Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Written Evidence


Written evidence submitted by Reprieve

BRITISH INVOLVEMENT IN RENDITIONS AND TORTURE

  The British government has been facing increasing pressure to reveal the extent to which government officers have been complicit in CIA renditions and torture around the world. Thus far, the questions have focused upon the use of British airspace for CIA rendition flights, and possible British knowledge of the purpose of those flights. The two case studies below show that this question is but one aspect of possible British complicity in renditions and torture, and that there are many more questions that should be asked of our government in this respect.

CASE 1: BISHER AL -RAWI AND JAMIL EL-BANNA

  Bisher Al-Rawi and Jamil El-Banna are long term British residents who, far from being seized on the battlefield, were "grabbed in the Gambia" by US agents, apparently with British connivance. They were sent for torture in the "Dark Prison" in Kabul, and then taken to Guantanamo Bay. There is developing evidence of (1) British governmental involvement in the men's seizure and rendition, (2) British assurances that the men could safely go to the Gambia to set up a mobile peanut-processing plant, (3) telegrams that indicate direct British involvement in their seizure once they arrived, (4) the identity of the CIA plane that was used to render them, and (5) the failure to assist them despite the fact that they had worked to help British intelligence.

  The salient facts are as follows:

    —  Bisher and Jamil were arrested in the Gambia on 8 November 2002.

  They had travelled there with another business partner named Abdullah to meet Bisher's brother Wahab, and help him to set up a mobile peanut-processing plant.

    —  British authorities were well aware of the details of Bisher and Jamil's business trip to the Gambia, and had assured them they were safe to travel.

  In unclassified statements to his lawyer, Jamil reports that in the last week of October 2002, around 10 days before he left the UK, two MI5 agents came to his house and told him that that they knew all about his planned trip. When Jamil asked them if this was okay, they told him it was, and good luck with it. A 31 October 2002 memo from MI5 corroborates everything that Jamil has told US military investigators in this respect. This should have been provided to Mr El-Banna's attorneys three years ago in support of his challenge to his confinement. Not only did the two agents reassure Mr El-Banna that he could travel safely with his documents, but they offered him a new life in an Islamic country if he agreed to cooperate with them more than he already had. He replied that his wife and children were now settled in the UK, and he would rather remain here.

    —  On the afternoon of 1 November 2002, Bisher and Jamil went to Gatwick airport. They didn't get very far: as they were checking in, they were detained on the grounds of a supposedly suspicious electronic device in Bisher's hand luggage.

  That day, a telegram sent from MI5 informed US intelligence that Bisher and Jamil were detained at Gatwick under the Terrorism Act 2000.  Most damaging in the 1 November 2002 telegram to the US was the suggestion that Bisher was an "Islamic extremist" (for which there is no evidence, and never has been any), and the fact that "[a] search of their baggage revealed some form of home-made electronic device. Preliminary inquiries including X-ray suggest that it may be a timing device or could possibly be used as some part of a car-based IED." (1 November 2002 telegram)

  Bisher and Jamil were held briefly pending a hearing. 48 hours later, when the "suspicious device" was finally examined, it was no "IED"; it was determined by the police to be a battery charger freely available from Dixons, Argos, Maplins and any number of other standard electrical stores in the UK. The police found the electrical item to be "an innocent device", and at 5:22 pm on 4 November, Bisher and Jamil were released.

    —  This central conclusion to the episode of the battery charger—that there was absolutely nothing suspicious about it—was communicated to other British authorities in an internal memo from MI5 to the British Foreign Office. (11 November 2002 telegram) However, there is no evidence to suggest that this information was ever communicated to the US to correct the earlier falsehood.

  Despite the fact that the item was deemed entirely "innocent," and Bisher and Jamil were released without charge, allegations concerning the battery charger appear in their Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRT) in Guantanamo Bay as "evidence" that they are enemy combatants. The British government has failed to correct its own mistake, which has contributed to three years' false imprisonment of these men.

    —  Meanwhile Bisher and Jamil returned home on 4 November 2002, and arranged to fly out to the Gambia four days later. During this period, unknown to them, a number of telegrams were sent to the Americans by MI5 about Bisher and Jamil, saying that they knew Abu Qatada, and that Jamil El-Banna was Abu Qatada's financier.

  In truth, Bisher and Jamil did know Abu Qatada. However, it was nonsense to say that Jamil was any kind of financier (indeed the US military has now got it totally muddled, and suggests equally erroneously that Bisher was helping Abu Qatada with finances). Furthermore, the US military has extrapolated the mere fact that Bisher and Jamil were friends with Abu Qatada (unsurprisingly, as all had previous links with Jordan), to the false assertion that Bisher and Jamil were somehow in an al Qaida "cell" in London.

  In contrast, Bisher had been helping MI5 effect Abu Qatada's peaceful arrest, with the full knowledge of all the parties. Jamil El-Banna assisted in this, and when they had arrested Abu Qatada, the British officers had thanked both men.

    —  On 8 November, the day that Bisher and Jamil flew to the Gambia, a telegram was sent by MI5 to the Americans giving the exact spellings of their names at check in and giving their flight details, noting the delay in takeoff, and giving the estimated time of arrival. They were immediately detained upon arrival at Banjul.

  Bisher, Jamil, Wahab and Abdullah were immediately detained in the Gambia, and taken to a house on the outskirts of Banjul. Some days later, Abdullah managed to telephone his wife and tell her what had happened. Bisher's brother Numann went to see his MP, Edward Davey MP, who contacted the Foreign Office.

  Over the following days, the Americans were very much in evidence, but Bisher, Jamil, Wahab and Abdullah never once saw a British official.

    —  When the men did ask to see British officials, both the Gambians and the Americans left them in no doubt that they were being detained at the request of British intelligence:

  When the prisoners demanded to see British consular officials, both the Gambians and the Americans told them that the British were the ones who had asked for them to be detained.

Wahab recalls: "I asked once more for a lawyer and to see the [British] High Commissioner. One of the CIA officers told me I should not ask for the assistance from the British. `Who do you think ordered your arrest?' the CIA officer asked. He implied to me that it had clearly been the British who had wanted us all detained."

Abdullah says: "The interrogations by the Americans took place every couple of days. * * * I told them the entire truth the whole time: we were there to set up a peanut oil factory and nothing more. Our trip to the Gambia had absolutely nothing to do with terrorism . . . When I was being interrogated alone by Mr Lee and one of his colleagues, Mr Lee told me that the British had "sold you out" to the Americans, indicating that the British had instigated our arrest."

  Jamil El-Banna remembers that when he expressed anger towards the Americans, his interrogators would repeatedly tell him:

    "Why are you angry at America? It is your government, Britain and the MI5, who called the CIA and told them that you and Bisher [Al-Rawi] were in Gambia and to come and get you. Britain gave everything to us. Britain sold you out to the CIA."[4]

  Bisher has a similar recollection.

  After almost one month in custody, Wahab and the other British citizen, Abdullah, were allowed to go home to England.

  Meanwhile, on a Sunday early in December, two or three days after Eid al Fitr (which was on 6 December that year), Bisher and Jamil were rendered to Kabul. The CIA flight that took them, via Egypt, has been specifically identified and documented.

    —  They were taken to the Dark Prison in Kabul, where they spent two weeks under shocking conditions.

—  They were held in freezing cold, seemingly underground, pitch-black cells.

—  They were given only shorts and T-shirt; Jamil El-Banna did not even have a blanket.

—  They were held in leg shackles 24 hours a day.

—  There was no access to a bathroom, only a drum in the corner of the room.

—  24 hours a day there was a cacophonous noise.

—  They were physically abused: punched, dragged along the floor and kicked.

    —  After the Dark Prison, Jamil and Bisher were taken to Bagram Airforce Base. In Bagram, they were imprisoned and badly abused for another two months.

  They were beaten, starved, and deprived of sleep. What is particularly noteworthy is the fact that the only information the interrogators were interested in was information about Abu Qatada. Over the years, CIA and military interrogators have repeatedly attempted to elicit testimony from both men, linking Abu Qatada to al Qaida. Mr El-Banna has repeatedly refused offers of freedom, money, and passports in exchange for what would be false testimony.

  Jamil El-Banna says that at Bagram:

    "I was interrogated by the Americans almost exclusively about Abu Qatada. They wanted me to say that Abu Qatada was linked to Al-Qaida, and that he was linked to some bombing in Jordan. I repeatedly said I knew no such thing. They offered me $5 million to say this, and gave me two days to think about it."

    "Then they came back and told me I could be a `secret witness,' and told me what they wanted me to say about Abu Qatada," Jamil continues. "This time they offered me $10 million and a US passport, and said that if I did not co-operate, not only would I continue to be held, but my wife would never get a British passport either. They gave me another two days and told me to think about it. Before they even left that time though, I said, if you give me $100 million, I will not bear false witness against Abu Qatada or anyone else."

    —  Bisher and Jamil were then rendered to Guantanamo Bay where they remain to this day.

  Since being taken into custody, Bisher has seen many people who have said they were from the CIA. From the beginning in Guantanamo, Elizabeth, the CIA agent, would tell him, "Don't think that leaving here will come without a price." She asked him whether he would work with them, and he said no. They suggested, "How about working with MI5?"

  The British have likewise asked Bisher to continue to work with them. In the summer of 2003, a British agent came to see Bisher. He said he knew Bisher, but Bisher did not know him. This person was apparently with the British detail who had worked with Bisher previously, but who Bisher had not actually seen.

  In January 2004, two British agents calling themselves "Martin" and "Matthew" came to see Bisher on two consecutive days. They asked Bisher if he would work with the MI5 any more when he got out. Bisher said he would, if what he was asked to do would help bring about peace. They seemed happy with this response, and said it would take them between one month and six months to get Bisher home to Britain.

  Also in 2004, "Alex" came to visit Bisher with a pretty female MI5 agent. Bisher has only seen Alex once in Guantanamo. According to what Bisher was told by Matt and Alex, "Martin was the ranking individual." (CSRT at 23). The CIA clearly knew all about Bisher's involvement with MI5 before Bisher's CSRT process. Yet when it came time to discuss this at his CSRT, Bisher was unable to find anyone willing to tell the truth.

  Both Bisher and Jamil have been subjected to highly unsatisfactory "Combatant Status Review Tribunals" (CSRTs) which purport to determine whether they are "enemy combatants". As was related at Bisher's CSRT proceeding:

    Q.  [By the US military] When you mentioned British Intelligence came here [to Guantanamo], what did they discuss with you?

    A.  It was a reunion. We discussed some things I don't want to go into.

  On 24 September 2004, Bisher requested assistance from various witnesses at his CSRT, including various from MI5:

    Alex, Mathew & Martin (last names unknown) are from the British Intelligence Agency and know [Bisher al Rawi]. They have interviewed him on several occasions. They can testify [to information that was] . . . known to the British Intelligence Agency because [Bisher] was working with them.

  Bisher was told that the British government declined to make these witnesses available. The "Tribunal President" ruled as follows:

    At this time, because of the lack of last names, they are unreasonably available. [sic] I still determine that they are not relevant at this point.

  However, it was explained during the CSRT hearing that "these three witnesses are from the British Intelligence Agency and knew him . . . [and] these three agents have interviewed him on several occasions, and that British Intelligence was already aware of the information in the summary of evidence [against him] because he was working with them". At this point, inevitably, the CSRT officers had to agree that their testimony would be relevant, and directed that they be located to testify if possible.

  According to official American records:

    The British Secret Service declined to provide information regarding the identity of these witnesses, and since the detainee only possessed their first names, which even he assumed to be pseudonyms, the witnesses could not be identified. The Tribunal President was therefore forced to deny the witness request because the witnesses were not reasonably available. (CSRT Conclusions at two of five)

  In conclusion, the "Tribunal President" stated:

    The British government didn't say they didn't have a relationship with you, they just would not confirm or deny it. That means I only have your word what happened. (CSRT at 22) (emphasis supplied)

  Ultimately, then, although there has been absolutely no denial by anyone that Bisher "was a sort of intermediary between Mr Qatada and the British Secret Service (BSS) . . . [t]he Tribunal found no evidence to corroborate this assertion. . . ." (CSRT Conclusions at three of five)

  As a result of the British government's refusal to go to bat for someone who had been helping them, then, Bisher al Rawi remains in Guantanamo Bay where—as the UN has recently found—torturous conditions continue to be the order of the day.

UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

  The telegrams between the UK and the US provoke more questions than they answer. They prove beyond doubt that the UK was passing information to the US to facilitate the detention of the men in the Gambia. The UK told the US of their precise arrival time in the Gambia. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) denies that the UK knew that the men would be rendered. What did the UK suppose the US was going to do with them on sovereign Gambia soil? Surely it was obvious that they would be taken elsewhere, and the UK denials ring false.

  Many unanswered questions stand out:

  1.  It seems clear that the two men were seized solely because of the misinformation provided to the US by the British—is there any other explanation?

  2.  What role did the British government really play in the rendition?

  3.  Why has British intelligence not corrected the misinformation provided to the US concerning the battery charger that was misidentified as an IED?

  4.  Was it British intelligence that fed the false information to the US that Mr. Al-Rawi and Mr. El-Banna were linked to some "al Qaida cell" in London?

  5.  Why did the British government refuse to "confirm or deny" for the US that Bisher Al-Rawi had indeed been helping British intelligence as he honestly told them?

  6.  What information did the British give to the US by telephone, telegram or otherwise?

  7.  When will Bisher Al-Rawi be home, and reunited with this family?

  8.  Why will the British government not intervene on behalf of Jamil El-Banna, whose wife and five small British children have been without him for three years?

  9.  When will the British government announce an official inquiry with the power to compel the attendance of witnesses to get to the bottom of these questions?

CASE 2: BINYAM MOHAMED AL -HABASHI

  Binyam Mohamed Al-Habashi is a British resident in Guantanamo Bay. Seized for a passport violation in Karachi, Pakistan on 10 April 2002, Binyam was handed over to the Americans who rendered him to Morocco. In Morocco, Binyam suffered the worst torture that we know of to date, and some of which he is still unable to talk about. He eventually confessed under torture to being part of a "dirty bomb plot" involving Jose Padilla and a number of other alleged high-level al-Qaida operatives.


  Thereafter Binyam was rendered to the Dark Prison and Bagram Airforce Base, Afghanistan, and finally to Guantanamo Bay. In Guantanamo, Binyam faces a Military Commission commencing on 6 April 2006—the kind of tribunal characterised by Lord Steyn as a "kangaroo court". Indeed, Guantanamo Military Commissions have been universally derided by human rights organisations and were noted by the British government to fall so far below fair trial standards as to be unacceptable for our own citizens.

    —  "Evidence" obtained from Binyam under torture in Morocco is likely to be used against him.

  The only evidence that has been revealed against Binyam are statements attributed to him, that were exacted as part of the torture process. He denies that any of this is true.

    —  There is growing evidence that British officers were aware Binyam was to be rendered to Morocco, and that the British supplied information to his torturers.

  The true extent of British involvement in Binyam Mohamed Al-Habashi's rendition and torture is as yet an unanswered question. The British government justifies its refusal to admit any diplomatic responsibility to Binyam by saying that because Binyam is a British resident, rather than a citizen, the British government is not obliged to make representations on his behalf. This is a gloss of the true facts of British involvement in his case, and our added responsibility to help Binyam come home to the UK.

  Binyam's troubles began when he was seized by the Pakistanis at Karachi Airport in April 2002.

    —  Binyam was taken first to Landi Prison and then to an interrogation unit in Karachi.

  He was taken to the ICI unit[5] where he was interrogated there by four FBI personnel. They seemed to believe that he was some kind of top al-Quaida operative. This was despite the facts that it was less than six months since Binyam had converted to Islam, and he could barely speak Arabic.

    —  At the ICI unit, Binyam was questioned by two MI6 officers who made it clear that they knew he was slated for torture.

  In Binyam's own words:

    "They gave me a cup of tea with a lot of sugar in it. I initially only took one. `No, you need a lot more. Where you're going, you need a lot of sugar.' I didn't know exactly what he meant by this, but I figured he meant some poor country in Arabia." One of them did tell me I was going to get tortured by the Arabs."[6]

    —  Binyam was then taken to Islamabad where he was turned over to the Americans for rendition to Morocco.

  The US soldiers were dressed in black, with masks, and what looked like Timberland boots. They stripped Binyam naked, took photos, put fingers up his anus, and dressed him in a tracksuit. He was shackled, with earphones, blind-folded, and put into a US plane. He was tied to the seat for the eight to 10 hours of the journey.

    —  In Morocco, Binyam was tortured, for 18 months, by a team of eight people.

  He has suffered the worst torture that has come to light to date in the War on Terror, some of which, almost four years on, he is still unable to speak about. What he is able to discuss includes:

    —  Around once a month, for 18 months, Binyam had his penis slashed with a razor-blade.

    "One of them took my penis in his hand and began to make cuts. He did it once, and they stood still for maybe a minute, watching my reaction. I was in agony, crying, trying desperately to suppress myself, but I was screaming they must have done this 20 or 30 times for maybe two hours. There was blood all over they cut all over my private parts. One of them said, it would be better just to cut it off, as I would only breed terrorists."

    —  He was frequently cuffed, with earphones blaring loud music put on his head.

    "I could not take the headphones off as I was cuffed. I had to sleep with the music on and even pray with it."

    —  Twice, for a month each, he was taken to a freezing cold, mouldy room that smelled of urine because there were holes in the toilet so it leaked out into the room.

    —  Drugs were put in his food and given to him intravenously, against his will:

"Then they came in again, and strapped me to a mattress. They put an IV in my arm. First one, then a second. There was some kind of yellow liquid. This I think must have been heroin, though I've never tried it, so I don't know for sure. I was out of this world. I didn't exist. They alternated. They'd do a plain IV, then the heroin IV, then the plain one, then the heroin one. My body started reacting. I started shivering this went on for maybe 10 or 14 days, but I lost track of time I'd go nuts, shaking, paranoid."

    —  When it was prayer time, the torturers would play pornographic films at high volume.

  Between the torture sessions, Binyam would be taken for weekly interrogation where, he says:

    "They would tell me what to say. They said if you tell this story as we read it, you will just go to court as a witness and all this torture will stop. I could not take any more of this torture, and I eventually repeated what was read out to me. They told me to say that I had been with Bin Laden five or six times. Of course that was false. They told me to say that I had told Bin Laden about places that should be attacked. Of course, that was false too. They told me to say that I had sat with UBL's (Usama Bin Laden) top people. That was a lie too. There were about 25 of them. They told me all their names. They told me that I must plead guilty. I'd have to say I was an Al-Qaida operations man, an ideas man. I kept insisting that I had only been in Afghanistan a short while.`We don't care,' was all they'd say."

  Of course, the proponents of torture believe that having prior information is critical to an effective torture strategy, and it is this aspect of the Moroccan routine that strongly suggests the British government were complicit in some of the abuse that took place against Binyam.

BRITISH INVOLVEMENT

  Various questions were asked in Morocco showing such specific knowledge that sadly it is hard to imagine a source other than the British. If this is correct, this would have required that the UK did an investigation that would have been passed along to the Moroccans.

    —  Binyam had been travelling on a passport that belonged to a friend of his. In order to protect his friend, Binyam had told the Americans that he (Binyam) had stolen the passport. The Moroccans told Binyam how he had really acquired the passport, saying that Binyam's friend had told the British, who had relayed it on to the Moroccans, that he had given it to him.

    —  The Moroccans asked him questions about his old kick-boxing trainer in North Kensington, London, that could only have come from the British.

    —  They told Binyam what college he had studied at, what grades he achieved, and various information that could only have come from an ex-girlfriend in London.

    —  They knew Binyam's former address in North Kensington.

    —  Binyam was questioned about his links with Britain:

"The interrogator told me that we have been working with the British, and we have photos of people given to us by MI5.  "Do you know these? I realised that the British were sending questions to the Moroccans to say I was disappointed at that moment is an understatement."

    —  Later, Binyam was shown some pictures, all of British people. His torturers told him, "This is the British file."

  Eventually, at the end of January 2004, Binyam was taken to Afghanistan. There were five US soldiers in black and grey, who cut off Binyam's clothes. A white female Military Personnel (MP) took pictures. When she saw the injuries on his penis, she gasped, saying to her companions, "Oh my God, look at that". Later in Afghanistan, more pictures were taken. Someone explained that the photos were "to show Washington it's healing."

    —  In Afghanistan, Binyam was taken to the notorious Dark Prison in Kabul, he was there for around five months.

  He was chained to the floor with little room for manoeuvre, wearing only shorts and a top, in the pitch black with non-stop blaring music. He had a bucket to use as a toilet, but it was hard to use in the dark, so everything got on his blanket, which was the only one he had. At the Dark Prison,

    "interrogation was right from the start, and went on until the day I left there. The CIA worked on people, including me, day and night for the months before I left. Plenty lost their minds. I could hear people knocking their heads against the walls and the doors, screaming their heads off."

    —  In late May 2004, Binyam Mohamed Al-Habashi was transferred to Bagram Airforce Base. On 19 September 2004 he was rendered to Guantanamo Bay, where he remains to date.

UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

  Many unanswered questions stand out:

    1.  Did the British government play any role in Mr Mohamed's seizure?

    2.  What information did the British give to the Americans whilst Mr Mohamed was being held in Pakistan that may have contributed to his rendition?

    3.  What information did the British give to the Americans and the Moroccans that contributed to his torture?

    4.  If British officers knew that Mr Mohamed was to be rendered to Morocco, how did they know this, and why did they not do anything to help him?

    5.  Did the British receive any information from the Moroccans obtained from Mr Mohamed whilst he was in Morocco?

    6.  What information have the British received that has been obtained from Mr Mohamed whilst he was being abused in US (or Moroccan) custody?

    7.  Given the requirement of the Convention Against Torture, why has Mr Mohamed not been given any assistance by the British in Pakistan, Morocco, Afghanistan or Guantanamo Bay?

    8.  Has the British government ever sought assurances from the Pakistanis, Moroccans or Americans regarding the treatment of Mr Mohamed whilst in their custody?

    9.  Why will the British government not intervene on behalf of Mr Mohamed, who faces trial by Military Commission in a process that has been universally condemned, on charges that were dropped against Jose Padilla because they couldn't stand up in the regular US court system?

    10.  When will the Government announce an official inquiry with the power to compel the attendance of witnesses to get to the bottom of these questions?

Clara Gutteridge

Director

Reprieve

March 2006







4   Unless otherwise indicated, all italicised text in reference to Bisher Al-Rawi and Jamil El-Banna is taken from unclassified statements made to their lawyer Clive Stafford Smith whilst in Guantanamo Bay. Back

5   The ICI is the Pakistani Security Service. Back

6   Unless otherwise indicated, all italicised text in reference to Binyam Mohamed Al-Habashi is taken from unclassified statements made to their lawyer Clive Stafford Smith whilst in Guantanamo Bay. Back


 
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