore his job has not changed.
37 See headnote. Back
38
The full minutes of evidence will be printed separately as HC
909-i. Back
39
Note by Witness: Article 23.2 TEU specifies certain strictly
limited circumstances, including the appointment of EUSRs, where
the Council acts by qualified majority. The majority of Joint
Actions and other CFSP Decisions are of course taken by the Council
acting unanimously as specified in Article 23.1. Back
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