16 European Security and Defence Policy
and Sudan
| (27499)
—
| Council Decision implementing Joint Action 2005/557/CFSP on the European Union civilian-military supporting action to the African Union mission in the Darfur region of Sudan
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| Legal base | Articles 14, 25, 26 and 28(3); unanimity
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | EM of 18 May 2006
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| Previous Committee Report | None
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| To be discussed in Council | 12 June 2006 General Affairs and External Relations Council
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared
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Background
16.1 The EU has been actively involved since the outset in the
international efforts to contain and resolve the Darfur crisis,
helping to broker the N'djamena cease-fire of 8 April 2004 and
providing planning and management support, funding and logistic
assistance to the African Union (AU) mission in Darfur (AMIS).
The EU is the most important donor for AMIS and has also provided
substantial humanitarian assistance and food aid for Darfur and
Darfurian refugees in neighbouring Chad, as well as funding and
support for the political talks in Abuja. Last July, the EU was
not alone in welcoming the Comprehensive Peace Accord, on the
civil war, and the Abuja peace talks on the Darfur crisis, whose
successful conclusion, it was hoped, would begin the re-building
process.
16.2 At that time, in his 6 July 2005 Explanatory
Memorandum on a Council Joint Action authorising EU civilian-military
supporting action to the African Union monitoring mission in Darfur,
the Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Dr
Kim Howells) underlined that the AU was leading the operation
in Darfur and managing offers of assistance from the international
community; that that there was no operational command and control
role for either NATO or the EU; and that both organisations had
coordinated their offers in line with AU requirements in response
to the AU Security Council's earlier decision to increase AMIS
II from 2,700 to 7,700 troops. He also stated that "collaborative
responses such as this will increasingly have to become the norm
as the international community adapts itself to respond to today's
strategic challenges".
16.3 He outlined the EU supporting action to the
military component of AMIS II as including the provision of equipment
and assets, provision of planning and technical assistance to
all AMIS II levels of command, provision of additional military
observers, training of African troops and observers forming part
of the AMIS II enhancement and strategic and tactical air transport.
EU supporting action to the civilian component of AMIS II was
to include the secondment of policing advisors and trainers to
provide support to the AMIS II Police Chain of Command and provide
training for AMIS's own police trainers; that policing support
would also help strengthen the AU's policing capacity more generally,
through the development of a policing unit within the AU Secretariat
in Addis Ababa. To make EU support effective, the Joint Action
also provided for an EU coordination Cell in Addis Ababa, under
the authority of the newly-appointed EU Special Representative
and responsible for EU coordination with the AU chain of command
in Addis Ababa, other bilateral donors engaged in supporting AMIS
II and the UN and NATO (particularly in the area of airlift).
16.4 He went on to explain that:
- the UK hoped to send 5-10 police
officers at an estimated cost of no more than £1 million
over one year;
- the costs of seconded UK military personnel (two
were anticipated) would be funded by the FCO's Africa Conflict
Prevention Pool;
- Common costs for the police component (accommodation
not provided by the AU, additional communications requirements,
training equipment, transportation and per diems) would
be covered by the Common Foreign and Security Policy budget; and
- the Athena financing mechanism[57]
would be applied for military common costs, which would be limited
to an estimated €1.97million and apply only to officers serving
in the AMIS II chain of command and coordination cell, plus communications
and medical evacuation costs for the military observers.
16.5 We cleared the Joint Action on 13 July 2005,
taking the view at the time that, important though the overall
context was, the UK involvement was such as not to warrant a substantive
Report to the House. We came to a similar conclusion at our meeting
on 2 November 2005, when the previous Minister for Europe (Mr
Douglas Alexander) submitted an Explanatory Memorandum covering
a Council Decision to extend the financial arrangements from 29
January 2006 to 28 July 2006.
16.6 The hopes of last year were, sadly, dashed through
continued fighting by rebel forces in Darfur and yet more hardship
for non-combatants. However, a further Darfur Peace Agreement
(DPA) was signed in Abuja on 5 May 2006 by the Government of National
Unity (GoNU) and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) of
Minni Minawi, which, in the words of the Peace and Security Council
(PSC) of the African Union in its 15 May 2006 communiqué,
paves the way for the restoration of lasting peace and security
in Darfur. The PSC commends the courage of the GoNU and the leaders
of the Movement that signed the DPA and those individuals and
groups that subsequently identified themselves with the Agreement
and asked to be considered as partners in its implementation.
It also urged all concerned to respect their commitments and implement
the agreement in good faith and without delay. But
it also deeply regretted the failure
of the SLM/A group led by Abdulwahid Al Nour and the Justice and
Equality Movement (JEM) of Khalil Ibrahim to sign the DPA, urged
them to do so by 31 May 2006 and said that it would consider measures,
including sanctions, against the leadership and members of the
concerned groups if they did not. They also demanded
that all groups in Darfur immediately commit themselves to be
bound by the provisions of the DPA, in particular those relating
to the Comprehensive Ceasefire, as well as relevant previous agreements.
The draft Council Decision
16.7 It is against this improved but still precarious
background that, in his 18 May Explanatory Memorandum, the Minister
says that although the 18 July 2005 Council Decision authorising
the European Union to undertake this action remains valid, with
no set end date for the mission, financial support to the mission
will expire on 30 June.
16.8 He explains that this further Council Decision
will ensure continued EU financial support until the end of September
2006. After recalling its components and purposes, he says that:
the EU coordination Cell in Addis Ababa continues to be responsible
for EU coordination with the Administrative Control and Management
Centre within the AU chain of command in Addis Ababa; and the
EU also continues to maintain close and effective coordination
with all institutional and bilateral donors engaged in supporting
AMIS II. He says that coordination of EU support through the AU
AMIS II mission "brings greater cohesion and allows for better
coordination between bilateral partners and other multilateral
organisations including NATO, who are providing much needed strategic
lift capability, and the UN".
The Government's view
16.9 The Minister says that the EU's support to
civilian policing in Darfur is an important element of its effort
to help address the crisis there, and that the UK is filling eight
positions, including Police Head of Mission (part of the EU Special
Representative's team) and is hoping to provide another two police
experts shortly; and is also providing support to the military
element of the EU support in the form of one staff officer and
six military observers. The UK will continue to bear the costs
of seven of the staff seconded to the police component (the costs
for the Police Head of Mission are met from the Common Foreign
and Security Policy budget) and the costs of the seconded military
personnel, with the appropriate part of the MOD recovering the
additional costs of deployment from the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office's Africa Conflict Prevention Pool.
16.10 He adds that common costs for the police component
(accommodation not provided by the AU, additional communications
requirements, training equipment, transportation and per diems)
will continue to be covered by the CFSP budget; and that while
the cost of the policing component during the three-month-long
extension is yet to be confirmed, he estimates it to be in the
region of €1 million (£697,000).
16.11 He concludes as follows:
"Continuing support to the AU AMIS II mission
is essential to safeguard the achievements of the current mission.
While the situation on the ground continues to be matter of concern,
the AMIS mission plays a key role as the only source of stability
in Darfur. Withdrawing EU support would undermine the ability
of AMIS to bring stability to the area, and have a detrimental
impact on the AU's to demonstrate its peace-keeping capabilities
in general. It would lead the AU to question the extent to which
partners are willing to support an African-led solution to peace
and security in Africa."
Conclusion
16.12 30 June 2006 is in fact the date by which
the Council shall evaluate whether EU supporting action should
continue.
16.13 That said, as was the case last July and
November, no questions arise concerning the nature and modalities
of the EU support and the UK's part in it. But in the light of
what has happened subsequently in Darfur, and the House's continuing
interest therein, we consider that a substantive Report is warranted
on this occasion.
16.14 We are content to clear the document on
the basis that the essential elements are, as anticipated by the
Minister, unchanged; and would expect him to revert to us, should
that not transpire.
57 Contributions by Member States on a GDP-based key. Back
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