Select Committee on European Scrutiny Fifteenth Report


16 EU STRATEGY AGAINST PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

(27140)
Council Joint Action in support of the BTWC, in the framework of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction


Legal baseArticle 14 TEU; QMV
DepartmentForeign and Commonwealth Office
Basis of consideration EM of 9 January 2006
Previous Committee Report None
To be discussed in Council 30 January 2006 General Affairs and External Relations Council
Committee's assessmentPolitically important
Committee's decisionCleared

Background

16.1 The Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC), which was opened for signature in 1972 and entered into force on 26 March 1975, bans the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition and retention of microbial or other biological agents or toxins, in types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes. It also bans weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. There are now 155 States Party to the Convention.

16.2 As the BTWC website notes,[48] "[it] is only four pages long and has no provisions for verification or for monitoring compliance. When it was negotiated in the early 1970s, there was a perception that biological weapons had little military utility although previous biological weapons had demonstrated, by all means short of actual use, their potential effectiveness. Since the BTWC entered into force, there has been evidence of biological weapons programs even in some countries that are parties to the Convention. In addition, terrorists have been found to be close to completing a biological weapons capability. The rapid progress in biotechnology and genetic engineering have also raised the spectre of designer biological warfare agents. These developments have heightened international concern about the danger of biological warfare and reduced confidence in the Convention's effectiveness".

16.3 In the years since the BTWC was negotiated, the international community has increasingly recognized the importance of verification and of the monitoring of compliance to the arms control process and to the building of confidence. Multilateral agreements negotiated since the BTWC, in particular the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, contain detailed provisions for declarations, routine inspections as well as for challenge inspections.

16.4 The Second and Third BTWC Review Conferences in 1986 and 1991 agreed some measures intended to strengthen compliance with the Convention and to improve transparency, including confidence-building measures (CBMs) consisting of annual exchanges of data and information, as well as declarations of past and present activities of relevance to the Convention. The measures include:

  • Measure A, Part 1 — Exchange of data on research centres and laboratories that meet very high national or international safety standards;
  • Measure A, Part 2 — Exchange of information on national biological defence research and development (R&D) programs, including declarations of facilities where biological defence R&D programs are conducted. This measure also includes information relating to contractors and on available publications;
  • Measure B — Exchange of information on outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins that seem to deviate from the normal pattern;
  • Measure C — Encouragement of publication of results of biological research directly related to the Convention and promotion of use of knowledge;
  • Measure D — Active promotion of contacts between scientists, other experts and facilities engaged in biological research directly related to the Convention, including exchanges and visits for joint research on a mutually agreed basis;
  • Measure E — Declaration of legislation, regulations and other measures including exports and/or imports of pathogenic micro-organisms in accordance with the Convention;
  • Measure F — Declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive biological R&D programmes since 1 January 1946; and
  • Measure G — Declarations on vaccine production facilities, licensed by the State Party for the protection of humans.

States Parties have also agreed annually to complete and submit a simple proforma indicating for each CBM whether they have "Nothing to declare" or "Nothing new to declare". Since 1987, over half of the States Parties have made one or more CBM declarations.

The Council Decision

16.5 This Joint Action is undertaken within the framework of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction agreed in December 2003, which the Minister of State for Europe in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr Douglas Alexander), in his 9 January 2006 Explanatory Memorandum, says has particular focus on national implementation and development of the BTWC, and particularly:

i)  promotion of the universality of the BTWC (by carrying out activities, including regional and sub-regional workshops and seminars, aimed at increasing the membership of the BTWC); and

ii)  support for BTWC implementation by the States Party (assistance to States Party for the national implementation of the BTWC, in order to ensure they translate the international obligations of the BTWC into their national legislation and administrative measures).

16.6 The Joint Action refers to the importance of the CBMs referred to above, and particularly improving the number and nature of those submitted to the UN Secretary General by Member States.

16.7 It also refers to the BTWC Review Conference later this year as "a good opportunity to agree specific, practical and realistic measures to strengthen both the Convention and compliance with it".

16.8 Annex 1 sets out a list of projects in line with i) and ii) above:

—  five regional workshops for Signatory States and States not Party in West and Central Africa, Eastern and Southern Africa, the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific and Latin America and the Caribbean, with the objective of enhanced membership and strengthened regional networking; and

—  a workshop and technical and legal assistance, particularly in drafting national legislation and ensuring appropriate physical protection of biological agents and toxins and related material and equipment.

16.9 The Council Secretariat will supervise execution of the project, which will be carried out by the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva. It will last for 18 months. Funding is from the CFSP budget at an estimated cost of €876,000 (£598,220), of which the UK currently contributes approximately 17% — for this Joint Action, €148,920 (£101,697).

The Government's view

16.10 The Minister says that the Government supports all efforts which would strengthen the BTWC. In parallel to the Joint Action, Member States have agreed to strengthen the BTWC's annual Confidence Building Measures exercise by ensuring each Member State submits a return to the United Nations on an agreed date (now April 2006: in the past only around 15 Member States have done so) and onwards. He notes that the UK regularly submits such returns, which have now begun to be made public on the FCO's website.

16.11 EU partners have also agreed to demonstrate support for the United Nations Secretary-General's mechanism for investigating the possible use of chemical and biological weapons. EU Member States have agreed to consider whether they can provide or update, as appropriate, a list of national experts and laboratories which could be called upon to provide the necessary expertise in any future investigation. This includes the UK, which last updated its list of experts in 2004 and is currently updating it.

Conclusion

16.12 Although the sums are small, the context is plainly of considerable, and growing, importance, and the project would seem to be a good example of how, in a modest and low-key way, the Common Foreign and Security Policy can support international endeavours to contain threats to global security. It is to be hoped that the Review Conference later this year will be able to take the process forward, and particularly in the central area of effective verification. Given the interest in the House in both WMD non-proliferation and CFSP, we are drawing this to its attention.

16.13 We now clear the document.





48   http://www.opbw.org/ Back


 
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