'SCORING' PERFORMANCE AGAINST TARGETS
62. A look at the scores for performance against
some of the targets in the Departmental Report illustrates the
difficulties involved in assessing the FCO's performance, particularly
against targets which depend on external factors that may be outside
the FCO's control or even, in some cases, beyond their capacity
to influence.
63. For example, the Departmental Report 2005-06
notes that following the US-India
agreement on nuclear energy development, the United Kingdom is
relaxing its ban on nuclear dual-use exports to India, which is
a nuclear-armed state.[73]
It also notes that Iran is the FCO's "top counter-proliferation
priority." Given that the period covered by the Report ended
on 31 March 2006, when the prospects for a successful resolution
of the Iran nuclear issue were perhaps even less good than they
are now, we find it surprising that the FCO assessed progress
on PSA-1A (the target relating to weapons of mass destruction),
which is couched in terms of "rolling back [WMD] programmes,"
as 'amber' rather than 'red'. Similarly, progress on the PSA on
securing "more robust action by the international community"
on weapons of mass destruction, PSA-1B, was assessed as 'amber',
rather than 'red', although the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
Review Conference failed to reach a substantive agreement.[74]
64. The FCO's Finance Director, Ric Todd, told us
that,
the rating which we give is the product
of a set of assessments against a number of indicators and statistical
measurements and judgments. We put them together, build it up
from the bottom, review it from the top down and come up with
a rating, the result was the one which we made at the time which
we felt was justified.[75]
Sir Michael Jay followed this up in writing, explaining
that in the FCO's view the 'amber' assessment of this target was
justified, given the progress made in areas other than the NPT.
He conceded, however, that "we remain seriously concerned
about the risks of proliferation, especially with respect to Iran
and DPRK [North Korea]."[76]
This exposes one of the limitations of the exercise, which is
that the set of assessments used to build the rating can and often
will incorporate contradictory measurements of progress.
65. Another example of this, also taken from the
FCO's Departmental Report for 2005-06, is the rating of performance
on SR04 PSA-7 (understanding of and engagement with Islamic countries
and promotion of reform). This, too, is shown as amber, or 'on
course'. However, four of the seven 'reform' scorecards are red,
and none is green. Among the red scorecards is perhaps the most
important one, "promoting a moderate version of Islam in
Islamic countries and the UK."[77]
Sir Michael told us that the disparity between the individual
scorecard markings and the overall rating had much to do with
the fact that, although governments in North Africa and the Middle
East had signed up to commitments to introduce democratic and
other reforms, they had so far failed to implement them.[78]
Of course, a target couched in terms of engagement with the Islamic
world, and promoting a moderate version of Islam, is essentially
about inputs, not about outcomes. In scoring its performance against
this target as 'red', the FCO may therefore have been a little
hard on itself.
66. In the case of many departmentsparticularly
those providing services to the public, such as health and educationit
is possible to devise targets that are quantifiable and measurable,
even for outcomes. For the FCO, devising such targets has been
more of a problem. We were critical in our last Report of the
fact that too many of the FCO's targets are expressed in terms
of outcomes which are beyond its ability to secure.[79]
We suggested to the FCO that it discuss with the Treasury a move
to targets based more on inputs and outputs than on outcomes.
67. In reply, the FCO told us that:
From 1 April 2006, the FCO is working towards
achieving nine PSA targets, which were agreed with Treasury during
the 2004 Spending Review. These targets are based on outcomes
and are fixed until 31 March 2008, when the spending review period
expires. As part of the Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR07)
negotiations, the FCO will be required to draw up a new Public
Service Agreement for the next spending review period (2008-11).
This will involve consulting a wide range of stakeholders before
agreeing a new set of PSA targets and performance indicators with
Treasury. As part of this process, we will be discussing whether
targets defined in terms of inputs and outputs are more appropriate,
and how we might devise a performance management framework that
accounts for outcomes where the FCO has limited leverage.[80]
We will certainly wish to monitor this process.
68. The FCO will have to negotiate new PSAs with
the Treasury as part of the Comprehensive Spending Review process
now under way. Sir Michael hinted that some of the less useful
current PSA targets might have been dictated, or at least heavily
influenced, by the Treasury.[81]
If this is so, we would expect FCO Ministers to support their
officials in negotiating specific, measurable, achievable, realistic,
time-related targets. They would certainly have the support of
this Committee if they were to do so. The FCO has told us: "We
welcome the FAC's interest in and views on our PSA targets. PSAs
are proposed to HMT and we will take into account any views made.
We will start negotiations with HMT later this year on the 2008-2011
PSA."[82] The FCO
has also undertaken to provide this Committee with full details
of the 2008-2011 PSA as soon as it has been agreed. However, we
would rather see the draft PSA before it has been agreed, so that
we may comment on it.
69. We recommend that the FCO share its draft
Public Service Agreement with this Committee, before the negotiation
process with HM Treasury is completed.
Fraud
70. In our Report on last year's Departmental Report,
we commented on cases of fraud carried out at Posts overseas.[83]
We were surprised that the FCO had not informed us of the largest
identified loss by fraud in its historyeven though it had
occurred at an Embassy we were about to visitand we were
very concerned that the National Audit Office had found that weaknesses
in financial control and failure to apply correct procedures had
allowed this and other frauds to take place.
71. In its response, the FCO apologised and told
us that procedures had been put in place "to ensure that
the FAC are advised, promptly, of any significant FCO frauds,
in parallel with reporting to the PAC [Public Accounts Committee]."[84]
It also informed the Committee of a further large fraud by persons
unknown involving the loss of satellite 'phones in Iraq, resulting
in a loss of £594,000, and of a fraud carried out by a British
Council employee in Bahrain in 2004, in which £148,000 was
lost.[85]
72. Since then, the FCO has informed us about two
further cases of fraud. In Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, eleven locally-engaged
staff were dismissed in May after it was discovered they had been
under-declaring their social insurance contributions, thus incurring
their employer, the Embassy, a liability of more than £20,000.[86]
In August, we were given details of a further fraud at the Embassy
in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, where the locally employed
accountant stole £200,000.[87]
73. In both cases, it appears that the frauds remained
undiscovered, not because of any lack of procedures or mechanisms
to prevent them, but because the procedures were not followed.
The Ulaanbaatar fraud came to light only after the FCO reminded
all Posts to ensure they were following local regulations. In
September 2005, the Embassy checked records going back to January
2003 and discovered that monthly returns to the Mongolian authorities
since that date had been falsified by locally-engaged staff, without
the knowledge of FCO staff.[88]
In the case of Santo Domingo, the FCO was alerted by a local bank
in July 2006, following which fraud was discovered dating back
to July 2004. The FCO told us that "the fraud was allowed
to take place because of non application of prescribed procedures
rather than gaps in the control framework."[89]
74. In its response to our earlier Report, the FCO
set out the steps it has taken to prevent recurrences of such
frauds:
- the introduction of the Prism
"purchase to pay" system. This provides a good assurance
that payments are valid before they are made;
- the annual programme of home
self audit and self audit for Posts. This provides an additional
annual check that the most important controls are in place;
- the end of month checking regimes
at Posts have been revised to make them more analytical and risk-based
in approach, to highlight issues promptly; and
- there is a major initiative
in place to remove cash from the FCO's payments and receipts systems.
Procedures for the payment of satellite (and mobile)
'phone bills and for sending 'phones to Posts have also been changed,
and the Finance Director wrote to all Heads of Mission reminding
them of the need to ensure that prescribed procedures are in place.[90]
Sir Michael Jay told us that he attached huge importance to ensuring
that Ambassadors realise they are accountable as sub-accounting
officers for financial propriety at their Posts.[91]
75. We hope that these various steps will achieve
a reduction in the number of cases of fraud, but we do not suppose
they will eliminate fraud completely. As we noted above, external
advice or oversight may be helpful in ensuring that the FCO's
internal financial management and auditing procedures are up to
the highest standards.[92]
76. There remains the FCO's undertaking to inform
this Committee as well as the PAC of "significant" frauds.
Government accounting guidelines require departments to inform
Parliament, and to give details in their accounts, of any individual
frauds involving the loss of more than £250,000.[93]
However, departments are obliged to consult the Treasury on "any
cases, irrespective of the amount of money concerned, which involve
important questions of principle; raise doubts about the effectiveness
of existing systems; or contain lessons which might be of wider
interest." We agree that the scale of a fraud is not necessarily
the only or even the best indicator of its significance or its
seriousness. For example, a fraud may also be significant or serious
because, although a relatively small sum has been lost, it is
perpetrated by a senior official, or it involves high political
sensitivity, or it exposes a serious lapse in procedure, or it
risks creating a danger to national security. We would not, therefore,
be content for the FCO to limit its reporting of frauds to this
Committee to cases involving a loss above a particular threshold,
and certainly not to those greater than £250,000. We
recommend that the FCO inform this Committee promptly, and if
appropriate before it is made public, of any fraud which is significant
in terms of the sum lost, or which involves important questions
of principle, or which raises doubts about the effectiveness of
existing systems, or which contains lessons which might be of
wider interest.
43 Foreign Affairs Committee, Second Report of Session
2005-06, HC 522, paras 62 to 69 Back
44
Cm 6791, response to recommendations 19, 20 Back
45
Minutes available at www.fco.gov.uk Back
46
Minutes available at www.fco.gov.uk Back
47
Q 21 Back
48
Qq 93, 94 Back
49
Cm 6791, response to recommendation 19 Back
50
Compared with a 'Capital DEL' provision of £175.5m the FCO's
estimated outturn is £152.5m. See Main Estimates, HC 1035,
bottom of page 335 and Departmental Report Table 8 and last part
of Table 15. Back
51
Q 80 Back
52
Minutes of the May 2006 FCO Board meeting, available at www.fco.gov.uk Back
53
Q 80 (Ric Todd) Back
54
Q 82 Back
55
Minutes of the May 2006 FCO Board meeting, available at www.fco.gov.uk Back
56
Q 82 Back
57
Qq 52-54 Back
58
Ev 39 Back
59
Cm 6823, p 81 and Table 13 Back
60
Q 84 Back
61
Q 85 Back
62
Cm 6791, Annex A Back
63
FCO Audit & Risk Committee terms of reference, available at
www.fco.gov.uk Back
64
FCO Resource Accounts 2004-05, HC 776, December 2005, p 6 Back
65
Minutes available at www.fco.gov.uk Back
66
Board Minutes for July 2006, available at www.fco.gov.uk Back
67
Ev 120 Back
68
Ev 120 Back
69
See para 78-80 Back
70
Ev 120 Back
71
Q 69 Back
72
Q 69 Back
73
Cm 6823, p 110 Back
74
Cm 6823, p 110 Back
75
Q 75 Back
76
Ev 39 Back
77
Cm 6823, p 121 Back
78
Ev 39 Back
79
Foreign Affairs Committee, Second Report of Session 2005-06, HC
522, para 12 Back
80
Cm 6791, response to recommendation 3 Back
81
Qq 72-3 Back
82
Ev 6 Back
83
Foreign Affairs Committee, Second Report of Session 2005-06, HC
522, paras 47 and 48 Back
84
Cm 6791, response to recommendation 13 Back
85
The Iraq fraud was also noted in the FCO's Resource Accounts.
See HC (2005-06) 1495, pp 57-60. Back
86
Ev 92 Back
87
Ev 94 Back
88
Ev 92-93 Back
89
Ev 94-95 Back
90
Cm 6791, response to recommendation 13; see also Ev 4 Back
91
Q 52 Back
92
See paras 47 and 48 Back
93
See www.government-accounting.gov.uk Back