Examination of Witnesses (Questions 20-40)
RT HON
DOUGLAS ALEXANDER
MP, MR TIM
BARROW, MR
DAVID FROST
AND MS
KAREN PIERCE
8 FEBRUARY 2006
Q20 Richard Younger-Ross: On other
issues, like trade liberalisation, this country has always been
prepared to go ahead of the pack. Could we not, in this case,
go ahead of the pack and could our ministers not report back to
this Parliament exactly how they have voted in the Council of
Ministers?
Mr Alexander: Individual Member
States are public on the decisions that they reach and we account
to Parliament in terms of the decisions that we reach. That being
said, with respect, I think we were leading this discussion during
the last six months, and had it not been for the initiative of
the British Government in pushing to secure as maximal a position
as we could achieve on transparency we would not have seen the
progress that we secured.
Q21 Richard Younger-Ross: So, on
any question on agriculture, or on DTI, you are saying that if
we ask we will be told exactly how our minister has voted on all
of those issues?
Mr Alexander: There are statements
made after each Council, reporting back to Parliament the conclusions.
Q22 Richard Younger-Ross: On how
we voted, not just broad statements of what our policy stance
is?
Mr Alexander: Of course, if questions
are asked of us, by any Member of Parliament, then we endeavour
to answer them. What I am clear about is the fact that statements
are issued after every Council which narrate the outcomes of Council
meetings. If there are individual decisions which are a matter
of probing by parliamentary colleagues then that will be a decision
which will be reached on the basis of the particular question
that is put to us.
Q23 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: Minister,
we have heard that the Council of Ministers has moved at a snail's
pace to open itself up. Can you tell me what you think of another
EU body? Do you think that public suspicion about the EU is fuelled
by the fact that all European laws and regulations have to be
initiated by 25 unelected people, meeting in private, called the
European Commission? They are against all monopolies except that
monopoly, which they guard jealously, their monopoly over new
legislation. Do you think that is just wholly incompatible with
any system that pretends to call itself, in any sense, democratic?
I notice your White Paper is silent on this, so are you not prepared
to push for reform, genuinely opening up the European institutions
right across the board, if we are to have any chance of re-engaging
the public in this charade of democracy in Brussels?
Mr Alexander: The Commission's
power of initiation is long-standing and has been one of the cornerstones
on which not just the European Union but the single market has
been built. I think, if you take the example of the single market,
it evidences the importance of being able to have the ability
to take those kinds of decisions on the basis of initiation from
the Commission. On the general point that you make in terms of
is it a charade of democracy, the European Union, I think, with
respect, we probably disagree. I certainly wanted to see greater
transparency in the course of the British Presidency. We have
also wanted to see a greater engagement of the British Parliament,
and indeed other Member State Parliaments, during the Presidency,
which is why we convened an important conference with the Dutch
Government, who share many similar views with us on this matter
and the issue of subsidiarity. I do not sit before this Committee
and suggest that there cannot be further progress made in ensuring
that people do feel that sense of connection and engagement with
the means by which Europe reaches its decisions. On the other
hand, I am not convinced that the case which you make, that the
power of initiation should be removed from the European Commission,
is the right way forward.
Q24 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: The European
Convention, which drew up the constitution, was mandated to create
a simpler, more democratic Europe, closer to its citizens. That
has not been achieved. We have wasted another two years. Why not
be pressing and pushing and demanding that all these institutions
open themselves up to public scrutiny, starting with the most
powerful one of all, which, as I say, has a monopoly of initiative
about the laws which then we have to obey? That is simply not
democratic and everybody knows that it is not, so why are you
not pressing for a properly radical reform rather than simply
going along with the tide?
Mr Alexander: With the greatest
of respect, I do not believe that what you are proposing is the
right answer. I am respectful of your own experience on the Convention,
but I do think, given that depth of experience and knowledge,
there is some risk that sometimes you can see problems through
the wrong end of a telescope. I do not believe that the principal
legitimacy issue facing the European Union is institutional in
character as much as can Europe be seen transparently to address
the issues of principal concern to Europe's citizens. I find,
in conversation and debates and discussions that I have here in
the United Kingdom, if the debate starts from the curvature of
a cucumber, or even whether the British pint is going to be allowed
to continue to exist, on the basis of wholly misguided but nonetheless
potent myths put about in British newspapers, it is understandably
difficult to convince people as to the merits of the European
ideal and a European future. On the other hand, if you say to
people, in a commonsensical fashion, are there challenges which
it is better for the United Kingdom to address working together,
whether the issue of climate change, whether the issue of securing
jobs for prosperity now in the world's largest single market,
whether the ability for us to meet challenges like migration and
immigration, are we better equipped to address those by working
in concert with other European nations in the European Union,
I think actually the majority of British citizens have sympathy
with that argument. I think, respectfully, when we said at the
outset of the British Presidency that it would be wholly wrong
to spend the next six months engaged in an inward-looking institutional
argument about the relative authority of the Commission, Parliament
or indeed the Council of Ministers, that instead we should seek
to make practical changes, whether geopolitical in effect, such
as the decision to open accession talks with Turkey, or other
practical areas of work, for example, the work that we secured
in the form of the sugar regime under the Common Agricultural
Policy, it was the best service that we could offer both to convincing
people the case that I believe, that Britain's future does lie
within the European Union, and avoiding the perception which you
claim to be concerned about, which is that people appear to think
politicians are somehow out of touch as soon as they start discussing
Europe. I think that literally we could guarantee they would be
perceived as being out of touch if at this particular juncture
we were returning to an entirely institutionally-focused discourse
about the European Union.
Q25 Chairman: Minister, I am moving
on to questions on "Near Neighbours". Belarus: what
is the EU's policy on Belarus?
Mr Alexander: At the last General
Affairs Council, which took place, if I recollect, a week ago
on Monday, there was a leading Opposition politician from Belarus
whom I had the opportunity to meet with directly and hear of the
concerns that he has, as they anticipate the coming elections
within Belarus. It is a matter of considerable concern to the
European Union, the present position and the present circumstances
in which Belarus finds itself. Looking to the future, a neighbourhood
policy would be open to Belarus, if there were sufficient improvements
in exactly those issues of democracy and in human rights, but,
regrettably, those benchmarks have not been achieved under the
present regime. Therefore, the elections, which I understand are
taking place on 19 March this year, will be the next key test
to establish whether we can see free and fair elections within
Belarus. The final point that I would make would be that I am
conscious, in answering that question, that it is not as easy
to discern the policy instruments available to the European Union
in Belarus as in many other Near Neighbours. It is a matter which
is receiving continuous focus within the Councils of the European
Union, not least because, for many of the new members of the European
Union, Belarus is anything but a distant country, but actually
near, both in terms of their thoughts as well as their geography.
Q26 Chairman: What happens if the
March elections turn out to be not fair and free?
Mr Alexander: Our scope to influence
the regime, even if the elections are not free and fair, I do
not think it is disingenuous to recognise, is limited, but I would
not wish to prejudge what steps the Union could take potentially
in those circumstances, given that all of our focus at the moment
is on supporting efforts to ensure that they are free and fair.
In particular, also, work that we have taken forward to support
civil society and non-governmental organisations which are fundamental
to the health of democracy and which have been under considerable
pressure in Belarus in recent months and years.
Q27 Michael Connarty: I want to move
on to the Middle East. There is one outstanding question about
the future of the agreement with Syria, which I understand was
supposed to be based upon partnership and reciprocity and shared
values. Given Syria's position in failing to co-operate with the
investigation into the murder of the Lebanese Prime Minister,
one wonders exactly how far that has got to go, and it is not
mentioned specifically, I notice, in your White Paper, unless
I missed it. Also, you might want to comment on the next period,
given the result of the Palestinian elections, and there would
appear to be the determination by Israel to steal a large part
of the former Palestinian Occupied Territories by continuing with
the building of the wall?
Mr Alexander: The position of
the British Government and indeed the position, if I recollect,
which had been taken in the General Affairs Council, in relation
to the barrier, are well-known and are well-rehearsed. While we
recognise that Israel has a legitimate right to protect its citizens
from terrorism, that does not justify the development of the barrier,
for example, on Palestinian territory. Those views have been communicated
directly to the Israeli Government and that position is unchanged.
We do face real challenges, of course, in terms of the election
of the Hamas Party to leadership within the Palestinian Authority
and we have taken a position, which the Foreign Secretary, Jack
Straw, set out before the House of Commons in Foreign Office Questions
yesterday, which is different from some others in terms of our
approach to the financing of the Palestinian Authority. This is
a matter which we continue to discuss, not just directly with
the Israelis but with other partners within the quartet. On your
related point in terms of Syria, I think it is right to identify
your concerns in terms of the divergence of values. I would not
claim that there is alignment of values between ourselves and
the Syrian Government on many areas of policy, but it does beg
a fundamental question as to how the European Union can extend
its influence to advance peace, democracy and stability in Near
Neighbourhoods, and in particular in the Middle East. I would
argue that, notwithstanding the fact that often it involves dealing
with other countries which we may have a difference with, indeed
very fundamental disagreements, nonetheless, there is a case for
Europe working to see where we can exert influence to effect the
kinds of changes that we want. That may be in relation to Syria,
it may also be, as is well rehearsed, on the issue of nuclear
proliferation, where, with the support of the European Union,
the E3 and now the United States have led efforts which have led
to where we are today, in terms of the report to the Security
Council.
Q28 Michael Gove: Given what you
have just said about Iran and the role of the E3, do you think
it is appropriate to acknowledge that diplomacy ran its course
some time ago and that the comments of the Iranian President indicate
that Iranian hardliners drew comfort from the approach that the
European Union was taking, rather than recognising that there
was a robustness when it came to dealing with the issue of non-proliferation,
at the heart of our approach?
Mr Alexander: Chairman, rather
inadvertently I gave some unintended publicity to the Henry Jackson
Society yesterday, in answer to the honourable gentleman's question
to me on Cuba, and I feel I am about to do the same by suggesting
that, while his views may find favour on the wilder shores of
the Henry Jackson Society or neo-conservative opinion in the United
States, I am not convinced that diplomacy has run its course.
The views he expresses are perfectly honourable ones for somebody
to advance. I simply do not agree with them. I took part in a
debate in this House last week in which a number of his Conservative
colleagues put similar points to me. Boiled down, their case was
essentially a forceful and eloquent plea that something must be
done, but they were far more detailed in their description of
the problem than in the prescription of the solution. I think
actually one of the challenges that we face in relation to resolving
this issue with Iran is to recognise quite how difficult, time-consuming
and complex is the issue of diplomacy, but nonetheless recognise
that it is vital to maintain an international consensus, for some
of the reasons that we rehearsed in our discussion on energy policy.
I do think it is right to secure international consensus, not
just because it strengthens our hand but I believe it offers us
the best hope of being able to send an effective signal to the
Iranian administration at this juncture. That involves necessarily
securing the support both of China and indeed of Russia, and therefore
it is vital at this stage, as a report has now been made to the
Security Council, that we maintain as united a front as we can.
I would be careful, again, however, to pay due respect to the
IAEA, in the sense that we have gone for reports rather than referral,
in order that we uphold the importance of the IAEA as the body
continuing to deal directly with Iran on this matter, rather than
it being a Security Council matter. I cannot anticipate, as neither
could the Foreign Secretary when he answered questions on this
matter in the Commons yesterday, where those discussions within
the Security Council will reach, but I am far from convinced that
diplomacy has run its course at this stage. I think now it is
vital that we send a unified signal, not just from within this
House but from within the international community, that we do
require Iran to move into meeting its obligations under the various
IAEA Board resolutions, of which it is in breach.
Q29 Michael Gove: The Minister will
be aware that the European Union has a fund to support the establishment
of democracy in the near abroad and the Minister will be aware
also that the Prime Minister, when challenged by the Leader of
the Opposition about the situation in Iran, agreed with the Leader
of the Opposition that the fundamental problem lay in the undemocratic
nature of the Iranian regime rather than particular policies it
happened to follow at the moment. Can you elucidate what support
the Foreign Office, the British Government and the European Parliament
are offering to create democracy activists within Iran, and particularly
labour organisations, like the bus drivers, and others, who are
striking in Tehran at the moment?
Mr Alexander: Given the honourable
gentleman's previous experience on the picket line of the press
in general, I know that he cares deeply about these issues of
industrial relations and I pay due respect to him for that.
Chairman: He was not about during the
miners' strike, if I remember correctly.
Q30 Michael Gove: I was at school
at the time.
Mr Alexander: That is a line I
fear we will hear more from the Conservative Party in the years
to come. I will write to the honourable gentleman. I misspoke.
I shall ask my colleague, Kim Howells, the Minister with responsibility,
to write to him on the specific question that he raises.[3]
He is right in recognising that for every so-called democratic
structure within Iran there are also parallel theological structures.
It is not a system of governance which is easily understood by
those outwith that particular community. That probably, therefore,
should conclude my remarks on the matter and ensure that the reply
is forthcoming.
Q31 Mr Cash: Following up on that specific
point, does the Government take the view that democratic elections
create a democracy? Or does the Government take the view, for
example, with regard to Hamas and with regard to Iran, that if
a government does not behave in a democratic fashion, for example,
just to take the provisions of the European Treaties, that if
a government did not subscribe to human rights arrangements, as
set out in the Treaty, they could have their membership suspended?
Applying similar criteria, would one say that, in fact, with respect
to the Middle East, there are not only question-marks but there
are moments when you would simply say "We can't deal with
you because you're not behaving in a democratic fashion"?
Mr Alexander: I am very intrigued,
Chairman, by the honourable gentleman's suggestion that now we
should extend the reach of the European Union right into the Middle
East. It is certainly a new line of questioning. In terms of the
substance of the point, it is a valid and important question.
I think, of course one would wish to see free and fair elections
and therefore simply to have elections is no guarantor that a
government is democratic; they can be transparently unfair and
unfree elections. Election to government is the start of a journey,
not the conclusion of a journey, and that is why in our public
commentary, particularly in relation to Hamas in recent days,
we have been scrupulous in acknowledging the fact that a decision
has been reached, by what appears to be a free and fair means,
by the people of the Palestinian Authority and we are respectful
of that decision. Equally, we are clear that you cannot simultaneously
accept the privileges and responsibilities of a democratic government
while actively pursuing a course of violence. We have been, I
hope, solicitous in both acknowledging the right of the Palestinian
people to reach their choice but, at the same time, to avoid saying
anything which does anything but leave the responsibilities squarely
on the shoulders of Hamas at this time to establish their credentials
in terms of their fair dealings with neighbouring countries and
indeed the wider international community.
Q32 Jim Dobbin: Minister, can we
leave the Middle East and move to Russia, on our global tour this
afternoon. Is the Government satisfied that Russia can and will
live up to its side of the bargain in what is described as the
Four Common Spaces? How can recent legislation against NGOs there
be squared with its commitments to its shared values?
Mr Alexander: We had expressed
concern in terms of the recent NGO law which was passed in the
Russian Duma, and that is a matter of record. We support the work
of NGOs within Russia in a transparent and straightforward manner.
We believe that they are an essential ingredient of a healthy
civic society and indeed contribute to the kind of democracy that
we have just been discussing. We do believe that we made some
real progress at the EU-Russia Summit that took place under the
British Presidency. I did not mention it earlier, in the course
of our discussion of energy policy, but at that Summit we established
a structured dialogue on energy and that reflects one of the areas
of work of the Four Common Spaces. I would not claim that the
Four Common Spaces is the only word or the final word in either
Britain's relations with Russia or indeed the European Union's
relations with Russia, but I do believe it provides a framework
and a basis on which we can take forward that dialogue, albeit
that there will be challenging and difficult issues, no doubt,
in the years ahead.
Q33 Michael Connarty: Do you want
to comment on security policy in a wider area; specifically, what
work does the Government want to see taken forward under the CFSP
"workstream" that emerged? It was one of the six that
emerged from the Hampton Court informal Summit. What would you
say were its priorities?
Mr Alexander: I think it will
be easiest to describe as the familiar headline foreign policy
issues that we are dealing with. Within the CFSP ambit you have,
of course, the issue of Iran, which we have spoken about, there
are other priorities in terms of ESPD civilian missions, we have
seen those taken forward during the British Presidency, also out
of area missions, in the sense that, for the first time, we saw
an EU mission to Aceh, in support of the peace initiative that
is being taken forward there. Whether it is in support of the
African Union, in terms of the important work it is undertaking
in Darfur, whether it is in Asia, in Aceh or indeed nearer to
home, in terms of the Rafah border mission, we believe that there
have been successful missions undertaken under the CFSP banner
during the British Presidency, and we would expect that to continue
as we look ahead to the Austrian Presidency.
Q34 Michael Connarty: Is not that
just a reactive agenda? I get the sense it is developing without
a plan, in some way. What started off as a specific model for
the Balkans now is just going to Africa, Afghanistan, Iran; we
are just being drawn into things without any sense of plans, targets
and limits.
Mr Alexander: As in all foreign
policy, there is always going to be an aspect in which one has
to react to events. For example, when a request is made to us
that there is an urgent need to assist, in terms of the border
crossing in Rafah, I do not see it as being incoherent or unstrategic
to recognise that need and to be able to address it, if it makes
sense in terms of the broader CFSP agenda that has been set out
in terms of the advancement of the values which the European Union
shares and which are in the national interest of the requisite
Member States. For example, if you look at the Rafa border mission,
it is a good example of where I believe that the European presence
has been welcomed both on the Palestinian side and indeed on the
Israeli side. It is hard not to argue that, given everything that
is happening in our modern world, we do not have a very clear
direct interest in seeing a way forward in the Middle East peace
process, of course we do, but equally it would be hard to envisage
which individual Member State would have been either willing or
capable of undertaking that mission without it being a genuine
collective effort of the European Union. I think that example
probably makes the case that I have tried to describe, which is,
clearly you want to advance broader foreign policy interests but
equally you want to have the capacity to respond effectively to
specific circumstances as they arise.
Q35 Michael Connarty: Do you not
think that the External Relations Commissioner's (Ferrero-Waldner)
reference to, for example, "the need for coherence between
different CFSP instruments at the disposal of the Union under
the first and second pillar" and remarks on this being, and
I quote, "the rationale for the Commission being `fully associated'
with CFSP" and reflecting, again a quote, "the direction
which the Constitutional Treaty was taking us" sounds like
the Commission once again trying to get even more levered into
the CFSP arena?[4]
It is "here we go again," with the Commission growing
like Topsy?
Mr Alexander: I am not sure that
I follow your final clause, in the sense that what even an esteemed
Commissioner like Mrs Ferrero-Waldner says and what is achieved
can often differ. In that sense, it may well be the ambition of
individuals within the Commission to see changes, but they are
bound by the terms of the Treaties under which the Commission
operates and there has not been the change that was anticipated
by the draft Constitutional Treaty because the Treaty has not
been ratified. So of course it is the case that one would have
moved to a position under the Treaty where there was a Foreign
Minister, where there was an External Action Service supporting
that Foreign Minister, but I think that the quotes that you offer
reflect a sense of what might have been under the Treaty rather
than that clear, contemporary changes are actually happening on
the ground at the moment.
Q36 Jim Dobbin: On the CFSP, do you
think, Minister, that it is significantly underfunded, given its
ever-expanding horizons and the likely long-term nature of the
engagements that it has entered into?
Mr Alexander: There is a balance
to be struck between our credentials as a country broadly supportive
of discipline in the European budget, which I believe has been
further burnished by the budget deal which was agreed in December,
and a recognition in public policy terms that we have supported
an increase and an uplift in the CFSP budget because we believe
it has proved to be an effective tool to advance not just British
national interests but the broader interests of the European Union.
Under our Presidency there was a significant uplift in that budget
and the budget line for CFSP from, if I reflect,
62 million to
102 million. We believe that does represent a significant
step forward. Of course, there will always be competing demands
on those resources but, as I say, I think you need to strike a
balance between there being legitimate competing demands, which
exercises a degree of budget discipline, and, on the other hand,
having sufficient funds that we can meet future challenges.
Q37 Michael Connarty: I have had
again the privilege of going with the Armed Forces Parliamentary
Scheme and spending a week with our troops and with the EUFOR
in both Bosnia and Kosovo. What sort of role do you see for the
EU in a post-settlement Kosovo and do you see it as being similar
to the settlement which we have now in Bosnia? Though, basically,
although it is called "military", I have to say, the
troops I spoke to said they were just glorified policemen and
did not actually do any soldiering.
Mr Alexander: Obviously we are
at a delicate stage in Kosovo, not just because of the passing
of President Rugova but also where Martti Ahtisaari's final status
talks have actually led us, and I would not wish today to say
anything, with respect, that would prejudge the outcome of those
final status talks. That being said, I think there is a broad
sense in which Europe will have a continuing role to play, principally
civilian, because there will continue to be a need for military
support for what emerges from the final status talks and we are
supportive of the efforts that NATO has made in that regard. Whether
that is, for example, in the area of governance or support for
the judiciary, those are areas where Europe has worked previously,
but I would expect that it would be in that type of area that
you would see a continuing European presence, whatever the outcome
of the final status talks.
Q38 Nia Griffith: If we could look
at the UN and the EU and switch to the Democratic Republic of
Congo, is there likely to be any new EU military mission to back
up the UN during the elections there this spring?[5]
Mr Alexander: Our principal focus
is on supporting the African Union in the transition to a blue-helmeted
operation.[6]
I think it is important just to recognise how successful the African
Union has been in what have been very difficult circumstances,
both for them operationally, because they have got very limited
experience of undertaking a mission of that sort, and also in
working in concert both with NATO and then with the European Union
in their efforts. As I say, our principal focus now is on the
transition to supporting a UN effort. It seems to be the only
agency that would be capable of undertaking the work that the
African Union, given its capabilities and capacity, has taken
to a level which now it feels it is necessary to hand over. That
is an important point, because there has been some commentary
and criticism suggesting that somehow this mission has now been
taken away from the African Union. In fact, the African Union
itself has made clear its desire to complete the phase of the
mission which it is capable of delivering, and in that sense that
is the focus of our work. In terms of what efforts then will go
into supporting elections we will turn to once we have resolved
the issue of the UN.
Q39 Chairman: Where does the Government
want ESDP to be at the end of 2006?
Mr Alexander: In what sense; in
a financial sense, in a strategic sense?
Q40 Chairman: In a strategic sense;
where do you see it being?
Mr Alexander: We want to build
on the successes that we believe have been secured in the course
of the British Presidency. We believe that, for example, we can
build on the success of the civilian ESDP missions which have
been undertaken. Obviously, we will continue work in Bosnia, which
we have just spoken about, the Democratic Republic of Congo and
elsewhere, and we will consider what role can be played in Kosovo,
depending on the outcome of the final status agreement. There
will be potentially a rule of law mission in Iraq, depending on
continuing work that is underway, and we will review the work
that is being undertaken there, and we are monitoring the mission
in Palestine. That gives you a flavour of the kinds of issues
that will be very much in our mind in the course of the coming
year.
Chairman: Minister, we have covered a
fair range of subjects today. On behalf of the Committee, can
I thank you and your colleagues very much for coming along here
today. I found the evidence session very informative and, dare
I say, quite enjoyable as well. Thank you, Minister.
3 See Ev 13 Back
4
Speech to the European Parliament, 1 February 2006, item 11. Back
5
See Ev 13 Back
6
Note by Witness: This answer refers to the Sudan rather
than the Democratic Republic of Congo.
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