16 EU STRATEGY AGAINST PROLIFERATION
OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
(27140)
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Council Joint Action in support of the BTWC, in the framework of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
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| Legal base | Article 14 TEU; QMV
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration |
EM of 9 January 2006 |
| Previous Committee Report |
None |
| To be discussed in Council
| 30 January 2006 General Affairs and External Relations Council
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared
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Background
16.1 The Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC), which
was opened for signature in 1972 and entered into force on 26
March 1975, bans the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition
and retention of microbial or other biological agents or toxins,
in types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic,
protective or other peaceful purposes. It also bans weapons, equipment
or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for
hostile purposes or in armed conflict. There are now 155 States
Party to the Convention.
16.2 As the BTWC website notes,[48]
"[it] is only four pages long and has no provisions for verification
or for monitoring compliance. When it was negotiated in the early
1970s, there was a perception that biological weapons had little
military utility although previous biological weapons had demonstrated,
by all means short of actual use, their potential effectiveness.
Since the BTWC entered into force, there has been evidence of
biological weapons programs even in some countries that are parties
to the Convention. In addition, terrorists have been found to
be close to completing a biological weapons capability. The rapid
progress in biotechnology and genetic engineering have also raised
the spectre of designer biological warfare agents. These developments
have heightened international concern about the danger of biological
warfare and reduced confidence in the Convention's effectiveness".
16.3 In the years since the BTWC was negotiated,
the international community has increasingly recognized the importance
of verification and of the monitoring of compliance to the arms
control process and to the building of confidence. Multilateral
agreements negotiated since the BTWC, in particular the 1993 Chemical
Weapons Convention, contain detailed provisions for declarations,
routine inspections as well as for challenge inspections.
16.4 The Second and Third BTWC Review Conferences
in 1986 and 1991 agreed some measures intended to strengthen compliance
with the Convention and to improve transparency, including confidence-building
measures (CBMs) consisting of annual exchanges of data and information,
as well as declarations of past and present activities of relevance
to the Convention. The measures include:
- Measure A, Part 1 — Exchange
of data on research centres and laboratories that meet very high
national or international safety standards;
- Measure A, Part 2 — Exchange
of information on national biological defence research and development
(R&D) programs, including declarations of facilities where
biological defence R&D programs are conducted. This measure
also includes information relating to contractors and on available
publications;
- Measure B — Exchange of information on
outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused
by toxins that seem to deviate from the normal pattern;
- Measure C — Encouragement of publication
of results of biological research directly related to the Convention
and promotion of use of knowledge;
- Measure D — Active promotion of contacts
between scientists, other experts and facilities engaged in biological
research directly related to the Convention, including exchanges
and visits for joint research on a mutually agreed basis;
- Measure E — Declaration of legislation,
regulations and other measures including exports and/or imports
of pathogenic micro-organisms in accordance with the Convention;
- Measure F — Declaration of past activities
in offensive and/or defensive biological R&D programmes since
1 January 1946; and
- Measure G — Declarations on vaccine production
facilities, licensed by the State Party for the protection of
humans.
States Parties have also agreed annually to complete
and submit a simple proforma indicating for each CBM whether they
have "Nothing to declare" or "Nothing new to declare".
Since 1987, over half of the States Parties have made one or more
CBM declarations.
The Council Decision
16.5 This Joint Action is undertaken within the framework
of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
agreed in December 2003, which the Minister of State for Europe
in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr Douglas Alexander),
in his 9 January 2006 Explanatory Memorandum, says has particular
focus on national implementation and development of the BTWC,
and particularly:
i) promotion of the universality of the BTWC
(by carrying out activities, including regional and sub-regional
workshops and seminars, aimed at increasing the membership of
the BTWC); and
ii) support for BTWC implementation by the States
Party (assistance to States Party for the national implementation
of the BTWC, in order to ensure they translate the international
obligations of the BTWC into their national legislation and administrative
measures).
16.6 The Joint Action refers to the importance of
the CBMs referred to above, and particularly improving the number
and nature of those submitted to the UN Secretary General by Member
States.
16.7 It also refers to the BTWC Review Conference
later this year as "a good opportunity to agree specific,
practical and realistic measures to strengthen both the Convention
and compliance with it".
16.8 Annex 1 sets out a list of projects in line
with i) and ii) above:
— five
regional workshops for Signatory States and States not Party in
West and Central Africa, Eastern and Southern Africa, the Middle
East, Asia and the Pacific and Latin America and the Caribbean,
with the objective of enhanced membership and strengthened regional
networking; and
— a workshop and technical and legal assistance,
particularly in drafting national legislation and ensuring appropriate
physical protection of biological agents and toxins and related
material and equipment.
16.9 The Council Secretariat will supervise execution
of the project, which will be carried out by the Graduate Institute
of International Studies, Geneva. It will last for 18 months.
Funding is from the CFSP budget at an estimated cost of €876,000
(£598,220), of which the UK currently contributes approximately
17% — for this Joint Action, €148,920 (£101,697).
The Government's view
16.10 The Minister says that the Government supports
all efforts which would strengthen the BTWC. In parallel to the
Joint Action, Member States have agreed to strengthen the BTWC's
annual Confidence Building Measures exercise by ensuring each
Member State submits a return to the United Nations on an agreed
date (now April 2006: in the past only around 15 Member States
have done so) and onwards. He notes that the UK regularly submits
such returns, which have now begun to be made public on the FCO's
website.
16.11 EU partners have also agreed to demonstrate
support for the United Nations Secretary-General's mechanism for
investigating the possible use of chemical and biological weapons.
EU Member States have agreed to consider whether they can provide
or update, as appropriate, a list of national experts and laboratories
which could be called upon to provide the necessary expertise
in any future investigation. This includes the UK, which last
updated its list of experts in 2004 and is currently updating
it.
Conclusion
16.12 Although the sums are small, the context
is plainly of considerable, and growing, importance, and the project
would seem to be a good example of how, in a modest and low-key
way, the Common Foreign and Security Policy can support international
endeavours to contain threats to global security. It is to be
hoped that the Review Conference later this year will be able
to take the process forward, and particularly in the central area
of effective verification. Given the interest in the House in
both WMD non-proliferation and CFSP, we are drawing this to its
attention.
16.13 We now clear the document.
48 http://www.opbw.org/ Back
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