Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 22-39)

MS NOMI BAR-YAACOV

19 OCTOBER 2005

  Chairman: Can I welcome our third witness this afternoon, Nomi Bar-Yaacov. Thank you for being so patient. As you saw, we had a lot of questions and not enough time. Can we go straight in with the first question.

  Q22 Mr Hamilton: Good afternoon, Ms Bar-Yaacov. It is very nice to see you here again. I wanted to ask you about Gaza. As you know, in December 2003 the Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, proposed his plan for unilateral disengagement from the Palestinians, and the first area was to be Gaza, and after, obviously, a stormy time through the Knesset, it was finally agreed, and on 23 August Israeli troops began the evacuation and by 12 September had withdrawn from the settlements in the Gaza Strip. James Wolfensohn, the former head of the World Bank, is the Quartet's envoy to the region. He has highlighted the need for the 1.2 million Palestinians of Gaza to see an improvement in their lives following the withdrawal. In fact, he said that in order to create greater incentive for peace amongst the Palestinians, it will be important to create jobs, develop infrastructure, oversee functioning schools and clinics and clean up vast expanses of untreated sewage. I wondered whether you could tell us whether since the withdrawal began on the 23 August and was completed on 12 September the lives of ordinary Palestinians living in Gaza have actually improved in any way.

  Ms Bar-Yaacov: Not yet, I am afraid. The key issue with improvement in the lives of the Palestinians in Gaza is the economy, and in order for the economy to function in Gaza the borders need to be opened. Jim Wolfensohn, who is doing a fantastic job, I think, as the Quartet envoy, is currently negotiating the openings of the crossings. First and foremost it is important to open the Rafah crossing in the south so that there will be free access into Egypt. My understanding is that he is fairly close to clinching the deal with the Israelis. As you know, the Israelis are extremely concerned about their security. There has in the past been a lot of smuggling of arms and militant terrorists through the numerous tunnels in the Gaza border. Israel withdrew entirely from the Philadelphi corridor, which is the border further south, and that is currently monitored solely by 750 Egyptian border police. That, I think, is a very positive move, because one of the concerns that we analysts raised ahead of the disengagement was that in the disengagement plan in fact they had intended to maintain an Israeli presence in the strip. So that is clear. There is no Israeli presence in Rafah either at the moment. There is talk of third-party monitoring, and that is what is currently being negotiated: what kind of monitoring, what kind of third party, what kind of scanners, what kind of overseeing monitoring mechanisms, because clearly there is a security issue there. My understanding is that it will probably be open within weeks. I do not think there is going to be a rapid improvement in the lives of ordinary Palestinians. There is the issue of job creation, which is contingent upon the issue of security. Security is a very serious issue in Gaza. As you know, following the withdrawal there has been a large number of kidnappings, and there have been armed struggles between the different factions. The Palestinian Authority has not always been 100% in control. There are lots of local gangs, families that rule a number of power centres, not necessarily working with each other but very much working against each other. I think it is a matter of some hard work on the part of the Palestinians, the Wolfensohn mission, and the Egyptians. Those are the key bodies involved.

  Q23  Mr Hamilton: Can I follow that up by asking you whether you can tell us who is in control of Gaza if the Palestinian authority is not fully in control? How important, for example, are Hamas in Gaza? Is there an al Qaeda presence there at all?

  Ms Bar-Yaacov: Lots of questions! I will take one at a time and just do it in an orderly fashion. The PA, I said, is not in 100% control. It obviously has some control in some areas. Gaza is very much divided into different areas. As I said, and I am just reiterating, there are a number of power bases. We saw, for example, the kidnapping and then assassination of Mussa Arafat not long ago, Yasser Arafat's nephew. Apparently, he made 40 calls when he was kidnapped to anybody and everybody in the PA, and none of his calls were returned, which begs the question who ordered the kidnapping and the shooting, who carried it out and why the Palestinian authority, who were only 200 metres down the road, the headquarters of the security forces, did not do anything about it. That just gives you a bit of insight into how complicated it is. The thinking is that there were a number of power bases who joined forces, because Mussa Arafat was viewed as a disruptive power base and therefore they decided to eliminate him. I cannot tell you whether Hamas were involved or not. I can tell you that a number of people who work in Gaza think that they were—that they were involved, though not necessarily that they carried out the shooting. I would just reiterate that there are a number of different groups. Hamas certainly controls certain areas. Other Fatah militant factions control other areas. Different families control different refugee camps. You saw yesterday there was a kidnapping in Khan Yunis by one family, and a different family was negotiating the potential release of the two Palestinians who were kidnapped. It is not very clear at any given moment. The lesson that is important to learn from all of this is that the international community, the UK government, all of us sitting here need to really strengthen Abu Mazen, strengthen the Palestinian President, strengthen the legitimate authority, in order to ensure that there will be one powerful, legitimate authority, one rule, one gun. Your other question was about Hamas and al Qaeda. Hamas, as you know, are gaining strength. They are claiming that the disengagement was as a result of their pushing Israel out of Gaza, a result of their action. They are running in the upcoming legislative elections, the January Palestinian legislative council elections, under the slogan of "Our actions are worth much more than the ten years of negotiations." They are very much against a negotiated settlement, and that is quite a worrying aspect, one of the worrying aspects. They are gaining power also because they are seen as clean; they are not seen as corrupt. The PA unfortunately suffers from a very serious corruption problem, and Hamas do not. Hamas are viewed as the only people—because it is not just the PA; there are the different Fatah factions, and they have all been tainted with corruption. Unfortunately, the Palestinian Authority has not done anything significant enough yet to show that they are actually fighting corruption. Those of us who proposed that they should actually put people behind bars, that they should try people, have a high visibility case against some of the leaders—Abu Mazen has not done it, and a serious problem remains there. Al Qaeda was your third question. Al Qaeda have a base in Sinai, Egypt, which is very close to Israel and Gaza, so the thinking is that they are trying to get in all the time. Whether they are in Gaza or not, I personally do not know. What I know is that the Israeli head of military intelligence said a couple of days ago that he believes that they have managed to penetrate Gaza. When you talk about al Qaeda, as we heard in the evidence session before me, it is not so clear exactly who we are talking about. There are a number of affiliate groups that call themselves al Qaeda, but there is a very serious and real danger that if control over the Gaza-Egypt border is not done properly, they will be able to penetrate Gaza and operate from within Gaza. That is mainly why the issue of the opening of Rafah is so serious.

  Q24  Richard Younger-Ross: You talked before about Hamas and its relations with al Qaeda. The previous witnesses said that they felt that Hamas was trying to distance themselves from al Qaeda. However, I note that Palestinian security officials in the documents we have have said that al Qaeda members were Hamas activists. Can you give us some light as to which of those views is correct, and in your view is Hamas going to operate against al Qaeda if al Qaeda is successful in penetrating Gaza?

  Ms Bar-Yaacov: I do not think that Hamas will operate against al Qaeda. I do not think that is the way I look at it. I think the witness giving evidence before me was 100% right in what he said, and I said exactly the same in a session here two years ago, that it is not in Hamas's interests to affiliate themselves with al Qaeda—I am just reiterating what I said two years ago—because they do not want to meet the same fate as al Qaeda; they do not what the US to basically go after them. Their goal is limited. Hamas's goal is a Palestinian Islamic state in the whole of Israel and Palestine. It is not an Islamist world entity in the same way that other organisations are working towards. I cannot see that there will be tension between them over this issue. The one thing is that with the internet today, with the kind of communications that we are seeing, they do feed off each other. Hamas are picking up tips from al Qaeda and they are getting closer in that sense. But I agree; I do not think Hamas want to affiliate themselves with al Qaeda.

  Q25  Richard Younger-Ross: So the statement by the Palestinian security officer would be wrong?

  Ms Bar-Yaacov: What are you reading from?

  Q26  Richard Younger-Ross: He is not named. He is a PPC source.

  Ms Bar-Yaacov: I have to say I do not know what the source is. I have not heard that.

  Q27  Richard Younger-Ross: Can I develop on from that just on the Sinai. You made a statement there that al Qaeda is in the Sinai. Can you expand upon that?

  Ms Bar-Yaacov: A cell of about 30 al Qaeda members has been found recently in the Sinai. As you know, there have been a series of attacks in the Sinai against Israeli and international targets in recent months, and the thinking is that al Qaeda are trying to penetrate Israel and trying to penetrate through Gaza, but the Egyptians are the ones that uncovered the al Qaeda cell in Sinai, and it is Egypt that is mainly concerned about al Qaeda given that it is operating in Egyptian territory.

  Q28  Richard Younger-Ross: The attacks at Sharm el Sheikh.

  Ms Bar-Yaacov: Exactly, and Tabah.

  Q29  Chairman: Can I ask you about the relationship between Gaza and the West Bank in terms of communication between the Palestinian Authority and therefore of the groups that operate. What relationship does Hamas have from Gaza to the West Bank and how easy is it for people to operate in this context? Has that changed because of the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza?

  Ms Bar-Yaacov: It has changed in the political sense. As you know, there is a ceasefire that has been agreed on between the different Palestinian factions, including Hamas. The problem is that Israel has been operating in the West Bank, has been carrying out targeted assassinations post withdrawal in the West Bank, and the question really is whether Hamas and other organisations will retaliate from the West Bank, since they are unlikely to retaliate from Gaza, even though they did so when there was this blunder in Jabalia camp. There was a huge procession of arms and some of them exploded, killing many Hamas people, and Hamas blamed Israel even though Israel had nothing to do with it, and then, in order to prove that they were right, they rained Kassams on to Israel, to which Israel then retaliated with great force, and I think that episode is over. So in terms of the links between the West Bank and Gaza, it is tricky because what Hamas will try to do is they will try to keep Gaza quiet so that they could consolidate control over there, but they will operate from the West Bank if there is something they do not like. They can also use rockets over the wall and hit Israel from the West Bank. The distances between the West Bank and Israel are very close, and Israel's main concern is that they will be able to hit Ben Gurion airport, the main international airport, from the West Bank. That is the general thinking.

  Q30  Mr Keetch: I was astonished when I visited Israel and the Palestinian territories. You can stand by the fence, wall, whatever, and you can see the Mediterranean, and you can see the width of Israel before you. It is a very small country, an incredibly small country. In terms of how we look towards the establishment of a viable Palestinian state—because to me that is the central resolution of the problem, not just for the Israel Palestinian problem but also the wider problem about terrorism, which we were discussing earlier—if we can establish a viable Palestinian state, we are well on the way to curing international terrorism. Simply how viable is it to have a state of Palestine with two separate land areas? Could it physically work? Could it physically be created and achieved?

  Ms Bar-Yaacov: You mean between the West Bank and Gaza? There will have to a link, which there used to be under Oslo, called a safe passage, between the West Bank and Gaza, and that is second on the priority list after opening the external borders, the link between the West Bank and Gaza. There are discussions, again, led by Jim Wolfensohn, about what kind of passage it is going to be, whether it is going to be a rail link or a road link, whether it is going to be raised or whether it is going to be in a ditch, like a deep ditch, for security reasons. Some progress is being made on this issue. Obviously, the link between the West Bank and Gaza is absolutely essential for the viability of a Palestinian state.

  Q31  Richard Younger-Ross: But you believe that you could establish a viable Palestinian state if you had that link? This is something viable that can be achieved given the size of the area, the population, etc?

  Ms Bar-Yaacov: I think in order to have a viable Palestinian state you have to have a lot more in place. You have to have a legitimate and able Palestinian authority, one that can really enforce the law. The current one, as I said, is actually having serious problems enforcing the law. You have to have a peace agreement in place, and I cannot see a final status agreement being negotiated at present. I can see very important steps that need to be taken now in order for a final status agreement to be signed, but yes, I can see a viable Palestinian state, given the geography.

  Q32  Mr Maples: When Sharon announced that Israel was going to withdraw from Gaza, I think a lot of us saw that as a very constructive move, but it was greeted with deep suspicion by the PA, and Hamas and everybody else.

  The Committee suspended from 4.01 pm until 4.15 pm for a division in the House

  Q33 Chairman: In the context of the process after the withdrawal from Gaza, we understand that the Israeli government's position is that there are no further unilateral steps, and that anything else that comes must be negotiated. Is that what you believe will happen, and is it likely, given the domestic problems within the Israeli right, within Likud, and the power struggle between Netanyahu and Sharon, that anything can be negotiated in the foreseeable future?

  Ms Bar-Yaacov: Again, spokespersons of the Israeli government said about two weeks ago and have been saying that there are planned further unilateral withdrawals, so the statement that everything will be negotiated has been overtaken by events. In other words, Eyal Arad, who is the senior adviser to Sharon, stated in public that there are plans to carry out further withdrawals from the West Bank if Israel deems that Abu Mazen is too weak and is not a viable partner for negotiation. So from an Israeli point of view, much depends on whether the Palestinian Authority gets its act together, presumably after their legislative elections in January, or not. Clearly, everybody's preference would be to see a negotiated deal, to see Israeli and Palestinian negotiations resume. The question is how and under what terms. I think it would be very good for the international community to help facilitate an ongoing dialogue between Abu Mazen and Sharon. It is very helpful to have someone engaged full-time, shuttling all the time between the Israelis and the Palestinians to help them overcome the difficulties and the gaps in terms of where they are standing. The big question today, I think, is how to move the process from a unilateral one to a bilateral one, and the answer is through a third party mediator.

  Q34  Sir John Stanley: I would just like to ask you a number of specific questions following on from the area that the Chairman has opened up. First of all, in relation to the security wall, is it your understanding now that, though the security wall has been constructed in separate lengths, the intention and policy of the Israeli government now is to fill in the gaps so that it will run essentially on a continuous basis across the West Bank?

  Ms Bar-Yaacov: I have a map here of the current security wall and fence in terms of where it has already been constructed and areas that have not been constructed but have been approved. The idea is, certainly on the western part of the West Bank parallel to the green line, to seal it, definitely to fill in all the gaps. The questions that remain, and are very problematic, are over east Jerusalem. There are cases pending in the Israeli Supreme Court, which sits as a High Court, currently pending, and there the wall—it is a wall in those particular areas—could potentially disrupt the peace process very seriously, and could even lead to a third Intifada, a missile Intifada from east Jerusalem and the West Bank into Israel, because the wall as it is currently constructed, and if all the gaps are filled in that area, actually cuts across east Jerusalem neighbourhoods like Abu Dis, Eizariya, Shu'afat. Part of it is constructed on a schoolyard. Palestinians living in Jerusalem with Israeli IDs with permits to work in Israel will find it virtually impossible to get to work, their kids will have to change schools, it will create tremendous unhappiness and will lead to more extremism. So I think the focus of international pressure at the moment should really be on that area, because I do not think the West Bank, western wall and fence is as much of a problem. The key lesson with the wall is really to recognise that it is a reality, that it is there; to tell the Palestinians that it is there and therefore they should negotiate with the Israelis alternative routes where they are problematic, and much more access through the wall, gates and those sort of areas. The Israeli Supreme Court has been very active in trying to strike a balance between Palestinian humanitarian needs and Israeli security needs, and that is the route through which the wall will move in order to make it somewhat easier for Palestinians to exercise their freedom of movement.

  Q35  Chairman: Can I follow up on the question of the route, the green line? The question of where it varies. You said in Jerusalem there was a problem, but the fundamental problem surely is that it is not on the '67 borders.

  Ms Bar-Yaacov: There are a number of fundamental problems. It is a system of walls and fences; it is not just one wall, and that is partly where the problem lies. It is not as if there is just one line running parallel to the green line, sometimes on the green line and sometimes not on the green line but in Palestinian territories. There are towns like Qalqilya and Tulkarm that are completely surrounded by a sub-wall or sub-fence. The problem is not only whether it is on the green line or not, and that is clearly a problem in some areas because the Palestinian villages that are trapped between the green line and the wall or the fence in some areas. There is a recognition, I think, among the Israeli public and the Israeli political echelons that it was a mistake not to build the wall on the green line where possible. The army, when they planned the route of the fence and the wall, did not take into account Palestinian humanitarian needs. Now there is a recognition that they should have done and the Supreme Court has issued a number of judgments calling on the Israeli defence forces to move the fence and consequently, they have had to move the fence or the wall. So there is a problem there and more adjustments will have to be made.

  Q36  Sir John Stanley: You said that in your view it was a good idea to tell the Palestinians the wall was a reality. Do you not also think it might be a good idea to tell the Israeli government that the wall is illegal?

  Ms Bar-Yaacov: The Israelis know that it is illegal to build it in certain areas of the West Bank. I do not think it is illegal to build it on the international border. It is illegal to build it inside Palestinian territory. I think there is a consensus in Israel that the wall or the fence in and of itself is a good idea to prevent terror. There is a lack of consensus, and that is where there is room for movement, on the route of the fence and the wall. In terms of the advice to the Palestinian government, given that it is there, is to get them to negotiate further access through it. It is not just going to disappear. It is potentially going to move but it will not be completely dismantled everywhere. In terms of the legality of it, my personal opinion is that under international law it is legal to build a wall on an international border, but not deep into Palestinian land. That is where the mistake was made.

  Q37  Sir John Stanley: I may have misheard you but I do not think I did. You may just want to check this. I think you said it was legal to build it inside Palestinian territory.

  Ms Bar-Yaacov: No, illegal. If I said "legal" I meant to say "illegal". I apologise for that. I will reiterate: highly illegal.

  Q38  Sir John Stanley: The next question I want to put to you is this. Do you agree that if you measure the number of settlers or dwellings that have been unilaterally removed in the West Bank, and I am referring particularly to the four small northern settlements, those numbers of dwellings or settlers are actually very much smaller than the number of new authorisations of houses inside the existing settlements? Do you agree with that?

  Ms Bar-Yaacov: Yes, I agree with that, and I think, again, the UK government and the international community should pressurise Israel to stop the expansion of settlements in the West Bank and to dismantle the illegal outposts.

  Q39  Sir John Stanley: Do you agree that the Israeli government's position is that it considers it has no obligation in the peace negotiations to withdraw back to the 1967 boundaries?

  Ms Bar-Yaacov: No. I disagree. I think that the Israeli government's position is that this is a matter for final status negotiations and they will negotiate that issue in the context, and only in the context of a final status agreement and not ahead of it, not now.


 
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