Examination of Witnesses (Questions 80-99)
MR JACK
STRAW MP, MR
DAVID RICHMOND
CMG AND DR
PETER GOODERHAM
24 OCTOBER 2005
Q80 Richard Younger-Ross: I very
carefully used the word "extreme" before the word "cleric".
I appreciate that a large number of them are working and are a
moderating force. However, I am concerned that more power is being
given to those who do not wish to see the sort of democracy that
we wish to see, but wish to go back to the sort of democracy they
have in Iran, rather than the democracy you described earlier.
I fear that we will move towards a new Vietnam where these other
groups, which cannot agree to the model of democracy—
Mr Straw: It is good for a headline
in the liberal news, but it is complete nonsense.
Q81 Richard Younger-Ross: Liberal
Democrat!
Mr Straw: It is complete nonsense.
The parallels are about zero, with great respect to you. Just
look at the fact that you have now got a UN-backed democratic
process. There was not ever a single United Nations Security Council
resolution in respect of Vietnam. Everybody is agreed in the Security
Council about the strategy needed to put Iraq on a settled path.
The two other things I say are these: there is not seen to be
any particular appetite amongst Iraqis for setting up a structure
similar to that in Iran. Although it is true that the majority
of Iranians are Shia, and in the south and other parts of Iraq
a significant proportion of the Iraqis are Shia, the Iraqis are
Arab and the Iranians are not Arab, they are Persian. This division
between the two is not accidental but is quite powerful, and there
are other reasons that explain the nature of the Iranian constitution,
about which I would be very happy to bore this Committee at some
length. The Iraqi constitution states in the opening articles—and
I paraphrase, but only a little—that it should take account
of the Islamic heritage of Iraq; but it also states that it should
take account of democratic rights and human rights. The architecture
of the document is not one that makes this an Islamic state in
the classical sense that you see in Iran or, in a different way,
in Saudi Arabia.
Q82 Mr Illsley: In regard to the
Basra situation and the incidents on 19 September, just how big
a disappointment was it that the newly-trained police forces seemed
to be in alliance with the militias in the handing over of British
troops to those militias?
Mr Straw: It obviously was a disappointment.
It was aimed at one particular section of the police force. There
was disappointment, and we have to deal with that. We hoped that
it would be otherwise.
Chairman: We are moving to Iran now.
Q83 Andrew Mackinlay: I will come
on in a moment to IAEA Security Council's atomic weapons, but
in recent weeks the Prime Minister, yourself and the Defence Secretary
have indicated a fear that some of the ordinance and planning
and preparation and some of the personalities involved in attacks
upon British soldiers and coalition forces in Iraq and other malevolence
around the region has been from Hezbollah or Iran. I note that
you said at a press conference that the explosives that killed
at least eight British soldiers originated from Hezbollah or Iran.
That is pretty definite. Downing Street/the Prime Minister have
been fairly strong, but in some parliamentary exchanges the Defence
Secretary seemed to slightly pull back from that. I do not mean
this in any spiteful way, as you would know, but there does seem
to be a degree of ambiguity. I wonder if you could take this opportunity
to share with us what you do know. Is it Hezbollah or Iran, and
if it is the latter to whom does one look? At what level is this
and to what extent are the fingerprints of the Iran regime on
this?
Mr Straw: There is a degree of
ambiguity about this, Mr Mackinlay, because there is a degree
of uncertainty about it. We believe, from forensic examination
of these improvised explosive devices, that they are similar to
or the same as those used by Hezbollah; and it appears that they
can be traced back to Iran. We do not know about the timing and
we do not know directly about any involvement by the Iranian Government,
but it is sufficient for us to be concerned about it and we have
made representations to the Iranian Government. I think I have
probably said enough about that; we just state that there is not
a continuation of these devices.
Q84 Andrew Mackinlay: Turning to
suicide bombers, there have been press reports, which are not
vague reports, about how the regime and organs of the regime,
including Iran's newly-installed Defence Minister, had both invited
volunteers for suicide bombings and celebrated them. A celebration
is planned on 30 October in Tehran, which, by definition, must
have at least the tacit support of the regime, entitled Men of
the Sun. They are going to celebrate suicide operations at this
celebration, encouraging people to sign up for martyrdom-seeking
operations. The Defence Minister has indicated support for this
kind of activity. What do we know about this; what representations
have we made; and is this not something that really puts that
regime beyond the pale? There are very few regimes, and certainly
they are regimes that you would not do business with, that are
actively encouraging and promoting the concept of suicide operations
around the world and around the region.
Mr Richmond: It is worth remembering
that they were using suicide bombers in the Iran/Iraq war, and
it is quite a long tradition. These people have been celebrated,
and there is a foundation that looks after wives and dependants
and so on; so this is something that has existed in Iran quite
some time. It is true to say that recently more publicity has
been given to this, but you have to see what they did rather than
what they wrote in their newspapers.
Mr Straw: It is slightly more
complicated because of the Iran/Iraq war. We look to the Government
of Iran to take the same unambiguous view of terrorism that all
other countries do. A point I often make to Iraqi interlocutors
is that with their very active support and encouragement when
I was Home Secretary, at the request of my then predecessor the
late Robin Cook, I banned, under the Terrorism Act, the Iraq/Iranian
terrorist organisation MEK—and it is still banned. I also
banned in the same list the military wings of Hamas and Hezbollah.
The Iranian Government give very active support to Hezbollah and
some support to Hamas, and we think they should desist from that
because you have to be unambiguous in your approach to terrorist
organisations. That is a conversation that continues to happen
with the Iranians.
Q85 Andrew Mackinlay: And the PMOI
were banned—or is that the MEK?
Mr Straw: Yes.
Q86 Andrew Mackinlay: I do not want
to labour the point, but it seems to me that that should be revisited.
Mr Straw: You are not supporting
this terrorist organisation—
Q87 Andrew Mackinlay: I am certainly
not, no.
Mr Straw: Okay.
Q88 Andrew Mackinlay: But, equally,
since—
Mr Straw: Did NCRI fund—
Q89 Andrew Mackinlay: The answer
is "no", but the point is that I certainly think we
should always revisit those which we ban.
Mr Straw: There are provisions
in the Terrorism Act 2000, if organisations want to make representations—
Q90 Andrew Mackinlay: Perhaps I can
go, as I promised you, to the question of development of nuclear
weapons. The IAEA has been unambiguous in its condemnation of
Iran for non-compliance. There is now talk about the matter being
referred to the Security Council, which seems logical. The anxiety
which some have is that it will go to the Security Council, and
then there will be impotence; because if the Security Council
stands by the IAEA and shows robustness, there is very little
that the international community can do. Is that not the case?
Where are we on this? How can we contain and control Iran on development
of nuclear weapons?
Mr Straw: First, let me just say
where we are. We do not know for certain whether Iran is developing
a nuclear weapons capability. What we do know for certain is that
over a 20-year period they failed to notify the IAEA of very large
developments at Isfahan and Natanz of conversion and enrichment
facilities and other matters. We also know that they were in close
touch with A. Q. Khan, who is the man who was in the lead in developing
the Pakistani bomb and who then decided to go into business selling
nuclear weapons technology. We know they experimented in polonium
and plutonium, and there is also a large question mark as to why
they need such large fuel cycle facilities to create nuclear fuel
when they only have one nuclear power station at Bushehr. That
power station is being built under contract with the Russians,
and the Russians are under contract to provide fuel for it; but
they have no other power stations ready to go, and there are none
in development either. Those are the question marks. You talk
about impotence, but the record of the IAEA on Iran is one of
the strength of the international community in support of one
of the world's most important international treaties, the Non-Proliferation
Treaty. Where are we? When we started this in the immediate aftermath
of the Iraq war, Dominic de Villepin, Joschka Fischer and myself
thought there was every prospect that Iran would exploit the divisions
in the international community and carry on regardless. They have
simply not done that, and we have been able to achieve a situation
where the enrichment of uranium is suspended. That remains suspended.
What we also achieved for a period was the suspension of the conversion
facility at Isfahan. The Iranians made the decision to restart
that on 2 August this year; and it is because of that that we
have a problem. As you say, Mr Mackinlay, when this came before
the IAEA board of governors there was a vote of 22 in favour of
declaring Iran non-compliant. There was one against, which was
Venezuela, and the rest abstained. That was quite a shock to the
Iranians because they thought that the most votes we would muster
would be 18, and in fact if Venezuela had not voted against we
would have ended up with a consensus. That is where it is at the
moment. Enrichment remains suspended and further conversations
are taking place. I hope that it is possible to resolve this matter
within the board of governors of the IAEA, but the statutes of
the IAEA provide that if such matters cannot be resolved, then
there can be a reference to the Security Council. As to whether
that is necessary or when it would take place is a choice that
we would make, and we would certainly not announce it in advance.
Q91 Mr Pope: You have said on a number
of occasions that it is inconceivable that military action would
be taken against Iran, and whilst I am sure that is true at the
moment, it presumably really is not the case if one looks to the
future. I cannot see Israel, for example, standing by and allowing
Iran to develop a nuclear weapons capability; and for that matter
I cannot really see the United States allowing that to happen.
My point is that it is not inconceivable.
Mr Straw: Mr Pope, I speak for
the British Government; I do not presume to speak for the Israeli
Government; they have to make their own decisions. It was in the
context of the nuclear dossier that I made those remarks. The
second thing to say is that people need to chill a bit on this.
Military action is not on anybody's agenda with respect to Iran,
and that has been made clear repeatedly by the American Government
and clearly by Condoleezza Rice yesterday at the joint interview
I did with her from Birmingham, Alabama. It is simply not on the
agenda. There is always a caveat entered on behalf of the President
of the United States, who is also Commander in Chief, which I
understand; but it is not on the agenda of the American Government
and it is not on our agenda or anybody's agenda on the board of
governors. My judgment is that we have to work extremely hard
to resolve this by diplomatic means. What I do know is that where
we are united—and we have been until very recently completely
united—we can get a long way. I also know that the Iranians
were surprised and a little chastened by the extent to which we
got, not unanimous support in the last board of governors, but
very significant and substantial support, which they thought would
go their way.
Q92 Mr Pope: The Committee visited
Iran and went to Tehran and Isfahan about two years ago. It was
quite a friendly visit, certainly in comparison to when we went
to France at about the same time!
Mr Straw: I shall make sure that
our Ambassador in Tehran tells the Iranian Government that.
Q93 Mr Pope: I know that you have
invested quite a lot of time and effort personally in the UK relationship
with Iran, but I just think that over the last two years things
have deteriorated somewhat. There was the case of the British
soldiers who were kidnapped in the Shatt al-Arab waterway. Mr
Mackinlay has pointed out that there is compelling evidence that
Iranian-produced or Iranian-financed weapons have been used against
UK forces south of Iraq. It seems to us that our diplomatic relationship
is not as good as it was two years ago when we went there. Would
you characterise it thus and, if so, what can we do about it?
Mr Straw: There has been a difficult
period in the relationship between Iran and the international
community; and just bear in mind that every move that the United
Kingdom has made has been in concert with France and Germany,
and through that E3 arrangement the rest of the European Union
as well. If people say, "What is the point of EU foreign
policy?" this is the point of EU foreign policy. Increasingly
we have had the active support of the United States Government,
backing our proposals. We are working at improving co-operation
with the Russian Federation as well as other countries. Iran had
elections; they were imperfect elections because of their constitutional
system, but they produced a result in which President Ahmadinejad
took office. It is a new government. I was present at the United
Nations General Assembly when he made the speech that he did and
set out his stall. It is a more difficult environment than it
was two years ago; however, that is not a reason for abandoning
the diplomatic route. You have to try and understand where the
Iranians are coming from. Iran is a very proud nation, with a
very fine past. It is also a nation which, for rather good reasons,
has felt that it has been over-dominated by great power politics
in turn by Russia, by the United Kingdom and by the United States;
and that is part of their national consciousness, as is this very
powerful sense of their own national dignity. You have to take
that into account. The argument over the Non-Proliferation Treaty
is complicated. The Iranians say: "Article 4 of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty entitles us to the full panoply that is necessary to generate
electricity by nuclear power." On the face of it, that is
correct. However, there is an obligation under Article 2 not to
do anything towards developing nuclear weapons capability. The
intersection of these two comes at the point of the fuel cycle,
and that is why there is such anxiety about the use to which the
Iranians are intending to put the fuel that they would generate.
That is what we have to work on. As far as I am concerned, and
I think I can speak for the French and German Governments and
for Javier Solana, we are just going to keep going on this.
Q94 Mr Hamilton: Following on from
what Mr Pope has just said about the possibilities of military
action or otherwise against Iran, I am sure you will have heard
of the Heritage Foundation, the right-wing think-tank in Washington—
Mr Straw: Are they supporting
me?
Q95 Mr Hamilton: I do not think they
are not supporting you. It has a great influence on President
Bush's policies, and I am delighted to hear what Condoleezza Rice
has said about the possibility of any kind of military action
against Iran. However, as you may recall a few weeks ago, Dr Nile
Gardiner, someone we met a couple of years ago in Washington,
was on the Newsnight programme. He told Jeremy Paxman that it
is about time we stopped using the carrot and waved the stick
at Iran; in other words, we would have to do something quite radical
to stop them developing nuclear weapons if they did not stop of
their own accord. Are you worried by that? Do you think that his
views are likely to penetrate the White House at some stage and
force them into military action if Iran does not go along with
the IAEA?
Mr Straw: He has his point of
view. Was that the programme that I was in?
Q96 Mr Hamilton: No, it is one that
I was on actually—helping you!
Mr Straw: Thank you very much.
Let me just repeat the position of the American Government, which
was spelt out yesterday, and before, by Secretary Rice. She said
that military action was not on the agenda of the United States
at this time. She went on to say words to the effect that the
United States Government had been giving support for the E3 process;
they have done so, and we are very grateful to the United States
Government for that support. Each resolution that we have had
before the board of governors has also been actively supported
by the United States. That is where we are. As I say, one can
endlessly speculate. I think I have made our position fairly clear.
I believe that the diplomatic route is the right one. It is not
just about diplomacy across a table; it is about the pressure
that one can exercise through the international community on a
country like Iran. It could also be exercised on us in different
circumstances. It is about the power of the United Nations system
that we are dealing with here.
Q97 Mr Hamilton: In other words,
you are still wholly committed to constructive engagement, which
is the British Government's continuing policy in Iraq.
Mr Straw: Let me say that for
all sorts of reasons sometimes it is hard going with Iran, but
I happen to be committed to it, and I happen to think that it
is far better than the alternative.
Q98 Ms Stuart: If none of that pressure
works, surely the minimum is the end of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty?
Mr Straw: It may be the end of
the Non-Proliferation Treaty; it depends on the circumstances.
Meanwhile, there are other challenges for the Non-Proliferation
Treaty. Only three members of the United Nations have not signed
up to the Non-Proliferation Treaty but they all have a nuclear
weapons capability, so trying to deal with that is also something
we have to factor into our approach.
Q99 Mr Mackay: Foreign Secretary,
I want to bring you on to another problem state in the region,
namely Syria, whose regime, quite rightly, has had the international
spotlight focused on it particularly in the last few days. I would
appreciate your comments on the German Prosecutor's findings.
We all recall that he was doing this at the request of the Secretary
General of the United Nations, which confirmed that Syria was
intimately involved in the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri
in Beirut back in February, and that against the backcloth that
the Interior Minister Kanaan seems to have conveniently committed
suicide in the last few weeks and against a backcloth of the serious
allegations, which appear to be very well-founded, that a significant
number of members of Saddam Hussein's regime are being harboured
in Syria with no effort to bring them to justice. Finally, there
is the backcloth that security advisors say to us that almost
certainly the Syrian border is the most porous and the most dangerous
border with Iraq, and I would appreciate your comments.
Mr Straw: The findings of the
Mehlis Commission are very serious indeed. They are so serious
that Secretary Rice and I have agreed that there should be a ministerial
meeting of the Security Council, and we are currently fixing up
a date for that very shortly, providing we can get other member
countries on board for that. This report that I have in front
of me requires an answer to the international community. You cannot
have a member of the United Nations that has subscribed to the
Charter of Human Rights, and much else besides, deciding that
the way it resolves its problems is having people, at least at
a pretty senior level, complicit in the murder of political opponents
in a country that is regarded by every other member of the United
Nations as independent; this is simply intolerable. We have to
meet and decide what to do next in respect of the conclusions
of the Mehlis Commission. There is also, let me say, business
in respect of Resolution 1559. We are dealing with two resolutions
here. Resolution 1595 was the one that established the Mehlis
Commission and Resolution 1559 was an earlier resolution that
required Syria to remove its troops and its penetration of Lebanon
altogether. It has made some progress on that and has certainly
removed its troops, but it still has to do a very great deal more,
including recognising the Lebanon as an independent member of
the United Nations, and put embassies into Beirut and exchange
ambassadors. These are very elementary matters, but very important
matters. On the second point you raised, Mr Mackay, about penetration
of the border, you are right to say that this is the most dangerous
and most porous border into Iraq. The Syrians have taken some
steps to improve security and co-operation across the border,
but they have got to take many more. Dr Gooderham may wish to
say something more about this. An associated point is that they
have got to be categorical in ceasing to allow Syria to be used
as a base for Hamas and Islamic Jihad. It is almost a joke in
the Arab region, and regarded as such, when Syrian leaders say
that Hamas and Islamic Jihad are not allowed to operate from Syria.
I recently met a very well-known, senior Arab journalist, who
got out his pocket book and said, "if I want to talk to leaders
of Hamas or Islamic Jihad, I phone these numbers in Damascus;
I am told that they have moved; I then leave a message and they
phone me back within five minutes from Damascus." It is a
charade but it is all part of the same problem.
Doctor Gooderham: As the Foreign
Secretary said, there is some evidence that Syria has taken some
steps with respect to its border with Iraq, but the sense we have
is that those steps have been half-hearted, grudging and tactical
in nature. What we have been looking for is a strategic decision
on the part of the regime in Damascus to get to grips with the
problem of the insurgents coming in and out of Iraq and Syria;
and so far we have not seen that. We continue to press for it.
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