RELATIONS IN BASRA
280. For a long time the situation in Basra, where
the United Kingdom has responsibility, was enviably calm. However,
since the last Report in this inquiry, the security situation
in Basra has become much more challenging and relations with the
local authorities have come under strain. This deterioration has
taken place amid rising sectarian divisions, growing tensions
among different Shia groups vying for political power and the
proliferation of criminal gangs, which have been blamed for a
wave of kidnappings and murders.[356]
281. In 2005, the use by insurgents of new, more
lethal roadside bombs forced British troops to scale down their
patrols and alter their mode of transport, with journeys undertaken
by helicopter rather than road if possible.[357]
We discuss suspicions of Iranian links with the increased threat
in Chapter 7. A number of incidents have also sparked tension
with local communities. In September 2005, two undercover British
soldiers were detained by the Iraqis. On 19 September, a British
force freed the two men from prison in central Basra, damaging
the police station and injuring several Iraqis. The incident led
to a serious deterioration in relations between British forces
and the local authorities, with local police commanders and provincial
council members refusing to work with the British.[358]
282. On 22 November 2005, the former Foreign Secretary
wrote to us about the situation:
During my visit to Basra, on 11 November, I was
able to meet the Deputy Governor and to see first hand that relations
with the local authorities have improved since the events of 19
September. The joint UK/Iraq statement of 11 October, expressing
regret that the incident took place and for the casualties on
both sides and damage to public facilities, forms part of the
wider efforts to restore good working relations with the Iraqi
authorities in Basra.
Present at my meetings in order to continue support
for the Iraqi political process in Basrawere senior members
of Basra Provincial Council, and a cross-section of local civil
society (including Shi'i and Sunni tribal leaders). All my interlocutors
emphasised the need for greater consultation with the UK presence
in Basra. During my visit, I called on the Basra Provincial Council
to condemn those groups mounting attacks on MND(SE) and to ensure
local security forces took effective action against them. This
will help remove the major obstacle to an acceleration of reconstruction
and the strengthening of co-operation
Our staffat the British Consulate General
in Basrahave been hard at work ensuring greater Council
involvement in reconstruction projects, security issues, and assistance
for education and culture in Basra. We are, therefore, now currently
on much better terms with the Governor and Council, and co-operation
in all areas is proceeding as well as expected given the continuing
fragile security situation. Our Consul General, James Tansley,
now addresses weekly meetings of the Council and regularly discusses
security issues with the Governor. We aim to continue this engagement
to ensure that the legacy of our presence in Basra will create
further renewal of the region.[359]
283. Regrettably, relations have continued to come
under strain in 2006, with a series of flare-ups. The arrest of
several Iraqi security officials suspected of conspiring with
militia led to a boycott by the Basra authorities of cooperation
with the British army. During our visit to Basra in January 2006,
Members of this Committee found that the situation was again going
through a difficult period and contacts with the British authorities
had been broken off by the Governor and some Members of the Provincial
Council.
284. The visit by Foreign Office Minister Kim Howells
to Basra in March 2006 went some way to improve relations, as
David Richmond CMG, Director-General, Defence and Intelligence
at the FCO told us: "the visit of Dr Howells has helped considerably,
and I think there are signs that we are now getting back to normal
in terms of the relationship with the Provincial Council and some
signs of getting back to normal with the Governor as well, though
he is more difficult."[360]
285. However, on 6 May, the crash of a British military
helicopter in which five British personnel were killed, led to
clashes between British troops and Iraqi youths.[361]
More positively, Iraqi police supported British soldiers during
the unrest that followed the crash and the Iraqi authorities agreed
to formally resume cooperation with the British Army in the aftermath.[362]
On 17 May 2006, Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett told the House
that the Chairman of the Basra Provincial Council had announced
a formal end to the boycott. She added "This welcome development
opens the way to restoration of full co-operation between us and
the Basra local authorities."[363]
The situation in Basra remains tense; at the end of May, Prime
Minister Maliki declared a month-long state of emergency in an
effort to tackle the rise in sectarian clashes and factional rivalry.[364]
286. We conclude that the deterioration in the
security situation and the continuing difficulties in relations
with the local communities in Basra are deeply worrying. We commend
efforts that have been made to build bridges and repair relations.
We recommend that the Government set out in its response to this
Report what further steps it is taking to improve the situation
in the four south-eastern provinces of Iraq and to bring about
a resolution of the differences between Shia groups.
The decision to go to war in
Iraq
287. In April 2006, we heard from several witnesses
about the Government's decision to go to war in Iraq. Asked when
he believed the Prime Minister made a commitment to go to war
in Iraq, Professor Philippe Sands QC told the Committee:
My personal view is that the Prime Minister took
a decision very early on, in March/April 2002, to provide unambiguous
support to President Bush and that President Bush had decided
at that time to remove Saddam Hussein from office, irrespective
of what did or did not emerge. In terms of proofand
as a lawyer, as an English barrister obviously one is very careful
in answering your questionI
would say that certainly by 31 January 2003 the Prime Minister
had taken his personal decision to support President Bush's decision
to remove Saddam Hussein from office. I refer to that date because
that is a date from a memorandum that I have referred to later
in the book, at pages 272 and 273, relating to a private conversation
between the President and the Prime Minister at the White House,
accompanied by a small number of other individuals, at which President
Bush unequivocally states that he has decided to use force, and
the Prime Minister unequivocally states, "I am solidly with
you." And in my view everything that happened thereafter,
including the UN process, the views of the weapons inspectors,
did not really matter what it turned up because the decision had
been taken and the start date for war had already been pencilled
in.[365]
288. If true, this would raise questions about the
Prime Minister's comments to Parliament on 18 March 2003.[366]
Asked directly whether he thought the Prime Minister deliberately
misled the House in his speech on 18 March 2003, Sir Christopher
Meyer, who was British Ambassador to Washington from 1997 until
the Spring of 2003, said: "Absolutely not."[367]
289. Sir Christopher did not attend the meeting that
produced the minute cited by Philippe Sands.[368]
Asked to comment on the minute of that meeting, Sir Christopher
told us:
By the time that Tony Blair came to the meeting
on 31 January I was saying that, absent a coup in Iraq or Saddam
suddenly deciding to go off into exile in some hospitable place
like Minsk, the die was cast for war and therefore the Prime Minister's
main objective for that meeting should be to ensure that in the
coming war we went into battle, if you like, in the best company
possible, which is another way of saying, "Let us get a second
resolution."[369]
Sir Christopher expanded on the Prime Minister's
commitment to stand with the USA in any war against Iraq:
I think Tony Blair had made a decision to support
George Bush, however the cards fell, from the Crawford Summit
of April 2002. This is a distinction I make in my book. This was
not a decision in April 2002 at Crawford to go to war on such-and-such
a date. It was not an operational decision, but Blair had decided
that the right thing to do, given his own view of Saddam Hussein,
was to be with the President of the United States whatever decision
he chose to take. That was a decision by Blair, I think, taken
to try to ensure that he had the maximum influence possible over
the President. This is a very important distinction because the
criticism has been levelled at both President Bush and Prime Minister
Blair that from a very early stage in 2002 they had decided, come
what may, that they were going to go to war against Saddam Hussein
in the spring of 2003. I do not think that is true because the
consequence of that is that everything that then followed in 2002,
including the efforts of the United Nations, would have been simply
a smokescreen for a devious plan, if you like. I do not believe
that to be true. I do not believe the two leaders lied to their
respective public opinions. I do believe though that they were
very doubtful that Saddam would ever do the right thing and that
probably it would come to war, but we did not get to the moment
of truth until early 2003.[370]
290. Sir Christopher went on to say: "I do not
know exactly what transpired between President and Prime Minister,
but the speech that the Prime Minister made the next day at College
Station, which was one of the best speeches he made on Iraq, sounded
to me like a statement of very strong support for the President,
whatever he chose to do."[371]
291. We conclude that there remain significant
disagreements about the timing of the decision to go to war with
Iraq. We recommend that the Government set out in its response
to this Report the chronology of when decisions were made with
regard to the Iraq war, including publication of the memorandum
of the conversation between the Prime Minister and President Bush
on 31 January 2004.
275 HC (2004-05) 36-I, paras 99-103 Back
276
HC (2004-05) 36-I, paras 100-103 Back
277
"Iraqi blast damages Shia shrine", BBC News Online,
22 February 2006, news.bbc.co.uk Back
278
"Bush 'troubled' by Haditha report", BBC News Online,
31 May 2006, news.bbc.co.uk Back
279
"Iraq killings top 1,000 in April", BBC News Online,
10 May 2006, news.bbc.co.uk Back
280
"Iraq edging towards precipice", BBC News Online,
8 March 2006, news.bbc.co.uk Back
281
"Shia shrine attack blamed for refugee exodus", Financial
Times, 4 May 2006 Back
282
"Violence took nation close 'to abyss' of civil war",
Financial Times, 6 March 2006 Back
283
"Iraqi leaders establish new council in effort to build unity",
Financial Times, 20 March 2006 Back
284
Q 263 [Mr Chehab] Back
285
Q 264 [Mr Said] Back
286
Q 265 [Mr Chehab] Back
287
HC (2004-05) 36-I, paras 102-103 Back
288
Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Sixth Report of the Foreign
Affairs Committee; Session 2004-05; Foreign Policy Aspects
of the War Against Terrorism; Response of the Secretary
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Cm 6590, June
2005 Back
289
Q 265 [Mr Said] Back
290
Q 264 [Mr Said] Back
291
See paras 18-19 Back
292
Q 263 [Mr Chehab] Back
293
HC (2004-05) 36-I, HC 36-I, paras 130-133 Back
294
See paras 74-77 Back
295
Q 266 [Mr Said] Back
296
HC (2004-05) 36-I, paras 123-129 Back
297
Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Sixth Report of the Foreign
Affairs Committee; Session 2004-05; Foreign Policy Aspects
of the War Against Terrorism; Response of the Secretary
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Cm 6590, June
2005 Back
298
Q 79 [Mr Straw] Back
299
"Iraqi Forces: The Other Side of the Development Story",
Anthony H. Cordesman, CSIS, 22 March 2006 Back
300
Q 269 [Mr Chehab] Back
301
"Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2005", released
by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, US State
Department, 8 March 2006, available at: www.state.gov Back
302
"In their own words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency",
International Crisis Group, Middle East Report N°50, 15 February
2006 Back
303
Q 268 [Mr Said] Back
304
Ibid Back
305
HC (2004-05) 36-I, para 129 Back
306
Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Sixth Report of the Foreign
Affairs Committee; Session 2004-05; Foreign Policy Aspects
of the War Against Terrorism; Response of the Secretary
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Cm 6590, June
2005 Back
307
"Bush calls for restraint as fears of civil war rise",
Financial Times, 23 February 2006 Back
308
HC Deb, 13 March 2006, cols 1151-1152 Back
309
"UK troop numbers to fall by 800", BBC News Online,
13 March 2006, news.bbc.co.uk Back
310
Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Sixth Report of the Foreign
Affairs Committee; Session 2004-05; Foreign Policy Aspects
of the War Against Terrorism; Response of the Secretary
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Cm 6590, June
2005 Back
311
Ministry of Defence, "Defence Secretary: Security Handover
in Muthanna is a 'significant milestone' for all Iraqis",
19 June 2006 Back
312
"Japan to pull troops out of Iraq", BBC Online,
20 June 2006, news.bbc.co.uk Back
313
"Bush calls for restraint as fears of civil war rise",
Financial Times, 23 February 2006 Back
314
Q 267 [Mr Said] Back
315
Q 284 [Mr Said] Back
316
Q 281 [Mr Chehab] Back
317
Q 267 [Mr Said] Back
318
Q 224 Back
319
"The enforcer", The Guardian, 20 May 2006 Back
320
HC (2003-04) 441-I, paras 27-31; and Foreign Affairs Committee,
Ninth Report of Session 2001-02, Private Military Companies,
HC 922 Back
321
HC (2003-04) 441-I, para 31 Back
322
Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Seventh Report from the
Foreign Affairs Committee; Session 2003-04; Foreign Policy
Aspects of the War against Terrorism; Response of the Secretary
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Cm 6340, September
2004 Back
323
HC (2005-06) 574, Ev 67 Back
324
Ev 101 Back
325
Ev 101-102 Back
326
Ev 102 Back
327
Q 226 Back
328
HC (2004-05) 36-I, paras 144-149 Back
329
Remarks by the Foreign Secretary, 16 October 2005, available at:
www.fco.gov.uk Back
330
"Iraqi Shias win election victory", BBC News Online,
21 January 2006, news.bbc.co.uk Back
331
Q 77 [Mr Straw] Back
332
Q 223 [Mr Straw] Back
333
Q 280 [Mr Said] Back
334
HC (2004-05) 36-I, para 168 Back
335
Evidence from Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett to the Inquiry
into Developments in the European Union, to be published as HC
768-iv Back
336
See paras 347-351 Back
337
Q 270 [Mr Said] Back
338
Q 229 [Mr Straw] Back
339
Q 230 [Mr Straw] Back
340
Q 81 [Mr Straw] Back
341
"US, Iran Closer to Talks on Iraq", The Washington
Post, 18 March, 2006 Back
342
HC (2004-05) 36-I, paras 118-122 Back
343
HC (2004-05) 36-I, para 122 Back
344
Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Sixth Report of the Foreign
Affairs Committee; Session 2004-05; Foreign Policy Aspects
of the War Against Terrorism; Response of the Secretary
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Cm 6590, June
2005 Back
345
"Iraq: Insecurity, corruption hamper reconstruction effort",
Reuters, 20 March 2006 Back
346
Ibid Back
347
Ibid Back
348
Q 287 [Mr Said] Back
349
"Iraq: Insecurity, corruption hamper reconstruction effort",
Reuters, 20 March 2006 Back
350
"Iraq reconstruction 'has stalled'", BBC News Online,
21 March 2006, news.bbc.co.uk Back
351
Ibid Back
352
Q 286 [Mr Said] Back
353
Ev 36 Back
354
HC (2004-05) 36-I, para 172 Back
355
Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Sixth Report of the Foreign
Affairs Committee; Session 2004-05; Foreign Policy Aspects
of the War Against Terrorism; Response of the Secretary
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Cm 6590, June
2005 Back
356
"Iraq imposes emergency in Basra", BBC News Online,
31 May 2006, news.bbc.co.uk Back
357
"Shaped bombs magnify Iraq attacks", BBC News Online,
10 October 2005, news.bbc.co.uk Back
358
"UK agrees to pay for Basra damage", BBC News Online,
11 October 2005, news.bbc.co.uk Back
359
Ev 36 Back
360
Q 228 [Mr Richmond] Back
361
"Basra assault compounds PM's problems", Financial
Times, 8 May 2006 Back
362
"Iraqis resume ties with British", BBC News Online,
7 May 2006, news.bbc.co.uk Back
363
HC Deb, 17 May 2006, col 995W Back
364
"Iraq imposes emergency in Basra", BBC News Online,
31 May 2006, news.bbc.co.uk Back
365
Q 289 Back
366
HC Deb, 18 March 2003, cols 760-764 Back
367
Q 337 Back
368
Q 328 Back
369
Q 329 Back
370
Q 330 Back
371
Q 331 Back