Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Fourth Report

4  The United Arab Emirates

The United Arab Emirates and the 'war against terrorism'


Links with the Taliban and al Qaeda

141. The UAE was one of only three countries to recognise the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan (Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were the other two). During Taliban rule, the UAE continued to allow Ariana Afghan airlines to operate services to the UAE. It has been argued that this resulted in "the growth of an organic link between groups in Afghanistan on the one hand and Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the other, as contact, travel and financial flows between them did not encounter the problems faced elsewhere."[186] Many US officials believe that al Qaeda activists might have spent time in the UAE.[187] Notably, two of the highjackers in the 11 September 2001 attacks were UAE nationals.

Financial links with terrorism

142. The UAE had a long-standing reputation as a haven for smuggling and money laundering. Even before 2001, al Qaeda was known to have financial links with the UAE. In 1999, a US delegation travelled to the UAE with evidence that Washington claimed proved that Osama bin Laden was channelling funds through the Dubai Islamic Bank.[188] However, early international pressure on the UAE to clean up money laundering and smuggling met with little success.[189]

143. Frank Gardner told the Committee about the situation in the UAE:

    Dubai particularly is an international conduit for both good and bad things. It was long a centre for smuggling gold into India. It has often been used as a place for money-laundering, particularly by Russians who were coming out of the CIS states with just wads of cash, and buying up electronics and going back. Nobody ever asked where the money came from. I used to live in Bahrain as well, and Bahrain had a very tight financial system because they had close links with the Bank of England, so the monetary agency worked very closely and was very strict on money-laundering. Dubai did not have those tight, stricter controls. When I used to be a banker, we were always rather wary of doing business in Dubai because we could not be sure of where the money came from. It is very much a home of Hawala transactions, which are paperless, record-less transactions, all done over the phone…There are no auditable records of this; it is all done on trust. It is done very much on trust. It is an ancient system and it allows people to evade strict financial controls. There has been a lot of concern that this has helped terrorists to get funding.[190]

144. Much of the financing for the 11 September attacks is known to have passed through the UAE via the unregulated Hawala money-transfer system. However, the formal banking sector is also believed to have been involved. Frank Gardner told the Committee: "It is known for a fact that some of the funding for the 9/11 attacks did pass through a bank in Dubai, not through the Hawallah system, but through an actual bank."[191]


145. The UAE has also been involved in proliferation networks. According to a press report in 2005, an MI5 document entitled 'Companies and Organisations of Proliferation Concern' lists the UAE as "the most important" of the countries where front companies may have been used. The list was compiled in an attempt to prevent British companies from inadvertently exporting sensitive goods or expertise to organisations covertly involved in WMD programmes.[192]

146. This is not the first time that there have been concerns over businesses based in the UAE. In 2001, the United Kingdom told the UAE to shut down the air freight businesses of a Russian accused of trafficking weapons to rebel movements in Africa including in Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone.[193]

147. AQ Khan's proliferation network has also been linked with the UAE: "In connection with recent revelations of illicit sales of nuclear technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea by Pakistan's nuclear scientist AQ Khan, Dubai was named as a key transfer point for shipments of nuclear components sold by Khan. Two Dubai-based companies were apparently involved in trans-shipping such components: SMB Computers and Gulf Technical Industries."[194] The UAE was the main transhipment point for much of the equipment bound for Libya.[195]

Terrorist target?

148. The UAE, and especially Dubai, have been seen as prime targets for al Qaeda given the number of highly visible western companies and individuals there. Al Qaeda and affiliated groups have threatened the country. A letter dated 26 May 2002 warned the UAE that continued cooperation with the USA would "bring the country into an arena of conflict, in which it will not be able to endure or escape from its consequences". The letter noted the UAE's economic dependence on "impudent tourism". Another warning listed the government's work with the UN and in training and equipping the Iraqi police force as leaving "no room for doubt that the punishment of God will befall your country".[196]

149. However, when he appeared as a witness to the Committee, Frank Gardner downplayed this threat:

    It has surprised a lot of people that Dubai has not yet been hit by a terrorist attack, but Dubai is a huge melting pot. If al Qaeda hit Dubai, it would be an own goal… I am quite certain that al Qaeda has supporters, possibly even operatives there, but there have been no signs so far that they have chosen to make any big attacks. It would be disastrous for everybody but also for the Makhtoums.[197]

Other analysts have speculated that the UAE has been spared attacks due to its usefulness for al Qaeda as a communications and financial hub.[198] However, some others believe that the UAE has not been attacked so far because of the extremely tight security in the country, and that it is inevitable that there will be terrorist attacks in the UAE at some time.


150. The attack on the twin towers led to a dramatic change in the approach of the UAE authorities. The UAE strongly condemned the September 2001 terrorist attacks and broke off relations with the Taliban. It has since cooperated with the international community in tackling international terrorism. During our visit to the region we were reassured that the UAE is totally 'onside' when it comes to cooperation in counter terrorism. While the level of this cooperation is difficult to gauge in some fields, it is known that the UAE has extradited a number of high-profile jihadi figures. The UAE acknowledged assisting in the 2002 arrest of at least one senior al Qaeda operative in the Gulf (Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri). The country also arrested Qari Saifullah Akhtar, a senior al Qaeda operative who trained militants for combat in Afghanistan and is believed to have been involved in two attempts to assassinate Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf; Akhtar was subsequently turned over to Pakistan.[199]

151. Although the UAE has so far escaped attack, its government knows that it is a potential target and has taken stringent precautions. Even a failed attack could be disastrous for Dubai's booming tourist industry. In its fight against terrorism, the UAE is aided by the fact that it is a small country with no large cities in which terrorists can disappear. Moreover, it benefits from a high level of wealth which goes some way to mitigate against domestic discontent.

152. During its visit to the region, the Committee heard about bilateral cooperation on aviation security. Secondees from the Department of Transport are working to monitor airport security and are providing invaluable assistance on practical aviation security. This work is being funded by the Global Opportunities Fund. Officers from the Metropolitan Police's SO18 division have also visited the region to discuss ways to tackle the threat from Man Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS).

153. The UAE has good bilateral relations with the United Kingdom and the USA. This is highlighted by cooperation in the defence field. In 1994, the UAE and USA reached a defence pact; the 1996 defence cooperation agreement is the United Kingdom's largest single commitment to the defence of a single country outside Nato.[200]

154. The EU has no representation in the UAE. During our visit, we were told that given the absence of regionally administered development programmes, it has been difficult for the EU to secure funds to set up a mission in the UAE. We also heard concern that the lack of an EU presence is contributing to a failure to create a good image for the EU in the region and that the UAE-EU relationship 'lacks substance'.

155. EU relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are channelled through a Cooperation Agreement signed in 1989 between the European Community and the GCC. Negotiations for an EU-GCC Free Trade Agreement were opened in 1990 and re-launched in 2001 after the GCC moved to establish a customs union; there is concern that negotiations have been 'dragging on'. The Commission is also seeking to enhance cooperation activities with the GCC against the framework of the Strategic Partnership for the Mediterranean and the Middle East approved by the European Council in June 2004.

156. In May 2004, the members of the GCC agreed a counter-terrorism accord. This accord focuses on intelligence sharing and efforts to use the media and religious platforms to tackle terrorism.[201] However, there are doubts over how effective the accord is. The Gulf States Newsletter has commented that the lack of transparency over the accord has given many the impression that its announcement was more "style than substance".[202] During our visit to the region, these sentiments were echoed. We were told that there is a need for greater cross-border cooperation on terrorism, but that as is the case internationally, intelligence communities are reluctant to share information.

Financial reform

157. The UAE has taken a number of steps to tighten regulation of the financial system. During our visit we heard about money laundering legislation that has been formulated in line with international Financial Action Task Force (FATF) directives.[203] Steps have also been taken to bring the hawala system under control[204]. According to the International Monetary Fund's 2005 Article IV Consultation for the UAE:

    Major steps have been taken to put in place a strong legal framework to prevent money laundering and financing of terrorist activities. Two laws were passed in 2004, one on dealing with financing of terrorism and the other addressing AML/CFT [anti-money laundering/counter-terrorist financing] issues in the financial free zones. A law criminalizing money laundering that was adopted in 2002 has been widely cited as a model of best practices. Hawala dealers continue to voluntarily register and have been certified by the CBU. As of end-February 2005, the CBU has received 156 registration applications and 133 certificates have been issued.[205]

158. Frank Gardner told the Committee about these measures. He also highlighted the role played by the United Kingdom in assisting these efforts: "If you talk to the Foreign Office you will find that there are a number of people in Customs & Excise who, every now and then, are stationed in the British Embassy in Dubai."[206] During our visit to the region we heard about the success of cross-departmental work in British embassies, notably the posting of a secondee from HM Treasury at the embassy in Abu Dhabi to work with the UAE Central Bank on anti-laundering exercises, and Home Office and HM Revenue & Customs staff working at the embassy in Abu Dhabi.

159. Nevertheless, there are concerns over both the utility of efforts to tackle terrorism through banking reform and the continued exploitation of the hawala system, despite increased regulation. Banks have been forced by compliance rules to spend hundreds of millions of dollars recording details about transactions. However, there are doubts over whether banking systems are likely to spot impending terrorist attacks.[207] In large part, this is because terrorist funds are tiny and according to some estimates make up just 1% of the dirty money in the financial system. Terrorist attacks do not require large amounts of money.

160. Many in the sector have come to believe that there is little preventative value in anti-terrorism regulations.

    "The only practical use of data about transactions is after an attack, when there might be some chance of tracing links in the networks that sustain terrorist movements… But information to allow this existed before the introduction of today's massive regulatory system…. There is no risk in scrapping the specific rules relating to terrorist finance. Much information will still be captured, because parallel efforts to combat money laundering will continue (and are anyway more effective)."[208] This opinion was strongly expressed to the Committee during its visit to the region. We heard great frustration over the emphasis put on banking reform to tackle terrorist financing. We were told that while the banking sector can work to uncover money laundering, exposing terrorist financing and proliferation is a job for the intelligence agencies and the police.

161. There are also doubts over the impact of reform on the hawala system. This method of money transfer has been used for generations; many immigrants rely on it as a cheap way to send money home. During our visit, we were told that the hawala system is under control in the UAE and is not extensive; only small amounts are transferred by hawala. However, while the hawala houses have genuine business, it is possible that terrorists could still make use of them.

162. Neil Partrick agreed about the limits to what can be achieved by financial regulation in the 'war against terrorism':

    [T]here is still a practical, as well as political, limit to what can be done to prevent money transfers in either direction. With the operation for example of the hawala system, which Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries are very keen to stress they monitor very carefully, it is very difficult to prevent monies reaching terrorists. The ease with which this informal transfer system can operate is what defines it; harsh constraints would render it unrecognisable and make the transfer of monies by much foreign labour in the kingdom very difficult.[209]


163. The UAE has been taking steps to tackle the risk of proliferation. In particular, it has been working with the USA: in December 2003, the USA organised a basic awareness course on WMD for UAE law enforcement agencies. This was followed by a course in May 2004 on Seaport Interdiction and Counter-Proliferation. The course was intended to enhance the ability of UAE law enforcement agencies to analyse, target and examine high-risk commercial shipments that may lead to the interdiction of weapons of mass destruction or their related delivery systems.[210]

164. In December 2004, the USA and Dubai signed a Container Security Initiative (CSI) Statement of Principles aimed at screening US bound containerised cargo transiting Dubai ports.[211] Our predecessor Committee's last Report in this inquiry outlined the establishment of the CSI by the USA. It noted: "The United Kingdom joined the CSI in December 2002; ports included in the initiative are Felixstowe, Liverpool, Southampton, Thamesport and Tilbury. However, the United Kingdom does not have officials carrying out a similar function in major ports overseas. Without the posting of HM Customs officials overseas, the United Kingdom's ports may remain under terrorist threat." The Report concluded that "the Container Security Initiative is a sound means to promote the security of the United States. We recommend that the Government examine the possibilities of enacting a similar initiative to secure the ports of the United Kingdom and its Overseas Territories."[212]

Educational and religious reform

165. Similarly to Saudi Arabia, the UAE has been taking steps to reform religious teaching and the education system in order to address the root causes of terrorism. The government of the UAE is well aware of the causes of radicalisation and realises that it is necessary to keep track of what imams are preaching and schools are teaching. Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan (the Crown Prince of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi) has been particularly vocal on the need to address the religious aspects. Following the November 2005 terrorist attacks in Jordan, he said:

    "There should be a firm stand by Islamic clerics and scholars who live among us against this terrorism… Personally, I blame the clerics and Islamic scholars who live among us and with us. If they do not declare them apostate, the least they would do is to drive them out of the faith. Terrorism came to us in the name of Islam, so there is no point trying to throw it into other directions. We should be the ones who confront and resist it."[213] During its visit to the region, the Committee heard about some of the work being done to regulate mosques and religious teaching. The Committee was also interested to hear that the President's religious adviser has forged strong links with a number of British institutions.

166. The Committee also heard about the need to reform the school curriculum, which is "not as robust and complete as it should be". We heard that one problem has been that the education system relies on foreign teachers and there is concern that some of them have been 'misrepresenting' Islam to pupils. We also heard concern over the use of schools and mosques to brainwash people and "convince youth to commit horrific acts". We were reassured that the UAE authorities are seized of the need to confront this problem. Nevertheless, the Committee also heard concern over the impact of western policies in the region and their role in causing indignation among Muslims, assisting the efforts of errant clerics.

167. We conclude that the UAE is an important ally in the international 'war against terrorism'. We further conclude that the UAE has taken important steps to improve banking regulation in order to target money laundering; we welcome the role of British personnel in this area. However, we conclude that there are limits to what regulation of the banking sector can achieve with regard to terrorist financing. We further conclude that important work is being done to tackle the risk of proliferation, in large part through work between the UAE and the USA by means of the Container Security Initiative (CSI). We recommend that the Government set out in its response to this Report its current position on placing British officials in major ports overseas to improve security for the United Kingdom and its Overseas Territories.

168. We conclude that the public and Congressional concern in the USA at the prospect of a deal that would have given Dubai Ports World control over a number of US ports is very regrettable, and sends the wrong signals to the Arab and Muslim world. However, we also conclude that the level of regional cooperation is not as high as it could be. We recommend that the Government work to support regional efforts at cooperation where appropriate and that it set out in its response to this Report what steps it is taking in this regard. We conclude that as a Muslim country, the UAE has an important role to play in countering sources of terrorism, such as religious teaching and education system; indeed, the Federation's leaders have provided bold and courageous leadership in this regard. We further conclude that the UAE's experience in this area could provide useful lessons for the United Kingdom.

The UAE and Reform


169. The UAE is a federation of seven emirates. The style of government has been described as "medieval feudalism… with a veneer of 21st century regulations".[214] The UAE has no democratically elected institutions and political parties are banned.

170. During our visit to the region, we were told that the UAE is one country where a traditional form of consultation works effectively. The population are able to express their concerns directly to the leadership through traditional consultative mechanisms, such as the open majlis (council) held by many leaders. This system is made possible by the small size of the population: according to the UN, the population is around 4.5 million, of which 75-80% are believed to be foreign.[215] There are regular meetings with the ruling sheikhs at which people can raise their concerns.[216]

171. The UAE is politically stable and there are few calls for reform. While there have been demands by a number of intellectuals for elections to the Federal National Council (FNC, a 40-strong consultative body that acts as a parliament but is appointed by the rulers of the seven sheikhdoms and is limited to an advisory role), pressure for political reform is muted by free healthcare and education, a booming economy and domestic stability.[217] Frank Gardner told the Committee about the lack of interest in politics in the UAE: "The UAE is essentially non-political. I have never met any Emirati who is interested in politics: he wants his plot of land, his villa, his four-wheel drive, and his holidays twice a year to Orlando or Paris. They are not interested in politics there."[218] During our visit, we were told that the UAE is a unique case: it is a wealthy, small country with no compelling economic reason for reform.

172. Nonetheless the UAE's leadership knows that things will have to change. We were assured that the UAE's ruler, Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayid al Nahyan, recognises the need for a more democratic system and is likely to act soon. Indeed, shortly after our visit tentative reform measures were announced. In a speech delivered in Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Khalifa said the UAE was to "embark on a march that culminates in more participation and interaction from all the citizens of the country". This will begin with limited reform of the FNC.[219] How far this reform will go is unclear. The highest decision-making body remains the Federal Supreme Council, which is made up of the leaders of the Emirates.[220]

173. We conclude that there is a serious democratic deficit in the UAE, although informal channels of consultation appear to go some way to address the needs of the population. We recommend that the Government work to support moves towards democratisation in the UAE, offering assistance wherever appropriate.


174. There are a number of human rights concerns in the UAE. One key area is the rights for foreign workers. As with other countries in the region, the UAE is heavily reliant on migrant workers: an estimated 75-80% of the population is foreign. These workers are often excluded from the rights afforded to nationals and are denied basic rights such as freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining.

175. Construction workers face particular difficulties. Human Rights Watch recently conducted research into the problem. The organisation found that employers routinely deny construction workers their wages. According to official figures, in 2005 alone, nearly 20,000 workers filed complaints about the non-payment of wages and labour conditions. Most construction workers secure work in the UAE by taking loans from recruiting agencies in their home country. A typical construction worker uses a large portion of his wages to repay these loans, and without wages he falls further into debt. The result is "virtual debt bondage". There are also reports that death and injury at the workplace are on the rise.[221]

176. In a press release issued in March 2006, Human Rights Watch called on the UAE to take immediate steps to end abusive labour and criticised it for being "unwilling to make a real commitment to stop systematic abuses by employers, including the extended non-payment of wages, the denial of proper medical care, and the squalid conditions in which most migrant workers live."[222] In particular, Human Rights Watch called on the UAE Government to:

  • Expand its staff overseeing migrant labour treatment (according to government sources, the ministry of labour employs only 80 inspectors to oversee the activities of nearly 200,000 businesses that sponsor and employ migrant workers).
  • Reform its labour laws to conform to international standards set by the International Labor Organization, and become a party to the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.

177. Human Rights Watch also called on the international community to take firmer action on the issue. In particular it called on the USA, the United Kingdom and Australia, which are currently negotiating free trade agreements with the UAE, to:

  • Require the UAE to improve labour practices and legal standards before signing agreements.
  • Include in any free-trade agreement strong, enforceable workers' rights provisions that require parties' labour laws to meet international standards, and the effective enforcement of these laws.

178. Following the criticism by Human Rights Watch, the UAE government announced changes to the regulations governing foreign workers. According to press reports, an amendment to the labour law is awaiting cabinet approval and would pave the way for the establishment of a labour union. New regulations would require companies to pay workers through cash dispensing machines, giving the authorities a quick audit of companies that are delaying payments. Compulsory health insurance is also due to come into effect by the end of 2006.[223]

179. Another issue of international concern is the use of small children as camel jockeys. The FCO's annual human rights report commented on this issue:

    There have been significant improvements during the reporting period in the UAE. The ministry of interior has replaced the camel racing federation as the organisation responsible for regulating the sport. Publicity campaigns by Anti-Slavery International and the American TV channel AHBO's Real Sports programme, highlighting the practice of small children being used as camel jockeys, have played a major part in persuading the federal authorities to take such a firm stance on this issue. A prominent advertising campaign by the ministry of interior in February 2005 announced regulations, issued by presidential decree, prohibiting the use of boys under the age of 16 and less than 45 kilograms as camel jockeys. First-time offenders face fines of approximately £3,000. A second offence carries a one-year ban from camel racing and subsequent offences may incur prison sentences. Measures introduced by the ministry of interior to enforce the ban include stringent immigration checks, a requirement that all children entering the UAE must have their own passport, and DNA testing at race meetings of jockeys suspected of breaching the rules. These measures were introduced at the close of the racing season. We await the start of the new season and will seek to ensure that the regulations are being rigorously enforced.[224]

180. Limited press freedom is also problematic. During our visit, we were told that there is considerable self censorship by the press and that some subjects are strongly off bounds. The FCO's human rights report also comments on this:

    In UAE, the government exercises some restriction in practice and journalists self-censor. UAE law prohibits, under penalty of imprisonment, criticism of the government, ruling families, and friendly governments, as well as other statements that threaten social stability. There has been increased coverage by the print media of some contentious local issues such as poor performance of ministries and labour disputes. The presence of respected international media operators such as the BBC, Reuters and CNN at Dubai Media City has led to greater openness in the media, though there remains room for further improvement.[225]

181. In recent years, the UAE has made some progress on women's rights. In January 1999, the wife of former ruler Sheikh Zayid said that women would be given a role in the country's political life. Sheikh Zayid subsequently appointed a women as Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs—the first woman to hold a high-ranking post. Shortly before his death, Sheikh Zayid appointed the first female minister, Sheikha Lubna al Qassimi, to head a combined economy and planning ministry. In 2003, Sharjah appointed five women to its 40-seat consultative council and increased the number to seven in 2004. However, no women have been appointed to the Federal National Council. In 2004, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs increased the number of women in the diplomatic corps to 40, equal to 17% of the service.

182. We conclude that there remain areas of human rights concern in the UAE, notably the treatment of foreign workers. We recommend that the Government work to encourage the UAE to sign up to the remaining ILO rules and improve the status of foreign workers. We further conclude that there have been serious efforts to improve the situation of child jockeys, nevertheless, we recommend that the Government remain seized of this issue and remind the UAE of the need to protect children.

186   Gerd Nonnemann, Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Iris Glosemeyer, Terrorism, Gulf Security and Palestine: Key issues for an EU-GCC dialogue, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, January 2002 Back

187   "The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy", Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 9 May 2005 Back

188   "Trail links Bin Laden aide to hijackers", The Guardian, 1 October 2001; and "US traces bin Laden funds to UAE bank", The Times, 9 July 1999 Back

189   "Hijackers linked to Saudi Arabia and Emirates", The Guardian, 14 September 2001 Back

190   Q 164 Back

191   ibid Back

192   "MI5 unmasks covert arms programmes", The Guardian, 8 October 2005 Back

193   "International Economy: Britain tells UAE to close arms dealer's freight business", Financial Times, 24 January 2001 Back

194   "The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy", Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 9 May 2005; and "Nukes 'R' US", The New York Times, 4 March 2004 Back

195   "Unravelling the A. Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks", The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2005 Back

196   "Declassified Document Outlines History of al-Qaeda Threat to the UAE", Terrorism Focus, The Jamestown Foundation, 21 March 2006, volume III, issue 11 Back

197   Q 164 Back

198   "Declassified Document Outlines History of al-Qaeda Threat to the UAE", Terrorism Focus, The Jamestown Foundation, 21 March 2006, volume III, issue 11 Back

199   "Terror suspect sent to Pakistan", BBC News Online, 8 August 2004, Back

200   "Gulf states keep lid on extent of defence ties", Financial Times, 18 February 2003 Back

201   Gulf States Newsletter, volume 28, number 753, 28 May 2004 Back

202   Ibid Back

203   "Arabia bridles at Americans' insistence on al-Qaeda cash", Financial Times, 21 February 2002 Back

204   The hawala system is based on paperless, record-less transactions, conducted by phone. There are no auditable records of transactions, which are based on trust. Back

205   "United Arab Emirates: 2005 Article IV Consultation-Staff Report", IMF Country Report No. 05/269, August 2005 Back

206   Q 165 Back

207   "The lost trail", The Economist, 22 October 2005 Back

208   Ibid Back

209   Ev 185 Back

210   See: Back

211   "The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy", Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 9 May 2005 Back

212   HC (2004-05) 36-I, paras 437-439 Back

213   The Emirates News Agency, "Mohammad expresses solidarity with Jordan over bombings", 18 November 2005 Back

214   "Off centre: The veil over dirty money in Dubai", Financial Times, 24 February 2001 Back

215   "World Population Prospects", Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, available at: Back

216   "Few want vote in booming Dubai", BBC News Online, 29 July 2005, Back

217   Ibid Back

218   Q 166 Back

219   "UAE to begin electoral reforms", Financial Times, 2 December 2005 Back

220   "The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy", Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 9 May 2005 Back

221   Human Rights Watch, UAE: Address Abuse of Migrant Workers , 30 March 2006 Back

222   Ibid Back

223   "UAE pledges to improve plight of migrant workers", Financial Times, 31 March 2006 Back

224   Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Human Rights Annual Report 2005, Cm 6606, July 2005, pp 233-234 Back

225   Ibid, July 2005, p 224 Back

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