15 RESTRICTIVE MEASURES AGAINST CÔTE
D'IVOIRE
(27131)
16033/05
—
| Council Common Position concerning restrictive measures against Côte d'Ivoire
|
| Legal base | Article 15 EU; unanimity
|
| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
|
| Basis of consideration |
EM of 9 January 2006 |
| Previous Committee Report |
HC 38-i (2004-05), para 24(1 December 2004) |
| To be discussed in Council
| 23 January 2006 Agriculture and Fisheries Council
|
| Committee's assessment | Politically important
|
| Committee's decision | Cleared
|
Background
15.1 The Kimberley Process is a joint government, international
diamond industry and civil society initiative to stem the flow
of "conflict diamonds" — rough diamonds that are
used by rebel movements to finance wars against legitimate governments
and which are generally regarded as having contributed to devastating
conflicts in countries such as Angola, Côte d'Ivoire, the
Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone. The Kimberley Process
Certification Scheme is described on its website as "an innovative,
voluntary system that imposes extensive requirements on Participants
to certify that shipments of rough diamonds are free from conflict
diamonds". The Kimberley Process is composed of 45 Participants,
including the European Community. Kimberley Process Participants
account for approximately 99.8% of the global production of rough
diamonds.[45]
15.2 A serious political and military crisis has
beset the Côte d'Ivoire since September 2002. The EU has
repeatedly expressed concern at subsequent human rights violations
by both sides, chiefly prior to the signing of the Linas Marcoussis
peace agreement (LMA) in January 2003 but also subsequently. That
agreement identified reforms that needed to take place to ensure
an end to violence. However, the agreement was not signed by President
Gbagbo or by the Government of Côte d'Ivoire (GCI). In July,
all sides signed a new Agreement — Accra III — but
in November the GCI breached the ceasefire and crossed a UN-held
line to attack the northern rebels in contravention of UN Security
Council Resolution 1528. Subsequently, nine French peacekeepers
were killed in a government airstrike. France retaliated by destroying
the Côte d'Ivoire airforce. This led in turn to mass anti-French
demonstrations and attacks by pro-government militia.
The EU Common Position
15.3 In November 2004 the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted resolution 1572 (2004) imposing
an arms embargo against Côte d'Ivoire with immediate effect.
The resolution also imposed a travel ban and an assets freeze
against individuals who constitute a threat to the peace and reconciliation
process, to come into force on 15 December 2004. The African Union,
in a statement on 14 November 2004, gave its full support to the
resolution. The current EU Common Position implements the terms
of resolution 1572 across the European Union. In addition, it
prohibits the supply of equipment which might be used for internal
repression in Côte d'Ivoire. It was cleared by the then
Committee on 1 December 2004 and agreed at the 13 December 2004
General Affairs and External Relations Council.[46]
15.4 The criteria for lifting the arms embargo and
restrictive measures is full implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis
and Accra agreements, i.e. demobilisation, disarmament and resettlement
(DDR) of combatants as well as free, fair and credible elections.
These criteria have not been met. Therefore, on 15 December 2005
the UNSC agreed resolution 1643 to renew all the above measures
(save the assets freeze, which is not time-specific and does not
require renewal).
15.5 UNSCR 1643 includes the addition of a ban on
the import of all rough diamonds from Côte d'Ivoire. From
the outset, in November 2002, the GCI suspended itself from the
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), which regulates
the international trade in rough diamonds. Any diamond exports
from Côte d'Ivoire are treated as illicit by all other participants
in the KPCS. However, there is evidence that Côte d'Ivoire
diamonds are being smuggled to neighbouring states who are not
KPCS participants — e.g., Mali — where they are able
to enter the legitimate trade, despite the fact that Kimberley
Process participants are supposed to encompass 99.8% of the international
diamond trade and none is supposed to buy from or sell to non-KPCS
participants. The UN Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire —
fortified by evidence in a recent report by the NGO Global Witness
— believes that the purchase of Ivoirean diamonds contributes
to regional instability by providing an important income for the
Forces Nouvelles (FN), who control some the largest mines and
also extract revenues from road-blocks near the border areas,
where natural resources, including diamonds, leave the country.
By making diamonds from Côte d'Ivoire illicit in international
law, it is hoped that the UN ban will reinforce the Kimberley
Process and assist its planned investigation into the production
capacity of the Ivoirean diamond trade. That this is necessary
is evidenced by the conclusion of the 15-18 November 2005 Kimberley
Process Meeting, that the ongoing production of rough diamonds
in Northern Côte d'Ivoire, and the possible introduction
of such illicit diamonds into the legitimate diamond trade, threaten
the integrity and credibility of the Kimberley Process Certification
Scheme.
The Government's view
15.6 The Minister for Europe says that, under Article
11 of the Treaty on European Union, one of the objectives of the
Common Foreign and Security Policy is "to preserve peace
and strengthen international security, in accordance with the
principles of the United Nations Charter" and that the EU's
implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1643 is crucial
to the furthering of this aim. The Government supports the renewal
of the sanctions and the addition of a diamond ban as part of
a broader strategy to establish lasting peace and security in
Côte d'Ivoire. The Government judges that the diamond ban
will only affect those associated with the illegal diamond trade,
and will not result in the negative humanitarian effects that
a ban on legal commodity exports, such as cocoa, might have.
Conclusion
15.7 Given the political interest in conflict
resolution efforts in west Africa, the then Committee considered
that the imposition of the arms embargo and restrictive measures
warranted a Report to the House. As the Minister makes clear,
the political situation in Côte d'Ivoire is little improved,
and illicit diamond smuggling there appears not only to be stoking
the fires of instability but also, in the view of last November's
Kimberley Process Plenary Meeting, to be threatening the integrity
and credibility of the whole Kimberley Process. With the importance
of overcoming such threats to the peace and security that continually
undermines development interest being crucial to the successful
implementation of the recently agreed EU Strategy on Africa (which
we consider elsewhere in this Report),[47]
we judged it appropriate to draw this extension, in scope as well
as duration, of the Common Position to the attention of the House.
15.8 We now clear the document.
45 For further information on the Kimberley Process,
see http://www.kimberleyprocess.com:8080/site/. Back
46
see headnote. Back
47
See para 12 Back
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