Conclusions and recommendations
The ongoing threat from terrorism
1. We
conclude that despite a number of successes targeting the leadership
and infrastructure of al Qaeda, the danger of international terrorism,
whether from al Qaeda or other related groups, has not diminished
and may well have increased. Al Qaeda continues to pose an extremely
serious and brutal threat to the United Kingdom and its interests.
(Paragraph 15)
2. We conclude that
the dispersal and fragmentation of al Qaeda into more autonomous
local cells mainly linked together by a common ideology will make
it more difficult to tackle the threat of international terrorism.
We further conclude that the situation in Iraq has provided both
a powerful source of propaganda for Islamist extremists and also
a crucial training ground for international terrorists associated
with al Qaeda. (Paragraph 21)
3. We conclude that
propaganda is one of the major tools in al Qaeda's arsenal. We
further conclude that progress towards resolving key international
conflicts would go some way to removing widespread feelings of
injustice in the Muslim world that feed into the causes of and
support for terrorism. Although the United Kingdom and its allies
recognise this, and are working to resolve these conflicts, they
are putting insufficient effort and funding into countering terrorist
propaganda. Much greater effort needs to be made to communicate
effectively with the Arab and Islamic world in order to bridge
the gulf of mistrust that feeds into international terrorism.
We recommend that the Government continue to engage with Muslim
leaders and clerics who speak out against distorted and extremist
versions of their faith. We commend the Government's Engaging
with the Islamic World Programme as well as the decision to set
up an Arabic BBC World Service television station, but note that
it will initially broadcast for only 12 hours a day and be much
less generously funded than al Jazeera, which is heavily subsidised
by the government of Qatar. We conclude that much more could be
done. We recommend that the Government set out in its response
to this Report what plans it has to expand its work in this field.
We also recommend that the BBC World Service carry out an evaluation
of the cost-effectiveness of this expenditure. (Paragraph 30)
4. We acknowledge
that there is a problem of what to do with some of the detainees
at Guantánamo and that those detained include some very
dangerous terrorists. We also conclude that the continuing existence
of Guantánamo diminishes US moral authority and adds to
the list of grievances against the US. We further conclude that
detentions without either national or international authority
work against British as well as US interests and hinder the effective
pursuit of the 'war against terrorism'. We conclude that those
who can be reasonably safely released should be released, those
who can be prosecuted as criminals should be prosecuted and that
as many others as possible should be returned to their countries
of citizenship. We commend the British Government for its policy
of urging the US government to move towards closing Guantánamo.
(Paragraph 46)
5. We conclude that
there has been a lot of speculation about the possible use of
rendition to countries where torture can take place, so called
"Black Sites" and the complicity of the British Government,
all of which would be very serious matters, but that there has
been no hard evidence of the truth of any of these allegations.
The British and US governments have categorically denied that
either UK airspace, or airports have been used by the US government
for rendition or extraordinary rendition since 11 September 2001.
We reiterate our strong view that the Government must deal with
extraordinary rendition in a transparent manner with timely answers
to questions from this Committee. We conclude that it is regrettable
that far more detailed information has been given in parliamentary
answers to opposition party spokesmen than has been given in response
to questions from this Committee. (Paragraph 58)
6. We conclude that
despite the reforms adopted by the 2005 UN General Summit, there
remain uncertainties over the international legal framework for
humanitarian intervention. We recommend that the Government set
out in its response to this Report what steps it is taking to
establish a consensus on whether and when intervention on humanitarian
grounds is permissible. (Paragraph 66)
Saudi Arabia
7. We
conclude that there remains a serious terrorist threat in Saudi
Arabia, and that this is directed at both the Saudi authorities
and foreign interests. (Paragraph 77)
8. We conclude that
Saudi Arabia is taking the threat of terrorism very seriously
and is providing valuable assistance to the international community
in this area. The Kingdom has put in place an effective security-focussed
strategy targeting individuals and this has had a forceful impact
on the al Qaeda presence in the Kingdom. However, we also conclude
that the level of regional cooperation could be significantly
improved, and recommend that the Government give assistance in
this area, setting out in its response to this Report what steps
it is taking. We further recommend that the Government pursue
with its Saudi counterparts the possibility of a regional terrorism
centre headed by Saudi Arabia. (Paragraph 87)
9. We conclude that
Saudi Arabia is taking very seriously the causes of terrorism
and process of extremist recruitment and has conducted valuable
research in this area. We further conclude that Saudi Arabia is
pursuing crucial long-term policies to tackle the causes of terrorism.
We conclude that the United Kingdom could usefully learn from
Saudi Arabia's experience in this field, highlighting the two-way
nature of cooperation with the Kingdom. (Paragraph 99)
10. We conclude that
despite a number of reform steps, the political environment remains
severely constrained in Saudi Arabia. This raises serious concerns,
and in the context of glaring socio-economic disparities, could
feed into extremism and the causes of terrorism. Nevertheless,
we conclude that the Saudi reform process must be domestically
driven; perceived interference by the international community
could be counter productive. (Paragraph 128)
11. We conclude that
the human rights situation in Saudi Arabia continues to give cause
for grave concern. We recommend that the Government continue to
make clear that discrimination against women, other human rights
abuses which are endemic in Saudi Arabia including discrimination
against migrant workers, torture and the shortcomings of the judicial
system, breed discontent and fall far short of universal standards.
We recommend that the Government set out in its response to this
Report what progress was made in this area at the April 2006 meeting
of the Two Kingdoms Forum. We further recommend that the Government
set out whether it is seeking a memorandum of understanding with
Saudi Arabia. (Paragraph 135)
12. We conclude that
the United Kingdom's relationship with Saudi Arabia is of critical
and strategic importance. Not only is the Kingdom a crucial ally
in the international 'war against terrorism', but it is central
to many of this country's national interests and meets most of
the Government's strategic priorities. We further conclude that
while the United Kingdom may not see eye to eye with Saudi Arabia
on a number of issues, it is critically important that the two
countries remain close and communicative allies. We conclude that
Saudi Arabia is a country where a significant British diplomatic
presence can make a difference. The stability of Saudi Arabia
is vital to the United Kingdom's interests, particularly in the
context of the war in Iraq and developments in Iran. We conclude
that stability requires significant reform. (Paragraph 139)
13. At the time of
concluding the drafting of our Report, the United Kingdom's courts
had just determined that the Saudi Arabian government is immune,
in international law, from being pursued in UK courts in relation
to the unjustified detention and alleged torture of British citizens.
We recommend that the British Government disclose what it knows
about this grave incident and what representations it made on
behalf of the British nationals. (Paragraph 140)
The United Arab Emirates
14. We
conclude that the UAE is an important ally in the international
'war against terrorism'. We further conclude that the UAE has
taken important steps to improve banking regulation in order to
target money laundering; we welcome the role of British personnel
in this area. However, we conclude that there are limits to what
regulation of the banking sector can achieve with regard to terrorist
financing. We further conclude that important work is being done
to tackle the risk of proliferation, in large part through work
between the UAE and the USA by means of the Container Security
Initiative (CSI). We recommend that the Government set out in
its response to this Report its current position on placing British
officials in major ports overseas to improve security for the
United Kingdom and its Overseas Territories. (Paragraph 167)
15. We conclude that
the public and Congressional concern in the USA at the prospect
of a deal that would have given Dubai Ports World control over
a number of US ports is very regrettable, and sends the wrong
signals to the Arab and Muslim world. However, we also conclude
that the level of regional cooperation is not as high as it could
be. We recommend that the Government work to support regional
efforts at cooperation where appropriate and that it set out in
its response to this Report what steps it is taking in this regard.
We conclude that as a Muslim country, the UAE has an important
role to play in countering sources of terrorism, such as religious
teaching and education system; indeed, the Federation's leaders
have provided bold and courageous leadership in this regard. We
further conclude that the UAE's experience in this area could
provide useful lessons for the United Kingdom. (Paragraph 168)
16. We conclude that
there is a serious democratic deficit in the UAE, although informal
channels of consultation appear to go some way to address the
needs of the population. We recommend that the Government work
to support moves towards democratisation in the UAE, offering
assistance wherever appropriate. (Paragraph 173)
17. We conclude that
there remain areas of human rights concern in the UAE, notably
the treatment of foreign workers. We recommend that the Government
work to encourage the UAE to sign up to the remaining ILO rules
and improve the status of foreign workers. We further conclude
that there have been serious efforts to improve the situation
of child jockeys, nevertheless, we recommend that the Government
remain seized of this issue and remind the UAE of the need to
protect children. (Paragraph 182)
Israel-Palestine
18. We
conclude that the recognition given to the state of Israel in
President Abbas's proposed 18-point peace plan is welcome but
that the recognition should be explicit rather than implicit.
We recommend that the FCO state whether or not it favours the
holding of a national referendum in the Palestinian territories
on President Abbas's 18-point peace plan. (Paragraph 187)
19. We conclude that
the Government is correct to refuse to deal directly with Hamas.
We recommend that, until Hamas accepts the existence of Israel
and commits itself to both to a two-state solution and exclusively
peaceful means of achieving its goals, the Government should continue
to refuse to deal with it directly. However, we further recommend
that the Government continue to work with President Abbas, work
with international organisations and non-governmental organisations
in order to assist the Palestinian people, and seek out, where
feasible, 'back channels' in order to facilitate movement towards
negotiations between the Palestinians and Israelis. (Paragraph
192)
20. We conclude that
the Government was right to refuse to channel its aid through
a Palestinian administration led by Hamas, and we endorse the
Government's support for the policy set out by the Quartet in
the London statement of 30 January. However, it is important that
the Palestinian people are not punished for exercising their rights
as voters and we support the subsequent decision to create a mechanism
for channelling aid directly to those who most need it. We recommend
that the Government act with all speed to ensure that this mechanism
is fully implemented and that it has the desired effect of averting
an economic and humanitarian disaster in the Palestinian territories.
We further recommend that the Government, in its response to this
Report, set out what steps it is taken to avert an economic and
humanitarian crisis in the Palestinian Territories. (Paragraph
197)
21. We reiterate the
Committee's previous conclusions on the illegality of the current
route of the separation barrier and underline our concerns about
the impact it is having on the lives of ordinary Palestinians.
We recommend that the Government continue to make the strongest
representations to the Israeli authorities to align the route
of the barrier with the 1967 border and that it raise the question
of the present alignment of the barrier in international fora
such as the new United Nations Council on Human Rights. (Paragraph
206)
22. We conclude that
satisfactory road and rail links between Gaza and the West Bank
are essential for the creation of a viable Palestinian state.
We recommend that the Government intensify the international efforts
being made to achieve progress with these projects and provide
the Committee with a full statement of the latest position in
its response to this Report. (Paragraph 213)
23. We conclude that
there is little prospect of the Israelis and Palestinians reaching
any agreement on the way forward without substantial commitment
and engagement by the Quartet, by regional players and above all
by the USA. We recommend that the Government do everything possible
both bilaterally and through international mechanisms to encourage
both parties to implement their Road Map obligations. (Paragraph
222)
Iraq
24. We
conclude that the continued deterioration in the security situation
in Iraq is extremely worrying, as are the deepening sectarian
and ethnic dimensions of the violence. We further conclude that
Iraq's neighbours have yet to take sufficient steps to prevent
the movement of insurgents across Iraq's borders, although we
note that the length and porous nature of these borders make this
task extremely difficult. (Paragraph 232)
25. We conclude that
despite continued hard work to build up the Iraqi Security Forces,
and the dedication and bravery of many of the members of those
forces, they remain a long way from being able to take the lead
on security across Iraq. We further conclude that relying on Shia
and Kurdish communities to build up the Iraqi Security Forces
has contributed to the development of sectarian forces and that
this is regrettable in the volatile security and political environment
in Iraq. We recommend that the Government continue to work with
its international partners to address this problem and make clear
to the Iraqi authorities the importance of legitimate national
Security Forces. We further recommend that the Government set
out in its response to this Report what steps it is taking to
assist the Iraqi authorities to establish a security infrastructure
that respects human rights. (Paragraph 238)
26. We recommend that
the Government set out in its response to this Report the circumstances
under which it would withdraw British forces from Iraq. We further
recommend that the Government set out in its response to this
Report the findings of the 'joint committee to transfer security
responsibility'. (Paragraph 245)
27. We conclude that,
in the context of the insurgency and the appalling level of violence,
detention will continue to be necessary; however, the level of
such detentions is a problem for coalition forces too and for
the United Kingdom's image in the region. Wherever and whenever
possible such detainees should be handed over to the Iraqi government
for trial. We recommend that the Government set out in its response
to this Report the current number and status of detainees held
by the United Kingdom in Iraq, including the basis for their detention,
as well as any plans to transfer them to Iraqi or US custody or
to subject them to due judicial process. We also recommend that
the Government provide in its response the latest information
it has as to the number of detainees being held by the USA in
Iraq and the number being held by the Iraqi authorities. (Paragraph
247)
28. We conclude that
the Government is making slow progress towards resolving the issue
of how to regulate private military and security companies. This
is regrettable given the increase in the use of such firms in
Iraq and elsewhere. We recommend that the Government accelerate
its efforts in this area and that it set out in its response to
this Report what measures it plans to take. (Paragraph 253)
29. We commend the
continued commitment of ordinary Iraqis to the democratic process
in Iraq and are impressed by the obvious desire on the part of
ordinary Iraqis to achieve a more representative political system.
We reiterate the conclusion of our predecessor Committee that
it is essential that the international community, and especially
the USA and United Kingdom, refrain from interfering in Iraqi
politics and decision making. Nevertheless, there is an important
continuing role for the international community in support of
the democratic government in Iraq. We recommend that the Government
do all it can to facilitate the UN's role in Iraq, both in terms
of providing security assistance in Iraq and through support in
the Security Council. We recommend that the Government set out
in its response to this Report what progress has been made on
providing security to the UN in Iraq and what plans there are
to facilitate a greater UN presence. We further recommend that
the Government set out in its response to this Report the progress
made in establishing EU assistance to Iraq. (Paragraph 261)
30. We conclude that
concerns over Iranian involvement in Iraq reinforce the need for
dialogue and engagement with Tehran. We recommend that the Government
engage with both its Iranian and Iraqi counterparts to ease concerns
in this area and that it work to encourage Washington to take
a similar approach. We further conclude that serious concerns
exist over Iranian involvement in Iraq and that the organisation,
weaponry and technology for a number of terrorist incidents in
Iraq have emanated from within Iran. (Paragraph 265)
31. We conclude that
the reconstruction process has been made extremely difficult by
the insurgency, both by sabotage and by the level of violence
to personnel involved; however, the lack of progress risks dissatisfaction
with the political process. We recommend that the Government set
out in its response to this Report its plans to make reconstruction
efforts more effective as well as its plans, if any, to take part
in setting up Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq. (Paragraph
275)
32. We conclude that
conditions remain extremely difficult for British personnel in
Iraq and commend the good work they are doing in testing circumstances.
We recommend that the Government update us in its response to
this Report on the number of British personnel in Iraq, their
location and its plans to improve facilities further. (Paragraph
279)
33. We conclude that
the deterioration in the security situation and the continuing
difficulties in relations with the local communities in Basra
are deeply worrying. We commend efforts that have been made to
build bridges and repair relations. We recommend that the Government
set out in its response to this Report what further steps it is
taking to improve the situation in the four south-eastern provinces
of Iraq and to bring about a resolution of the differences between
Shia groups. (Paragraph 286)
34. We conclude that
there remain significant disagreements about the timing of the
decision to go to war with Iraq. We recommend that the Government
set out in its response to this Report the chronology of when
decisions were made with regard to the Iraq war, including publication
of the memorandum of the conversation between the Prime Minister
and President Bush on 31 January 2004. (Paragraph 291)
Iran
35. We
conclude that there is clear cause for international concern over
Iranian nuclear intentions and a number of substantive issues
have yet to be resolved, as spelled out in successive IAEA reports.
We further conclude that the Government is correct to take extremely
seriously the possibility that Iran is seeking to acquire nuclear
weapons. A nuclear armed Iran would radically alter the security
geography of the region and would lead other countries to seek
nuclear weapons or guarantees themselves. (Paragraph 303)
36. We conclude that
despite achieving a high degree of international agreement about
the need to address Iran's nuclear ambitions, there has been a
worrying lack of consensus among the Permanent Members of the
UNSC on how best to tackle this problem. We commend the Government's
commitment to diplomatic efforts to resolve the nuclear standoff
with Iran. We sincerely regret the breakdown of negotiations in
2005 and Iran's resumption of enrichment activities. We commend
the international consensus achieved among members of the IAEA
Governing Board and the efforts taken to maintain this consensus
in the decision to report Iran to the UN Security Council. We
also commend renewed efforts by the EU3 to resolve the crisis
by diplomatic means and we recommend that the Government keep
us informed of the progress of these negotiations. (Paragraph
312)
37. We commend the
high-level cooperation between the United Kingdom, France and
Germany in their negotiations with Iran. We conclude that US engagement
will be an essential component of any lasting agreement and commend
US involvement in the current EU3 diplomatic initiative. We recommend
that the Government use its close relationship with the USA to
encourage it to engage further with Iran and that it set out in
its response to this Report what steps it is taking to do this.
(Paragraph 324)
38. We conclude that
a broad range of options are available to the international community
with regard to Iran, but that that some are fraught with difficulty.
We further conclude that in the interest of legitimacy as well
as effectiveness it is highly desirable that maximum international
consensus is maintained on any action taken against Iran. (Paragraph
332)
39. We conclude that
military action against Iran would be likely to unleash a host
of extremely serious consequences both in the Middle East and
elsewhere and would not be guaranteed to prevent Iran from developing
nuclear weapons in the long term. We further conclude that the
Government should not undertake or support military action against
Iran until all other options have been exhausted or without broad
agreement among its international allies. We also conclude that
the lack of international consensus for sanctions against Iran
combined with the extremely worrying prospect of military action
mean that all possible diplomatic efforts must be applied to reaching
a negotiated agreement with Iran; we recommend that the Government
make this point absolutely clear to the administration in Washington.
(Paragraph 340)
40. We conclude that
Iran's position towards the 'war against terrorism' has been contradictory,
and extremely unhelpful in a number of key areas. Iran continues
to have links with terrorist groups, while statements by the Iranian
president about Israel and denial of the Holocaust are deplorable
and cannot be dismissed as empty rhetoric. We commend the Prime
Minister's robust response to these comments and recommend that
the Government continue to make clear to the Iranian Government
that such behaviour and comments are unacceptable. (Paragraph
353)
41. We conclude that
the human rights situation in Iran remains extremely unsatisfactory.
We recommend that the Government continue to use its diplomatic
contacts with the Iranian government to promote respect for human
rights and political and religious freedoms, and actively encourage
the EU to do likewise. We further conclude that the democratic
process in Iran is deeply flawed, and that although this issue
must be handled with care, there is a role for the United Kingdom
and the international community more broadly in supporting reform
efforts. We recommend that the Government seriously consider funding
a Farsi BBC television service. (Paragraph 361)
Afghanistan
42. We
conclude that bringing stability to Afghanistan remains a key
British interest. We commend the Government for its role in hosting
and co-chairing the London Conference and welcome the Prime Minister's
comments that the United Kingdom will remain by the side of the
Afghan people in their struggle for freedom, moderation and democracy.
(Paragraph 366)
43. We conclude that
there has been a worrying deterioration in the security situation
in Afghanistan, and that there are signs that the tactics that
have brought such devastation to Iraq are being replicated in
Afghanistan. We recommend that in its response to this Report
the Government indicate what steps it is taking to prevent further
deterioration. (Paragraph 371)
44. We commend the
Government's work assisting the Afghan authorities to establish
secure prison facilities and in providing training in prison techniques.
We recommend that the Government set out in its response to this
Report what further assistance it could give in this area, particularly
in respect of increasing the Afghan capacity to house drug offenders
at the provincial level. (Paragraph 377)
45. We reiterate our
predecessor's Committee's conclusion that "the United Kingdom's
lead role in co-ordinating the UN's counter-narcotics strategy
in Afghanistan is one of the Government's most important responsibilities
overseas". We conclude that negligible progress has been
made reducing opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. We recommend
that the Government set out in its response to this Report how
it intends to make better progress in tackling this problem. We
further recommend that the Government clarify its position towards
eradication and that it set out what progress has been made on
developing alternative livelihoods for Afghan farmers. (Paragraph
383)
46. We conclude that
there is potential for a blurring of the United Kingdom's counter-insurgency
and counter-narcotics objectives in Afghanistan. We recommend
that the Government clarify the role of British personnel, including
with regard to the policy of eradication and support to eradication
activities. We further conclude that the expansion of ISAF's area
of operation requires careful consideration of how best to coordinate
with the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom. We reiterate our predecessor
Committee's conclusion that "increased synergy between and
better integration of NATO's operations in Afghanistan and those
of the US-led coalition is a potentially positive move, which
if correctly implemented should enhance the effectiveness of security,
reconstruction and counter-terrorist activities alike". We
recommend that the Government update us in its response to this
Report on NATO planning to achieve this greater synergy. (Paragraph
391)
Non-proliferation
47. We
conclude that the failure of the May 2005 NPT Review Conference
is a matter of serious concern. We recommend that the Government
do all in its power to sustain the NPT, as the most effective
tool for the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
(Paragraph 401)
48. We recommend that
the Government set out in its response to this Report what it
is doing to strengthen the non-proliferation tools available to
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and set out its
views on the proposals for strengthening the IAEA put forward
by Director General Dr Mohammed ElBaradei. We further recommend
that the Government work with its IAEA partners to establish a
permanent section of the IAEA dealing with nuclear proliferation
by non-state actors, with adequate and sustainable funding arrangements.
(Paragraph 406)
49. We recommend that
the Government set out in its response to this Report what impact
the agreement between New Delhi and Washington on nuclear co-operation
might have on the existing non-proliferation framework. We also
recommend that in its response to this Report the Government set
out what progress has been made on introducing revisions to the
guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. (Paragraph 409)
50. We conclude that
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is a crucial tool for
the control of the spread of nuclear weapons, and the work of
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) is both
technically impressive and of great worth. We recommend that the
Government urge those states that have not yet ratified the CTBT
to do so, concentrating its efforts on the states which have not
ratified for technical reasons, such as Colombia, Indonesia and
Vietnam. (Paragraph 414)
51. We conclude that
a successful outcome of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
(BWC) Review Conference is essential in order to preserve confidence
in the global non-proliferation regime. We recommend that the
Government outline what progress has been made by the various
meetings of experts and state parties since the middle of 2005,
and set out what it hopes to achieve at the Review Conference.
We also recommend that the Government explain how it proposes
to ensure compliance with the BWC without the existence of a verification
mechanism. (Paragraph 419)
52. We conclude that
universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention is a most desirable
objective, and we recommend that the Government step up its efforts
to encourage Middle Eastern states such as Egypt, Israel, Lebanon,
and Syria to ratify the CWC. We also conclude that the destruction
of chemical weapons is a priority, and recommend that the Government
urge other states to accelerate the destruction of their chemical
weapons. (Paragraph 422)
53. We conclude that
the work of the G8 Global Partnership makes a valuable contribution
to the reduction of nuclear and chemical weapons material in the
former Soviet Union, although the slow progress on plutonium and
chemical weapon destruction is a serious concern. We recommend
that the Government set out in its response to this Report how
it will maintain the momentum behind the G8 Global Partnership.
We also recommend that it explore the possibilities of expanding
the Partnership's work beyond the borders of the former Soviet
Union. (Paragraph 428)
54. We welcome the
Government's outreach work on the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR) and we recommend that in its response to this Report the
Government set out what further steps it is planning to take in
this area. We also welcome India's decision to comply with MTCR
guidelines voluntarily, and we recommend that the Government work
to encourage India to become a full member of the MTCR. However,
we conclude that the spread of knowledge of cruise missile and
space programme related technology may outpace the MTCR's best
efforts, and we recommend that the Government set out in its response
to this Report how it will ensure that the MTCR keeps pace with
the spread of technology and what steps it will take to give the
MTCR greater enforceability. (Paragraph 432)
55. We welcome the
expansion of the Wassenaar Arrangement, both in terms of membership
and its trigger lists, but fear that the organisation will continue
to work at the lowest common denominator. We recommend that the
Government explore means to strengthen the Wassenaar Arrangement,
perhaps by establishing an inspections regime. We also conclude
that the lack of interaction between the Wassenaar Arrangement
and UN bodies dealing with small arms and light weapons hinders
the effective implementation of an international non-proliferation
regime on small arms and might have a deleterious impact on the
establishment of an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). We recommend that
the Government work to bring the Wassenaar Arrangement into closer
collaboration with the UN and other international efforts related
to the ATT. (Paragraph 437)
56. We welcome progress
towards an international ATT and recommend that the Government
continue its work to garner support for such a treaty. However,
we recommend that the Government does not allow its desire to
establish internationally accepted norms lead to a treaty that
operates only at the lowest common denominator. (Paragraph 440)
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