35 Relations between the EU and Iraq
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| Commission Communication: Recommendations for renewed EU engagement with Iraq
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| Legal base | — |
| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | Letter of 6 June 2005 and EM of 9 June 2005
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| Previous Committee Report | None; but see HC 42-xxiii (2003-04), para 14 (16 June 2004)
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| To be discussed in Council | 12 June 2006 General Affairs and External Relations Council
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared
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Background
35.1 The overall EU strategy for the Mediterranean and Middle
East included the development of EU relations with the new authorities
in Iraq, after the transfer of sovereignty on 30 June 2004, which
was dealt with in more detail in the June 2004 Communication:
"The European Union and Iraq: A Framework for Engagement".
For the medium term, the Communication suggested three objectives:
the development of a stable and democratic Iraq; the establishment
of an open, stable, sustainable and diversified market economy;
and Iraq's economic and political integration into its region
and the open international system. It suggested EU action in three
phases:
— Phase
One: establishment of informal political dialogue, support for
elections, economic assistance and on-going implementation of
a €305 million package of humanitarian and reconstruction
assistance;
— Phase Two: the launch of formal political
dialogue with the elected Transitional Government, assistance
in areas of mutual interest, continued support for Iraq's engagement
within its region and the expansion of technical assistance and
capacity-building programmes; and
— Phase Three: start of negotiations for
an EU/Iraq Agreement, targeted assistance on economic diversification
and poverty reduction, and the continuance of existing action
in support of democratisation, human rights and the rule of law.
35.2 The Government welcomed the Commission's approach
and noted that the Commission's recommendations tallied with the
areas where the Government believed the EU would be able to add
value, and were consistent with the recommendations under UNSCR
1546 for greater international support for Iraq. Notably, the
Government also recognised that the speed of implementation will
depend on an improving security situation in Iraq and welcomed
the flexible approach suggested by the Commission (establishing
engagement with Iraq as quickly as possible and including recommendations
to help the then Interim Government address security).
35.3 In clearing it in June 2004,[114]
the then Committee, in recognition of the security uncertainties
then prevalent, asked to be kept informed of progress. Subsequent
letters from the previous Minister for Europe showed that, those
difficulties notwithstanding, the EU had subsequently:
— supported
the 2005 elections;
— established EU JUSTLEX (an integrated
Rule of Law and Police Training Mission);
— taken steps to enhance Iraqi capacity
to enter a Trade and Co-operation Agreement and to ensure that
Iraq could benefit from the Generalised System of Preferences;
— signed a Joint Political Declaration
(as the prelude to a Troika dialogue at Political Director level)
and programmed an additional €200m aid package aimed at restoring
public service and supporting the political process, civil society
and human rights; and
— agreed a negotiating mandate for the
sort of Trade and Co-operation Agreement (TCA) with Iraq envisaged
in Phase Three, under which it was envisaged that Iraq would in
due course benefit from improved access to EU markets as well
as co-operation in a wide range of areas including science and
technology, environment, energy, industry, investment, financial
services, transport and telecommunications; assistance in preparing
for WTO membership; and a framework for EU technical assistance
and capacity building efforts. The negotiations would also cover
co-operation on Human Rights, Counter-terrorism, the International
Criminal Court, and Non-proliferation.
The draft Communication
35.4 In his 7 June 2006 Explanatory Memorandum, the
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (Lord Triesman) says that this further Communication was
issued under cover of a joint letter from Secretary General/EU
High Representative, Javier Solana, and External Relations Commissioner
Benita Ferrero-Waldner on 7 June 2006 and updates the June 2004
Communication. He says that it sets the same objectives as in
2004, viz:
— a
secure, stable and democratic Iraq;
— an open, sustainable and diversified
Iraqi market economy; and
— an Iraq at peace with its neighbours
and integrated into the international community.
35.5 He goes on to say that:
"In pursuit of these, the Communication
makes recommendations for EU support, noting that the new government
is a "renewed opportunity" to engage. It stresses the
need for co-operation with other international organisations and
the importance of Iraq ownership. The main ways in which the Communication
envisages EU involvement are:
— To
endorse and support a model of democratic government that overcomes
divisions, including: counter-sectarianism; national inclusiveness;
the constitutional review; support to parliament and other democratic
institutions (including capacity building and technical assistance);
and working on human rights and democracy at regional, provincial
and local levels.
— To contribute to a consolidation of security
by underpinning the system of rule of law and promoting a culture
of respect for human rights, covering: security training; EUJUST
LEX Rule of Law mission; respect for human rights; and Disarmament,
Demobilisation and Reintegration.
— To support national and regional authorities
in improving the delivery of basic services and in promoting a
conducive environment for job creation, focusing on: access to
basic services; promoting private sector job creation; and SMEs.
— To support mechanisms to pave the way
for Iraq's economic recovery and prosperity, covering: EU dialogue;
energy (where work in regulatory, legal and financial reform and
a technical dialogue are promised); and EU-Iraq Trade & Co-operation
Agreement (TCA) negotiations.
— To promote the development of an effective
and transparent administrative framework, including: legal reform;
improved transparency, accountability and financial management,
with EU assistance and capacity-building drawing on national and
EU experience, including the enlargement process; and the establishment
of technical working groups in the TCA process."
The Government's view
35.6 The Minister says that, with a constitutionally
elected government now in place, the Government believes that:
"… this is a timely opportunity to
take stock of progress against the 2004 Communication and to take
a fresh look at how the EU can engage with Iraq, starting with
political dialogue with the new government. We welcome the proposals
for EU action, which tally with the areas where the Government
believes the EU will be able to add value to the engagement of
the international community with Iraq. We recognise that the speed
of implementation will depend on an improving security situation
in Iraq. We strongly believe that it is essential that the EU
continues to broaden its engagement with Iraq. This will send
an important signal of the increasing normalisation of Iraq's
relationship with the international community."
35.7 In his earlier 6 June 2005 letter, the Minister
for Europe (Mr Geoffrey Hoon) wrote to advise the Chairman of
the imminent issue of the Commission. He too endorses the timeliness
of "a fresh look at how the EU can engage with Iraq",
with a constitutionally elected government in place, beginning
with political dialogue and, the actions identified in the 2004
Communication having been completed, underpinned by updated Commission
recommendations for this renewed engagement. A revised Communication
"should send a strong signal of the EU's commitment to engage
with the new government". He goes on to say that the 12 June
General Affairs and External Relations Council was expected to
endorse it and that "the timetabling was only announced at
the end of last week … Unfortunately, given that there are
only three working days between issue of the Communication and
the GAERC, Member States will have to consider the Communication
before your Committee has had the chance to complete scrutiny."
Conclusion
35.8 Despite the hazardous security environment,
the case for such an engagement is self-evident, since its purpose
and scope are very much what Iraq will need if a stable and prosperous,
open, law-based democracy is ever to take root. We therefore clear
the Communication.
35.9 But in so doing we express our dissatisfaction
at the way in which its promulgation has been handled. The prospect
of a constitutionally elected government being in place has been
around for some while. The nature of the recommendations in the
Communication are not sensitive. It is inconceivable that the
Minister and his officials have not been aware of them for some
time. We therefore cannot see why the Minister could not have
followed the practice of his predecessor in providing an insight
at a much earlier stage, and find it unacceptable that, instead,
we are presented with a fait accompli for no good reasons.
We shall wish to discuss this with him when he next gives evidence
to us, shortly after the June European Council.
114 See headnote. Back
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