Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 40-59)

SIR MICHAEL JAY, KCMG, MR RICHARD STAGG, CMG, MR DAVID WARREN AND MR RIC TODD

26 OCTOBER 2005

  Q40  Mr Keetch: It is an astonishingly large number. In terms of people individually being murdered—as opposed to Iraq or tsunamis or individual incidents like that—it is a large number of people. What amazes me is that there is no standard procedure to deal with the murder of British citizens overseas, when that dreadful thing happens when they are on holiday. You are aware that I raised, with both the minister and with you, the case of a constituent Mr Richard Collins—and his family are aware that I am going to mention this—who was murdered in Thailand on 9 March this year, and yet his body was allowed to decompose to such a degree that no proper coroner's investigation was able to be carried out. What astonishes me about this incident is that there is no set procedure as to what information is given to families; what information is given to the insurance companies of the deceased concerned; in what way our consular staff overseas tries to deal with the family back in the UK, who are obviously going through very difficult times; and to deal with the insurance company to try to ensure that the body is repatriated as soon as possible. We see in our passport that Her Majesty's Government demands that we are looked after. Surely if we, or our next of kin, or our sons, fathers, brothers or sisters are murdered, there ought to be a standard procedure whereby our consulate staff keep us informed? If we cannot do that correctly, then how can we deal with situations like tsunamis or Katrinas? I think that you ought to look as a matter of urgency at how that is dealt with, to ensure that when these appalling things happen—as they happen dozens of times a year, sadly, to British citizens travelling overseas, and are more likely to increase as travel increases—there are standard procedures which are followed, to ensure that these mistakes do not happen in the future.

  Sir Michael Jay: I thought that this was an important point which you raised, Mr Keetch, of which I had not previously been aware. I asked Mr Stagg to look into it, in case you did raise it today. Could I ask him to say a bit more about it?

  Mr Stagg: Happily. On the question of deaths, I think we have statistics for those who die overseas, which is about 4,000 British citizens every year. I am not sure if they are categorised exactly by the nature of that death. In terms of standard guidance, I have here the standard guidance we have for our consular officials, Dealing with the death of a British citizen overseas. So there are some quite carefully crafted—

  Q41  Chairman: Can you send that to us, please?

  Mr Stagg: I can even give a copy after this.

  Q42  Chairman: I think that the Committee should have it formally.

  Mr Stagg: Yes, I will happily do that. The second thing to say is that, in the case of murders, we would normally communicate with the family in the UK through the police, because they have an investigative interest in the case and they have trained family liaison officers, who are the normal channel through which we work. They are trained to deal with these issues and they have a network all round Britain, which means they can deal with people face to face, which we obviously do not.

  Q43  Mr Keetch: Are you aware of an organisation called SAMM, Support for Murders and Manslaughters of British citizens overseas?

  Mr Stagg: I have heard of it. I have never dealt with it.

  Q44  Mr Keetch: I would suggest that the Foreign Office ought to inform next of kin of British citizens who have been murdered of the existence of that organisation, because certainly in this instance—and I think in other instances—that does not normally happen. If we cannot support citizens back at home in that respect, then I think that we are failing.

  Mr Stagg: Thank you very much. We are very keen to use these occasions to learn as well as to give you our views. To conclude, in the tsunami we found a number of organisations which we had not heard of before who were specialist in helping those who had been bereaved. So this is a help to us.

  Q45  Mr Mackay: Sir Michael, as has been mentioned earlier, the tsunami was geographically widespread. When you are doing a post-mortem and learning lessons, you presumably will have a chance to compare best practice in different embassies and high commissions, because it seems to me that some did considerably better than others—and I am not going to name them, because I think that would be invidious at a public meeting like this. In one particular case there seemed to be severe shortcomings, and in one particular case a specific senior diplomat fell a long way below the standards that should be expected. I gather that this is a matter that has been and is being taken up. However, I do hope that we can have an assurance that you will compare, because there seemed to be a vast difference in performance. I am not on a witch-hunt; I am trying to ensure best practice thereafter.

  Sir Michael Jay: Certainly we would look at the differing nature of the response from different embassies and high commissions, and draw lessons from that. I do not want to get into the particular case either, though there are, as you know, differing views about that. The general point you make, however, is an entirely valid one.

  Q46  Richard Younger-Ross: Of course, with the tsunami there are bodies that are recovered. That is a closure, in a sense. There were many British citizens in the tsunami whose bodies were never recovered: who are missing. There are others who are kidnapped, presumed murdered or whatever. You will know the case of the Popes, whose son was kidnapped, presumed murdered, in Angola, and there has been a long correspondence with the department.

  Sir Michael Jay: Yes. I have met the family in Luanda.

  Q47  Richard Younger-Ross: One of the difficulties they face and others face is presumption-of-death certificates, as I raised with you yesterday, and advice given them at that time was contradictory and wrong. Advice was given on what the presumption of death was in Angola, but of course most families are not interested in what happened in Angola; they are interested in the death and how they register it in the UK. Do you have standard notes of how consular officials should deal with people who are missing and presumption of death, both in terms of abroad and in the UK? If so, could that be placed with this Committee? Also, would you look at revising your draft Support for British Nationals Abroad document, to include a little bit more on that? I think that is an area which is perhaps weak at the moment.

  Mr Stagg: I do not know exactly what you are looking for in our guidance, but I will find what we have and send it to the Committee, and then if there are other issues—

  Q48  Chairman: We will write to you.

  Sir Michael Jay: If it would help the Committee, I think that we should try to look through—given the real interest that you have in consular work and the importance for us of getting your suggestions—and make certain that the Committee has all the relevant documents here. Even though this may be quite a bundle, I think it would be helpful for you to have that.

  Q49  Chairman: We will decide which ones we want to cover. Send us the lot! Before we move off consular services, can I raise the question of your public service agreement targets? I understand that the FCO failed to meet four of the six PSA targets on consular services and that, specifically, you failed to meet the target with regard to issuing passports overseas. You were supposed to have 95% issued within five working days, and you only got 73.3%. Is that acceptable? If it is not acceptable, can you explain why it has happened and what you are going to do about it?

  Sir Michael Jay: We have worked really hard to meet the targets and it is not acceptable not to meet them, unless there are overriding reasons why we have not. I am afraid I ought to, but I do not have the details of our consular targets at hand. I do not know whether any of my colleagues do.

  Mr Stagg: To respond to your underlying question, I think that there have been problems over technology to a degree. We introduced, over the last two years, a new system.

  Q50  Chairman: This is Prism you are talking about?

  Mr Stagg: No, Chairman. I would happily come on to Prism, but this is GenIE.

  Q51  Chairman: More technology problems?

  Mr Stagg: I think not extremely difficult, but implementing these programmes around the world in quite differing environments is quite a challenge.

  Q52  Chairman: What is the programme called?

  Mr Stagg: It is GenIE.

  Chairman: Is it still in the bottle?

  Q53  Mr Keetch: Lamp!

  Mr Stagg: We could easily give you an overview of this in writing, because it is more than just the technology issues.[6]


  Q54 Chairman: Can I move on to some other areas? Diplomatic representation overseas. We have just had a letter from the Foreign Secretary, listing the number of posts which are being planned to be closed or already have been closed; also plans to localise some others and to change facilities in other places. I had a personal experience when I led a Commonwealth Parliamentary Association delegation to Swaziland in September. As you are aware, we have closed our high commission and, while I was there, we were advertising the sale of the residence in the local newspapers. This has gone down extremely badly in Swaziland. I understand that you are also closing Lesotho, and both are being run from Pretoria by our new high commissioner—who is a very good high commissioner—in South Africa. There are similar concerns from the Pacific. We have had letters, representations to do with closures in a number of the Pacific islands—all of them Commonwealth countries, as are Lesotho and Swaziland—and similar concerns have been expressed for other parts of the world. Can you explain why these decisions have been taken? Also, do you agree that for many, very small, Commonwealth countries which have long associations with the UK, this is being interpreted as our withdrawing from interest in their countries, downgrading their significance, and they feel deeply hurt by this?

  Sir Michael Jay: The overseas network can never be static. We have, over the last seven years or so, opened 29 posts and closed 25, and that is a reflection of shifting priorities. One of the things that we try to do is to ensure that our resources, which are constrained, are allocated in accordance with our priorities and, in particular, with the strategic priorities which were set out in the strategy document which the Foreign Secretary and I published a couple of years ago. That is the starting point for where we want to put our resources. With the resources constrained, if you want to put your resources into areas which have become a high priority, you have to take them from somewhere. This inevitably means some hard choices and hard priorities—about places which are not unimportant but which are not as important as the high-priority ones. We would much rather not have had to close any posts but, had we not closed some, we would not have been able to put our resources where they needed to be, or we would have run our network too thin across the board and been unable to achieve what we need to do in the places that really matter. We judged that our interests in Swaziland and Lesotho could be satisfactorily represented by our high commissioner in Pretoria and equally that, in the Pacific, we could move to more of a hub-and-spoke arrangement, making more use of our high commission in Suva, in Fiji. These were not easy decisions; they were decisions that were made after a quite rigorous examination of where our interests lay; they were as a result of quite lengthy discussions with ministers, and taking into account various other considerations. That is the explanation for it, Mr Chairman. I accept that it is seen by those concerned as being a withdrawal of interest, and to an extent it is. It does not mean a complete withdrawal of interest. We will continue to have relations with the countries and, in the case of Swaziland, there will be an honorary consul there and he will be supported by regular visits from the high commissioner and his staff from Pretoria.

  Q55  Mr Keetch: Again, this was mentioned yesterday but I want to raise it in the case of Seattle, where we are closing a consulate and we are replacing that with an honorary consul, who I am sure will do a very good job. We are replacing that with a trade post, which I am told will not have fewer people in it than the consul's office did, in a place where there are so many ex-pats that they even have a cricket league, and where important decisions are made for Rolls-Royce and other companies about their investment in the Boeing programmes; and at a time also, I am told, when other aspects of UK-plc, namely the overseas offices of the Scottish Executive and the Welsh Development Agency, are considering moving into that area because they believe there is a very good trade reason to do so. I would like to be assured that, when we make a decision to do this, we consult with other aspects of government like the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly and that we also look at this over a long period of time. Closing a very small consulate, replacing it with a trade office, then having an honorary consul, then maybe having other departments of government move in there, I am not sure, in the long run, will save a huge amount of money. Certainly in terms of what the mayor and other important people in that city think, they consider it to be a slap in the face to them—because they see HM Government is moving out. I would hope that, when we make these closures—particularly if we are going to localise them, as is described—we see whether we are actually saving any money in the long run, looking at the long-term consequences as opposed to just making that decision.

  Sir Michael Jay: We do try to do that, Mr Keetch. The decision to close the consulate-general in Seattle was one which was taken as part of the restructuring of the whole network in the United States, in order to ensure that our resources were effectively deployed across the United States, and taking into account the relative importance of different cities and different areas. It was taken in close conjunction with UKTI,[7] because it is essentially a commercial post. The judgment was made that it would meet our interests in Seattle if we were to move to having a locally employed team there, supported by stronger UKTI representation elsewhere on the west coast. The decisions are not arbitrary; they are taken after a really careful consideration of where our interests lie, what our resource constraints are, and how best we can allocate our resources over time. If I may say so, your point about Scotland and Wales is a very good one. I think I need to make sure that we are closely in touch—as I believe we are—with the Scottish Executive and with the Welsh Assembly over their plans. As I think you know, in many parts of the globe the Scottish and the Welsh are indeed co-located with our embassies and high commissions, and we do work very closely together.


  Q56 Sir John Stanley: Sir Michael, I return to another matter that you and your department will be familiar with. Instead of flying last night from Belgrade to Podgorica, I chose to come back to have the pleasure of this meeting with you.

  Sir Michael Jay: Thank you, Sir John!

  Q57  Sir John Stanley: At the meetings I had in Belgrade on Monday and Tuesday, it was absolutely clear that there will be a referendum in Montenegro next February/March. Nobody expects the result of that referendum to be anything other than independence for Montenegro, and the Serbian senior ministers that we met were absolutely clear that, if that was the wish of the Montenegrins, Serbia would not stand in the way of Montenegro's independence. Against that, first of all is it not very regrettable that, at this extremely politically important time, we still have no embassy in Podgorica? If you agree that the events in Montenegro in the next few months will be as I have indicated, surely the Foreign Office should now be taking very early steps to establish an embassy in Podgorica? This would be a country which will be looking for EU applicant status; it has an important position in the Balkans; it is not wholly unrelated to the important issue of a settlement in relation to Kosovo. Surely this is an area which, certainly on political grounds, most conspicuously should be having more attention on the ground from the Foreign Office?

  Sir Michael Jay: I will look into that question, Sir John. Clearly Montenegro will have an important role to play in our overall Balkans policy. We have to consider whether we can represent it adequately from elsewhere or whether we need to be represented there. If we are represented there, of course, we will have to make a judgment as to where we take the resources from. There are no free posts. We are under pressure to reduce our total number of staff and if we are to open up in places, we have to take them from somewhere else. However, I will look into that.

  Q58  Sir John Stanley: The root issue is perhaps that the Foreign Office should have been tougher with the Treasury in accepting assumptions for efficiency savings, and indeed assumptions of the benefits of IT, than the department has actually been. It has been seriously salami-sliced by the Treasury. Perhaps you at senior official level and your ministers need to do some more standing-up-toughly to the Treasury's demands.

  Sir Michael Jay: We certainly felt at the time that we were standing up toughly, I can tell you, Sir John. Some of the outcome of the last spending round was, from the Foreign Office's point of view, very satisfactory, particularly in the amount of money that the Treasury agreed to give us for the security of our overseas posts, following the attack on our consulate-general in Istanbul. At the time, that was a very high priority for us, because it was essential to be able to reassure our staff that we were providing them with the security to enable them to operate. That was a very high priority for our settlement, and I personally was very glad that that money was given to us. Like all government departments, however, we were subject to the efficiency targets, which we are now aiming to meet—but I will look into that.

  Q59  Chairman: Before I bring in Andrew Mackinlay, can you tell us what annual savings in financial terms will be made by these closures and localisations of posts which you have just announced, and about which you have sent us a memo.

  Sir Michael Jay: There are two issues here. One is about the savings in terms of money, and the other is the savings in terms of staff. I might ask either Dickie Stagg or Ric Todd to say a bit more about that.


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