'Alternative
representation'
110. The FCO's Public Service Agreement 9 target
requires it to provide "effective advice on, support for,
and delivery of Government objectives through a viable and responsive
network of diplomatic posts."[155]
In its Departmental Report for 2004-05, the FCO explains that
it "has been reorganising to deliver the priorities [
]
including closing eight sovereign and ten subordinate posts."[156]
It is not clear, however, that this programme of closures has
any particular rationale, beyond saving resources. The increased
representation in some of the new EU member states, for example,
is arguably less important given the EU single market and the
number of decisions now taken in Brussels; whereas closures of
Posts in small, relatively distant Commonwealth countries where
a modest effort may generate a substantial diplomatic or trade
return could incur real political and economic costs.
111. Our predecessors in the last Parliament pointed
this out in their Report on the FCO's Departmental Report 2003-04.
They recommended that wherever possible the FCO should maintain
its wide-reaching network of Posts.[157]
The FCO agreed that "The network is our greatest asset."[158]
Sir Michael Jay also reminded us that "over the last seven
years or so, [the FCO has] opened 29 posts and closed 25."[159]
This is, as he pointed out, "a reflection of shifting priorities."
However, the latest announcements appear to reflect not so much
a shifting of geographical or diplomatic priorities as a cost-cutting
measure. We have no doubt that, given the choice, the FCO would
have preferred to retain its network of Posts.
112. The most recent announcement of changes in overseas
representation was made by the Secretary of State in a Written
Ministerial Statement on 11 October 2005.[160]
The consolidated effect of these when taken together with the
changes announced the previous December is as follows:

113. In its response to one of our written questions,
the FCO confirmed that 35 UK-based diplomatic staff posts will
be cut as the changes are implemented. These reductions are in
addition to staff savings in the senior management structure previously
agreed.[161] The financial
savings are expected to be of the order of £6 million, not
including property disposals, almost half of this from the closures
or localisations in Europe.[162]
The October 2005 statement shows that 23 Posts will be (in some
cases, already have been) closed, nine will be downgraded and
one will be opened. These changes, it seems to us, are somewhat
more far-reaching than the "adjustments at the margins of
the network" which we were assured in November 2004 were
all that was expected.[163]
114. We are particularly concerned that a number
of the affected Posts are in Commonwealth countries, with which
the United Kingdom has had a long and particularly close association.
These include closure of the High Commissions in Swaziland and
in Lesotho, both of which are now covered from Pretoria, South
Africa. Such Posts will be particularly missed.
115. We also received evidence that the closure of
the British Embassy in Antananarivo last August[164]
took place at a time when Madagascar was emerging from a long
period of misrule, with aid and trade opportunities opening up.
The world's second-biggest mining company, Rio Tinto, is reported
as having written to the Foreign Secretary, expressing its disappointment
at the closure of the Embassy.[165]
According to The Times, the Chief Executive of another
British prospecting company active in Madagascar, Jubilee Platinum,
said that embassies "are like insurancethey don't
matter until they matter."[166]
A British visitor to Madagascar, Mr Thomas Rambaut, wrote to us
to suggest that "The FCO have made a serious mistake in deciding
to close the British Embassy in Antananarivo" and pointed
out that the decision appears to be at odds with the Prime Minister's
declaration of 2005 as the Year of Africa.[167]
To these voices were added those of many eminent politiciansincluding
the former Chairman of this Committee, Lord AndersonAfrica
specialists, naturalists and others in a letter to The Times
on 22 December 2005, calling on the Government to reverse
the decision.[168]
116. We note that the FCO has taken a different approach
in Liberia, where a full-time presence has been maintained by
locating the sole United Kingdom-based officer in the US Embassy
in Monrovia.[169] In
the Departmental Report for 2004-05, the FCO explains under the
heading 'Alternative representation overseas' how it seeks efficiency
savings by, "wherever appropriate", sharing accommodation
with an ally.[170]
Although this arrangement is not ideal, we believe that there
are circumstances in which it makes good sense to co-locate, for
example in countries where the United Kingdom has interests but
they are not on a scale or of an importance sufficient to justify
a free-standing Post, or where security considerations mean that
it is impractical to maintain a separate Embassy. We were surprised
that, given the Departmental Report's endorsement of 'alternative
representation' as a means of maintaining a diplomatic presence,
co-location was not the preferred solution in respect of some
of the other Posts which are being closed. We therefore asked
the FCO what consideration had been given to this possibility.
117. Sir Michael Jay replied that the FCO had indeed
considered co-location, either by having an 'implant' in another
country's embassy (as in Liberia) or by sharing premises (as is
the case in a number of countries).[171]
Unfortunately, co-location did not prove to be a viable option
in any of the cases this time. Sir Michael told us that the factors
which determined this included a lack of opportunity (presumably,
lack of a suitable partner or premises) and lack of potential
for savings to be made. However, we note that since Sir Michael
sent his reply, co-location has been chosenon security
groundsas the preferred option for continued representation
in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire.[172]
118. We conclude that although co-location of
a British sovereign Post with or within the post of another country
is in general undesirable, it is almost always likely to be preferable
to outright closure. We recommend that the FCO consider very carefully
the case for co-location when adjusting its international priorities
or when looking to achieve financial savings from its overseas
operations.
119. The Foreign Affairs Committee in the last Parliament
recommended on more than one occasion the establishment of a United
Kingdom-staffed Post in Podgorica, the capital of Montenegro.
This recommendation was most recently re-stated in the Committee's
Report of February 2005 on the Western Balkans, when we drew attention
to the likelihood that Montenegro will gain independence from
Serbia.[173] We raised
this again when Sir Michael Jay appeared before us last October.[174]
In a subsequent letter, Sir Michael told us that "The Committee's
views will be given full weight" in the FCO's deliberations
on the future status of the Post in Podgorica.[175]
We conclude that the forthcoming referendum on Montenegro is
likely to add to the case for the FCO to upgrade its Post in Podgorica
to one headed by its own British Ambassador and appropriately
staffed, and we recommend that this be done without further delay.
120. Our predecessors also consistently made the
case for a full-time Post to be established in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan,
a friendly country which by the standards of its region has made
some progress towards democracy.[176]
The absence of a British Ambassador in Kyrgyzstan's capital, Bishkek,
causes hurt and dismay among that country's body politic and among
those with whom the United Kingdom has a considerable interest
in fostering closer relationships. The duties of Ambassador to
Kyrgyzstan fall to the British Ambassador to Kazakhstan, some
hundreds of miles away in Almaty. His responsibilities include
representing British interests in an important and strategic country
about the size of North West Europe. In addition, he is not based
in that country's capital but some thousand miles distant from
it, which inevitably places an additional representative burden
on him. The Committee has repeatedly urged Sir Michael, personally,
when he has appeared before us, about the need for a small embassy
in Bishkek. He confirmed that the FCO would wish to open a permanently-staffed
Post in Bishkek but that it does not presently feel this is a
priority for the resources it has available.[177]
Sir Michael undertook to keep this under review, which is a formulation
often heard when something is kicked into the long grass. We
recommend that the FCO make the opening of an Embassy in Bishkek
a priority.
121. Regrettably, the British Council does not have
an office in Kyrgyzstan either.
The overseas estate
122. Our predecessors in the last Parliament took
a close interest in the FCO's programme of selling off embassy,
consulate and high commission buildings overseas, known in the
FCO as 'asset recycling'. In their final observations on this
practice before the last general election, they reached the following
conclusions:
[
] the "asset recycling scheme"
has had a very serious impact on the Foreign Office's property
portfolio, with valuable buildings that were appreciating in value
being sacrificed on the altar of short-term Treasury-inspired
targets. [
] these sales have left the Foreign Office more
at risk from fluctuations in the international property market
and exchange rates, and may have significantly damaged the long-term
financial strength of its estate.[178]
[
] serious mistakes were made during the
sale and purchase of the residences in Dublin and New York and
should not have occurred. Such incidents serve to underline the
importance of effective scrutiny of the Foreign Office's property
transactions by Parliament.[179]
The Committee also criticised in very strong terms
the FCO's refusal to publish details of its estate sales.[180]
This practice was reversed, following pressure from the Committee.
We now receive quarterly reports from the FCO, listing the properties
that have been sold.
123. The FCO's overseas estate consists of some 4,300
properties, including embassy buildings and staff accommodation.[181]
Of these, about 60% by value are owned and the remainder are leased.
The highest proportion by value (over 70%) of owned assets as
against leased assets is in Africa and the lowest (under half)
is in Central and South America.[182]
The value of each part of the overseas estate is calculated with
reference to the value of buildings put to similar use in the
vicinity. The FCO itself recognises this is "not ideal"
and it therefore has an agreement with the Treasury to maintain
an 'impairments reserve' to absorb the negative financial effects
of revaluations.[183]
This reserve has fluctuated from £198 million in 2000-01
to £20 million in 2004-05 and has been set at £50 million
for 2007-08.[184]
124. The FCO's Estate Strategy Unit (ESU) administers
857 of its overseas buildings. The remainder, which are mostly
staff accommodation, are managed directly by Posts.[185]
In financial year 2004-05, the following disposals were made by
the FCO:[186]

Total gross income from property sales in 2004-05
was thus £10,574,000. It is, of course, important to bear
in mind that there are costs associated with property sales; the
FCO estimates its transaction costs at about 6 to 8%.[187]
125. The Departmental Investment Strategy 2004-07
records that the ESU's estate sales or 'asset recycling' programme
"has shifted into a lower gear. There are fewer under-performing
properties to sell, and the reduction in the [Treasury's] Test
Discount Rate from 6% to 3.5% has shifted the value for money
in favour of owning property."[188]
However, the FCO's Capital Plan for the period 2005-06 to 2007-08
projects a consistent annual income from estate sales of £10
million.[189] It appears
from the Efficiency Technical Note published in November 2005
that £4 million of these receipts may be cashable.[190]
The FCO intends that all of this income will be reinvested in
the estate[191]a
list showing the considerable number of building and refurbishment
projects overseas scheduled for financial years 2005-06 and 2006-07
was published in Hansard in December 2005.[192]
The list includes a substantial sum for redevelopment of the estate
in Warsaw, an increasingly important EU Post which a number of
us visited recently.
126. The FCO has also developed an Estate Strategy
for managing its home and overseas estate.[193]
This strategy notes that "unless there are major changes
of policy is respect of the nature and pattern of HMG's overseas
representation, we judge that further large sales or other deals
are unlikely. We note that high-profile sales can be difficult
to carry through successfully, and can be controversial."[194]
We welcome this statement, but we note that notwithstanding the
new estate strategy the intention remains to dispose of not less
than £10 million of assets overseas in each of the next three
financial years. This will be a considerable sum to amass from
small, low-profile sales.
127. We are therefore concerned to note that when
the strategy refers to an unspecified number of "properties
accepted as of special architectural or historical importance",
including 40 residences, it suggests that the decision on whether
to retain them may rest on a trade-off between the market value
of the property and the "present importance of the country
in question."[195]
It is quite conceivable that the sale of a single historic property
could deliver the FCO's entire 'asset recycling' requirement for
a year or more. If the worth of the property is to be assessed
on the basis of the "present importance" of the country
in which it is situated, there is the danger that short-term priorities
may prevail over long-term interests. The ESU has undertaken to
consult Ministers on major decisions affecting the historic properties;
it does not state whether these include Treasury Ministers.
128. We conclude that there is no clear basis
for the FCO's projected receipts of £10 million from estate
sales over the next three financial years. We recommend that in
its response to this Report the FCO explain how it arrived at
this projection, whether it regards the figure as a target, and
if so how it expects to achieve it without "further large
sales or other deals", particularly involving properties
of special architectural or historical importance.
129. In last year's Report, our predecessors recorded
their strong dissatisfaction with the FCO's handling of the sale
of the residence of the Ambassador in DublinGlencairnand
the purchase of a new residenceMarley Grangefollowed
by the decision to retain the original residence, which left the
newly-purchased property surplus to requirements.[196]
The National Audit Office, too, reported its conclusions on this
episode.
[
] in 2000 the Department gave insufficient
consideration to retaining the Ambassador's and Defence Attaché's
residences at Glencairn while selling the bulk of the estate.
[
] The Department embarked on the sale of Glencairn without
real knowledge of the likelihood of being able to find the kind
of replacement that it wished to purchase. Its criteria for seeking
a replacement residence in Dublin 4 were initially too restrictive,
and eventually could not be met [
] The purchase of Marlay
Grange for £6.4 million should not have gone ahead unless
the owners had first agreed to a full survey of the general condition
of the property.[197]
The FCO recognised that mistakes had been made, and
undertook not to repeat them.[198]
We sought an update on the position with respect to these properties
and were told by the FCO that "it remains our intention to
repurchase Glencairn [
] Pending completion of the re-purchase,
we have not marketed Marley Grange."[199]
We asked for a further update when Sir Michael Jay appeared before
the Committee in November 2005. Sir Michael wrote that "Work
continues on the repurchase" of Glencairn, but that meanwhile
the residence is occupied free of rent.[200]
130. The Foreign Affairs Committee has been paying
close attention to the FCO's management of its overseas estate
for some years now. Over that period, despite serious lapses such
as the mishandled sale of the Dublin residence, we have begun
to see some signs of improvement, particularly in the scope and
quality of information presented to Parliament. We conclude
that the provision of information on the FCO's management of its
overseas estate has improved in recent years. We welcome the quarterly
reports which the Committee now receives from FCO, and we will
continue to scrutinise these and the policies which underlie them
closely.
155 Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Foreign and
Commonwealth Office Departmental Report 1 April 2004-31 March
2005, Cm 6533, June 2005, p 158 Back
156
Ibid Back
157
Foreign Affairs Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2003-04, Foreign
and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2003-04, HC 745, para
50 Back
158
Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Government Response to the
Foreign Affairs Committee's Eighth Report: Foreign and Commonwealth
Office Annual Report 2003-04, Cm 6415, November 2004, p 3 Back
159
Q 119 Back
160
HC Deb, 11 October 2005, col 22-23WS Back
161
Ev 7 Back
162
Ev 7; Q 60 Back
163
Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Government Response to the
Foreign Affairs Committee's Eighth Report: Foreign and Commonwealth
Office Annual Report 2003-04, Cm 6415, November 2004, p 3 Back
164
HC Deb, 19 January 2006, col 1534W Back
165
'Rio Tinto hits hout at closure of embassy', The Times,
10 September 2005, p 65 Back
166
Ibid Back
167
Ev 93 Back
168
'Embassy in Madagascar', The Times, 22 December 2005, p
16 Back
169
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Departmental Investment Strategy
2005, http://www.fco.gov.uk, para 8 Back
170
Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Foreign and Commonwealth
Office departmental report 1 April 2004-31 March 2005, Cm
6533, June 2005, p 201 Back
171
Ev 48 Back
172
Ev 82 Back
173
Foreign Affairs Committee, Third Report of Session 2004-05, The
Western Balkans, HC 87, para 96 Back
174
Q 57 Back
175
Ev 48 Back
176
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Country Profiles, Kyrgyzstan,
available at www.fco.gov.uk Back
177
Q 66 Back
178
Foreign Affairs Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2003-04, Foreign
and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2003-04, HC 745, para
86 Back
179
Ibid, para 92 Back
180
Ibid, para 83 Back
181
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Department Investment Strategy,
http://www.fco.gov.uk, para 7 Back
182
Ibid, figure 2 Back
183
Ibid, para 12 Back
184
Ibid, Table 2 Back
185
Ibid, Annex III para 11 Back
186
Source: House of Commons Library, see HC Deb, 10 January 2006,
col 462W Back
187
Ev 49 Back
188
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Department Investment Strategy,
http://www.fco.gov.uk, para 47 Back
189
Ibid, Table 3 Back
190
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Efficiency Technical Note,
See www.fco.gov.uk Back
191
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Department Investment Strategy,
http://www.fco.gov.uk, para 48 Back
192
HC Deb, 19 December 2005, cols 2474W and 2475W Back
193
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Department Investment Strategy,
http://www.fco.gov.uk, Annex III Back
194
Ibid, Annex III para 18 Back
195
Ibid, Annex III para 19 Back
196
Foreign Affairs Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2002-03, Foreign
and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2003-04, HC 745, paras
87-92 Back
197
National Audit Office Report, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Resource Accounts 2003-04: Rationalisation of the Glencairn Estate
in Dublin, HC (2003-04) 1088 Back
198
Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Government Response to the
Foreign Affairs Committee's Eighth Report: Foreign and Commonwealth
Office Annual Report 2003-04, Cm 6415, November 2004, pp 6
and 7 Back
199
Ev 10 Back
200
Ev 48 Back