Select Committee on European Scrutiny Thirty-Third Report


15 EU-Russia relations

(26607)

8779/05

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EU-Russia: Road Maps for the Common Economic Space, the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice, the Common Space of External Security and the Common Space on Research, Education and Culture

Legal base
DepartmentForeign and Commonwealth Office
Basis of considerationMinister's letter of 21 June 2006
Previous Committee ReportHC 34-i (2005-06), para 6 (4 July 2005); also see (25804): HC 42-xxvii (2003-04), para 17 (14 July 2004)
To be discussed in Council
Committee's assessmentPolitically important
Committee's decisionCleared (Debated in European Standing Committee on 20 October 2005)

Background

15.1 The Common Strategy instrument was created by the Amsterdam Treaty, as the means of setting out the objectives, overall policy guidelines, organisation and duration of the EU's external policies towards geographic or thematic areas. The EU's Common Strategy on Russia — its first — was adopted at the June 1999 Cologne European Council, for a period of four years. It had four objectives:

  • encouraging the democratic reform process in Russia;
  • encouraging economic reform;
  • promoting regional and global stability and security; and
  • promoting co-operation with Russia on areas of common concern such as international crime and environmental questions.

15.2 In July 2004, the Committee considered a Council Report on the main lines of a proposed successor. The Common Strategy had had limited success, being described by the then Minister for Europe as "long and diffuse", and not clearly signalling what the EU's specific priorities were. It had never enjoyed any "buy-in" from Russia. And it had been overtaken by developments elsewhere in the EU-Russia relationship, culminating in the May 2003 St Petersburg EU-Russia summit, which envisaged the development of relations instead taking place within an Action Plan embracing four Common Spaces — a common economic space (building on the notion of a Common European Economic Space); a common space of freedom, security and justice; a space of co-operation in the field of external security; and a space of research and education. Work accordingly proceeded on this proposal, within the framework of the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA).

15.3 The main lines of a Joint EU-Russia Action Plan on the four "Common Spaces" were forwarded to Russia in April 2004, for agreement at the May Moscow EU-Russia summit. But, in July, Russia had yet to respond. Since it seemed that lack of political will on the Russian side had limited progress on the Common Strategy, and given the overlap between its four objectives and the four Common Spaces, the previous Committee could see no obvious reason why the latter was bound to be more effective. It was concerned that the EU might be tempted to backslide in some of the more contentious areas — especially in governance issues — in order to make progress elsewhere. They accordingly asked for information on those main lines forwarded to Russia.[35]

The Four Common Space Road Maps

15.4 Several exchanges of correspondence culminated in an Explanatory Memorandum of 7 June with the full text of the four Road Maps agreed at the 10 May 2005 EU-Russia Summit:

    Common Economic Space

    The objective is to create an open and integrated market between the EU and Russia, bringing down barriers to trade and investment and promoting reform and competitiveness, based on the principles of non-discrimination, transparency and good governance.

    Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice

    The underlying principles are democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including free and independent media and the effective application of common values by independent judicial systems. Implementation should lead to agreements on readmission and visa facilitation, to promote greater contact and facilitate private, business and official travel. Regular EU-Russia consultations on human rights fall within this space, as does co-operation on combating terrorism, organised crime and corruption.

        Common Space of External Security

        This underlines the shared responsibility of the EU and Russia for an international order based on effective multilateralism, including co-operation to strengthen the central role of the United Nations and to promote the role and effectiveness of the OSCE and the Council of Europe. Both parties will strengthen their co-operation and dialogue on security and crisis management, notably in relation to terrorism, the proliferation of WMD and existing and potential regional and local conflicts — with particular attention to "the common neighbourhood", to promote resolution of frozen conflicts (e.g. in Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh), where the EU would continue to provide humanitarian assistance and support economic rehabilitation, confidence building and efforts to tackle poverty and human rights abuses.

        Common Space on Research, Education and Culture

        This aims to promote economic growth and strengthen competitiveness, reinforce links between research and innovation, encourage close co-operation in the field of education and promote cultural and linguistic diversity. A European institute in Moscow, co-funded by the EU and Russia, would be set up in 2006.

      15.5 The then Minister said that the challenge was to press ahead with implementation and deliver practical benefits to the EU and Russia alike. Because the Road Maps "are political documents [and] not legally binding agreements", they would not be put formally to the Council for approval, but will be submitted for the Council to take note. In a separate letter, he said that the he had been unable to share any of the contents of the Road Maps with us earlier in order to preserve the confidentiality of the negotiations.

      15.6 We felt that, though it might no longer be called a Common Strategy, any "framework for the EU's relations with Russia" was self-evidently of immense importance. The Common Strategy was judged to have failed because it did not set priorities and lacked political commitment. Progress had been made, to the extent that a joint list of priorities has been agreed, across a very wide agenda. Arguably, however, we felt that the relationship should aspire to somewhat more than "practical benefits", and that the challenge was likely to be in making progress in those areas that tend to be grouped under the notion of "shared values" and which revolved around "good governance", but which nonetheless had a real bearing on the attainment of long-term practical benefits. Although we did not wish the Minister to hold up agreement in the Council, we nonetheless recommended that the Four Common Spaces "Road Maps" be debated in European Standing Committee, in time for the Government to be aware of the views of the House ahead of the 4 October 2005 EU-Russia Summit. The debate did not in fact take place until 20 October 2005, when the European Standing Committee agreed that the Road Maps "provide a valuable framework for the EU to achieve its objectives in its relations with Russia in the medium term".[36]

      15.7 The Minister also agreed to update us after each bi-annual Summit. The first such letter covered each Common Space in terms reminiscent of the diplomatic communiqué, and gave little insight into the nature of the discussions that had taken place, particularly on the areas about which we had expressed particular concern. But this was the first Summit under the new arrangements, so we decided to await further developments.

      The Minister's letter

      15.8 In his 21 June 2006 letter on the second EU-Russia Summit under the new arrangements (and the 17th overall), which took place on 25 May 2006 in Sotchi, in Russia, the Minister for Europe (Mr Geoffrey Hoon) says that the EU side was led by the Austrian Presidency represented by Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel, the High Representative for CFSP Javier Solana, and European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso, with the Russian side being led by President Vladimir Putin. He continues as follows:

        "The Summit made some substantive progress in the EU-Russia relationship. The two main Summit outcomes were the approval of visa facilitation and readmission agreements between the EU and Russia; and agreement on the basis for negotiations on a Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) successor. The visa facilitation agreement does not apply to the UK as a non-Schengen country, but the UK will benefit from the readmission arrangements. The PCA is the legal framework document for EU-Russia relations. It expires in 2007, though it can be rolled forward. The EU and Russia are keen to see a new agreement to reflect changes since the PCA was first signed.

        "The Summit had frank discussions on areas important to the UK. The latest round of the EU-Russia Human Rights Consultations was welcomed. Discussion on Chechnya was particularly noted. On the common neighbourhood, the EU expressed the hope for progress on Nagorno-Karabakh in the South Caucasus, though the Russian side was less optimistic. We were pleased to see final agreement on the EU's aid package to the North Caucasus, the proposal announced at the UK Presidency's EU-Russia Summit last year.

        "The EU stressed its concerns on Belarus and Moldova. On this issue more than any other, the Russians defended their policy of engagement with Belarus. Russia was critical of the steps taken by the EU border assistance mission on the Moldova/Transnistria-Ukraine border to reduce smuggling as creating undue pressure.

        "There were detailed discussions on energy, the EU noting continuing concerns in Europe stemming from the January Russia/Ukraine gas dispute interruptions. Russia in response stressed their reliability as a supplier, although they did not agree to EU proposals to ratify the Energy Charter Treaty.

        "There were discussions of a number of other international issues such as Kosovo and Iran. The Russians raised the Kosovo process as a possible precedent over questions of territorial integrity, including for the South Caucasus states' frozen conflicts. The EU underlined its view of Kosovo's unique situation.

        "The incoming Finnish Presidency has put the EU's relations with Russia as one of their priorities. We welcome this focus. We will continue to sustain the focus on commitment to common values such as democracy, human rights, and respect for OSCE and Council of Europe principles."

      Conclusion

      15.9 It is gratifying to see early signs of concrete progress in such a key relationship. But there remain important areas of considerable difficulty and difference. Perhaps the most pressing is energy co-operation, where the words in the Minister's letter indicate positions at odds with the avowed priority given to this issue by the Russian side for its G8 Presidency. There also appears to be no sign of any meeting of minds on many of the other issues revolving around external security and "common values", perhaps the most disturbing of which during the past six months is the new law on Non-Profit Organisations, which appears not to have been discussed but about which the EU felt sufficiently concerned to issue a formal statement on 19 January.[37]

      15.10 The Minister's letter sheds a little more light on the proceedings than either that of his predecessor or the post-Summit Press Release,[38] for which we are grateful. But it nonetheless raises as many questions as it answers. For example, what is meant by "discussion on Chechnya was particularly noted", and what sort of "undue pressure" does Russia see in the steps taken by the EU border assistance mission on the Moldova/Transnistria-Ukraine border to reduce smuggling? What was discussed in the latest round of EU-Russia Human Rights Consultations? In what sense was it "welcomed" — simply because it had taken place? We look forward to pursuing these matters further with him when he gives evidence to us, and to further such reports.

      15.11 Given its importance, we also look forward in due course to scrutinising the new Partnership and Co-operation Agreement, which is also touched upon in our separate consideration of projects financed under the TACIS scheme in the Russian Federation.[39]


      35   25804 - ; see HC 42-xxvii (2003-04), para 17 (14 July 2004). Back

      36   Stg Co Deb, European Standing Committee, 20 October 2005, cols 3-28. Back

      37   http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/06/st05/st05497.en06.pdf. Back

      38   http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/89754.pdf. Back

      39   See para 12 of this Report. Back


       
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