ANNEX 1
Letter to the Clerk of the European Scrutiny
Committee from CORE, Cumbrians Opposed to a Radioactive Environment
European Security Committee's Third Report 2004-05.
5. Control of shipments of radioactive waste and fuel.
We write in relation to the above Report which we
have read with interest, specifically in respect of the
Committee's deliberations on the expansion of the 92/3/Euratom
Directive to include the import/export of spent fuel for reprocessing.
We have noted the Minister's comments on this expansion of the
Directive.
We believe there are compelling grounds for the Directive
to be expanded to include spent nuclear fuel for reprocessing,
primarily because its inclusion will provide the means for the
UK's Regulators to properly regulate the import of radioactive
materials from other Member States or countries. This is not currently
the case, as evidenced by our own recent experience which we outline
briefly below. More detail is provided in the attached letter
which we sent to the CEO of the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority
earlier this year.
Outline:
(1) In April 2003, the UK imported the first of thirteen
shipments of spent fuel from Italy. The fuel, from the Garigliano
nuclear power station, had been contracted in 1980 for reprocessing
at Sellafield. We objected to the shipment/s on the basis that,
having abandoned its nuclear power programme in 1987, Italy was
unable to honour the terms of the original contract — the
requirement to take back the materials (plutonium and uranium)
recovered via reprocessing at Sellafield for re-use by Italy as
new nuclear fuel.
Our objection was also based on evidence from Italy
of the increasing and well documented need for the country to
rid itself of its stored spent fuel. This resulted from (a) the
deteriorating condition of the stores in which it was being held
and (b) the necessity, post 9/11, to enhance the security of its
stored nuclear materials. We therefore concluded that the reprocessing
of this fuel at Sellafield was not the prime and genuine reason
for its export to the UK. Rather, it
was an attempt by Italy to offload radioactive
waste, under the guise of spent fuel onto another country. Confirmation
that our conclusion was correct comes from a more recent event
that we outline at (2) below.
We approached the UK's Environment Agency (as lead
regulators in radioactive export/import issues) with our objections
to this import. The Agency replied that as the import was designated
as "spent fuel for reprocessing" (rather than radioactive
waste), it was unable to investigate the matter. Had the material
been classified in the first instance by Italy as radioactive
waste, as we contend it should, the Agency would have been empowered
under a number of conventions to investigate the import and either
approve or disapprove of Italy's application. In summary, with
existing conventions geared to radioactive wastes only, the Regulators
are deprived of any means of investigating spent fuel imports
— and whilst this remains the case, countries such as Italy
will continue to use the loophole to bypass the conventions.
(2) In December 2004, the Italian authorities published
new plans for dealing with a further volume of Italian spent fuel
which has been languishing in deteriorating storage facilities
for the past two decades. Unlike the Garigliano fuel in (1) above,
this fuel has never been contracted for reprocessing, with plans
for its long-term management and eventual disposal in Italy being
well documented.
The new plan is to invite British Nuclear Fuels and
its French counterpart Cogema within the next few weeks to tender
for the work of reprocessing this fuel. Clearly, the problems
of storing this fuel in Italy have worsened since our own investigations
in 2003. Further, in announcing details of their new plan, the
Italian authorities have openly admitted that they cannot re-use
the materials recovered by reprocessing and hope to leave their
plutonium and uranium stockpiled at Sellafield. The plan can now
only be construed as a blatant attempt at waste-dumping by Italy,
whose authorities can show no genuine need for the fuel to be
reprocessed.
As before, the Environment Agency will be powerless
to intervene in the plan because the material to be exported by
Italy will be categorised as spent fuel and not radioactive waste,
though the latter is a far more accurate description given the
prevailing conditions in Italy. In 1997, the Radioactive Waste
Management Advisory Committee (RWMAC) advised Ministers
of just such a situation. In its Report, the Committee warned
that:
"In the RWMAC's view, it is conceivable
that a situation may arise where a foreign concern was willing
to enter into a reprocessing contract, whether for irradiated
or unirradiated fuel, with a United Kingdom company in order to
rid itself of what it construed as a 'waste management' problem,
possibly one of inadequate or hazardous storage "
We believe that this statement concisely captures
the prevailing situation in Italy that has prompted the authorities
to seek new reprocessing contracts. The point we make is that
the expansion of the Directive to include spent fuel for reprocessing
will provide the necessary regulatory framework for the Environment
Agency to properly investigate any potential import such as that
planned by Italy, and thereby reach a conclusion as to the validity
of the exporter's intentions — as per RWMAC's advice.
Without this expansion of the Directive, we are concerned
that BNFL and its Member State customers will continue,
with impunity, to trade in the export/import of radioactive
waste — under the guise of spent fuel for reprocessing.
We ask therefore that copies of our letter and the attached letter
to the NDA are made available to all members of the European Scrutiny
Committee for their information and urgent consideration. Needless
to say we will be happy not only to provide any further information
the Committee members may need, but also to give oral evidence
to the Committee if so required.
1 February 2005
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