Letter to the Chairman of the Committee
from the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
Thank you for your letter of 25 July. I hope
that this response provides you with a full account of the points
that you raised in your letter.
What is HMG's view on what breaches of international
law have been committed by both Israel and Hezbollah with regard
to distinguishing between civilians and military personnel, humanitarian
concerns, proportionality and collective punishment?
All parties to the conflict are responsible
for complying with their obligations under International Humanitarian
Law, including the obligation not to target civilians and to respect
the principle of proportionality. It is vital that both sides
abide by International Humanitarian Law and provide access to
ensure that life-saving aid reaches those who need it.
During the crisis, we consistently called on
both sides to honour their obligations to protect civilians. I
do not believe it would be helpful for HMG to opine at this stage
on whether these obligations were met. The most important thing
now is to get on with the task of addressing the humanitarian
needs of the Lebanese people, the deployment of UNIFIL+, and the
implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701.
What sort of international force does HMG envisage
for Lebanon, in terms of makeup, mandate and rules of engagement,
and what contribution would the United Kingdom be able to make?
The UN has created a Concept of Operations (CONOPs)
for the expanded UNIFIL force, which will see a three-phase deployment
providing a ceiling of 15,000 UN troops in Lebanon. The Force
Generation process is still underway, so full details are not
yet available.
The phase one deployment will focus on mechanised
infantry and engineering capabilities, along with the relevant
command and control structures (a small land-heavy Joint Task
Force HQ) and a naval and air element. The naval element is envisaged
as being made up of several large vessels and numerous fast patrol
craft. The air element will be based around an aerial reconnaissance
capability.
Phase two is envisaged as further enhancing
the mechanised infantry and engineering capability and also providing
additional helicopter and logistics assets for the mission.
Phase three will provide yet more mechanised
infantiy battalions plus the introduction of a Gendarmerie unit.
Due to our current operational commitments elsewhere,
we will not be able to provide ground troops. But if the UN has
a requirement for certain air and sea support, we would consider
providing a destroyer or frigate, which may be suitable for the
littoral patrol task, and up to two E3 AWACS and six Jaguar aircraft
(two of which can be used in a Photo-Reconnaissance role at any
time). These are currently committed to Nato Reaction Force 7
(NRF7), but we may be able to release them. We are willing to
respond positively to requests to use our Sovereign Base Areas
on Cyprus. We will also pay our share of the costs of the UN operation,
on which we pay a premium as a permanent member of the UN Security
Council.
Before the crisis in Lebanon, the MOD had offered
the Lebanese Armed Forces a training package for their senior
leadership to consider border security issues and apply a structured
analysis to address their specific situation. We are willing to
look positively at future requests for similar assistance to enhance
the capacity of the Government of Lebanon and its armed forces
in support of UNSCR 1701.
We are looking to play a major role in Security
Sector Reform (SSR) more generally. This is crucial in order to
establish effective internal security and long-term stability
in Lebanon. With the UN's encouragement, we are providing a team
to help pull together international efforts to train and equip
the Lebanese Armed Forces and support longer-term SSR. We have
established a scoping team to help focus SSR co-ordination efforts
between international partners, UNIFIL planners, and the Government
of Lebanon. The team is now moving between Beirut, New York, and
European capitals to take forward this work. The team will aim
to ensure an SSR structure is swiftly established to co-ordinate
international support, together with a process for identifying
and responding to longer-term needs.
What preconditions would HMG consider necessary
for the deployment of an international force to Lebanon?
As is normal in such deployments, the UK would
require that appropriate concept of operations, rules of engagement,
status of forces agreement and clear command and control structures
are in place prior to deployment. These are all either already
in place or are close to fruition and expected to be in place
shortly.
Why has HMG chosen not to support international
calls for an immediate ceasefire? What assessment has HMG made
of the implications of this policy for Iran's determination to
pursue its nuclear programme?
We deeply regret the loss of life on both sides.
However, simply calling for a ceasefire is easy but it does not
deliver one. Our focus from the very beginning was to work urgently
with other key players at the UN and elsewhere to create the necessary
conditions for a durable, sustainable cease-fire that would prevent
a return to the status quo ante. Our overarching goal is a Lebanon
which is genuinely sovereign and democratic, and in which the
Government has a monopoly on the use of force.
Iran has continued uranium enrichment-related
and reprocessing activities throughout the recent period of conflict
in Lebanon. In addition, during this time Iran neither accepted
nor rejected the far-reaching proposals of the E3+3 (France, Germany
and the UK plus China, Russia and the US). On 31 August Dr El-Baradei
issued his report into Iran's compliance with UNSCR 1696. This
report details Iranian failure to suspend enrichment activity
and continuing failure to co-operate with the IAEA to resolve
outstanding or new issues. There is therefore little to suggest
that events in Lebanon have fundamentally changed Iran's approach
to its nuclear programme. For our part, we remain committed to
a negotiated solution and continue to urge Iran to meet the requirements
of the IAEA Board of Governors and the Security Council and return
to negotiations on the basis of the E3+3 proposals.
What are HMG's expectations of aid requirements
in Lebanon, and what contribution will be made by the United Kingdom?
Humanitarian assessments reveal the key priorities
are: health, clearing unexploded ordinance, restoring livelihoods,
water, sanitation and hygiene. The UK will play its full part
in helping Lebanon to recover from this conflict. The Prime Minister
has been in direct touch with the Lebanese Prime Minister Siniora
about ways in which the UK can support both the humanitarian and
recovery effort, including emergency bridges to help the flow
of assistance. The UK is contributing £22.3 million for humanitarian
assistance and early recovery projects in Lebanon—most of
this will be channelled through UN agencies, the Red Cross and
NGOs, whose role will be crucial. UK funding has so far helped
to provide and deliver food, water, health, hygiene, other essential
supplies and mine-clearing activities. The funds will also contribute
towards emergency bridges, and potentially road repairs, to open
up routes for humanitarian assistance. A team of advisers working
on both humanitarian issues and post conflict stabilisation and
recovery has been in Lebanon, and the Secretary of State for International
Development visited Lebanon on 15 August to assess the situation
first hand. We will continue to work with the Government of Lebanon
to help co-ordinate international efforts to support recovery
and reconstruction.
Why did the evacuation of British citizens from
Lebanon not begin sooner?
Our objective was to get all those British nationals
who wanted to leave out of Lebanon as safely as possible. We judged
that safety was paramount over speed for its own sake. The most
vulnerable were evacuated by helicopter. We decided that departure
by sea was the safest and most practical option for the majority
of British nationals wishing to leave. Given the number of people
to be moved, like others in a similar position (France, USA, Canada),
we judged that land convoys would be inadequate and potentially
dangerous. Our aim throughout was to implement a phased evacuation
strategy, and we had factored in the use of Royal Navy vessels
for this purpose. We were determined to get this right and needed
proper access for our vessels, and the conditions in which we
could evacuate people safely and securely.
How many British citizens have been evacuated
from Lebanon (a) by the United Kingdom and (b) by other countries,
and how were they prioritised? How many citizens of other countries
were evacuated by the United Kingdom?
During the crisis, we deployed an additional
114 staff to Cyprus and Beirut to assist with the evacuation,
including an FCO Rapid Deployment Team (RDT). They all played
an essential role in processing evacuees onto and off ships and
aircraft.
The first UK-assisted evacuation started on
17 July with a helicopter lift and was followed on 18 July by
evacuation via Royal Navy ships. Assisted evacuations continued
until 22 July. During the operation, the UK evacuated over 4,600
people to Cyprus. Of these, 2,230 were British passport holders.
The remainder comprised largely family members and Commonwealth
and EU nationals which we have agreed to assist—where their
own country is not represented.
Over 100 Britons left Lebanon on other EU, UN
or Canadian vessels. Others left overland as part of convoys organised
by other countries. In many cases, their movement was organised
by British Embassy staff (for example families leaving South Lebanon
via Tyre).
We prioritised departures as follows: the sick,
those with young families, and the elderly were given first priority.
Some were evacuated by helicopter. Where possible, British passport
holders were given priority—but we also tried to keep families
together. As a result, British nationals would often be accompanied
by Lebanese or other dependants.
We evacuated at least 500 EU nationals from
Lebanon to Cyprus as well as over 500 Lebanese dependants. In
addition, we evacuated 360 Australians, 40 Americans, 31 New Zealanders,
39 Canadians, 14 Japanese, as well as a number of other nationals.
We also acted as liaison points for many other countries whose
Governments needed help or advice. We made sure that we had sufficient
capacity to evacuate all British nationals who wanted to leave,
and then offered spare capacity to international partners. We
did not charge them. Throughout the operation we maintained close
contact with our EU partners and other key allies.
Is the Government satisfied with the assistance
it received from Israel with facilitating the evacuation of British
citizens from Lebanon?
In order to ensure the safety of British nationals,
we liaised regularly with the Israeli authorities during the evacuation
process, both bilaterally and in concert with EU partners. We
secured agreement from the Israelis to provide safe conduct to
ships and aircraft used for the evacuation. We co-ordinated on
routings and timings in order to de-conflict our ships and aircraft
with ongoing IDF combat operations. To date, 106 military and
civilian flights, 13 ship transits to Beirut Port, three land
convoys and five yacht passages have been coordinated with the
IDF through the British Embassy in Tel Aviv. No British nationals
were harmed in the evacuation.
Rt Hon Margaret Beckett MP
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
7 September 2006
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