Examination of Witnesses (Questions 22-39)
MS NOMI
BAR-YAACOV
19 OCTOBER 2005
Chairman: Can I welcome our third witness
this afternoon, Nomi Bar-Yaacov. Thank you for being so patient.
As you saw, we had a lot of questions and not enough time. Can
we go straight in with the first question.
Q22 Mr Hamilton: Good afternoon, Ms Bar-Yaacov.
It is very nice to see you here again. I wanted to ask you about
Gaza. As you know, in December 2003 the Israeli Prime Minister,
Ariel Sharon, proposed his plan for unilateral disengagement from
the Palestinians, and the first area was to be Gaza, and after,
obviously, a stormy time through the Knesset, it was finally agreed,
and on 23 August Israeli troops began the evacuation and by 12
September had withdrawn from the settlements in the Gaza Strip.
James Wolfensohn, the former head of the World Bank, is the Quartet's
envoy to the region. He has highlighted the need for the 1.2 million
Palestinians of Gaza to see an improvement in their lives following
the withdrawal. In fact, he said that in order to create greater
incentive for peace amongst the Palestinians, it will be important
to create jobs, develop infrastructure, oversee functioning schools
and clinics and clean up vast expanses of untreated sewage. I
wondered whether you could tell us whether since the withdrawal
began on the 23 August and was completed on 12 September the lives
of ordinary Palestinians living in Gaza have actually improved
in any way.
Ms Bar-Yaacov: Not yet, I am afraid.
The key issue with improvement in the lives of the Palestinians
in Gaza is the economy, and in order for the economy to function
in Gaza the borders need to be opened. Jim Wolfensohn, who is
doing a fantastic job, I think, as the Quartet envoy, is currently
negotiating the openings of the crossings. First and foremost
it is important to open the Rafah crossing in the south so that
there will be free access into Egypt. My understanding is that
he is fairly close to clinching the deal with the Israelis. As
you know, the Israelis are extremely concerned about their security.
There has in the past been a lot of smuggling of arms and militant
terrorists through the numerous tunnels in the Gaza border. Israel
withdrew entirely from the Philadelphi corridor, which is the
border further south, and that is currently monitored solely by
750 Egyptian border police. That, I think, is a very positive
move, because one of the concerns that we analysts raised ahead
of the disengagement was that in the disengagement plan in fact
they had intended to maintain an Israeli presence in the strip.
So that is clear. There is no Israeli presence in Rafah either
at the moment. There is talk of third-party monitoring, and that
is what is currently being negotiated: what kind of monitoring,
what kind of third party, what kind of scanners, what kind of
overseeing monitoring mechanisms, because clearly there is a security
issue there. My understanding is that it will probably be open
within weeks. I do not think there is going to be a rapid improvement
in the lives of ordinary Palestinians. There is the issue of job
creation, which is contingent upon the issue of security. Security
is a very serious issue in Gaza. As you know, following the withdrawal
there has been a large number of kidnappings, and there have been
armed struggles between the different factions. The Palestinian
Authority has not always been 100% in control. There are lots
of local gangs, families that rule a number of power centres,
not necessarily working with each other but very much working
against each other. I think it is a matter of some hard work on
the part of the Palestinians, the Wolfensohn mission, and the
Egyptians. Those are the key bodies involved.
Q23 Mr Hamilton: Can I follow that
up by asking you whether you can tell us who is in control of
Gaza if the Palestinian authority is not fully in control? How
important, for example, are Hamas in Gaza? Is there an al Qaeda
presence there at all?
Ms Bar-Yaacov: Lots of questions!
I will take one at a time and just do it in an orderly fashion.
The PA, I said, is not in 100% control. It obviously has some
control in some areas. Gaza is very much divided into different
areas. As I said, and I am just reiterating, there are a number
of power bases. We saw, for example, the kidnapping and then assassination
of Mussa Arafat not long ago, Yasser Arafat's nephew. Apparently,
he made 40 calls when he was kidnapped to anybody and everybody
in the PA, and none of his calls were returned, which begs the
question who ordered the kidnapping and the shooting, who carried
it out and why the Palestinian authority, who were only 200 metres
down the road, the headquarters of the security forces, did not
do anything about it. That just gives you a bit of insight into
how complicated it is. The thinking is that there were a number
of power bases who joined forces, because Mussa Arafat was viewed
as a disruptive power base and therefore they decided to eliminate
him. I cannot tell you whether Hamas were involved or not. I can
tell you that a number of people who work in Gaza think that they
were—that they were involved, though not necessarily that
they carried out the shooting. I would just reiterate that there
are a number of different groups. Hamas certainly controls certain
areas. Other Fatah militant factions control other areas. Different
families control different refugee camps. You saw yesterday there
was a kidnapping in Khan Yunis by one family, and a different
family was negotiating the potential release of the two Palestinians
who were kidnapped. It is not very clear at any given moment.
The lesson that is important to learn from all of this is that
the international community, the UK government, all of us sitting
here need to really strengthen Abu Mazen, strengthen the Palestinian
President, strengthen the legitimate authority, in order to ensure
that there will be one powerful, legitimate authority, one rule,
one gun. Your other question was about Hamas and al Qaeda. Hamas,
as you know, are gaining strength. They are claiming that the
disengagement was as a result of their pushing Israel out of Gaza,
a result of their action. They are running in the upcoming legislative
elections, the January Palestinian legislative council elections,
under the slogan of "Our actions are worth much more than
the ten years of negotiations." They are very much against
a negotiated settlement, and that is quite a worrying aspect,
one of the worrying aspects. They are gaining power also because
they are seen as clean; they are not seen as corrupt. The PA unfortunately
suffers from a very serious corruption problem, and Hamas do not.
Hamas are viewed as the only people—because it is not just
the PA; there are the different Fatah factions, and they have
all been tainted with corruption. Unfortunately, the Palestinian
Authority has not done anything significant enough yet to show
that they are actually fighting corruption. Those of us who proposed
that they should actually put people behind bars, that they should
try people, have a high visibility case against some of the leaders—Abu
Mazen has not done it, and a serious problem remains there. Al
Qaeda was your third question. Al Qaeda have a base in Sinai,
Egypt, which is very close to Israel and Gaza, so the thinking
is that they are trying to get in all the time. Whether they are
in Gaza or not, I personally do not know. What I know is that
the Israeli head of military intelligence said a couple of days
ago that he believes that they have managed to penetrate Gaza.
When you talk about al Qaeda, as we heard in the evidence session
before me, it is not so clear exactly who we are talking about.
There are a number of affiliate groups that call themselves al
Qaeda, but there is a very serious and real danger that if control
over the Gaza-Egypt border is not done properly, they will be
able to penetrate Gaza and operate from within Gaza. That is mainly
why the issue of the opening of Rafah is so serious.
Q24 Richard Younger-Ross: You talked
before about Hamas and its relations with al Qaeda. The previous
witnesses said that they felt that Hamas was trying to distance
themselves from al Qaeda. However, I note that Palestinian security
officials in the documents we have have said that al Qaeda members
were Hamas activists. Can you give us some light as to which of
those views is correct, and in your view is Hamas going to operate
against al Qaeda if al Qaeda is successful in penetrating Gaza?
Ms Bar-Yaacov: I do not think
that Hamas will operate against al Qaeda. I do not think that
is the way I look at it. I think the witness giving evidence before
me was 100% right in what he said, and I said exactly the same
in a session here two years ago, that it is not in Hamas's interests
to affiliate themselves with al Qaeda—I am just reiterating
what I said two years ago—because they do not want to meet
the same fate as al Qaeda; they do not what the US to basically
go after them. Their goal is limited. Hamas's goal is a Palestinian
Islamic state in the whole of Israel and Palestine. It is not
an Islamist world entity in the same way that other organisations
are working towards. I cannot see that there will be tension between
them over this issue. The one thing is that with the internet
today, with the kind of communications that we are seeing, they
do feed off each other. Hamas are picking up tips from al Qaeda
and they are getting closer in that sense. But I agree; I do not
think Hamas want to affiliate themselves with al Qaeda.
Q25 Richard Younger-Ross: So the
statement by the Palestinian security officer would be wrong?
Ms Bar-Yaacov: What are you reading
from?
Q26 Richard Younger-Ross: He is not
named. He is a PPC source.
Ms Bar-Yaacov: I have to say I
do not know what the source is. I have not heard that.
Q27 Richard Younger-Ross: Can I develop
on from that just on the Sinai. You made a statement there that
al Qaeda is in the Sinai. Can you expand upon that?
Ms Bar-Yaacov: A cell of about
30 al Qaeda members has been found recently in the Sinai. As you
know, there have been a series of attacks in the Sinai against
Israeli and international targets in recent months, and the thinking
is that al Qaeda are trying to penetrate Israel and trying to
penetrate through Gaza, but the Egyptians are the ones that uncovered
the al Qaeda cell in Sinai, and it is Egypt that is mainly concerned
about al Qaeda given that it is operating in Egyptian territory.
Q28 Richard Younger-Ross: The attacks
at Sharm el Sheikh.
Ms Bar-Yaacov: Exactly, and Tabah.
Q29 Chairman: Can I ask you about
the relationship between Gaza and the West Bank in terms of communication
between the Palestinian Authority and therefore of the groups
that operate. What relationship does Hamas have from Gaza to the
West Bank and how easy is it for people to operate in this context?
Has that changed because of the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza?
Ms Bar-Yaacov: It has changed
in the political sense. As you know, there is a ceasefire that
has been agreed on between the different Palestinian factions,
including Hamas. The problem is that Israel has been operating
in the West Bank, has been carrying out targeted assassinations
post withdrawal in the West Bank, and the question really is whether
Hamas and other organisations will retaliate from the West Bank,
since they are unlikely to retaliate from Gaza, even though they
did so when there was this blunder in Jabalia camp. There was
a huge procession of arms and some of them exploded, killing many
Hamas people, and Hamas blamed Israel even though Israel had nothing
to do with it, and then, in order to prove that they were right,
they rained Kassams on to Israel, to which Israel then retaliated
with great force, and I think that episode is over. So in terms
of the links between the West Bank and Gaza, it is tricky because
what Hamas will try to do is they will try to keep Gaza quiet
so that they could consolidate control over there, but they will
operate from the West Bank if there is something they do not like.
They can also use rockets over the wall and hit Israel from the
West Bank. The distances between the West Bank and Israel are
very close, and Israel's main concern is that they will be able
to hit Ben Gurion airport, the main international airport, from
the West Bank. That is the general thinking.
Q30 Mr Keetch: I was astonished when
I visited Israel and the Palestinian territories. You can stand
by the fence, wall, whatever, and you can see the Mediterranean,
and you can see the width of Israel before you. It is a very small
country, an incredibly small country. In terms of how we look
towards the establishment of a viable Palestinian state—because
to me that is the central resolution of the problem, not just
for the Israel Palestinian problem but also the wider problem
about terrorism, which we were discussing earlier—if we
can establish a viable Palestinian state, we are well on the way
to curing international terrorism. Simply how viable is it to
have a state of Palestine with two separate land areas? Could
it physically work? Could it physically be created and achieved?
Ms Bar-Yaacov: You mean between
the West Bank and Gaza? There will have to a link, which there
used to be under Oslo, called a safe passage, between the West
Bank and Gaza, and that is second on the priority list after opening
the external borders, the link between the West Bank and Gaza.
There are discussions, again, led by Jim Wolfensohn, about what
kind of passage it is going to be, whether it is going to be a
rail link or a road link, whether it is going to be raised or
whether it is going to be in a ditch, like a deep ditch, for security
reasons. Some progress is being made on this issue. Obviously,
the link between the West Bank and Gaza is absolutely essential
for the viability of a Palestinian state.
Q31 Richard Younger-Ross: But you
believe that you could establish a viable Palestinian state if
you had that link? This is something viable that can be achieved
given the size of the area, the population, etc?
Ms Bar-Yaacov: I think in order
to have a viable Palestinian state you have to have a lot more
in place. You have to have a legitimate and able Palestinian authority,
one that can really enforce the law. The current one, as I said,
is actually having serious problems enforcing the law. You have
to have a peace agreement in place, and I cannot see a final status
agreement being negotiated at present. I can see very important
steps that need to be taken now in order for a final status agreement
to be signed, but yes, I can see a viable Palestinian state, given
the geography.
Q32 Mr Maples: When Sharon announced
that Israel was going to withdraw from Gaza, I think a lot of
us saw that as a very constructive move, but it was greeted with
deep suspicion by the PA, and Hamas and everybody else.
The Committee suspended from 4.01 pm until
4.15 pm for a division in the House
Q33 Chairman: In the context of the process
after the withdrawal from Gaza, we understand that the Israeli
government's position is that there are no further unilateral
steps, and that anything else that comes must be negotiated. Is
that what you believe will happen, and is it likely, given the
domestic problems within the Israeli right, within Likud, and
the power struggle between Netanyahu and Sharon, that anything
can be negotiated in the foreseeable future?
Ms Bar-Yaacov: Again, spokespersons
of the Israeli government said about two weeks ago and have been
saying that there are planned further unilateral withdrawals,
so the statement that everything will be negotiated has been overtaken
by events. In other words, Eyal Arad, who is the senior adviser
to Sharon, stated in public that there are plans to carry out
further withdrawals from the West Bank if Israel deems that Abu
Mazen is too weak and is not a viable partner for negotiation.
So from an Israeli point of view, much depends on whether the
Palestinian Authority gets its act together, presumably after
their legislative elections in January, or not. Clearly, everybody's
preference would be to see a negotiated deal, to see Israeli and
Palestinian negotiations resume. The question is how and under
what terms. I think it would be very good for the international
community to help facilitate an ongoing dialogue between Abu Mazen
and Sharon. It is very helpful to have someone engaged full-time,
shuttling all the time between the Israelis and the Palestinians
to help them overcome the difficulties and the gaps in terms of
where they are standing. The big question today, I think, is how
to move the process from a unilateral one to a bilateral one,
and the answer is through a third party mediator.
Q34 Sir John Stanley: I would just
like to ask you a number of specific questions following on from
the area that the Chairman has opened up. First of all, in relation
to the security wall, is it your understanding now that, though
the security wall has been constructed in separate lengths, the
intention and policy of the Israeli government now is to fill
in the gaps so that it will run essentially on a continuous basis
across the West Bank?
Ms Bar-Yaacov: I have a map here
of the current security wall and fence in terms of where it has
already been constructed and areas that have not been constructed
but have been approved. The idea is, certainly on the western
part of the West Bank parallel to the green line, to seal it,
definitely to fill in all the gaps. The questions that remain,
and are very problematic, are over east Jerusalem. There are cases
pending in the Israeli Supreme Court, which sits as a High Court,
currently pending, and there the wall—it is a wall in those
particular areas—could potentially disrupt the peace process
very seriously, and could even lead to a third Intifada, a missile
Intifada from east Jerusalem and the West Bank into Israel, because
the wall as it is currently constructed, and if all the gaps are
filled in that area, actually cuts across east Jerusalem neighbourhoods
like Abu Dis, Eizariya, Shu'afat. Part of it is constructed on
a schoolyard. Palestinians living in Jerusalem with Israeli IDs
with permits to work in Israel will find it virtually impossible
to get to work, their kids will have to change schools, it will
create tremendous unhappiness and will lead to more extremism.
So I think the focus of international pressure at the moment should
really be on that area, because I do not think the West Bank,
western wall and fence is as much of a problem. The key lesson
with the wall is really to recognise that it is a reality, that
it is there; to tell the Palestinians that it is there and therefore
they should negotiate with the Israelis alternative routes where
they are problematic, and much more access through the wall, gates
and those sort of areas. The Israeli Supreme Court has been very
active in trying to strike a balance between Palestinian humanitarian
needs and Israeli security needs, and that is the route through
which the wall will move in order to make it somewhat easier for
Palestinians to exercise their freedom of movement.
Q35 Chairman: Can I follow up on
the question of the route, the green line? The question of where
it varies. You said in Jerusalem there was a problem, but the
fundamental problem surely is that it is not on the '67 borders.
Ms Bar-Yaacov: There are a number
of fundamental problems. It is a system of walls and fences; it
is not just one wall, and that is partly where the problem lies.
It is not as if there is just one line running parallel to the
green line, sometimes on the green line and sometimes not on the
green line but in Palestinian territories. There are towns like
Qalqilya and Tulkarm that are completely surrounded by a sub-wall
or sub-fence. The problem is not only whether it is on the green
line or not, and that is clearly a problem in some areas because
the Palestinian villages that are trapped between the green line
and the wall or the fence in some areas. There is a recognition,
I think, among the Israeli public and the Israeli political echelons
that it was a mistake not to build the wall on the green line
where possible. The army, when they planned the route of the fence
and the wall, did not take into account Palestinian humanitarian
needs. Now there is a recognition that they should have done and
the Supreme Court has issued a number of judgments calling on
the Israeli defence forces to move the fence and consequently,
they have had to move the fence or the wall. So there is a problem
there and more adjustments will have to be made.
Q36 Sir John Stanley: You said that
in your view it was a good idea to tell the Palestinians the wall
was a reality. Do you not also think it might be a good idea to
tell the Israeli government that the wall is illegal?
Ms Bar-Yaacov: The Israelis know
that it is illegal to build it in certain areas of the West Bank.
I do not think it is illegal to build it on the international
border. It is illegal to build it inside Palestinian territory.
I think there is a consensus in Israel that the wall or the fence
in and of itself is a good idea to prevent terror. There is a
lack of consensus, and that is where there is room for movement,
on the route of the fence and the wall. In terms of the advice
to the Palestinian government, given that it is there, is to get
them to negotiate further access through it. It is not just going
to disappear. It is potentially going to move but it will not
be completely dismantled everywhere. In terms of the legality
of it, my personal opinion is that under international law it
is legal to build a wall on an international border, but not deep
into Palestinian land. That is where the mistake was made.
Q37 Sir John Stanley: I may have
misheard you but I do not think I did. You may just want to check
this. I think you said it was legal to build it inside Palestinian
territory.
Ms Bar-Yaacov: No, illegal. If
I said "legal" I meant to say "illegal". I
apologise for that. I will reiterate: highly illegal.
Q38 Sir John Stanley: The next question
I want to put to you is this. Do you agree that if you measure
the number of settlers or dwellings that have been unilaterally
removed in the West Bank, and I am referring particularly to the
four small northern settlements, those numbers of dwellings or
settlers are actually very much smaller than the number of new
authorisations of houses inside the existing settlements? Do you
agree with that?
Ms Bar-Yaacov: Yes, I agree with
that, and I think, again, the UK government and the international
community should pressurise Israel to stop the expansion of settlements
in the West Bank and to dismantle the illegal outposts.
Q39 Sir John Stanley: Do you agree
that the Israeli government's position is that it considers it
has no obligation in the peace negotiations to withdraw back to
the 1967 boundaries?
Ms Bar-Yaacov: No. I disagree.
I think that the Israeli government's position is that this is
a matter for final status negotiations and they will negotiate
that issue in the context, and only in the context of a final
status agreement and not ahead of it, not now.
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