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UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL EVIDENCE To be published as HC 909-i House of COMMONS MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE european scrutiny committee
current matters relating to the European Union
WEDNEsday 8 February 2006 RT HON DOUGLAS ALEXANDER MP, MR TIM BARROW, MR DAVID FROST and MS KAREN PIERCE Evidence heard in Public Questions 1 - 40
USE OF THE TRANSCRIPT
Oral Evidence Taken before the European Scrutiny Committee on Wednesday 8 February 2006 Members present Mr Jimmy Hood, in the Chair Mr William Cash Michael Connarty Jim Dobbin Michael Gove Nia Griffith Mr David Hamilton Mr David Heathcoat-Amory Mrs Sharon Hodgson Mr Anthony Steen Richard Younger-Ross ________________ Witnesses: Rt Hon Douglas Alexander, a Member of the House, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Mr Tim Barrow, Deputy Political Director and Assistant Director of EU (External), Mr David Frost, Deputy Director of EU (Internal), and Ms Karen Pierce, Head of Eastern Adriatic Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, gave evidence. Q1 Chairman: Minister, welcome. We are delighted to see you at the European Scrutiny Committee again. We have a fair bit we want to cover with you so we will kick off. We might perhaps discuss European Scrutiny and Defence Policy and CFSP more generally later on. First, why does the Government think that a double-hatted EU Special Representative is the right answer in Macedonia? Mr Alexander: Firstly, with your permission, Chairman, if I could just introduce the co‑witnesses supporting me in this appearance today. I have David Frost, who is the Director of European Union within the Foreign Office, and Karen Pierce, who is the leader of the Balkans Team, and Tim Barrow, who deals with external European matters. In terms of double-hatting, you will be familiar, of course, with the correspondence and I have taken careful note of the letter that the Committee has sent back to me. Firstly, I would say that the view that we articulated, I articulated, in my letter to you earlier last year, holds good, that we do not regard this as a general principle but rather the specific circumstances meriting consideration. I took careful note of the point that, in turn, you replied, that you would be keen to have this discussion if we were to extend the remit of double-hatting. The reason for the extension, firstly, is that the timing of the arrangement for the individual in question fell at a point only four months prior to the normal period of renewal for Special Representatives, so the sole significance of writing to you at this stage is the fact that the mandate runs out at the end of February. Our experience and our discussions with others lead us to believe that it has been an effective approach that has been taken on the ground. That being said, I enquired very carefully with officials, when evidence came to us of the need to renew this mandate and the choice was given to me, as to the basis on which this could be differentiated from other situations with other Special Representatives. Firstly, I think it is worth bearing in mind that the Balkans do represent particular challenges to us, which are themselves distinctive. It is hard to think of another area where there is the intergovernmental aspect of the European Union work sitting alongside so closely the Commission's work, in terms of supporting other efforts within the Balkans, and the particular status of Macedonia therefore I think merits particular consideration. In terms of the effectiveness on the ground, we do believe that the provisions that we secured in terms of the terms of reference for the initial appointment were justified, and continue to be justified, and we would be looking for similar assurances in terms of the extension. We believe that provided adequate protection to our interests, in terms of the intergovernmental nature of the Council's business, and would avoid the kind of potential concerns as to confusion of lines of accountability between the areas of responsibility reporting upwards to the Commission and the areas of responsibility reporting upwards to the Council. Q2 Jim Dobbin: The Chairman mentioned Macedonia specifically. If Macedonia, why not elsewhere, when the EU and the Commission are both engaged in political work and technical assistance? Could you elaborate on that? Mr Alexander: We have got no concrete proposals for other, similar situations, in terms of double-hatting. I am aware that some Member States have been looking at the possibility of this providing a model for other areas, in particular in Bosnia and Kosovo, where there is a similar congruence of Commission responsibilities and Council responsibilities. My view on that, similarly to the view I expressed specifically in relation to Macedonia back earlier last year, was that those would need to be judged very carefully on the basis of the individual circumstances. Also that we would be looking for, if we were to reach the choice that it was an effective response to the challenges we faced, exactly the same type of assurances that we secured at the time of the mandate being written. Q3 Chairman: Is not this effectively the introduction of a central component of the foreign policy elements of the Constitutional Treaty? Mr Alexander: No. I can assure you, I looked at this very carefully, both when the original proposal came across my desk and then, subsequently, when I wrote to you seeking support for the continuation of the double-hatting arrangement in Macedonia. Firstly, it is based on existing Treaty provisions. Secondly, it does not anticipate the draft Constitutional Treaty. Thirdly, I think it can be very clearly distinguished from the External Action Service, on the basis that the External Action Service does require Treaty change and would service a Foreign Minister. There has not been Treaty change and there is not a Foreign Minister, so I think that explains the great care we took and worked hard to secure, in terms of the clear demarcation of responsibilities between the intergovernmental part of CFSP and the areas of work that this individual does to support the Commission in its efforts. Q4 Mr Cash: Am I right in saying that when you are dealing with joint actions, under what was originally the Maastricht Treaty, that then takes away the unanimity provisions in respect of activities that are taken within that sphere of joint action, and thereby you can operate thereafter by qualified majority vote? In respect of the question of the relationship to the Constitutional Treaty, I know it was intended that Javier Solana would become sort of the High Representative and with all the panoply of power, and no doubt glory, that you get from it. Nonetheless, in relation to our own concern, for example, about what is going on in Palestine, etc., Hamas was visited by Javier Solana, as I understand it, secretly. I just wonder on what basis he was entitled to do that, and did the Government take a view on it and, if so, was it authorised? Mr Alexander: Firstly, in terms of qualified majority voting, it does apply in this area, and I will ask Tim to share with you the specific reference in the Treaty that does bring it into operation. Specifically on the Macedonian double-hatting issue, I think it is only fair to be clear with the Committee that we did become convinced of the arguments that were put to us last year, that it made sense, in the specific circumstances of Macedonia, to have this arrangement, and therefore it was not for us a policy disagreement with others, we were looking for assurances in terms of how it would operate in practice. In terms of the High Representative, he does have continuing responsibility to the General Affairs Council, but you are right in recognising that he would have had different responsibilities had the Constitutional Treaty come into force and been ratified. I am not familiar with the exact basis on which he travelled to the Middle East that you refer to; if you want to provide me with the specific meeting dates in question, of course I will make sure that an answer is facilitated to you. I can assure you that Javier Solana, probably more than anybody else in the European Union, is only too acutely aware that the Constitutional Treaty has not been ratified and therefore his job has not changed. Q5 Nia Griffith: If I can move on to energy and economic reform, what methods are the Government examining to make sure that there is a genuinely open energy market within the European Union? My fear is very much that other people can come here and we do not get in, particularly in places like France. Mr Alexander: There were really three aspects to the initiative that we launched at Hampton Court back in October, and I know that there was some criticism, both in the United Kingdom and across Europe, when the Prime Minister stated, when I was alongside him at the European Parliament, immediately ahead of Hampton Court, that he was keen to see progress in relation to an energy policy. I think most of us now, given the events that we have witnessed both in the Russian Federation and Ukraine, regard the conclusions that were reached at Hampton Court as showing some prescience. The three main aspects of energy policy were, firstly, the issue of energy security, which clearly is relevant and will continue to be relevant in the future. Secondly, the issue of energy diversity and the diversity of supply, and that has very practical consequences for us in terms of the operation of not just the Grid across Europe but the pipeline access, particularly for gas, to Europe. Thirdly, there is the issue of having a genuine open market within the European Union, which you referred to; that is one of the key issues on which work is being taken forward. We anticipate that Commissioner Piebalgs will publish a Green Paper next month, I think it is in March that the Energy Commissioner is due to publish his proposals. Again just to explain, following those six workstreams which were identified at Hampton Court, if I recollect accurately, four of them were the responsibility of the Commission and two for Javier Solana, as the High Representative. It was merely a factual report that was provided to the December Council, outlining that work had begun on the areas of work identified in Hampton Court previously, in October. We are looking now to Commissioner Piebalgs, in what he will publish next month as a Green Paper, to deal with not just the issue of security and diversity but also the issue of a genuinely liberalised energy market. Q6 Nia Griffith: Do you see any particular obstacles to finding a way forward, particularly in relation to security and supply? Mr Alexander: It is a huge question, which probably I will not do justice to by way of answering. In terms of security of supply, I think we all have much to gain by ensuring that there is greater transparency in the energy markets internationally and looking to how we can secure international agreement so that there can be that genuine transparency, not just within the European Union but beyond. Secondly, I think there is a case for seeing whether we can discuss more effectively the needs of Europe as a net importer of gas, in particular, but of fuel supplies generally with principal suppliers. We have been in a position in the past, particularly in relation to the Russian Federation, where there have been very strong bilateral contacts, but perhaps not as strong a collective voice speaking about the needs of the energy users. Of course, at this point it is standard to say that, while a major energy producer, like Russia, has an interest in energy continuity and energy provision, they also have an interest in having secure customers and customers who want continuity of supply. I think, frankly, one of the areas that will likely emerge from Commissioner Piebalgs' Green Paper is more thought on this issue of how we make sure that in our relations with energy suppliers we manage to leverage more effectively on the fact that we are a very considerable and growing energy market in the years to come. Q7 Mr Hamilton: Minister, you talk in terms of security of supply and many of us will be talking about security of supply being within a United Kingdom framework, not a European framework. I would not like to depend on nuclear power coming across from France, because they are determined to go ahead with nuclear power station expansion. When you talk about energy security, that also affects other areas, such as coal. Poland has a substantial coal industry. Germany has maintained protection for its coal industry. When you talk in terms of security of supply, why should we not talk about security of supply for the UK first then talk in terms of Europe after that? Mr Alexander: I do not see there being any contradiction between establishing security of supply both for the United Kingdom and for Europe. I think we will be able to effect our influence and extend our national interests more effectively by working alongside other countries which themselves are net importers of fuel than if we simply have bilateral contact with those countries which are principally energy suppliers. I certainly take on board your point that there are very considerable domestic aspects to meeting the needs of energy use in the years to come, as well as an agenda for Europe. I think we have got to look carefully at where the European Union can add value. I believe, for example, having a genuinely liberalised and open energy market is one area where the institutions of the European Union can add value. At the same time, in terms of our own energy review that is underway at the moment, there are public policy choices that we need to make clear within the United Kingdom. That has implications not just in terms of targets for renewables but also a discussion in terms of coal, and in particular clean coal technology, and what role it can play in achieving the kinds of targets that this Government has set in terms of carbon emissions. My understanding of this, although it is a policy responsibility principally of the DTI, is that the difficulty with seeing almost instrumentally that, because there are concerns in terms of energy security, we should at this stage immediately redevelop the British coal industry is not that it is not a matter which will be given serious consideration but that, for exactly the reason you cite, the present price of coal imported actually is still below that of some of the estimates of increased coal production within the United Kingdom. It is rather a matter of economics than of policy that we continue to see significant imports of coal coming in from elsewhere within the European Union. Q8 Mr Hamilton: You believe, Minister, that we should not protect our industries but we should allow Germany and Poland to protect their industries? That is a naïve point of view, as I know. Mr Alexander: No, I do not think it is naïve, and if I have communicated a sense that we should not do what we can to support British industries then clearly that is not my intention. I have to say, I have got a great deal of sympathy for the individual who is questioning me on this matter, given his own experience. I have got less sympathy for his immediate neighbour on the Committee, suggesting that we have not looked after the British coal industry, given the record of previous governments in relation to not just manufacturing but mining here in the United Kingdom. I do think that one of the opportunities provided by the review that is taking place is to take a fresh look not just at the issue of renewables, not just at the issue of nuclear energy, but also at the issue of the British coal industry. I make merely a factual point that at the moment there are significant imports coming into the United Kingdom of coal from elsewhere within the European Union, on the basis of individual choices being made on the basis of commercial contracts. That, of course, however, should not preclude us from seeing what opportunities there are for developing the British coal industry in the future. Q9 Richard Younger-Ross: Minister, is it not time, on liberalisation, that the UK Government, rather than waiting for reports, ought to do a little bit of stamping of feet and proverbial swinging of handbags? When you go home and turn on your light, the chances are that you will be contributing towards the profits of a French company. When you went to your gîte in France, if you have a gîte in France, I do not know, and you turned on the light you would not be contributing to the benefits of a British company because we are not allowed to buy into their market. Is it not time that actually we stood and said, "Look, enough is enough; you have to open up your markets"? Mr Alexander: On a factual point, when I go home and switch on the lights, it is a Scottish company that benefits, I am glad to say, and when I go on holiday it tends to be the Isle of Mull, so it is Hydro Electric, another Scottish company, which benefits, so even when I am on holiday I hope I am supporting the efforts of British industry. Your point, however, I think is well taken. I think that energy is one of the areas where there is more scope for progress being made in having a genuinely liberalised market; that is why we look forward to what the Commission proposes in the Green Paper. As I say, I would not preclude further action from the British Government in the future to make sure that it is, in fact as well as in concept, a genuinely open energy market. Q10 Jim Dobbin: Minister, in the statement you made on the institutional issues, you mentioned transparency. What are the reasons for limiting public access to the Council's legislative deliberations to cases where the co‑decision procedure is applied? Mr Alexander: In terms of transparency, the position of the British Government was set out by the Prime Minister in answer to a question on the eve of the British Presidency, when he acknowledged that this was one area where he felt further progress could be made, notwithstanding the absence of Treaty change, so in policy terms we are supportive of seeing greater transparency. The challenge therefore we faced, and I faced as the Europe Minister, in the course of the six-month British Presidency, was how, in practical terms, to progress that policy goal, and essentially there were two choices. One, essentially, was to take a more maximal position and seek fundamentally to change the Rules of Procedure of the Council. The second was a more limited endeavour, which was actually to secure a political agreement that this was important, to better implement the Rules of Procedure as presently they exist and to secure a review of the arrangements in 2006. Frankly, I would have liked to secure the first, that it was necessary to work alongside others and secure a consensus in this matter, and we were unable to secure a consensus for the more maximal position. However, I would not diminish the significance of what we have achieved in the second, whereby we got a political declaration, we have got, I believe, some practical changes to the operation of the Rules of Procedure, in terms of how we will tighten up how they are interpreted, and also that we have a review in 2006. It is a step in the right direction, it is far from the last step, but I think it was a significant step and one which we hope we can build on in the future. Q11 Michael Connarty: I do apologise, Minister, for taking you back to economic policy. We are not trying to trick you here. I saw you flip your brief. It is not in my mellow nature, my mature years; the Chairman did not see me flapping to be called. I had the privilege of representing this Committee last week in the European Parliament, in a very important debate on the Lisbon Agenda, with all of the EU countries and African countries. What struck me there was that the Action Plans, all 24 chapters of each, are written in a different language for every country, and some said it led to diffusion, others said it led to confusion, in terms of where we were going on the Lisbon Agenda. The focus of the Spring European Council is to be on economic reform, I believe. On which issues in particular does the Government want to see progress, specifically what are your target issues, what is your template for progress, and what outcomes does the UK Government want from that Council? Mr Alexander: Firstly, let me echo a point that you made in your question, in terms of the Action Plans. I have been intrigued, in discussions with colleagues around Europe, as to how, particularly in some of the newer Member States, the development of the Action Plans themselves has served to further embed economic reform in the process of change within their economies. Frankly, I think we are in a fairly distinctive place in this argument in Britain, because many of the proposals that we have made, if you look at the British Action Plan, it talks about macroeconomic stability, it talks about employment growth, it talks about productivity, these are issues which have been the stuff of political debate in Britain for many years. In other countries, I think, frankly, the fact that they have had to develop, for the Commission, these Action Plans has been a very useful means by which they have been able to strengthen the hand of those wishing to reform their economies domestically, and in that sense I do think it is important. The areas of work in terms of those individual Member States necessarily and appropriately reflect the particular challenges that those Member States face. In terms of the Spring Council, you are right to say that economic reform will be the key focus. That is a matter of pride to us, partly because we pushed the economic reform agenda during our Presidency but also urged our Austrian colleagues to take forward that work. I have to say, credit is due to José Manuel Barroso as well, on behalf of the Commission, for continuing again the efforts that were made during our Presidency, and he is on record, at the turn of the year, as saying jobs and growth should be the priority for the European Union, as reflected in the Spring Council. In terms of the Spring Council, where I would look specifically would be in those workstreams that were identified coming out of Hampton Court. Again, I think I mentioned to the Committee that there was some scepticism at the time of the devising of the Hampton Court priorities as to whether actually they would become embedded in the work either of the Commission or of the European Union more generally. I have been heartened by the extent to which the Hampton Court priorities have become part of the lexicon of how Europe works, even in the few short months since October. That would mean a focus, for example, on taking forward work on research and development, on energy, as we have discussed, with Mr Piebalgs' report, and also more generally on this issue of how universities can work better with not just the research resources that are available but the business community to translate European ideas into European products and European jobs. Q12 Michael Connarty: You have not mentioned work, given that unemployment is rising in many of the key countries of the European Union to such an extent that they are saying that some of the anticipated moves forward on the EU economy are stalling because of this lack of work. What do you think we can bring to the Council that will move people forward in that respect and actually create a longer work life in Europe and a more productive use of labour in Europe, which does seem to be one of the key stumbling-blocks in some of the stronger economies in Europe at the moment? Mr Alexander: Of course, employment is one of the priorities, as I said, for our own national reform programme, which was published recently on behalf of the UK Government, but you are right in identifying not just unemployment but long-term unemployment as one of the principal challenges that the European Union faces. I would argue that our experience over the last eight years here in the United Kingdom reflects the fact that there is no single silver bullet that can secure employment growth. You need a range of different strategies, starting from the foundation of economic stability, building on that in terms of investment in the supply side, through ensuring that your people are equipped with the requisite skills. You need open markets so that you can provide not just the training and support that people need but create the job opportunities whereby they can secure employment. In that sense, I think the broad thrust of Lisbon, which was asking how we take Europe up the value chain of the modern economy, is not, in itself, contradictory to a high jobs strategy. I think, actually, in the modern economy, given the increasing pressures that we are facing from countries like China and India, with which we will never be able to compete on the basis of low skills, low wages, low added value, it is not an optional extra to say we should have a renewed focus on research and development or on universities, it is an essential foundation not just of economic success but of employment growth. Specifically on your question in terms of how we ensure the European workforce is capable of meeting that challenge, one of the areas which were identified at Hampton Court was the area of demographics. I have to say, when I read that title initially, I thought what is the locus of the European Union on this issue of demographics, will it be simply a report evidencing the declining birth rate in Europe compared with the rising populations in countries like China and India; in fact, it covers a whole range of areas which I think are very relevant to your question. For example, the issue of childcare, how do we ensure that we are able to provide economic opportunities and the means by which those economic opportunities can be grasped by female workers, in particular. Secondly, it looks at this issue in terms of the working life and how we can ensure that, in an era where life expectancy is increasing, we do get the balance right, a challenge that we are facing here domestically in the United Kingdom as well, on the issue of pensions and indeed of retirement age. There are a lot of issues which I think are directly relevant to ensuring that the European workforce is capable of rising to the challenge and which is complementary to all of the other steps that are being taken, in relation to Lisbon and also in relation to Hampton Court. Q13 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: Minister, your White Paper published last month has a section on Better Regulation, about the need to lighten administrative burdens and improve competitiveness, on page ten, but you are not doing this at home, are you? Last Thursday the House debated the regulations to implement the Artists' Resale Right Directive and you are gold-plating that Directive, and the threshold at which it applies has been reduced below the €3,000 required in the Directive down to €1,000, to the dismay of the art market who had their objections overruled, even though it complicates their business and reduces their competitiveness. These are fine words in your White Paper but who is responsible for implementing it across Whitehall, or are you just trying to tell the Europeans what to do but not doing it at home? Mr Alexander: The policy position, which I understand is a subject of debate within the House, indeed in the deferred voting, that I am sure most of us have just taken part in, this question arose, is the balance to be struck between the interests of the artists and indeed of dealers. I have in front of me the description that I have been offered in terms of what the initial European instrument stated, which was that there needed to be a balance of benefits to artists in rewarding their creativity and low risk of cost to the art market. We are required to set a threshold between zero and €3,000 and setting the threshold at €1,000, therefore, I would argue, is not itself gold-plating. To go beyond €3,000 I would have some sympathy with your arguments, but given the terms of the threshold that is set between zero and €3,000 then there is a genuine choice to be made as to what the threshold should be according to the public policy choice that we make here within the United Kingdom and that balance between the interests of the art market and indeed of individual artists. Q14 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: That will not do. Let me remind you that the Government, your Government, voted against this Directive, but instead of implementing it to the minimum you went below that and now you are going to scoop up into the net thousands of extra objects and small businesses and artists, many of whom are against the Directive, because, of course, it will simply send the business to New York. Instead of doing what is required by the Directive you go beyond it. That contradicts the message in your White Paper which is about reducing administrative burdens and improving competitiveness; so why are you saying one thing in a government White Paper while, in the same week, you are going beyond it in regulation? There is a very familiar story here, but when are you finally going to stop publishing fine words which are simply not implemented in practice? It causes immense cynicism about the entire European project as well as reducing your own reputation. Mr Alexander: On the specific detail of the Artists' Resale Right, it is not a matter for which I have direct policy responsibility and for that reason I do not say that because, of course, I am bound by collective responsibility, but I will ensure that a letter is forthcoming to the Committee on the specific policy matter that you raise. My clear understanding, on the basis of the briefing I undertook before the appearance before this Committee, was that a balance did need to be struck between zero and €3,000 and it was on that basis a policy choice was made to establish the figure of €1,000, but I will ensure a reply is forthcoming. On your general point in terms of gold-plating, it is of course a matter which is of concern to us; that is why we have asked Neil Davidson QC to undertake a review of this, so that we can move beyond the often rather sterile debate as to what level of regulation exists and whether gold-plating does exist. I think it would serve the interests of this Committee and indeed of the Government that we have that report as the basis on which we can look at this matter in the future. Q15 Mr Steen: Transparency: a question that my colleague, Mr Dobbin, asked a moment ago. I ask this question only for a bit of advice and perhaps some insight. This Committee goes to countries which take over the Presidency every six months. It is a costly exercise, an enjoyable one and very interesting that we go into these countries. The Chairman led a splendid delegation - of which I think I was the only Conservative - to Austria, just before Christmas, and we questioned all the officials and all the ministers and we were treated royally, and we went away having a very clear idea, or certainly I did, about what the Austrians were about. We learned, I think it was last week, that the Austrians are about to revive the dead patient, in the shape of the constitution, and we knew nothing about this, the Chairman knew nothing about it, none of the Members knew anything about it. I wonder whether you have been privy to the Austrian Presidency, six months, or whether we are all in the dark, or it is just a total red herring? Mr Alexander: I must say, you make your trip to Vienna immediately before Christmas sound very hard work. I am afraid I was in Strasbourg and Brussels at the time. I think you got slightly the better deal. In terms of the discussions we have had with the Austrians, of course we discuss, as you would expect from an outgoing Presidency, the areas of priority of the incoming Presidency. I imagine the Committee may want to ask about the European tax in due course, given the comments both of the Austrian President and indeed the Austrian Chancellor. It is not for us to dictate to an incoming Presidency what their priorities would be, but beyond the public statements that have been made, in particular by Ursula Plassnik, the Foreign Minister of Austria, I think we are broadly where I would have expected to be, which is just over halfway through the period of reflection. Of course, one would expect the Presidency to have something to say, who are responsible for facilitating the rendezvous which will take place in the June European Council. The Austrian position on the constitution has been developed historically. They have a particular responsibility during their Presidency, not simply to represent their national interest but to find consensus. In that sense, I do not regard it as being in any way threatening that the Austrians have a different emphasis from perhaps the public comments that have emerged from the British Government over recent weeks or months. The challenge is to make sure that over the weeks and months ahead we are able to engage constructively with all European partners, as we anticipate where we will be in the June European Council. Frankly, our priority during the first six months after the previous June Council was to have an effective and successful Presidency; you would expect me to say that. Of course, now we are giving thought to these broader issues of the future of Europe, and in particular the status of the draft Constitutional Treaty. The Prime Minister made reference to it yesterday, in his appearance before the House of Commons Committee the previous day, that day we had also spoken about it in the House of Commons. I am sure this is a matter where there will be continued debate within the United Kingdom. A final point I would make, however, would be, as well as the comments of Ursula Plassnik there have been significant comments from other European politicians since the turn of the year. I read with particular interest the comments that President Chirac made to his diplomats' conference in the first couple of weeks of the year, in Paris, and indeed the article that my opposite number, Catherine Colonna, placed in Le Figaro early in the year as well, both of which indicated that they were looking for incremental improvements to the operation of the European Union on the basis of existing Treaties. I have also noted, for example, the comment of Bernard Bot, the Dutch Foreign Minister, that for the Dutch the Treaty is dead. There is a range of opinions out there and I would not regard the statement by the Austrian Presidency at this stage as being in any way definitive as to where the debate will reach in the months to come. Q16 Michael Gove: I just want to continue on the issue of transparency and take you back to Brussels and Strasbourg. The European budget deal which the British Presidency brokered, I think I am right in saying that we have not yet had a detailed publication outlining how each nation stands, in terms of increased growth and net contributions, abatements and receipts. In response to a question that I asked of the Treasury on 31 January, your colleague, the Financial Secretary, published some very interesting figures. The Prime Minister said, in a statement to the House on 19 December, that our abatement would rise, not fall, but in Mr Lewis' answer he points out that while the abatement indeed does rise over the next two years then it falls in 2010 and again in 2011. It is also the case that net receipts from the European Union fall from 5.6 billion to 4.2 billion by 2011, meaning that our net contribution increases by over £1 billion. That was not made clear at the time by the Prime Minister. These figures had to be unearthed through a parliamentary question. Why cannot we have a publication of not just Britain's position in the budget deal but our position relative to other nations? Mr Alexander: Forgive me but I must take issue with the honourable gentleman. In terms of the statement that was made to the House immediately following the Council on 19 December 2005, let me remind the Committee as to what the Prime Minister stated at that stage. He stated, and I quote: "Because the rebate stays on CAP and all spending in the EU15, the rebate will rise, not fall, to an average of €5.8 billion in payments terms from 2007. In terms of net contributions, our contribution will increase by 63% over the next financial period in comparison with 2006. France's contribution, by contrast, will increase by 124%. Moreover, Mr Speaker, after some 20 years of paying under the original rebate twice as much as France, the United Kingdom and France contributions will from 2007, for the first time in history, be in rough parity. We have delivered a budget deal that is €160 billion cheaper than the original Commission proposals, provides for a huge transfer of spending from the original 15 to the new Member States of Eastern Europe and preserves the British rebate in full on the CAP and all spending in EU15." If the allegation is that is inconsistent with the answer that the Economic Secretary gave, I would certainly be interested as to on what basis the claim is being made. Q17 Michael Gove: I think the particular point, Chairman, is that there may well be inconsistencies, actually, because on the basis of the answer from the Treasury the abatement will fall after 2010, something not revealed and stated by the Prime Minister. He promised to make assertions about France's and Italy's contribution, yet we do not have detailed figures which have been published in the public domain so we can make the judgment as to whether or not the Prime Minister's assessment was correct. Given that the Treasury statement runs counter to the Prime Minister's statement, why cannot we have the publication of the full budget deal? Mr Alexander: In terms of the publication of every statistic in the Treasury, I am sure nothing would give the Quai d'Orsay greater happiness and joy at this particular stage of the discussions, in terms of the inter-institutional agreement, than to receive all of the workings of the British Treasury, indeed every other Member State's, finance department. However, of course we are under a clear obligation to Parliament to answer questions factually, and indeed to account truthfully on the floor of the House of Commons. I have no evidence, from the question that you have put to me, that there is such a disparity between the statement that was made, indeed you yourself have conceded, that the abatement will rise from where it has been during the period 2000-2006, unless you have noticed anything from the previous question. Q18 Michael Gove: I am merely quoting what the Treasury itself says, rising from 3.9, going up to 4.8, before then falling again to 3.5? Mr Alexander: Right; so you do accept that it rises. Michael Gove: Before it falls. Q19 Richard Younger-Ross: On transparency, Minister, the Council of Ministers; we have looked at making it more open but the openness seems to be rather shallow. The Netherlands, Sweden, think more should be done to make votes, for instance, more transparent so we know how individual ministers have voted and countries have voted. Why did the UK Government not join The Netherlands and Sweden when they had the opportunity to do so? Can you say, will individual countries' vote be transparent at a future date, or not? Mr Alexander: The answer to the simple question as to why we did not join those two other countries is not a policy issue but a proprietary issue. We deemed it inappropriate, given we were holding the Presidency at the time, effectively then to make a side declaration as to the British position when we were seeking to secure the maximum position of consensus within the Council. In policy terms, I find myself in sympathy with the points that were made that we should aim to go significantly further than what has been achieved to date. I would merely rehearse the arguments that I gave you earlier. Really there were two options which could have been achieved. Clearly, the Swedes were minded to go further and had we been the only voice in the room we would have gone further as well; our Prime Minister stated that earlier in the Presidency. The fact is, we did have to secure what agreement we could and that is why we have both secured the review and secured a political declaration, but I hope that, in turn, we will be able to go further in the future. Q20 Richard Younger-Ross: On other issues, like trade liberalisation, this country has always been prepared to go ahead of the pack. Could we not, in this case, go ahead of the pack and could our ministers not report back to this Parliament exactly how they have voted in the Council of Ministers? Mr Alexander: Individual Member States are public on the decisions that they reach and we account to Parliament in terms of the decisions that we reach. That being said, with respect, I think we were leading this discussion during the last six months, and had it not been for the initiative of the British Government in pushing to secure as maximal a position as we could achieve on transparency we would not have seen the progress that we secured. Q21 Richard Younger-Ross: So, on any question on agriculture, or on DTI, you are saying that if we ask we will be told exactly how our minister has voted on all of those issues? Mr Alexander: There are statements made after each Council, reporting back to Parliament the conclusions. Q22 Richard Younger-Ross: On how we voted, not just broad statements of what our policy stance is? Mr Alexander: Of course, if questions are asked of us, by any Member of Parliament, then we endeavour to answer them. What I am clear about is the fact that statements are issued after every Council which narrate the outcomes of Council meetings. If there are individual decisions which are a matter of probing by parliamentary colleagues then that will be a decision which will be reached on the basis of the particular question that is put to us. Q23 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: Minister, we have heard that the Council of Ministers has moved at a snail's pace to open itself up. Can you tell me what you think of another EU body. Do you think that public suspicion about the EU is fuelled by the fact that all European laws and regulations have to be initiated by 25 unelected people, meeting in private, called the European Commission? They are against all monopolies except that monopoly, which they guard jealously, their monopoly over new legislation. Do you think that is just wholly incompatible with any system that pretends to call itself, in any sense, democratic? I notice your White Paper is silent on this, so are you not prepared to push for reform, genuinely opening up the European institutions right across the board, if we are to have any chance of re‑engaging the public in this charade of democracy in Brussels? Mr Alexander: The power of initiation is long-standing and has been one of the cornerstones on which not just the European Union but the single market has been built. I think, if you take the example of the single market, it evidences the importance of being able to have the ability to take those kinds of decisions on the basis of initiation from the Commission. On the general point that you make in terms of is it a charade of democracy, the European Union, I think, with respect, we probably disagree. I certainly wanted to see greater transparency in the course of the British Presidency. We have also wanted to see a greater engagement of the British Parliament, and indeed other Member State Parliaments, during the Presidency, which is why we convened an important conference with the Dutch Government, who share many similar views with us on this matter and the issue of subsidiarity. I do not sit before this Committee and suggest that there cannot be further progress made in ensuring that people do feel that sense of connection and engagement with the means by which Europe reaches its decisions. On the other hand, I am not convinced that the case which you make, that the power of initiation should be removed from the European Commission, is the right way forward. Q24 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: The European Convention, which drew up the constitution, was mandated to create a simpler, more democratic Europe, closer to its citizens. That has not been achieved. We have wasted another two years. Why not be pressing and pushing and demanding that all these institutions open themselves up to public scrutiny, starting with the most powerful one of all, which, as I say, has a monopoly of initiative about the laws which then we have to obey? That is simply not democratic and everybody knows that it is not, so why are you not pressing for a properly radical reform rather than simply going along with the tide? Mr Alexander: With the greatest of respect, I do not believe that what you are proposing is the right answer. I am respectful of your own experience on the Convention, but I do think, given that depth of experience and knowledge, there is some risk that sometimes you can see problems through the wrong end of a telescope. I do not believe that the principal legitimacy issue facing the European Union is institutional in character as much as can Europe be seen transparently to address the issues of principal concern to Europe's citizens. I find, in conversation and debates and discussions that I have here in the United Kingdom, if the debate starts from the curvature of a cucumber, or even whether the British pint is going to be allowed to continue to exist, on the basis of wholly misguided but nonetheless potent myths put about in British newspapers, it is understandably difficult to convince people as to the merits of the European ideal and a European future. On the other hand, if you say to people, in a commonsensical fashion, are there challenges which it is better for the United Kingdom to address working together, whether the issue of climate change, whether the issue of securing jobs for prosperity now in the world's largest single market, whether the ability for us to meet challenges like migration and immigration, are we better equipped to address those by working in concert with other European nations in the European Union, I think actually the majority of British citizens have sympathy with that argument. I think, respectfully, when we said at the outset of the British Presidency that it would be wholly wrong to spend the next six months engaged in an inward-looking institutional argument about the relative authority of the Commission, Parliament or indeed the Council of Ministers, that instead we should seek to make practical changes, whether geopolitical in effect, such as the decision to open accession talks with Turkey, or other practical areas of work, for example, the work that we secured in the form of the sugar regime under the Common Agricultural Policy, it was the best service that we could offer both to convincing people the case that I believe, that Britain's future does lie within the European Union, and avoiding the perception which you claim to be concerned about, which is that people appear to think politicians are somehow out of touch as soon as they start discussing Europe. I think that literally we could guarantee they would be perceived as being out of touch if at this particular juncture we were returning to an entirely institutionally-focused discourse about the European Union. Q25 Chairman: Minister, I am moving on to questions on 'Near Neighbours'. Belarus: what is the EU's policy on Belarus? Mr Alexander: At the last General Affairs Council, which took place, if I recollect, a week ago on Monday, there was a leading Opposition politician from Belarus whom I had the opportunity to meet with directly and hear of the concerns that she has, as they anticipate the coming elections within Belarus. It is a matter of considerable concern to the European Union, the present position and the present circumstances in which Belarus finds itself. Looking to the future, a neighbourhood policy would be open to Belarus, if there were sufficient improvements in exactly those issues of democracy and in human rights, but, regrettably, those benchmarks have not been achieved under the present regime. Therefore, the elections, which I understand are taking place on 19 March this year, will be the next key test to establish whether we can see free and fair elections within Belarus. The final point that I would make would be that I am conscious, in answering that question, that it is not as easy to discern the policy instruments available to the European Union in Belarus as in many other Near Neighbours. It is a matter which is receiving continuous focus within the Councils of the European Union, not least because, for many of the new members of the European Union, Belarus is anything but a distant country, but actually near, both in terms of their thoughts as well as their geography. Q26 Chairman: What happens if the March elections turn out to be not fair and free? Mr Alexander: Our scope to influence the regime, even if the elections are not free and fair, I do not think it is disingenuous to recognise, is limited, but I would not wish to prejudge what steps the Union could take potentially in those circumstances, given that all of our focus at the moment is on supporting efforts to ensure that they are free and fair. In particular, also, work that we have taken forward to support civil society and non‑governmental organisations which are fundamental to the health of democracy and which have been under considerable pressure in Belarus in recent months and years. Q27 Michael Connarty: I want to move on to the Middle East. There is one outstanding question about the future of the agreement with Syria, which I understand was supposed to be based upon partnership and reciprocity and shared values. Given Syria's position in failing to co‑operate with the investigation into the murder of the Lebanese Prime Minister, one wonders exactly how far that has got to go, and it is not mentioned specifically, I notice, in your White Paper, at all, unless I missed it. Also, you might want to comment on the next period, given the result of the Palestinian elections, and there would appear to be the determination by Israel to steal a large part of the former Palestinian Occupied Territories by continuing with the building of the wall? Mr Alexander: The position of the British Government and indeed the position, if I recollect, which had been taken in the General Affairs Council, in relation to the barrier, are well-known and are well-rehearsed. While we recognise that Israel has a legitimate right to protect its citizens from terrorism, that does not justify the development of the barrier, for example, on Palestinian territory. Those views have been communicated directly to the Israeli Government and that position is unchanged. We do face real challenges, of course, in terms of the election of the Hamas Party to leadership within the Palestinian Authority and we have taken a position, which the Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, set out before the House of Commons in Foreign Office Questions yesterday, which is different from some others in terms of our approach to the financing of the Palestinian Authority. This is a matter which we continue to discuss, not just directly with the Israelis but with other partners within the quartet. On your related point in terms of Syria, I think it is right to identify your concerns in terms of the divergence of values. I would not claim that there is alignment of values between ourselves and the Syrian Government on many areas of policy, but it does beg a fundamental question as to how the European Union can extend its influence to advance peace, democracy and stability in Near Neighbourhoods, and in particular in the Middle East. I would argue that, notwithstanding the fact that often it involves dealing with other countries which we may have a difference with, indeed very fundamental disagreements, nonetheless, there is a case for Europe working to see where we can exert influence to effect the kinds of changes that we want. That may be in relation to Syria, it may also be, as is well rehearsed, on the issue of nuclear proliferation, where, with the support of the European Union, the E3 and now the United States have led efforts which have led to where we are today, in terms of the report to the Security Council. Q28 Michael Gove: Given what you have just said about Iran and the role of the E3, do you think it is appropriate to acknowledge that diplomacy ran its course some time ago and that the comments of the Iranian President indicate that Iranian hardliners drew comfort from the approach that the European Union was taking, rather than recognising that there was a robustness when it came to dealing with the issue of non-proliferation, at the heart of our approach? Mr Alexander: Chairman, rather inadvertently I gave some unintended publicity to the Henry Jackson Society yesterday, in answer to the honourable gentleman's question to me on Cuba, and I feel I am about to do the same by suggesting that, while his views may find favour on the wilder shores of the Henry Jackson Society or neo-conservative opinion in the United States, I am not convinced that diplomacy has run its course. The views he expresses are perfectly honourable ones for somebody to advance. I simply do not agree with them. I took part in a debate in this House last week in which a number of his Conservative colleagues put similar points to me. Boiled down, their case was essentially a forceful and eloquent plea that something must be done, but they were far more detailed in their description of the problem than in the prescription of the solution. I think actually one of the challenges that we face in relation to resolving this issue with Iran is to recognise quite how difficult, time-consuming and complex is the issue of diplomacy, but nonetheless recognise that it is vital to maintain an international consensus, for some of the reasons that we rehearsed in our discussion on energy policy. I do think it is right to secure international consensus, not just because it strengthens our hand but I believe offers us the best hope of being able to send an effective signal to the Iranian administration at this juncture. That involves necessarily securing the support both of China and indeed of Russia, and therefore it is vital at this stage, as the report has now been to the Security Council, that we maintain as united a front as we can. I would be careful, again, however, to pay due respect to the IEA, in the sense that we have gone for reports rather than referral, in order that we uphold the importance of the IEA as the body continuing to deal directly with Iran on this matter, rather than it being a Security Council matter. I cannot anticipate, as neither could the Foreign Secretary when he answered questions on this matter in the Commons yesterday, where those discussions within the Security Council will reach, but I am far from convinced that diplomacy has run its course at this stage. I think now it is vital that we send a unified signal, not just from within this House but from within the international community, that we do require Iran to move into meeting its obligations under the various IEA Board resolutions, of which it is in breach. Q29 Michael Gove: The Minister will be aware that the European Union has a fund to support the establishment of democracy in the near abroad and the Minister will be aware also that the Prime Minister, when challenged by the Leader of the Opposition about the situation in Iran, agreed with the Leader of the Opposition that the fundamental problem lay in the undemocratic nature of the Iranian regime rather than particular policies it happened to follow at the moment. Can you elucidate what support the Foreign Office, the British Government and the European Parliament are offering to create democracy activists within Iran, and particularly labour organisations, like the bus drivers, and others, who are striking in Tehran at the moment? Mr Alexander: Given the honourable gentleman's previous experience on the picket line of the press in general, I know that he cares deeply about these issues of industrial relations and I pay due respect to him for that. Chairman: He was not about during the miners' strike, if I remember correctly. Q30 Michael Gove: I was at school at the time. (Inaudible) Mr Alexander: That is a line I fear we will hear more from the Conservative Party in the years to come. I will write to the honourable gentleman. I misspoke. I shall ask my colleague, Kim Howells, the Minister with responsibility, to write to him on the specific question that he raises. He is right in recognising that for every so‑called democratic structure within Iran there are also parallel theological structures. It is not a system of governance which is easily understood by those outwith that particular community. That probably, therefore, should conclude my remarks on the matter and ensure that the reply is forthcoming. Q31 Mr Cash: Following up on that specific point, does the Government take the view that democratic elections create a democracy? Or does the Government take the view, for example, with regard to Hamas and with regard to Iran, that if a government does not behave in a democratic fashion, for example, just to take the provisions of the European Treaties, that if a government did not subscribe to human rights arrangements, as set out in the Treaty, they could have their membership suspended? Applying similar criteria, would one say that, in fact, with respect to the Middle East, there are not only question-marks but there are moments when you would simply say "We can't deal with you because you're not behaving in a democratic fashion"? Mr Alexander: I am very intrigued, Chairman, by the honourable gentleman's suggestion that now we should extend the reach of the European Union right into the Middle East. It is certainly a new line of questioning. In terms of the substance of the point, it is a valid and important question. I think, of course one would wish to see free and fair elections and therefore simply to have elections is no guarantor that a government is democratic; they can be transparently unfair and unfree elections. Election to government is the start of a journey, not the conclusion of a journey, and that is why in our public commentary, particularly in relation to Hamas in recent days, we have been scrupulous in acknowledging the fact that a decision has been reached, by what appears to be a free and fair means, by the people of the Palestinian Authority and we are respectful of that decision. Equally, we are clear that you cannot simultaneously accept the privileges and responsibilities of a democratic government while actively pursuing a course of violence. We have been, I hope, solicitous in both acknowledging the right of the Palestinian people to reach their choice but, at the same time, to avoid saying anything which does anything but leave the responsibilities squarely on the shoulders of Hamas at this time to establish their credentials in terms of their fair dealings with neighbouring countries and indeed the wider international community. Q32 Jim Dobbin: Minister, can we leave the Middle East and move to Russia, on our global tour this afternoon. Is the Government satisfied that Russia can and will live up to its side of the bargain in what is described as the Four Common Spaces? How can recent legislation against NGOs there be squared with its commitments to its shared values? Mr Alexander: We had expressed concern in terms of the recent NGO law which was passed in the Russian Duma, and that is a matter of record. We support the work of NGOs within Russia in a transparent and straightforward manner. We believe that they are an essential ingredient of a healthy civic society and indeed contribute to the kind of democracy that we have just been discussing. We do believe that we made some real progress at the EU‑Russia Summit that took place under the British Presidency. I did not mention it earlier, in the course of our discussion of energy policy, but at that Summit we established a structured dialogue on energy and that reflects one of the areas of work of the Four Common Spaces. I would not claim that the Four Common Spaces is the only word or the final word in either Britain's relations with Russia or indeed the European Union's relations with Russia, but I do believe it provides a framework and a basis on which we can take forward that dialogue, albeit that there will be challenging and difficult issues, no doubt, in the years ahead. Q33 Michael Connarty: Do you want to comment on security policy in a wider area; specifically, what work does the Government want to see taken forward under a CFSP "workstream" that emerged? It was one of the six that emerged from the Hampton Court informal Summit. What would you say were its priorities? Mr Alexander: I think it will be easiest to describe as the familiar headline foreign policy issues that we are dealing with. Within the CFSP ambit you have, of course, the issue of Iran, which we have spoken about, there are other priorities in terms of ESPD civilian missions, we have seen those taken forward during the British Presidency, also out of area missions, in the sense that, for the first time, we saw an EU mission to Ache, in support of the peace initiative that is being taken forward there. Whether it is in support of the African Union, in terms of the important work it is undertaking in Darfur, whether it is in Asia, in Ache or indeed nearer to home, in terms of the Rafa border mission, we believe that there have been successful missions undertaken under the CFSP banner during the British Presidency, and we would expect that to continue as we look ahead to the Austrian Presidency. Q34 Michael Connarty: Is not that just a reactive agenda? I get the sense it is developing without a plan, in some way. What started off as a specific model for the Balkans now is just going to Africa, Afghanistan, Iran; we are just being drawn into things without any sense of plans, targets and limits. Mr Alexander: As in all foreign policy, there is always going to be an aspect in which one has to react to events. For example, when a request is made to us that there is an urgent need to assist, in terms of the border crossing in Rafa, I do not see it as being incoherent or unstrategic to recognise that need and to be able to address it, if it makes sense in terms of the broader CFSP agenda that has been set out in terms of the advancement of the values which the European Union shares and which are in the national interest of the requisite Member States. For example, if you look at the Rafa border mission, it is a good example of where I believe that the European presence has been welcomed both on the Palestinian side and indeed on the Israeli side. It is hard not to argue that, given everything that is happening in our modern world, we do not have a very clear direct interest in seeing a way forward in the Middle East peace process, of course we do, but equally it would be hard to envisage which individual Member State would have been either willing or capable of undertaking that mission without it being a genuine collective effort of the European Union. I think that example probably makes the case that I have tried to describe, which is, clearly you want to advance broader foreign policy interests but equally you want to have the capacity to respond effectively to specific circumstances as they arise. Q35 Michael Connarty: Do you not think that the External Relations Commissioner's (Ferrero-Waldner) reference to, for example, "the need for coherence between different CFSP instruments at the disposal of the Union under the first and second pillar" and remarks on this being, and I quote, "the rationale for the Commission being "fully associated" with CFSP" and reflecting, again a quote, "the direction which the Constitutional Treaty was taking us" sounds like the Commission once again trying to get even more levered into the CFSP arena? It is "here we go again," with the Commission growing like Topsy? Mr Alexander: I am not sure that I follow your final clause, in the sense that what even an esteemed Commissioner like Mrs Ferrero-Waldner says and what is achieved can often differ. In that sense, it may well be the ambition of individuals within the Commission to see changes, but they are bound by the terms of the Treaties under which the Commission operates and there has not been the change that was anticipated by the draft Constitutional Treaty because the Treaty has not been ratified. So of course it is the case that one would have moved to a position under the Treaty where there was a Foreign Minister, where there was an External Action Service supporting that Foreign Minister, but I think that the quotes that you offer reflect a sense of what might have been under the Treaty rather than that clear, contemporary changes are actually happening on the ground at the moment. Q36 Jim Dobbin: On the CFSP, do you think, Minister, that it is significantly underfunded, given its ever-expanding horizons and the likely long-term nature of the engagements that it has entered into? Mr Alexander: There is a balance to be struck between our credentials as a country broadly supportive of discipline in the European budget, which I believe has been further burnished by the budget deal which was agreed in December, and a recognition in public policy terms that we have supported an increase and an uplift in the CFSP budget because we believe it has proved to be an effective tool to advance not just British national interests but the broader interests of the European Union. Under our Presidency there was a significant uplift in that budget and the budget line for CFSP from, if I reflect, €62 million to €102 million. We believe that does represent a significant step forward. Of course, there will always be competing demands on those resources but, as I say, I think you need to strike a balance between there being legitimate competing demands, which exercises a degree of budget discipline, and, on the other hand, having sufficient funds that we can meet future challenges. Q37 Michael Connarty: I have had again the privilege of going with the Armed Forces (parliamentary committee ?), spending a week with our troops and then with the EU in both Bosnia and Kosovo. What sort of role do you see for the EU in a post-settlement Kosovo and do you see it as being similar to the settlement which we have now in Bosnia? Though, basically, although it is called 'military', I have to say, the troops I spoke to said they were just glorified policemen and did not actually do any soldiering. Mr Alexander: Obviously we are at a delicate stage in Kosovo, not just because of the passing of President Rugova but also where Martti Ahtisaari's final status talks have actually led us, and I would not wish today to say anything, with respect, that would prejudge the outcome of those final status talks. That being said, I think there is a broad sense in which Europe will have a continuing role to play, principally civilian, because there will continue to be a need for military support for what emerges from the final status talks and we are supportive of the efforts that NATO has made in that regard. Whether that is, for example, in the area of governance or support for the judiciary, those are areas where Europe has worked previously, but I would expect that it would be in that type of area that you would see a continuing European presence, whatever the outcome of the final status talks. Q38 Nia Griffith: If we could look at the UN and the EU and switch to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, is there likely to be any new EU military mission to back up the UN during the elections there this spring? Mr Alexander: Our principal focus is on supporting the African Union in the transition to a blue-helmeted operation. I think it is important just to recognise how successful the African Union has been in what have been very difficult circumstances, both for them operationally, because they have got very limited experience of undertaking a mission of that sort, and also in working in concert both with NATO and then with the European Union in their efforts. As I say, our principal focus now is on the transition to supporting a UN effort. It seems to be the only agency that would be capable of undertaking the work that the African Union, given its capabilities and capacity, has taken to a level which now it feels it is necessary to hand over. That is an important point, because there has been some commentary and criticism suggesting that somehow this mission has now been taken away from the African Union. In fact, the African Union itself has made clear its desire to complete the phase of the mission which it is capable of delivering, and in that sense that is the focus of our work. In terms of what efforts then will go into supporting elections we will turn to once we have resolved the issue of the UN. Q39 Chairman: Where does the Government want ESDP to be at the end of 2006? Mr Alexander: In what sense; in a financial sense, in a strategic sense? Q40 Chairman: In a strategic sense; where do you see it being? Mr Alexander: We want to build on the successes that we believe have been secured in the course of the British Presidency. We believe that, for example, we can build on the success of the civilian ESPD missions which have been undertaken. Obviously, we will continue work in Bosnia, which we have just spoken about, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and elsewhere, and we will consider what role can be played in Kosovo, depending on the outcome of the final status agreement. There will be potentially a rule of law mission in Iraq, depending on continuing work that is underway, and we will review the work that is being undertaken there, and we are monitoring the mission in Palestine. That gives you a flavour of the kinds of issues that will be very much in our mind in the course of the coming year. Chairman: Minister, we have covered a fair range of subjects today. On behalf of the Committee, can I thank you and your colleagues very much for coming along here today. I found the evidence session very informative and, dare I say, quite enjoyable as well. Thank you, Minister. |