Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Minutes of Evidence


Letter to the Chairman of the Committee from the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

  Thank you for your letter of 25 July. I hope that this response provides you with a full account of the points that you raised in your letter.

What is HMG's view on what breaches of international law have been committed by both Israel and Hezbollah with regard to distinguishing between civilians and military personnel, humanitarian concerns, proportionality and collective punishment?

  All parties to the conflict are responsible for complying with their obligations under International Humanitarian Law, including the obligation not to target civilians and to respect the principle of proportionality. It is vital that both sides abide by International Humanitarian Law and provide access to ensure that life-saving aid reaches those who need it.

  During the crisis, we consistently called on both sides to honour their obligations to protect civilians. I do not believe it would be helpful for HMG to opine at this stage on whether these obligations were met. The most important thing now is to get on with the task of addressing the humanitarian needs of the Lebanese people, the deployment of UNIFIL+, and the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701.

What sort of international force does HMG envisage for Lebanon, in terms of makeup, mandate and rules of engagement, and what contribution would the United Kingdom be able to make?

  The UN has created a Concept of Operations (CONOPs) for the expanded UNIFIL force, which will see a three-phase deployment providing a ceiling of 15,000 UN troops in Lebanon. The Force Generation process is still underway, so full details are not yet available.

  The phase one deployment will focus on mechanised infantry and engineering capabilities, along with the relevant command and control structures (a small land-heavy Joint Task Force HQ) and a naval and air element. The naval element is envisaged as being made up of several large vessels and numerous fast patrol craft. The air element will be based around an aerial reconnaissance capability.

  Phase two is envisaged as further enhancing the mechanised infantry and engineering capability and also providing additional helicopter and logistics assets for the mission.

  Phase three will provide yet more mechanised infantiy battalions plus the introduction of a Gendarmerie unit.

  Due to our current operational commitments elsewhere, we will not be able to provide ground troops. But if the UN has a requirement for certain air and sea support, we would consider providing a destroyer or frigate, which may be suitable for the littoral patrol task, and up to two E3 AWACS and six Jaguar aircraft (two of which can be used in a Photo-Reconnaissance role at any time). These are currently committed to Nato Reaction Force 7 (NRF7), but we may be able to release them. We are willing to respond positively to requests to use our Sovereign Base Areas on Cyprus. We will also pay our share of the costs of the UN operation, on which we pay a premium as a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

  Before the crisis in Lebanon, the MOD had offered the Lebanese Armed Forces a training package for their senior leadership to consider border security issues and apply a structured analysis to address their specific situation. We are willing to look positively at future requests for similar assistance to enhance the capacity of the Government of Lebanon and its armed forces in support of UNSCR 1701.

  We are looking to play a major role in Security Sector Reform (SSR) more generally. This is crucial in order to establish effective internal security and long-term stability in Lebanon. With the UN's encouragement, we are providing a team to help pull together international efforts to train and equip the Lebanese Armed Forces and support longer-term SSR. We have established a scoping team to help focus SSR co-ordination efforts between international partners, UNIFIL planners, and the Government of Lebanon. The team is now moving between Beirut, New York, and European capitals to take forward this work. The team will aim to ensure an SSR structure is swiftly established to co-ordinate international support, together with a process for identifying and responding to longer-term needs.

What preconditions would HMG consider necessary for the deployment of an international force to Lebanon?

  As is normal in such deployments, the UK would require that appropriate concept of operations, rules of engagement, status of forces agreement and clear command and control structures are in place prior to deployment. These are all either already in place or are close to fruition and expected to be in place shortly.

Why has HMG chosen not to support international calls for an immediate ceasefire? What assessment has HMG made of the implications of this policy for Iran's determination to pursue its nuclear programme?

  We deeply regret the loss of life on both sides. However, simply calling for a ceasefire is easy but it does not deliver one. Our focus from the very beginning was to work urgently with other key players at the UN and elsewhere to create the necessary conditions for a durable, sustainable cease-fire that would prevent a return to the status quo ante. Our overarching goal is a Lebanon which is genuinely sovereign and democratic, and in which the Government has a monopoly on the use of force.

  Iran has continued uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities throughout the recent period of conflict in Lebanon. In addition, during this time Iran neither accepted nor rejected the far-reaching proposals of the E3+3 (France, Germany and the UK plus China, Russia and the US). On 31 August Dr El-Baradei issued his report into Iran's compliance with UNSCR 1696.  This report details Iranian failure to suspend enrichment activity and continuing failure to co-operate with the IAEA to resolve outstanding or new issues. There is therefore little to suggest that events in Lebanon have fundamentally changed Iran's approach to its nuclear programme. For our part, we remain committed to a negotiated solution and continue to urge Iran to meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors and the Security Council and return to negotiations on the basis of the E3+3 proposals.

What are HMG's expectations of aid requirements in Lebanon, and what contribution will be made by the United Kingdom?

  Humanitarian assessments reveal the key priorities are: health, clearing unexploded ordinance, restoring livelihoods, water, sanitation and hygiene. The UK will play its full part in helping Lebanon to recover from this conflict. The Prime Minister has been in direct touch with the Lebanese Prime Minister Siniora about ways in which the UK can support both the humanitarian and recovery effort, including emergency bridges to help the flow of assistance. The UK is contributing £22.3 million for humanitarian assistance and early recovery projects in Lebanon—most of this will be channelled through UN agencies, the Red Cross and NGOs, whose role will be crucial. UK funding has so far helped to provide and deliver food, water, health, hygiene, other essential supplies and mine-clearing activities. The funds will also contribute towards emergency bridges, and potentially road repairs, to open up routes for humanitarian assistance. A team of advisers working on both humanitarian issues and post conflict stabilisation and recovery has been in Lebanon, and the Secretary of State for International Development visited Lebanon on 15 August to assess the situation first hand. We will continue to work with the Government of Lebanon to help co-ordinate international efforts to support recovery and reconstruction.

Why did the evacuation of British citizens from Lebanon not begin sooner?

  Our objective was to get all those British nationals who wanted to leave out of Lebanon as safely as possible. We judged that safety was paramount over speed for its own sake. The most vulnerable were evacuated by helicopter. We decided that departure by sea was the safest and most practical option for the majority of British nationals wishing to leave. Given the number of people to be moved, like others in a similar position (France, USA, Canada), we judged that land convoys would be inadequate and potentially dangerous. Our aim throughout was to implement a phased evacuation strategy, and we had factored in the use of Royal Navy vessels for this purpose. We were determined to get this right and needed proper access for our vessels, and the conditions in which we could evacuate people safely and securely.

How many British citizens have been evacuated from Lebanon (a) by the United Kingdom and (b) by other countries, and how were they prioritised? How many citizens of other countries were evacuated by the United Kingdom?

  During the crisis, we deployed an additional 114 staff to Cyprus and Beirut to assist with the evacuation, including an FCO Rapid Deployment Team (RDT). They all played an essential role in processing evacuees onto and off ships and aircraft.

  The first UK-assisted evacuation started on 17 July with a helicopter lift and was followed on 18 July by evacuation via Royal Navy ships. Assisted evacuations continued until 22 July. During the operation, the UK evacuated over 4,600 people to Cyprus. Of these, 2,230 were British passport holders. The remainder comprised largely family members and Commonwealth and EU nationals which we have agreed to assist—where their own country is not represented.

  Over 100 Britons left Lebanon on other EU, UN or Canadian vessels. Others left overland as part of convoys organised by other countries. In many cases, their movement was organised by British Embassy staff (for example families leaving South Lebanon via Tyre).

  We prioritised departures as follows: the sick, those with young families, and the elderly were given first priority. Some were evacuated by helicopter. Where possible, British passport holders were given priority—but we also tried to keep families together. As a result, British nationals would often be accompanied by Lebanese or other dependants.

  We evacuated at least 500 EU nationals from Lebanon to Cyprus as well as over 500 Lebanese dependants. In addition, we evacuated 360 Australians, 40 Americans, 31 New Zealanders, 39 Canadians, 14 Japanese, as well as a number of other nationals. We also acted as liaison points for many other countries whose Governments needed help or advice. We made sure that we had sufficient capacity to evacuate all British nationals who wanted to leave, and then offered spare capacity to international partners. We did not charge them. Throughout the operation we maintained close contact with our EU partners and other key allies.

Is the Government satisfied with the assistance it received from Israel with facilitating the evacuation of British citizens from Lebanon?

  In order to ensure the safety of British nationals, we liaised regularly with the Israeli authorities during the evacuation process, both bilaterally and in concert with EU partners. We secured agreement from the Israelis to provide safe conduct to ships and aircraft used for the evacuation. We co-ordinated on routings and timings in order to de-conflict our ships and aircraft with ongoing IDF combat operations. To date, 106 military and civilian flights, 13 ship transits to Beirut Port, three land convoys and five yacht passages have been coordinated with the IDF through the British Embassy in Tel Aviv. No British nationals were harmed in the evacuation.

Rt Hon Margaret Beckett MP

Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

7 September 2006





 
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