Written evidence submitted by Dr Waheed
Hamzah Hadhem
TERRORIST MENTALITY
THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF TERRORISM,
AND THE
TERRORIST BEHAVIOR
1. Defining terrorism
2. Causes of Terrorism
3. Why Terrorism
4. The Vision of Us vs Them
5. Vision of The World
6. Vision of the past
7. Vision of the Present
8. Vision of the Future
9. The Mentality of Terrorism
Expectations vs Achievements
The Gap between reality and Idealism
The FrustrationAnger phase
10. The Behavioral Phase
11. The Microlevel of Analysis
12. The Macrolevel of Analysis
THE TERRORIST
MENTALITY: VISIONS
AND PERCEPTIONS
Waheed Hamzah Hashem (Associate Professor of
Political Science)
Terrorist mentality is a key factor in understanding
as well as determining terrorist behavior. The last determine
justifications for committing terrorist acts against the terrorists
targets. Terrorist views of the world (particularly of the others
that differ from them) determine their actions. Moreover, their
understanding of the reality they live within and how they view
the world determines their behavior.
Terrorist mentality is one of the subjects reviewed
and analysed the least in the last two decades as a result of
lack of understanding and the failure to answer the question:
why terrorists unleash their hate, anger and frustrations on the
others? and the question, how and according to what do they view
and perceive the world? Finally, there have been no answers to
the questions: what are the main factors that motivate terrorists
to act? And what are the reasons that move them to act or not
to act?
Reason, perception, and visions of terrorism
Terrorists and their savage actions against
their propagated enemies is a confrontation not so much of terrorist
operations as of strict values, negative perceptions, and highly
sensitive emotions; but also of reason that is heavily based upon
hate; of faith that do not believe in fear or in the human rights
of the others.
The emergence of terrorism was (and still is)
a result of the existence of harsh contradictions in human lives
or lets say improper or human existence. In another word, man
is a direct product of his or her social environment that has
been heavily shaped by religious as well as political factors
which both intertwined to produce such environment and hence reality.
Therefore, terrorist mentality is not as much
a result of clash of cultures or civilisations; it is a clash
between rigid and harsh mentalities that emanates from sharp and
deep contradictions in some civilisations that might also lead
to clash in civilisation itself and anarchybetween the
rule of law and no rules at all.
In this struggle, terrorists view their adversaries
as a direct threat to their ideology and human existence. They
are likely to avoid traditional battlefield situations because
of their inability to fight and lack of modern armaments.
The dominance of some harsh and rigid religious
teachings as well as rigid dogmatism and harsh ideology are well
established in the minds of the majority of terrorists. Therefore,
first they perceive things and events in specific ways and through
specific lens. Second, they think in a specific way and according
to way of analysis. Thirdly they act according to narrow inflexible
space of mind.
When asking the question Why? It might be argued
that, on the one hand terrorists' lack of sophistication in receiving,
processing, and analysing information or events; on the other,
their inability to understand reality and their reliance on their
religious leaders ( Mashaiekh) to interpret all events and make
the decisions for them. In short they are voluntarily highly obedient
to highly centralised religious authority.
THE INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENT
The term "Terrorist mentality" then
is broadly accepted as extremist militancy on the part of groups
or individuals protesting a perceived grievance or wrong usually
attributed to governmental action or inaction.1 Generally, three
principal issues are regarded to fall under that definition: The
existence of foreign troops in the Arabian Peninsula, Palestinian-Israeli
conflict, the intrusion of Westernisation in the Arab-Islamic
World.
Even though it probably never fully existed,
the artificial superficial equilibrium imposed by the Peace Process
in the Middle East has been destroyed. Within the existing Arab
political order imposed by Arab governments particularly on reformist,
nationalist, and liberal movements has given way to religious
groups' pressures and demands often accompanied by political violence
including terrorism, various forms of low intensity conflict,
as rapidly growing corruptions, unemployment, and inflation has
intensified general anger and discontent. The instability has
spilled over into various Arab countries where the various social
groups are attempting to cope with the uncertainties of social
and economic life, but in particular the fake democratisation.
Additionally, now that Moscow and Washington
are no longer inclined to use regional surrogates as a way of
avoiding direct confrontation, a number of regional powers are
emerging. Neither Moscow nor Washington have either the inclination
or the influence needed to constrain many of these regional would-be
superpowers. Iran is a case in point. Countries like Iran, Syria
and Libya use terrorism as a form of diplomacy and as an adjunct
to their foreign policies.2 To these states, terrorism is as integral
a part of their diplomacy as the exchange of ambassadors. Smaller
states can easily emulate their example.
In this era of what should be called a "new
world disorder" the breakdown of central authority and the
domination of the existing state system has been under assault
from a number of quarters. First, the legitimacy of many states
has been challenged by the growing assertion of both sub-national
and transnational calls for "self-determination" by
ethnic groups and religious movements that deny the legitimacy
of what they perceive to be a discredited international order.
Despite the optimism of the past, primordial loyalties have not
withered away in the face of technology, democracy, and the introduction
of free market economies. Indeed, many groups and movements have
fed upon a reaction to what is sometimes viewed as the secular
immorality of the West. Tribal loyalties on a sub-national level
share the rejection of secular mass societies with fundamentalist
movements. Some of these movements seem to offer the chimera of
psychological, sociological and political security to people who
are trying find their place in an uncertain, even threatening,
world.
New and dangerous players have emerged in the
international arena. The level of instability and concomitant
violence is further heightened by the rise to international political
significance of non-state actors willing to challenge the primacy
of the state. Whether it be the multinational corporation or a
terrorist group that targets it, both share a common characteristic.
They have each rejected the state-centric system that emerged
175 years ago at the Congress of Vienna.
All of these factors have accelerated the erosion
of the monopoly of the coercive power of the state as the disintegration
of the old order is intensified. And, this process will in all
probability gain even greater momentum because of the wide ranging
and growing activities of criminal enterprises. These include
everything from arms traders and drug cartels, which will provide
and use existing and new weapons in terrorist campaigns as a part
of their pursuit of profit and political power.
In sum, present and future terrorists and their
supporters are acquiring the capabilities and freedom of action
to operate in the new international jungle. They move in what
has been called the "grey areas," those regions where
control has shifted from legitimate governments to new half-political,
half-criminal powers.3 In this environment the line between state
and rogue state, and rogue state and criminal enterprise, will
be increasingly blurred. Each will seek out new and profitable
targets through terrorism in an international order that is already
under assault.
TECHNOLOGICAL/OPERATIONAL
CHANGES
The remarkable changes in the international
environment have been accompanied by technological changes that
may have serious ramifications as regards future terrorist operations
both internationally and in the United States. Up to now, terrorists
have not been especially innovative in their tactics. Bombing,
although not on the intended magnitude of that at the Oklahoma
City Federal Building, remains the most common type of attack.
Hostage taking and kidnapping are fundamental to the terrorist
repertoire and skyjacking is always a possibility. Automatic and
semi-automatic rifles and pistols remain the weapons of choice.
However, the employment of stand-off weapons
like American Stinger and Russian SA-7 hand-held anti-aircraft
missiles, the US Army M-72 light anti-tank weapon (LAW), and the
Russian-built RPG-7 anti-tank weapon may be more readily available
to terrorists than many like to believe. The same may be said
of terrorist bombing technologies. Dynamite has been replaced
by the more destructive and easily concealed Semtex. Furthermore,
the threat has grown as a result of increased technological sophistication
of timing devices and fuses. But weapons need not be sophisticated
to be destructive. One only has to consider what might have happened
if the pilot of the lone single-engine light aircraft which crashed
into the White House had filled his plane with something as simple
as a fertiliser bomb. That incident, even if it was not a terrorist
act, should serve as a warning for those who are concerned with
more advanced technological threats. They should remember that
smaller and more conventional instruments of destruction are still
quite lethal and can have a profound affect on the targeted individual,
corporation, government or what is often the ultimate target:
public opinion.
A growing concern is that terrorists will cross
the threshold to engage in acts of mass or "super terrorism"
by using atomic, biological, and chemical (ABC) weapons. So far,
the international order has been spared terrorist incidents involving
nuclear weapons. Indeed, those that have been reported have turned
out to be elaborate hoaxes. Fortunately, the threats have yet
to be translated into actual incidents, but many believe it is
only a matter of time before they are.4
All this could easily change as a result of
the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The current trade in illicit
weapon's grade plutonium serves to underscore the fact that the
necessary material and attendant technology will be increasingly
available for those terrorist groups who may want to exercise
a nuclear option, be it in the form of a dispersal of radioactive
material that could contaminate a large area or the use of a relatively
small but very lethal atomic weapon. The illegal trade in weapons
and technology will be further exacerbated by the very real dangers
resulting from the proliferation of nuclear weapons. There is
good reason to fear that either a rogue state, its terrorist surrogates,
or independent terrorist groups will have the capacity to go nuclear.
Whether this threshold will be crossed will depend in part on
the motivation, attendant strategies, and goals of present and
future terrorist groups. In sum, there is every reason to be concerned
that terrorists will engage in their own form of technical innovation
to develop the capacity to make the nightmare of a nuclear, chemical,
or biological threat move from the pages of an adventure novel
to the shores of the United States.
Scenarios addressing future acts of high-tech
terrorism include a wide variety of assaults on the delicate interdependent
infrastructure of modern industrialised society. These scenarios
move beyond the bombing or seizing of conventional or nuclear
power plants to include the potentially disastrous destruction
of the technological infrastructure of the information super highway.
However, the scope of what constitutes a terrorist act on computers
and their associated facilities is subject to interpretation.
The bombing of a multinational corporation or a government's crucial
computer centers could be judged an act of terrorism, but what
if a terrorist hacker placed a computer virus in a very sensitive
network? The results could range from the massively inconvenient
to dangerous or disastrous. Such an act, however, would lack an
essential element of terrorism as it is now defined: the use or
threat of the use of physical violence. Nevertheless, as the technology
expands so may definitions of what constitutes a terrorist act.
From the terrorist's point of view the following dictum may apply,
"so many new targets . . . so little time."
Finally, if indeed terrorism is "theater"
and the people are the audience, the stage is changing.5 CNN and
other networks provide the terrorists with a potential and almost
instantaneous means for spreading their message of fear and intimidation.
The reality of video proliferation is just as significant as that
of nuclear proliferation. Some terrorist groups already have the
ability to stage and videotape their acts, sending them out to
either a broad or limited audience. They can even transmit live
events through low power transmitter stations. Furthermore, the
next generation of terrorists may produce highly imaginative presentations
to seize the attention of a violence jaded public, one which has
grown used to the now standard images of hooded terrorists holding
hostages in embassies, prisons, or aircraft cabins. This kind
of theater of the obscene will find a ready mass audience among
those who watch the tabloid television shows and depend on the
National Enquirer for their news.6 Given the public's fascination
with television happenings like the O J Simpson trial, one can
only imagine what might happen if future terrorists direct and
produce their own television spectaculars.
Terrorists are more interested if not concerned
by weapons of mass destruction and by the cowardly instruments
of sabotage, hidden bombs, and committing suicide in terrorist
operations against civilians. These unconventional threats endanger
not only World's stability, but also the existence of mankind.
CHANGES IN
TERRORIST MOTIVATIONS
AND GOALS
There are almost certainly going to be changes
in both the motivation and goals of terrorist groups. The traditional
motivations for terrorism: ethnic, tribal, and religious animosities,
will continue and intensify. Even while people of goodwill struggle
to find solutions to problems in Northern Ireland and in the Middle
East, the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and the related
turmoil in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere have engendered
new groups pursuing their own varied agendas through violence,
including terrorism. While much of the violence is confined to
the various regions, the potential for involving surrounding states
and for international assaults is significant. Even in the Middle
East, where the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel
are moving along a tortuous road toward accommodation, various
factions, willing and able to engage in non-territorial terrorism,
will continue to "bring the war home" to Israel and
its primary supporter, the United States.
Perhaps even more ominous is the growing significance
of apolitical groups which resort to terrorism in pursuit of financial
gain as a part of criminal enterprises. While a number of these
groups may, in part, justify their actions under the rubric of
political rationalization, their major goal will relate to maximizing
their profits through co-opting, corrupting, and neutralising
the authority of the states in their respective countries and
regions of operations. These groups, which include narco-terrorists,
are particularly difficult to counteract given their vast resources
gleaned by illicit trade in drugs or weapons, and because of their
ability to influence, control or demoralize governments in countries
where they operate. This new criminal order can engage in operations
with the kind of violence that makes the old Mafia seem pacifistic
by comparison.
Finally, one might anticipate that in addition
to existing extremists operating according to issue-oriented movements
such as radical environmentalism, fringe elements of the pro-life
movement, and extremist animal rights groups, there will emerge
new groups willing to use terrorism to avenge grievances both
real and imaginary. These groups, which at the outset may be small
and not tied to any recognized social or political movement, may
have the capability to maximize their impact through the availability
of a wide variety of weapons, a rich selection of targets, and
the skillful use of the media and communications technology. There
will be both old and new adversaries to threaten the international
order and, more specifically, US interests and citizens both at
home and abroad.
Since there are many dimensions to international
terrorism, effective counter terrorism calls for the skills and
resources of various elements of the US government. We have learned
from past experience with fragmented efforts that coordination
of these resources is essential. For this reason, the President
has designated the Department of State, in keeping with its overall
responsibility for the conduct of US foreign policy, as the lead
agency for managing and coordinating counter terrorism policy
and operations abroad, whereas the Department of Justice has been
designated the lead agency for domestic terrorism. These responsibilities
were reaffirmed recently in Presidential Decision Directive 39,
signed by President Clinton on 21 June 1995.
Since the creation in 1972 of the forerunner
of the Office of the Coordinator for Counter terrorism, my officeknown
as S/CThas been the focal point for this coordinating activity.
Coordination, Mr Chairman, is central to State's counter terrorism
role, and I want to emphasize this at the outset of my testimony,
although the focus of this hearing is on specific responsibilities
of State, Defense and the FBI. For this reason, I would like to
explain State's particular contributions in the context of our
coordinating role.
We must understand that this confrontation is
long term. It doesn't lend itself to quick victories. To prevail
we must summon our courage, and we must equip ourselves with a
full range of foreign policy tools. Our armed forces must remain
the best led, best trained, best equipped and most respected in
the world. between rigid and harsh mentalities that emanates from
Diplomacy and International Cooperation
Terrorism affects the security and the political
and economic stability of nations. Acts of international terrorism,
by definition, involve the citizens or territory of more than
one nation, and terrorists are expanding their regional and global
reach. Diplomacy and international cooperation are, therefore,
critically important to a successful effort against the terrorist
threat.
To enhance such cooperation, my office conducts
frequent consultations with many foreign governments, usually
with interagency teams, which might include colleagues from Justice,
FBI, CIA, DOD, FAA and other agencies. These consultations are
a valuable means of projecting US policy aims and obtaining foreign
cooperation. In recent months, I have led interagency teams to
Moscow, New Delhi, Islamabad, Riyadh and Sanaa. We have held consultations
with over 20 governments in the past year, and we have met with
counterterrorism experts of the European Union and the Group of
Eight.
This network of international cooperation is
growing stronger, as more and more nations realise that cooperation
is essential. A series of regional and international conferences
on counterterrorism is a sign of the growing trend toward cooperation.
In August, I led a US delegation to Buenos Aires to attend a conference
of the states of the southern cone countries in Latin America,
plus the US and Canada. The agenda was cooperation in fighting
international terrorism against the backdrop of the 1992 and 1994
bombings in Buenos Aires. And we are now working with our partners
in the Organization of American states to prepare for a hemispheric
conference on counterterrorism in Lima this April, which was called
for by the Summit of the Americas at Miami in December, 1994.
A Ministerial Conference on Terrorism of the
Group of Eight in Ottawa in December, which grew out of the Halifax
Summit in June, addressed concrete ways to enhance international
cooperation against terrorism on a global level. The International
Conference on Counterterrorism at Baguio in the Philippines last
month, was the first such initiative in Asia.
Department of State-Law Enforcement Coordination
Strengthening the rule of law is a major tenet
of US counterterrorism policy. As my colleague from FBI will describe,
terrorism is a crime under various US laws and the laws of many
other nations, and effective law enforcement and aggressive prosecution
of international terrorists are thus critical to US and international
efforts against terrorism. Therefore, the Department of State
works closely in support of Justice and FBI efforts to pursue
terrorists abroad who violate US laws. State facilitates anti-terrorism
law enforcement overseas in a wide variety of ways, for example,
in establishing and supporting FBI investigations abroad, and
working with FBI, Justice and foreign governments when extradition
or rendition of terrorist suspects to the US is an option for
bringing them to justice.
My office, working closely with the Department's
Office of the Legal Adviser and with Justice, is also making a
major effort to persuade other governments, who have not yet become
party to the 10 existing international treaties and conventions
on terrorism, to do so.
StateIntelligence Coordination
Identifying international terrorists and their
networks, providing warning so that protective or deterrent measures
can be taken, and gathering information on terrorist acts requires
a major US intelligence effort. For this reason, the US intelligence
community and the technical and human resources they provide are
an indispensable element in our overall approach to international
terrorism.
My office relies heavily on State's Office of
Terrorism, Narcotics and International Crime (INR/TNC) in the
Bureau of Intelligence and Research to provide us with timely,
all-source intelligence on terrorism, and analysis on issues of
current policy concern. Intelligence is the lifeblood of effective
counterterrorism, and without INR's expert, round-the-clock support,
we could not do our job. It is essential that INR be given adequate
resources to perform its indispensable role.
State depends as well upon intelligence collection
and analytical support from other elements of the intelligence
community. We have a very close working relationship with the
DCI's Counter-Terrorism Center. And officers from the Center are
our close partners in working groups, international consultations,
and counterterrorism operations, which we coordinate.
StateDefense Cooperation
Our superb military counterterrorism capabilities,
which my colleague from Defense will describe, are another important
tool in our arsenal to combat international terrorism. When peaceful
means fail and the use of military force is feasible, we need
the world's best specialized military expertise to rescue victims
of terrorism, apprehend terrorists, or deter acts of terrorism,
and we rely on the Department of Defense for other forms of counterterrorism
support.
Emergency Response Capability
To respond promptly to terrorist incidents abroad
which require varied US resources, we have developed a unique
fast reaction team. This team, led by an officer from S/CT, consists
of experts from DOD, CIA, FBI and other agencies, as needed. At
the request of a foreign government or a US Ambassador abroad,
this team can be dispatched within a few hours on a specially
dedicated aircraft provided by DOD to any place in the world.
The team's job is to provide support to the Ambassador and the
host government in resolving a terrorist crisis, and to advise
on additional US assets that might be needed. Throughout the year,
the response team joins our special forces in major training exercises.
The team also supports our regional CINCS by providing role players
for exercises.
Flexibility and responsiveness are the watchwords
of this team concept. Small, tailored teams can be launched, depending
on the crisis, and specialists from individual agencies can be
sent alone, as the situation arises.
Other Examples of Coordination
Other recent examples of the integrated, coordinated
process which State directs to deal with terrorist crises abroad
include the following: a series of extradition, rendition and
law enforcement cooperation efforts which resulted in the return
in 1995 of two World Trade Center bombing suspects to the US including
ring leader Ramzi Ahmed Yousef; discovery of and preventive measures
to deal with a plot by this group to bomb US civilian aircraft
in Asia, and the successful return to the US for prosecution of
two more members of this group; investigation of the terrorist
murders of two US Consulate officials in Karachi; the bombing
of the US Training office for the Saudi National Guard in Riyadh
in November, which killed five Americans; support and assistance
to Argentina after the bombing of the Jewish cultural center in
1994; efforts to learn more about and take measures to deal with
threats arising from the Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attacks in Tokyo;
responding to a request by Israel for extradition of a suspected
HAMAS terrorist; and investigation of the recent bus bombings
in Jerusalem, in which two Americans died.
These efforts required resources and careful
teamwork from many members of the US counterterrorism community,
including Justice, FBI, and often CIA, NSA, Defense, Treasury,
Transportation, FAA and INS, as well as the Department's Bureau
of Diplomatic Security. Because these cases involved international
terrorism and foreign governments, they often require rapid reaction,
intricate planning, and complex coordination. In each case, State
played its coordinating role, relying on excellent cooperation
from all elements of the US counterterrorism community.
Protection Abroad, Visa Denial and Threat Warnings
State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security is another
important actor in the US counterterrorism community. DS is responsible
for protection of US official civilian personnel and facilities
abroad against terrorist and other threats. Since 1979, there
have been 460 such attacks against US diplomatic personnel, buildings
and vehicles. Twenty-five diplomats have been killed by terrorists,
and 55 have been wounded.
In addition to protective duties, Regional Security
Officers at US missions abroad have intelligence and investigative
responsibilities, for example, to investigate passport and visa
fraud, which often accompanies terrorist crimes. In Washington,
DS plays an important part in the process of issuing warnings
against terrorist threats and travel advisories. DS agents are
active in many counterterrorism investigations, and played a lead
role in the apprehension of Ramzi Ahmed Yousef. DS also helps
US business firms and NGOs abroad, through its Overseas Security
Advisory Council, which maintains an electronic bulletin board
for exchange of security related and terrorist information abroad.
The Bureau of Consular Affairs is another important
player in State's counterterrorism effort. CA, working with INR,
S/CT, DS and the intelligence community and our consulates abroad,
maintains systems for denying entry into the US of terrorists
and suspects. It also issues threat warnings and travel advisories
to American citizens overseas.
Identifying State Sponsors of Terrorism
Identifying State sponsors of terrorism and
mobilizing international pressure against them is a major element
of US policy, in accordance with Section 6(j) of the Export Administration
Act and related laws. The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism,
working with regional bureaus, INR and the intelligence community,
makes annual recommendations to the Secretary of State, which
provide the basis for his annual review of state sponsors. We
pursue through diplomatic channels, and through the UN in the
case of Libya and Iraq, the maintenance and broadening of economic
and other sanctions against these states. Mr Chairman, I believe
we can point to this policy as one reason why terrorist acts sponsored
by states or their proxies have declined in recent years, although
state sponsors like Iran remain a serious threat.
Anti-Terrorism Training, Research & Development
and Rewards
State's Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program, administered
by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security with policy guidance from
the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, is another
effective tool in reducing the danger of international terrorism.
Over the last decade, over 17,000 officials from 89 foreign countries
have received training in a wide variety of ATA courses. This
low cost program, funded at about $15 million annually in recent
years, has been a superb investment in reducing the terrorist
risk to friendly countries and to US citizens and airlines abroad.
We are pleased that the conferees recently increased the appropriation
to $16 million for FY 1996.
State also coordinates an interagency research
and development program for counterterrorism technologies, through
the Technical Support Working Group. The bulk of the funding for
this important program is provided by the Department of Defense.
We also chair US delegations that participate in joint research
in counterterrorism technologies under bilateral agreements with
the UK, Canada, and Israel.
State's International Terrorism Information
Rewards Program is another important part of our counterterrorism
effort. This program has paid out more than $3 million to individuals
who provided information leading to the prosecution of terrorists
or the prevention of acts of terrorism.
Analytic Reports
The most prominent unclassified report by the
Department of State on terrorism is our annual "Patterns
of Global Terrorism." This report, which the Congress requires
by 30 April each year, has become the recognized authority in
this field. We are grateful for the many contributions we receive
for Patterns from INR and CIA. From time to time, S/CT also publishes
unclassified public papers on individual terrorist groups or countries.
We have urged the Congress not to impose additional, mandatory
reporting requirements because of manpower constraints.
Conclusion
Mr Chairman, from my experience as Coordinator
for Counterterrorism at State, and from my intensive work with
colleagues from other agencies, I can say with conviction that
the United States is well served by our counterterrorism community.
All US Government Departments concerned share the strong commitment
of the President and Secretary Christopher to giving our counterterrorism
efforts the highest priority. Our counterterrorism community is
professional, dedicated, and committed to a coordinated, team
effort. Terrorism is a difficult and dangerous enemy, but we are
making a determined and impressive effort to combat it in all
its evil aspects.
HOW VULNERABLE
IS THE
UNITED STATES
AND WHAT
ARE THE
TERRORISTS' GOALS?
The following assessment is based on integrating
the analytical components presented above. The focus will be on
the vulnerabilities in the United States to attacks by international
terrorist or domestic groups or by such groups with domestic-international
linkages.
The new threat environment may see the emergence
of a wide variety of sub-national and transnational groups intent
on venting their frustrations with Washington for what they perceive
to be a lack of support for their causes or, conversely, for supporting
their adversaries. As the major military superpower, with an increased
global involvement, even when engaged under the United Nations,
the United States is likely to be viewed as the primary party
in future disputes. Even when neutral, Washington is likely to
be viewed suspiciously by one or more warring factions. In addition,
when Washington moves beyond "peace keeping" to "peace
enforcement" operations, the likelihood of a reaction among
one or more disputants is possible.
Even though the United States may not want to
be the policeman or the conscience of the world, the parties in
any conflict may question whether Washington is intentionally
or unintentionally pursuing a political agenda that may be counter
to their objective. The result might be the spillover of violence
to the United States by one or more parties in the dispute. Resort
to terrorism could be a punitive action or it might be an effort
to dramatize a cause. As the United States tries to redefine the
formulation and execution of its foreign policy in the post-Cold
War era, even if Washington is motivated by the highest of ideals,
ie, democratization, humanitarian assistance, or nation-building,
those who will be the objects of such efforts might resent it.
Their use of terrorism on American soil is a likely response.
The potential spillover effect may be intensified
by the domestic political and economic environment. The potency
of ethnic-based politics, coupled with the tendentious debates
over immigration policy, may provide fertile ground by which ethnic-based
conflicts from overseas may be transported to the United States.
Even if that is not the case, the existence of large immigrant
communities may provide the "human jungle" in which
external terrorist groups can operate. The emergence of a variety
of issue-oriented transnational groups could also lead extremists
within their respective organizations to establish linkages with
like-minded individuals or groups within the United States. Such
groups could undertake joint operations against American targets
in an effort to dramatize their causes or seek changes in public
policy. Cooperation between home-grown terrorists and their foreign
counterparts cannot be understated. In an increasingly interrelated
international environment, a new "terror network" might
emerge with issue-oriented groups launching assaults on domestic
targets.
The threat posed by fundamentalist religious
groups of all faiths cannot be discounted. Not only Islamic extremists,
but other "true believers" of a variety of faiths are
likely to engage in terrorist acts against American targets. These
groups might be supported or joined in their operations by domestic
religious extremists. In addition, they might also seek alliances
with a variety of cultists, survivalists, or neo-fascists who,
for their own reasons, reject the existing social, economic, and
political order and await their own versions of Armageddon.
Perhaps even more dangerous will be the resort
to terrorism by apolitical terrorists who are engaged in violence
and intimidation as a pant of criminal pursuits. Such groups have
operated overseas with impunity. Inner-city America could become
a fertile ground for their operations. They will be particularly
threatening since, as a result of their illegal trade in drugs
and other criminal enterprises, they may have access to vast funds
with which to corrupt local authorities. What will make these
groups especially dangerous may be the fact that their threats
and acts of terrorism will not necessarily be meant to achieve
publicity or to dramatize their cause.
Such groups may use terrorist tactics in extortion
attempts like those used to "shake down the neighborhood"only
these gangs may attempt to blackmail the entire city. With their
vast revenues, they could acquire a formidable arsenal of weapons
with which to challenge local authorities and carry out their
acts of violence on a scale not yet experienced in the United
States. Furthermore, it may be very difficult for our already
strained criminal justice system to address the development of
new criminal cartels.
The scope and magnitude of future potential
terrorist organizations will be enhanced by the rapid changes
in technology that will provide the next generation of terrorists
with capabilities undreamed of by the most highly dedicated and
skilled terrorist of today. In a sense the capture of the infamous
Carlos marked the end of an era. A new generation of terrorists
armed with technologically advanced weaponry will be able to engage
in violence that is more dramatic and destructive than that intended
in the bombing in Oklahoma City. The threat at the lower end of
the spectrum is likely to grow as well. The M-16, M-10, Uzi and
AK-47 assault rifles will be supplemented by stand-off weapons
like Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, LAWs and RPG-7s, already
available on the world weapons market. Just because a weapon is
relatively unsophisticated does not mean it cannot cause massive
casualties. A stinger missile aimed at a jumbo jet as it takes
off or as it approaches a large metropolitan airport could cause
tremendous casualties. A LAW or RPG round lobbed into the right
area of a nuclear power plant could produce catastrophic consequences.
Ultimately, the most fearful and recurrent terrorist
nightmare may be drawing closer to reality. The proliferation
of nuclear weapons and associated technologies, and the diffusion
of knowledge needed to manufacture chemical and biological weapons,
raises the fearful specter of mass destruction that makes concerns
related to use of anthrax as a way of spreading both disease and
panic pale to insignificance. The scary truth is that the United
States is all too vulnerable to this kind of attack. The porous
borders that have allowed massive illegal immigration are just
as open to those who want to import new instruments of mass destruction.
And, because there are significant profits to be made, there are
suppliers who are willing to provide the new generation of portable
nuclear weapons, chemical and biological delivery systems despite
Washington's growing concern and the improving technical means
to counter such threats. Furthermore, the next generation of terrorists
will have the capability of effectively exploiting the highly
competitive electronic and print media both to dramatize their
conventional or ABC capabilities and to extort money.
Technological changes will certainly have an
impact on target selection. At the outset, the availability of
more sophisticated conventional explosives could enable terrorists
to inflict greater damage on potential targets while lessening
the risk of capture that results from having to process or transport
the material. Highly symbolic targets like government buildings
and corporate headquarters will be more vulnerable to attack.
Major public events, like the Super Bowl or the 1996 Atlanta Olympics
are also prime targets.
Despite more effective physical security and
technological countermeasures it will be increasingly difficult
to harden potential targets. Even if the range of the weapons
is relatively short, it will be a considerable challenge to expand
an anti-terrorist security zone beyond the immediate periphery
of potential targets like sports facilities, government buildings,
or nuclear power plants. Defense in depth will require broader
protective measures.
Even of greater concern is the potential threat
of such weapons to aviation security. While anti-skyjacking measures
have been largely successful in the industrialized West, the possibility
of the threat or the destruction of commercial aircraft cannot
be dismissed. It is exceedingly difficult to expand a security
zone beyond the confines of an airport. Moreover, stand-off weapons
provide the opportunity for highly flexible hit and run attacks.
The resulting mobility will make it very difficult to predict
or take appropriate action against terrorists. Finally, as potential
targets continue to be hardened in urban areas, there is no reason
to believe that terrorists will not seek softer targets of opportunity
either in the suburbs (corporate headquarters) or rural areas
(nuclear or thermal power plants and other installations). Despite
these threats, it will remain difficult to develop the necessary
awareness, technology and training among those corporations outside
urban areas. Too many people may not take the threat seriously
enough due to an "it can't happen here" syndrome.
Most ominous, however, is the threat issuing
from mass or super-terrorism. Cities may be held hostage by threats
to poison the water supply or to disseminate any number of dangerous
chemical or biological agents. Such threats must also be taken
seriously given the proliferation of ABC capabilities. The threat
might be overt, in which case the authorities will have the onerous
task of reconciling the need to take appropriate action without
creating a panic. Or the threat might be covert, in which case
governments will be facing a form of nuclear, chemical, or biological
blackmail unknown to the public. Finally, one can anticipate that
there will be more incidents of criminal terrorism directed against
senior executives, public officials, and their families. The terrorists
will justify such acts of hostage-taking and kidnapping on the
basis of political causation, but in many cases they will be motivated
by nothing more than a desire for ransom money. There is no reason
to believe that criminal extortion, which has become a major industry
in Mexico and throughout Central and South America, will not be
emulated within the United States. In sum, the constellation of
potential targets and the means to attack them will continue to
expand in the coming decade.
The traditional motivation behind the resort
to terrorism by various groups is sure to continue. Ethnic identification
and hatred, the call to right perceived wrongs, and the demand
for self-determination will continue to inspire terrorists. The
ranks of the traditional terror mongers will be joined by religious
extremist groups who have rejected what they view to be the excesses
of Western and American secular society. These forces of reaction
may come from the Middle East, but there will be the non-Islamic
equivalents of the HAMAS and Hizbollah venting their anger and
demanding the destruction of the "Great Satan." These
true believers, in the conduct of what they view to be a "just
war," may attack the symbols of their religious or secular
rivals.
Acts such as the bombings of the Israeli Embassy
and the Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires might be emulated
in Washington or New York. Moreover. domestic groups acting either
independently or with the support of external terrorist organizations
may launch their own assaults. One need only recall how a sectarian
dispute within the United States was transformed into a mass hostage
taking by the Hanafi Muslims in Washington, DC in 1977. The most
alarming aspect of the religious extremists is the fact that they
did not necessarily constrain their actions by using terror as
a weapon to coerce or to propagandize for their causes. The new
true believer, armed with the certainty of faith, may not be concerned
with current public opinion or a change in the policy of an adversary.
To them, being killed while undertaking an act of terrorism may
be a way to paradise in the next life. The image of the smiling
truck bomber driving his vehicle into the Marine barracks in Beirut
may be duplicated in a large urban center in the United States.
And the nightmare only becomes more horrific if such a perpetrator
uses a nuclear device. While one does not want to overstate the
threat, the strategic thinker must be willing to "think the
unthinkable" so that appropriate responses may be conceived.
The panoply of potential attacks, save for the
nuclear option or other forms of super-terrorism, will probably
not create a major change in US foreign policy or the articulation
and pursuit of US strategic interests and national security objectives.
However, in this new world disorder terrorism may come to the
United States whenever foreign adversaries want to test Washington's
resolve in continuing its support for activities of the United
Nations and friendly governments. Given the lack of coherence
in the international environment and the low threshold of pain
in regard to the taking of American casualties in ill-defined
conflicts and the emergence of neo-isolationism, one must recognize
that future acts of terrorism, if skillfully executed, might have
a strategic result. The bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut
changed the course of US policy toward Lebanon. That kind of act
could be duplicated in the United States with even more dramatic
results.
CONCLUSION
As noted at the start of this chapter, it is
difficult to see through the smog of terrorism to assess America's
vulnerabilities. Furthermore, it is dangerous to either understate
or overstate the threat. If one minimizes the threat, little action
may be taken. If one overstates it, the public and the authorities
might overreact. What is needed is a realistic assessment which
avoids both extremes. While recognizing that there is a threat,
but not overemphasizing it, appropriate measures can be taken
to lessen the likelihood of an attack. Moreover, a balanced and
cautious view can assist both the public and policymakers in developing
a consistent level of anti-terrorism awareness and countermeasures.
Constant awareness and preparedness are fundamental to deterring
terrorists. Such a prudent approach is far better than the overreaction
that might occur after an incident. In the final analysis, the
United States is vulnerable to the changing terrorist threat.
But the threat can be met through heightened levels of awareness,
resolve, counterterrorism measures, and consistent policies.7
ENDNOTES
1. Bruce D Berkowitz and Allan E Goodman,
Strategic Intelligence for American National Security, Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989, pp 304.
2. Stephen Sloan, "International Terrorism:
Conceptual Problems and Implications," Journal of Thought:
An Interdisciplinary Quarterly, Vol 17, No 2, Summer 1982, p 23.
3. Xavier Raufer, "Gray Area: A New
Security Threat," Political Warfare: Intelligence, Active
Measures and Terrorism Report, No 20, Spring 1992, p 1.
4. For a short chronology of chemical and
biological incidents, see Joseph L Douglass, Jr and Neil O Livingstone,
"Selected List of C/B Incidents by Terrorists and Other Nonstate
Actors," in America the Vulnerable: The Threat of Chemical
and Biological Warfare. The New Shape of Terrorism and Conflict,
Lexington Books, 1987, pp 183-187.
5. Brian Jenkins, Intentional Terrorism:
A New Mode of Conflict, Research Paper No 48, California Seminar
on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, Crescent Publication, 1976,
p 4.
6. See Stephen Sloan, "Acts of Terrorism
or the Theater of the Obscene, in Simulating Terrorism, Norman,
OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1981, pp 19-28. This book illustrates
how the techniques of improvisational theater in the form of highly
realistic simulations were prepared and conducted to test the
ability of police and military forces who are responsible for
responding to terrorist threats.
7. Stephen Sloan, "US Anti-Terrorism
Policies: Lessons to be Learned to Meet an Enduring and Changing
Threat," Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol 5, No 1, Spring
1993.
Dr Waheed Hamzah Hadhem
January 2006
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