13 COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY
(27046)
14469/1/05
| The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy
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Legal base |
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Deposited in Parliament |
29 November 2005 |
Department | Home Office
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Basis of consideration |
EM of 18 January 2006 |
Previous Committee Report |
None; but see HC 34-xii (2005-06), para 26 (30 November 2005); see also HC 34-xiv (2005-06), para 8 (11 January 2006)
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Discussed in Council | European Council 15-16 December 2005
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Committee's assessment | Politically important
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Committee's decision | Cleared; but further information requested
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Background
13.1 The Presidency and the EU counter-terrorism coordinator circulated
documents on an EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy on 15 November.
These were the subject of written comments by the Member States,
which have been taken into account in preparing the draft Strategy
for presentation to the Justice and Home Affairs Council, the
General Affairs Council and the European Council for agreement.
The strategy was then formally adopted at the European Council
on 15-16 December 2005.
13.2 We considered two documents relating to an aspect
of the Counter-Terrorism Strategy, namely radicalisation and terrorist
recruitment, on 30 November. These were, respectively, a Commission
communication and a draft Strategy prepared by the UK Presidency.
We cleared these from scrutiny, agreeing with the statement in
the draft strategy that the primary responsibility for tackling
radicalism and recruitment to terrorism lay with the Member States.
13.3 On 11 January 2006, we considered a Commission
Green Paper on the protection of critical infrastructure, which
subject is also to form an element of the Counter-Terrorism Strategy,
and held this document under scrutiny, noting with concern its
large number of suggestions for an extensive role to be given
to the Commission in an area which concerns the fundamental duty
of the Member State to preserve its national security.
The Counter-terrorism Strategy
13.4 The strategy is framed at a high level of generality
and does not contain any detailed action plan. Instead, it has
been agreed to maintain the existing counter-terrorism action
plan in its present form as an "expert document" which
will be updated periodically. The Strategy is constructed around
four themes or elements, whereby it is proposed (i) to prevent,
(ii) to protect, (iii) to disrupt and (iv) to respond to terrorism.
It sets out the following "strategic" commitment, namely
"to combat terrorism globally while respecting human rights,
and to make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in freedom,
security and justice".
13.5 The element of the strategy concerned with the
prevention of terrorism focuses on countering radicalisation and
recruitment to terrorist groups such as Al Qa'ida and the groups
it inspires. The strategy notes that the challenge of combating
radicalisation and recruitment rests primarily with the Member
States, but suggests that work at an EU level, including the European
Commission, "can provide an important framework to help co-ordinate
national policies, share information and determine good practice".
This part of the strategy also refers to the need for mainstream
opinion to prevail over extremism by engaging with civil society
and faith groups which reject the ideas put forward by terrorists
and extremists. Reference is also made to the need to communicate
more effectively, so as to "change the perception of national
and European policies" and to ensure that such policies do
not exacerbate division. The strategy also suggests (enigmatically)
that "developing a non-emotive lexicon for discussing the
issues will support this".
13.6 The strategy also refers to the need to address
conditions in society, such as poor or autocratic governance,
and lack of political or economic prospects or educational opportunities,
which may create an environment in which individuals become more
easily radicalised. The strategy advocates the more vigorous promotion
outside the European Union of good governance, respect for human
rights, democracy as well as education and economic prosperity,
and the targeting of inequalities and discrimination and the promotion
of inter-cultural dialogue within the European Union.
13.7 The element of the strategy concerned with protection
against terrorism draws attention to the need to protect critical
infrastructure, to protect the EU's external borders and to raise
standards in transport security. The key priorities of this element
are identified as being to improve the security of EU passports
through the introduction of biometric data, to establish the Visa
Information System, to develop effective risk analysis of the
EU's external borders, to implement agreed common standards on
civil aviation security and port and maritime security, to agree
a European programme for critical infrastructure protection and
to "make best use of EU and Community level research activity".
13.8 The element of the strategy concerned with the
disruption of terrorism has as its objectives the impeding of
terrorist planning, the disruption of terrorist networks and the
activities of recruiters, the cutting off of funding and access
to materials and the bringing to justice of offenders. The strategy
notes that it has been agreed in the Hague Programme that when
Member States act to preserve their national security, they will
also focus on the security of the European Union as a whole. For
its part, the EU will support the efforts of the Member States
to disrupt the activities of terrorists by encouraging the exchange
of information and intelligence by providing common analyses of
the threat, and by strengthening operational cooperation in law
enforcement.
13.9 The strategy calls on Member States to update
their legislation and policy in relation to the analysis of intelligence
and the pursuit of terrorists, with a common aim of implementing
the recommendations made as part of the EU's peer evaluation process,
which is to be monitored closely by the Council on a country-by-country
basis. The strategy refers to instruments such as the European
Arrest Warrant as "important tools" for the pursuit
and investigation of terrorists across borders and asserts that
priority should be given to other practical measures to put into
practice the principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions.
It refers to the European Evidence Warrant as a "key measure"
to enable Member States to obtain evidence from elsewhere in the
EU in order to "help convict terrorists". The strategy
also calls on Member States further to improve their practical
cooperation and the exchange of information through police and
judicial authorities, in particular through Europol and Eurojust,
and for Joint Investigation Teams to be established for cross-border
investigations. The strategy refers to the "principle of
availability" of law enforcement information, which principle
is described as leading to a "transition from ad hoc to systematic
police co-operation and information exchange".
13.10 The strategy considers the need to deprive
terrorist of the means for mounting attacks, such as by depriving
them of weapons and explosives and false documents which would
allow undetected travel and residence. The strategy also argues
that terrorists "must be deprived as far as possible of the
opportunities offered by the Internet to communicate and spread
technical expertise related to terrorism", but does not explain
how this objective might be achieved.
13.11 The strategy acknowledges that much of the
terrorist threat has roots outside the EU, and notes that work
to disrupt the terrorist threat must have a global dimension and
that the EU will work to reinforce the international consensus
through the United Nations and other international bodies and
through dialogue and agreements with key third-party countries
with assistance provided to help them introduce and implement
mechanisms to disrupt terrorism.
13.12 The key priorities for disrupting terrorism
are identified as implementation of the recommendations made following
peer evaluation making full use of Europol and Eurojust, integration
of the EU Situation Centre's threat assessments into counter-terrorism
policy, further development of the mutual recognition of judicial
decisions including adoption of the European Evidence Warrant,
implementation and evaluation of existing legislation and ratification
of relevant international treaties and conventions, development
of the "principle of availability" of law enforcement
information, tackling terrorist access to weapons, explosives
and the internet, and tackling terrorist financing by implementing
agreed legislation and developing "robust approaches"
to the "abuse of the non-profit sector".
13.13 A final element of the strategy is concerned
with responding to a terrorist incident. It advocates full use
being made of existing structures such as the Civil Protection
Mechanism. The strategy argues that in the event of an incident
with cross-border effects "there will be a need for rapid
sharing of operational and policy information, media co-ordination
and mutual operational support". The strategy acknowledges
that Member States have the "lead role" in providing
the emergency response to a terrorist incident in their territory.
Nevertheless, the strategy also asserts that "there remains
a need to ensure that the EU collectively, supported by the European
Institutions including the Commission, has the capability to respond
in solidarity to an extreme emergency which might overwhelm the
resources of a single Member State and could constitute a serious
risk to the Union as a whole".
13.14 The strategy refers to solidarity with, and
assistance and compensation for, the victims of terrorism and
their families as an integral part of the response to terrorism
at a national and international level and states that "Member
States should ensure that appropriate compensation is available
to victims". The strategy asserts that by sharing best practice
on national arrangements and developing contact between national
victims' associations "the European Commission will enable
the EU to take steps to enhance the support offered to those who
most suffer from terrorist attacks".
13.15 The key priorities for this element of the
strategy are identified as agreement on EU Crisis Co-ordination
Arrangements and their supporting operational procedures, revision
of the legislation on the Community Mechanism for civil protection,
development of risk assessment for devising arrangements for responding
to an attack, improving co-ordination with international organisations
on managing the response to terrorist attacks and other disasters
and sharing best practice on providing assistance to the victims
of terrorism.
The Government's view
13.16 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 18 January
2006 the Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr Charles
Clarke) explains that whilst the United Kingdom devoted most of
its efforts during its Presidency of the EU towards promoting
the implementation of existing commitments in the field of counter-terrorism,
the Government also considered how best to make the EU's work
"more strategic and transparent" and how best to set
out a clear framework for future work. The Home Secretary also
explains that the strategy was agreed at the JHA Council on 1-2
December 2005 and formally adopted at the European Council on
15-16 December 2005, but expresses his regret that, due to an
administrative error, we were not sent an earlier version of the
Explanatory Memorandum in early December as had been intended.
13.17 The Home Secretary adds that the strategy and
action plan will together set out a clear strategic direction
for EU counter-terrorism efforts as well as explaining better
the EU's role in counter-terrorism to the public and to Ministers
and how this "adds value in an area where a large majority
of people think the EU has a role to play". On the question
of subsidiarity, the Home Secretary considers that no specific
issues arise from the strategy, but adds that the Government will
continue to look very carefully at compliance with the principle
of subsidiarity in all future EU counter-terrorism work.
13.18 As for the policy implications of the strategy,
the Home Secretary comments as follows:
"The vast majority of the EU's counter-terrorism
workstreams are ongoing and will not be affected by this strategy.
Rather, it is a framework designed to organise better the way
in which the EU approaches counter-terrorism work, and to make
clearer to both citizens and political leaders the areas where
the EU can best add value and its role in this area."
13.19 The Home Secretary also explains that the UK
Presidency has worked closely with the Commission and Council
Secretariat in developing the strategy, and offered Ministers
opportunities to comment at the JHA informal meeting in September
and again at the Hampton Court informal meeting in October, as
well as in Brussels at COREPER and the relevant Council working
groups.
Conclusion
13.20 We agree with the Home Secretary that it
is a matter for regret that we were not put in a position to consider
this document before it was adopted.
13.21 We note that most of the current ongoing
work will not be affected by the strategy, but we agree that it
helps to give a more comprehensible structure to such work and
explains better the role of the EU.
13.22 As the document has already been adopted,
we confine ourselves to two comments. The first is that the work
on preventing terrorism will need to involve persons and bodies
outside government, such as faith groups, in order to address
the causes and motivation for violent radicalism. The strategy
does not itself provide much evidence of consultation or involvement
of such persons.
13.23 The strategy is intended, at least in part,
to explain the EU's role in counter-terrorism and for this purpose
plain and ordinary language is, we think, to be preferred. However,
we note that in relation to the prevention of terrorism, reference
is made to developing a "non-emotive lexicon" for discussing
issues of violent radicalisation. We ask the Home Secretary to
explain further what is intended by this concept.
13.24 We are nevertheless content to clear the
document.
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