10 European Security and Defence Policy:
Border Assistance Mission in Gaza
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| Council Joint Action on establishing a European Union Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EU BAM Rafah)
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| Legal base | Articles 14 and 25(3) EU; unanimity
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | EM of 25 October 2006
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| Previous Committee Report | None, but see HC 34-xi (2005-06) para 16 (23 November 2005)
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| To be discussed in Council | 13 November 2006 GAERC
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared
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Background
10.1 The key elements of the international consensus on what a
negotiated settlement of the Israel/Palestine conflict might look
like offers full normalisation of relations between the Arab States
and Israel, in the context of a final settlement, including an
end to occupation and the exchange of "land for peace",
leading to a viable state of Palestine alongside the State of
Israel, both secure and respected within recognised borders, as
set out in UN Security Council Resolutions 242, 338 and 1397.
The path towards a renewed political process is through the Quartet
(US, UN, EU, and Russia) Roadmap, a performance-based plan leading
to a final and comprehensive settlement to the conflict. The situation
on the ground, however, was not conducive to the Roadmap timetable,
which envisaged completion by the end of 2005. But the successful
conclusion of the Israeli disengagement from Gaza and parts of
the northern West Bank on 15 September 2005 gave the process renewed
impetus.
10.2 It was against this background that, on 23 November 2005,
we cleared a Joint Action 2005/889/CFSP to establish a Border
Assistance Mission at the Rafah border crossing between Gaza and
Egypt (EU BAM Rafah) on 25 November 2005.[28]
The 2005 Joint Action provides for the mission until 25 November
2006.
The draft Joint Action
10.3 The draft Joint Action under consideration will extend the
mission for a further 6 months until 24 May 2007. The November
2005 Agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA)
provides for a third party presence to help increase the capacity
of the PA to operate the border at Rafah, to build confidence,
and to monitor the implementation of the Agreement between the
two parties allowing for the reopening of the border. They invited
the EU to take on this role. In providing this third party presence,
EU BAM Rafah does not act in substitution of the Palestinian Authority
but:
- actively monitors, verifies and evaluates the PA's performance
with regard to the implementation of the Framework, Security and
Customs Agreements concluded between the parties on the operation
of the Rafah terminal;
- contributes, through mentoring, to building up the Palestinian
capacity in all aspects of border management at Rafah;
- contributes to the liaison between the Palestinian, Israeli
and Egyptian authorities in all aspects regarding the management
of the Rafah Crossing Point; and
- carries out periodic assessments of the PA's performance at
the border crossing.
10.4 EU BAM Rafah is an ESDP crisis management operation with
a unified chain of command. The PSC[29]
will continue to provide the political control and strategic direction.
The Head of Mission, General Pietro Pistolese, will continue to
lead the Mission and be responsible for its day-to-day management.
He will also continue to report to the Secretary General/High
Representative through the EU Special Representative (EUSR).
The Government's View
10.5 In his 25 October 2006 Explanatory Memorandum, the Minister
for Europe at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr Geoffrey
Hoon) says that he continues to support the mission, "which
is an excellent example of the practical contributions the EU
can make to the Middle East Peace Process". He says that
"EUBAM has had a dramatic effect on the control Palestinians
exert over their Gaza border with Egypt", with "thousands
of Palestinians" having used the crossing since its opening.
However, what he describes as "exceptional security circumstances,
the abduction of the Israeli soldier Corporal Gilad Shalit, have
meant that the crossing point has been largely closed since 25
June". He has been working with EU partners since this date
to encourage Israel to open the crossing and will continue to
do so, and notes that Rafah was recently opened at the start of
Ramadan in early October.
10.6 He also recalls the original rationale for EU BAM Rafah —
a proper functioning of the Rafah crossing point to facilitate
confidence-building by increasing Palestinian capacity in all
aspects of border control and improving the living conditions
of the Palestinians and enhancing the viability of a future Palestinian
State — and the context in which it was set up, i.e., the
EU's role in the Middle East Peace Process, as a member of the
Quartet committed to assisting and facilitating the implementation
of the Roadmap.
10.7 He goes on to note that the prevailing security situation
requires close monitoring by the Mission in close co-ordination
with the Council Secretariat and other key partners, and that
"the Palestinian Authority and the Governments of Israel
and Egypt also play a key role in ensuring the security of the
EU-Mission within their respective jurisdictions as set out and
guaranteed in their agreements with the EU". He says that
security is reinforced by the presence of an EU Chief Security
Officer in the Mission who is responsible for the general management
of all mission security and for monitoring the Palestinian security
arrangements for the mission.
Financial Implications
10.8 The Minister recalls that funding for Common Costs (HQ, in-country
transport, office equipment etc) is met from the CFSP Budget and
explains that this extension requires no new funding, as the mission
will continue to draw on funds remaining from the 2005 Joint Action.
He says that, of the original €7.6 million budget, EUBAM
Rafah has spent €3 million, leaving the €4.4 million
required for the extension, with the underspend resulting from
vehicle donation and cheaper running costs than anticipated.
10.9 The UK contributes 2 staff, who will continue to be funded
from the Whitehall Peacekeeping Budget (a call on the Treasury's
central contingency reserve) for the duration of the extension.
Conclusion
10.10 A year ago, we noted that this was an important mission,
operating in a hazardous environment. The past half year has made
it all the more so. In responding to the Minister's "early
warning" letter earlier this month, we asked that his Explanatory
Memorandum should both assess its contribution thus far and outline
how its continued security was to be guaranteed in circumstances
that are, regrettably, less hopeful, and more dangerous, than
at the outset.
10.11 We understand that, in addition to the arrangements that
he describes, the President of the Palestinian Authority has tasked
his personal protective forces with guaranteeing the Mission's
security and that there is a direct channel of communication between
the mission and themselves if needed. We are accordingly reassured
that appropriate measures continue to be in place, so far as is
possible in such a hazardous context, to safeguard its security.
10.12 A year ago, we wished the Mission well, and continue
to do so.
10.13 We clear the document.
28 See headnote. Back
29
The committee of senior officials from national delegations who,
under article 25 of the EU Treaty, monitor the international situation
in areas covered by the CFSP and, under the general responsibility
of the Council, exercise political control and strategic direction
of crisis management operations. Back
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