Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Written Evidence


Written evidence submitted by Dr Waheed Hamzah Hadhem

TERRORIST MENTALITY

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TERRORISM, AND THE TERRORIST BEHAVIOR

  1.  Defining terrorism

  2.  Causes of Terrorism

    The Domestic Factors

    The External Factors

  3.  Why Terrorism

  4.  The Vision of Us vs Them

  5.  Vision of The World

  6.  Vision of the past

  7.  Vision of the Present

  8.  Vision of the Future

  9.  The Mentality of Terrorism

    Expectations vs Achievements

    The Gap between reality and Idealism

    The suffering phase

    The Frustration—Anger phase

    Discontent and Delusion

    Relative Deprivation

  10.  The Behavioral Phase

    Aggressive participation

  11.  The Micro—level of Analysis

  12.  The Macro—level of Analysis

THE TERRORIST MENTALITY: VISIONS AND PERCEPTIONS

  Waheed Hamzah Hashem (Associate Professor of Political Science)

  Terrorist mentality is a key factor in understanding as well as determining terrorist behavior. The last determine justifications for committing terrorist acts against the terrorists targets. Terrorist views of the world (particularly of the others that differ from them) determine their actions. Moreover, their understanding of the reality they live within and how they view the world determines their behavior.

  Terrorist mentality is one of the subjects reviewed and analysed the least in the last two decades as a result of lack of understanding and the failure to answer the question: why terrorists unleash their hate, anger and frustrations on the others? and the question, how and according to what do they view and perceive the world? Finally, there have been no answers to the questions: what are the main factors that motivate terrorists to act? And what are the reasons that move them to act or not to act?

Reason, perception, and visions of terrorism

  Terrorists and their savage actions against their propagated enemies is a confrontation not so much of terrorist operations as of strict values, negative perceptions, and highly sensitive emotions; but also of reason that is heavily based upon hate; of faith that do not believe in fear or in the human rights of the others.

  The emergence of terrorism was (and still is) a result of the existence of harsh contradictions in human lives or lets say improper or human existence. In another word, man is a direct product of his or her social environment that has been heavily shaped by religious as well as political factors which both intertwined to produce such environment and hence reality.

  Therefore, terrorist mentality is not as much a result of clash of cultures or civilisations; it is a clash between rigid and harsh mentalities that emanates from sharp and deep contradictions in some civilisations that might also lead to clash in civilisation itself and anarchy—between the rule of law and no rules at all.

  In this struggle, terrorists view their adversaries as a direct threat to their ideology and human existence. They are likely to avoid traditional battlefield situations because of their inability to fight and lack of modern armaments.

  The dominance of some harsh and rigid religious teachings as well as rigid dogmatism and harsh ideology are well established in the minds of the majority of terrorists. Therefore, first they perceive things and events in specific ways and through specific lens. Second, they think in a specific way and according to way of analysis. Thirdly they act according to narrow inflexible space of mind.

  When asking the question Why? It might be argued that, on the one hand terrorists' lack of sophistication in receiving, processing, and analysing information or events; on the other, their inability to understand reality and their reliance on their religious leaders ( Mashaiekh) to interpret all events and make the decisions for them. In short they are voluntarily highly obedient to highly centralised religious authority.

THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

  The term "Terrorist mentality" then is broadly accepted as extremist militancy on the part of groups or individuals protesting a perceived grievance or wrong usually attributed to governmental action or inaction.1 Generally, three principal issues are regarded to fall under that definition: The existence of foreign troops in the Arabian Peninsula, Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the intrusion of Westernisation in the Arab-Islamic World.

  Even though it probably never fully existed, the artificial superficial equilibrium imposed by the Peace Process in the Middle East has been destroyed. Within the existing Arab political order imposed by Arab governments particularly on reformist, nationalist, and liberal movements has given way to religious groups' pressures and demands often accompanied by political violence including terrorism, various forms of low intensity conflict, as rapidly growing corruptions, unemployment, and inflation has intensified general anger and discontent. The instability has spilled over into various Arab countries where the various social groups are attempting to cope with the uncertainties of social and economic life, but in particular the fake democratisation.

  Additionally, now that Moscow and Washington are no longer inclined to use regional surrogates as a way of avoiding direct confrontation, a number of regional powers are emerging. Neither Moscow nor Washington have either the inclination or the influence needed to constrain many of these regional would-be superpowers. Iran is a case in point. Countries like Iran, Syria and Libya use terrorism as a form of diplomacy and as an adjunct to their foreign policies.2 To these states, terrorism is as integral a part of their diplomacy as the exchange of ambassadors. Smaller states can easily emulate their example.

  In this era of what should be called a "new world disorder" the breakdown of central authority and the domination of the existing state system has been under assault from a number of quarters. First, the legitimacy of many states has been challenged by the growing assertion of both sub-national and transnational calls for "self-determination" by ethnic groups and religious movements that deny the legitimacy of what they perceive to be a discredited international order. Despite the optimism of the past, primordial loyalties have not withered away in the face of technology, democracy, and the introduction of free market economies. Indeed, many groups and movements have fed upon a reaction to what is sometimes viewed as the secular immorality of the West. Tribal loyalties on a sub-national level share the rejection of secular mass societies with fundamentalist movements. Some of these movements seem to offer the chimera of psychological, sociological and political security to people who are trying find their place in an uncertain, even threatening, world.

  New and dangerous players have emerged in the international arena. The level of instability and concomitant violence is further heightened by the rise to international political significance of non-state actors willing to challenge the primacy of the state. Whether it be the multinational corporation or a terrorist group that targets it, both share a common characteristic. They have each rejected the state-centric system that emerged 175 years ago at the Congress of Vienna.

  All of these factors have accelerated the erosion of the monopoly of the coercive power of the state as the disintegration of the old order is intensified. And, this process will in all probability gain even greater momentum because of the wide ranging and growing activities of criminal enterprises. These include everything from arms traders and drug cartels, which will provide and use existing and new weapons in terrorist campaigns as a part of their pursuit of profit and political power.

  In sum, present and future terrorists and their supporters are acquiring the capabilities and freedom of action to operate in the new international jungle. They move in what has been called the "grey areas," those regions where control has shifted from legitimate governments to new half-political, half-criminal powers.3 In this environment the line between state and rogue state, and rogue state and criminal enterprise, will be increasingly blurred. Each will seek out new and profitable targets through terrorism in an international order that is already under assault.

TECHNOLOGICAL/OPERATIONAL CHANGES

  The remarkable changes in the international environment have been accompanied by technological changes that may have serious ramifications as regards future terrorist operations both internationally and in the United States. Up to now, terrorists have not been especially innovative in their tactics. Bombing, although not on the intended magnitude of that at the Oklahoma City Federal Building, remains the most common type of attack. Hostage taking and kidnapping are fundamental to the terrorist repertoire and skyjacking is always a possibility. Automatic and semi-automatic rifles and pistols remain the weapons of choice.

  However, the employment of stand-off weapons like American Stinger and Russian SA-7 hand-held anti-aircraft missiles, the US Army M-72 light anti-tank weapon (LAW), and the Russian-built RPG-7 anti-tank weapon may be more readily available to terrorists than many like to believe. The same may be said of terrorist bombing technologies. Dynamite has been replaced by the more destructive and easily concealed Semtex. Furthermore, the threat has grown as a result of increased technological sophistication of timing devices and fuses. But weapons need not be sophisticated to be destructive. One only has to consider what might have happened if the pilot of the lone single-engine light aircraft which crashed into the White House had filled his plane with something as simple as a fertiliser bomb. That incident, even if it was not a terrorist act, should serve as a warning for those who are concerned with more advanced technological threats. They should remember that smaller and more conventional instruments of destruction are still quite lethal and can have a profound affect on the targeted individual, corporation, government or what is often the ultimate target: public opinion.

  A growing concern is that terrorists will cross the threshold to engage in acts of mass or "super terrorism" by using atomic, biological, and chemical (ABC) weapons. So far, the international order has been spared terrorist incidents involving nuclear weapons. Indeed, those that have been reported have turned out to be elaborate hoaxes. Fortunately, the threats have yet to be translated into actual incidents, but many believe it is only a matter of time before they are.4

  All this could easily change as a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The current trade in illicit weapon's grade plutonium serves to underscore the fact that the necessary material and attendant technology will be increasingly available for those terrorist groups who may want to exercise a nuclear option, be it in the form of a dispersal of radioactive material that could contaminate a large area or the use of a relatively small but very lethal atomic weapon. The illegal trade in weapons and technology will be further exacerbated by the very real dangers resulting from the proliferation of nuclear weapons. There is good reason to fear that either a rogue state, its terrorist surrogates, or independent terrorist groups will have the capacity to go nuclear. Whether this threshold will be crossed will depend in part on the motivation, attendant strategies, and goals of present and future terrorist groups. In sum, there is every reason to be concerned that terrorists will engage in their own form of technical innovation to develop the capacity to make the nightmare of a nuclear, chemical, or biological threat move from the pages of an adventure novel to the shores of the United States.

  Scenarios addressing future acts of high-tech terrorism include a wide variety of assaults on the delicate interdependent infrastructure of modern industrialised society. These scenarios move beyond the bombing or seizing of conventional or nuclear power plants to include the potentially disastrous destruction of the technological infrastructure of the information super highway. However, the scope of what constitutes a terrorist act on computers and their associated facilities is subject to interpretation. The bombing of a multinational corporation or a government's crucial computer centers could be judged an act of terrorism, but what if a terrorist hacker placed a computer virus in a very sensitive network? The results could range from the massively inconvenient to dangerous or disastrous. Such an act, however, would lack an essential element of terrorism as it is now defined: the use or threat of the use of physical violence. Nevertheless, as the technology expands so may definitions of what constitutes a terrorist act. From the terrorist's point of view the following dictum may apply, "so many new targets . . . so little time."

  Finally, if indeed terrorism is "theater" and the people are the audience, the stage is changing.5 CNN and other networks provide the terrorists with a potential and almost instantaneous means for spreading their message of fear and intimidation. The reality of video proliferation is just as significant as that of nuclear proliferation. Some terrorist groups already have the ability to stage and videotape their acts, sending them out to either a broad or limited audience. They can even transmit live events through low power transmitter stations. Furthermore, the next generation of terrorists may produce highly imaginative presentations to seize the attention of a violence jaded public, one which has grown used to the now standard images of hooded terrorists holding hostages in embassies, prisons, or aircraft cabins. This kind of theater of the obscene will find a ready mass audience among those who watch the tabloid television shows and depend on the National Enquirer for their news.6 Given the public's fascination with television happenings like the O J Simpson trial, one can only imagine what might happen if future terrorists direct and produce their own television spectaculars.

  Terrorists are more interested if not concerned by weapons of mass destruction and by the cowardly instruments of sabotage, hidden bombs, and committing suicide in terrorist operations against civilians. These unconventional threats endanger not only World's stability, but also the existence of mankind.

CHANGES IN TERRORIST MOTIVATIONS AND GOALS

  There are almost certainly going to be changes in both the motivation and goals of terrorist groups. The traditional motivations for terrorism: ethnic, tribal, and religious animosities, will continue and intensify. Even while people of goodwill struggle to find solutions to problems in Northern Ireland and in the Middle East, the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and the related turmoil in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere have engendered new groups pursuing their own varied agendas through violence, including terrorism. While much of the violence is confined to the various regions, the potential for involving surrounding states and for international assaults is significant. Even in the Middle East, where the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel are moving along a tortuous road toward accommodation, various factions, willing and able to engage in non-territorial terrorism, will continue to "bring the war home" to Israel and its primary supporter, the United States.

  Perhaps even more ominous is the growing significance of apolitical groups which resort to terrorism in pursuit of financial gain as a part of criminal enterprises. While a number of these groups may, in part, justify their actions under the rubric of political rationalization, their major goal will relate to maximizing their profits through co-opting, corrupting, and neutralising the authority of the states in their respective countries and regions of operations. These groups, which include narco-terrorists, are particularly difficult to counteract given their vast resources gleaned by illicit trade in drugs or weapons, and because of their ability to influence, control or demoralize governments in countries where they operate. This new criminal order can engage in operations with the kind of violence that makes the old Mafia seem pacifistic by comparison.

  Finally, one might anticipate that in addition to existing extremists operating according to issue-oriented movements such as radical environmentalism, fringe elements of the pro-life movement, and extremist animal rights groups, there will emerge new groups willing to use terrorism to avenge grievances both real and imaginary. These groups, which at the outset may be small and not tied to any recognized social or political movement, may have the capability to maximize their impact through the availability of a wide variety of weapons, a rich selection of targets, and the skillful use of the media and communications technology. There will be both old and new adversaries to threaten the international order and, more specifically, US interests and citizens both at home and abroad.

  Since there are many dimensions to international terrorism, effective counter terrorism calls for the skills and resources of various elements of the US government. We have learned from past experience with fragmented efforts that coordination of these resources is essential. For this reason, the President has designated the Department of State, in keeping with its overall responsibility for the conduct of US foreign policy, as the lead agency for managing and coordinating counter terrorism policy and operations abroad, whereas the Department of Justice has been designated the lead agency for domestic terrorism. These responsibilities were reaffirmed recently in Presidential Decision Directive 39, signed by President Clinton on 21 June 1995.

  Since the creation in 1972 of the forerunner of the Office of the Coordinator for Counter terrorism, my office—known as S/CT—has been the focal point for this coordinating activity. Coordination, Mr Chairman, is central to State's counter terrorism role, and I want to emphasize this at the outset of my testimony, although the focus of this hearing is on specific responsibilities of State, Defense and the FBI. For this reason, I would like to explain State's particular contributions in the context of our coordinating role.

  We must understand that this confrontation is long term. It doesn't lend itself to quick victories. To prevail we must summon our courage, and we must equip ourselves with a full range of foreign policy tools. Our armed forces must remain the best led, best trained, best equipped and most respected in the world. between rigid and harsh mentalities that emanates from

Diplomacy and International Cooperation

  Terrorism affects the security and the political and economic stability of nations. Acts of international terrorism, by definition, involve the citizens or territory of more than one nation, and terrorists are expanding their regional and global reach. Diplomacy and international cooperation are, therefore, critically important to a successful effort against the terrorist threat.

  To enhance such cooperation, my office conducts frequent consultations with many foreign governments, usually with interagency teams, which might include colleagues from Justice, FBI, CIA, DOD, FAA and other agencies. These consultations are a valuable means of projecting US policy aims and obtaining foreign cooperation. In recent months, I have led interagency teams to Moscow, New Delhi, Islamabad, Riyadh and Sanaa. We have held consultations with over 20 governments in the past year, and we have met with counterterrorism experts of the European Union and the Group of Eight.

  This network of international cooperation is growing stronger, as more and more nations realise that cooperation is essential. A series of regional and international conferences on counterterrorism is a sign of the growing trend toward cooperation. In August, I led a US delegation to Buenos Aires to attend a conference of the states of the southern cone countries in Latin America, plus the US and Canada. The agenda was cooperation in fighting international terrorism against the backdrop of the 1992 and 1994 bombings in Buenos Aires. And we are now working with our partners in the Organization of American states to prepare for a hemispheric conference on counterterrorism in Lima this April, which was called for by the Summit of the Americas at Miami in December, 1994.

  A Ministerial Conference on Terrorism of the Group of Eight in Ottawa in December, which grew out of the Halifax Summit in June, addressed concrete ways to enhance international cooperation against terrorism on a global level. The International Conference on Counterterrorism at Baguio in the Philippines last month, was the first such initiative in Asia.

Department of State-Law Enforcement Coordination

  Strengthening the rule of law is a major tenet of US counterterrorism policy. As my colleague from FBI will describe, terrorism is a crime under various US laws and the laws of many other nations, and effective law enforcement and aggressive prosecution of international terrorists are thus critical to US and international efforts against terrorism. Therefore, the Department of State works closely in support of Justice and FBI efforts to pursue terrorists abroad who violate US laws. State facilitates anti-terrorism law enforcement overseas in a wide variety of ways, for example, in establishing and supporting FBI investigations abroad, and working with FBI, Justice and foreign governments when extradition or rendition of terrorist suspects to the US is an option for bringing them to justice.

  My office, working closely with the Department's Office of the Legal Adviser and with Justice, is also making a major effort to persuade other governments, who have not yet become party to the 10 existing international treaties and conventions on terrorism, to do so.

State—Intelligence Coordination

  Identifying international terrorists and their networks, providing warning so that protective or deterrent measures can be taken, and gathering information on terrorist acts requires a major US intelligence effort. For this reason, the US intelligence community and the technical and human resources they provide are an indispensable element in our overall approach to international terrorism.

  My office relies heavily on State's Office of Terrorism, Narcotics and International Crime (INR/TNC) in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research to provide us with timely, all-source intelligence on terrorism, and analysis on issues of current policy concern. Intelligence is the lifeblood of effective counterterrorism, and without INR's expert, round-the-clock support, we could not do our job. It is essential that INR be given adequate resources to perform its indispensable role.

  State depends as well upon intelligence collection and analytical support from other elements of the intelligence community. We have a very close working relationship with the DCI's Counter-Terrorism Center. And officers from the Center are our close partners in working groups, international consultations, and counterterrorism operations, which we coordinate.

State—Defense Cooperation

  Our superb military counterterrorism capabilities, which my colleague from Defense will describe, are another important tool in our arsenal to combat international terrorism. When peaceful means fail and the use of military force is feasible, we need the world's best specialized military expertise to rescue victims of terrorism, apprehend terrorists, or deter acts of terrorism, and we rely on the Department of Defense for other forms of counterterrorism support.

Emergency Response Capability

  To respond promptly to terrorist incidents abroad which require varied US resources, we have developed a unique fast reaction team. This team, led by an officer from S/CT, consists of experts from DOD, CIA, FBI and other agencies, as needed. At the request of a foreign government or a US Ambassador abroad, this team can be dispatched within a few hours on a specially dedicated aircraft provided by DOD to any place in the world. The team's job is to provide support to the Ambassador and the host government in resolving a terrorist crisis, and to advise on additional US assets that might be needed. Throughout the year, the response team joins our special forces in major training exercises. The team also supports our regional CINCS by providing role players for exercises.

  Flexibility and responsiveness are the watchwords of this team concept. Small, tailored teams can be launched, depending on the crisis, and specialists from individual agencies can be sent alone, as the situation arises.

Other Examples of Coordination

  Other recent examples of the integrated, coordinated process which State directs to deal with terrorist crises abroad include the following: a series of extradition, rendition and law enforcement cooperation efforts which resulted in the return in 1995 of two World Trade Center bombing suspects to the US including ring leader Ramzi Ahmed Yousef; discovery of and preventive measures to deal with a plot by this group to bomb US civilian aircraft in Asia, and the successful return to the US for prosecution of two more members of this group; investigation of the terrorist murders of two US Consulate officials in Karachi; the bombing of the US Training office for the Saudi National Guard in Riyadh in November, which killed five Americans; support and assistance to Argentina after the bombing of the Jewish cultural center in 1994; efforts to learn more about and take measures to deal with threats arising from the Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attacks in Tokyo; responding to a request by Israel for extradition of a suspected HAMAS terrorist; and investigation of the recent bus bombings in Jerusalem, in which two Americans died.

  These efforts required resources and careful teamwork from many members of the US counterterrorism community, including Justice, FBI, and often CIA, NSA, Defense, Treasury, Transportation, FAA and INS, as well as the Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security. Because these cases involved international terrorism and foreign governments, they often require rapid reaction, intricate planning, and complex coordination. In each case, State played its coordinating role, relying on excellent cooperation from all elements of the US counterterrorism community.

Protection Abroad, Visa Denial and Threat Warnings

  State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security is another important actor in the US counterterrorism community. DS is responsible for protection of US official civilian personnel and facilities abroad against terrorist and other threats. Since 1979, there have been 460 such attacks against US diplomatic personnel, buildings and vehicles. Twenty-five diplomats have been killed by terrorists, and 55 have been wounded.

  In addition to protective duties, Regional Security Officers at US missions abroad have intelligence and investigative responsibilities, for example, to investigate passport and visa fraud, which often accompanies terrorist crimes. In Washington, DS plays an important part in the process of issuing warnings against terrorist threats and travel advisories. DS agents are active in many counterterrorism investigations, and played a lead role in the apprehension of Ramzi Ahmed Yousef. DS also helps US business firms and NGOs abroad, through its Overseas Security Advisory Council, which maintains an electronic bulletin board for exchange of security related and terrorist information abroad.

  The Bureau of Consular Affairs is another important player in State's counterterrorism effort. CA, working with INR, S/CT, DS and the intelligence community and our consulates abroad, maintains systems for denying entry into the US of terrorists and suspects. It also issues threat warnings and travel advisories to American citizens overseas.

Identifying State Sponsors of Terrorism

  Identifying State sponsors of terrorism and mobilizing international pressure against them is a major element of US policy, in accordance with Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act and related laws. The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, working with regional bureaus, INR and the intelligence community, makes annual recommendations to the Secretary of State, which provide the basis for his annual review of state sponsors. We pursue through diplomatic channels, and through the UN in the case of Libya and Iraq, the maintenance and broadening of economic and other sanctions against these states. Mr Chairman, I believe we can point to this policy as one reason why terrorist acts sponsored by states or their proxies have declined in recent years, although state sponsors like Iran remain a serious threat.

Anti-Terrorism Training, Research & Development and Rewards

  State's Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program, administered by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security with policy guidance from the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, is another effective tool in reducing the danger of international terrorism. Over the last decade, over 17,000 officials from 89 foreign countries have received training in a wide variety of ATA courses. This low cost program, funded at about $15 million annually in recent years, has been a superb investment in reducing the terrorist risk to friendly countries and to US citizens and airlines abroad. We are pleased that the conferees recently increased the appropriation to $16 million for FY 1996.

  State also coordinates an interagency research and development program for counterterrorism technologies, through the Technical Support Working Group. The bulk of the funding for this important program is provided by the Department of Defense. We also chair US delegations that participate in joint research in counterterrorism technologies under bilateral agreements with the UK, Canada, and Israel.

  State's International Terrorism Information Rewards Program is another important part of our counterterrorism effort. This program has paid out more than $3 million to individuals who provided information leading to the prosecution of terrorists or the prevention of acts of terrorism.

Analytic Reports

  The most prominent unclassified report by the Department of State on terrorism is our annual "Patterns of Global Terrorism." This report, which the Congress requires by 30 April each year, has become the recognized authority in this field. We are grateful for the many contributions we receive for Patterns from INR and CIA. From time to time, S/CT also publishes unclassified public papers on individual terrorist groups or countries. We have urged the Congress not to impose additional, mandatory reporting requirements because of manpower constraints.

Conclusion

  Mr Chairman, from my experience as Coordinator for Counterterrorism at State, and from my intensive work with colleagues from other agencies, I can say with conviction that the United States is well served by our counterterrorism community. All US Government Departments concerned share the strong commitment of the President and Secretary Christopher to giving our counterterrorism efforts the highest priority. Our counterterrorism community is professional, dedicated, and committed to a coordinated, team effort. Terrorism is a difficult and dangerous enemy, but we are making a determined and impressive effort to combat it in all its evil aspects.

HOW VULNERABLE IS THE UNITED STATES AND WHAT ARE THE TERRORISTS' GOALS?

  The following assessment is based on integrating the analytical components presented above. The focus will be on the vulnerabilities in the United States to attacks by international terrorist or domestic groups or by such groups with domestic-international linkages.

  The new threat environment may see the emergence of a wide variety of sub-national and transnational groups intent on venting their frustrations with Washington for what they perceive to be a lack of support for their causes or, conversely, for supporting their adversaries. As the major military superpower, with an increased global involvement, even when engaged under the United Nations, the United States is likely to be viewed as the primary party in future disputes. Even when neutral, Washington is likely to be viewed suspiciously by one or more warring factions. In addition, when Washington moves beyond "peace keeping" to "peace enforcement" operations, the likelihood of a reaction among one or more disputants is possible.

  Even though the United States may not want to be the policeman or the conscience of the world, the parties in any conflict may question whether Washington is intentionally or unintentionally pursuing a political agenda that may be counter to their objective. The result might be the spillover of violence to the United States by one or more parties in the dispute. Resort to terrorism could be a punitive action or it might be an effort to dramatize a cause. As the United States tries to redefine the formulation and execution of its foreign policy in the post-Cold War era, even if Washington is motivated by the highest of ideals, ie, democratization, humanitarian assistance, or nation-building, those who will be the objects of such efforts might resent it. Their use of terrorism on American soil is a likely response.

  The potential spillover effect may be intensified by the domestic political and economic environment. The potency of ethnic-based politics, coupled with the tendentious debates over immigration policy, may provide fertile ground by which ethnic-based conflicts from overseas may be transported to the United States. Even if that is not the case, the existence of large immigrant communities may provide the "human jungle" in which external terrorist groups can operate. The emergence of a variety of issue-oriented transnational groups could also lead extremists within their respective organizations to establish linkages with like-minded individuals or groups within the United States. Such groups could undertake joint operations against American targets in an effort to dramatize their causes or seek changes in public policy. Cooperation between home-grown terrorists and their foreign counterparts cannot be understated. In an increasingly interrelated international environment, a new "terror network" might emerge with issue-oriented groups launching assaults on domestic targets.

  The threat posed by fundamentalist religious groups of all faiths cannot be discounted. Not only Islamic extremists, but other "true believers" of a variety of faiths are likely to engage in terrorist acts against American targets. These groups might be supported or joined in their operations by domestic religious extremists. In addition, they might also seek alliances with a variety of cultists, survivalists, or neo-fascists who, for their own reasons, reject the existing social, economic, and political order and await their own versions of Armageddon.

  Perhaps even more dangerous will be the resort to terrorism by apolitical terrorists who are engaged in violence and intimidation as a pant of criminal pursuits. Such groups have operated overseas with impunity. Inner-city America could become a fertile ground for their operations. They will be particularly threatening since, as a result of their illegal trade in drugs and other criminal enterprises, they may have access to vast funds with which to corrupt local authorities. What will make these groups especially dangerous may be the fact that their threats and acts of terrorism will not necessarily be meant to achieve publicity or to dramatize their cause.

  Such groups may use terrorist tactics in extortion attempts like those used to "shake down the neighborhood"—only these gangs may attempt to blackmail the entire city. With their vast revenues, they could acquire a formidable arsenal of weapons with which to challenge local authorities and carry out their acts of violence on a scale not yet experienced in the United States. Furthermore, it may be very difficult for our already strained criminal justice system to address the development of new criminal cartels.

  The scope and magnitude of future potential terrorist organizations will be enhanced by the rapid changes in technology that will provide the next generation of terrorists with capabilities undreamed of by the most highly dedicated and skilled terrorist of today. In a sense the capture of the infamous Carlos marked the end of an era. A new generation of terrorists armed with technologically advanced weaponry will be able to engage in violence that is more dramatic and destructive than that intended in the bombing in Oklahoma City. The threat at the lower end of the spectrum is likely to grow as well. The M-16, M-10, Uzi and AK-47 assault rifles will be supplemented by stand-off weapons like Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, LAWs and RPG-7s, already available on the world weapons market. Just because a weapon is relatively unsophisticated does not mean it cannot cause massive casualties. A stinger missile aimed at a jumbo jet as it takes off or as it approaches a large metropolitan airport could cause tremendous casualties. A LAW or RPG round lobbed into the right area of a nuclear power plant could produce catastrophic consequences.

  Ultimately, the most fearful and recurrent terrorist nightmare may be drawing closer to reality. The proliferation of nuclear weapons and associated technologies, and the diffusion of knowledge needed to manufacture chemical and biological weapons, raises the fearful specter of mass destruction that makes concerns related to use of anthrax as a way of spreading both disease and panic pale to insignificance. The scary truth is that the United States is all too vulnerable to this kind of attack. The porous borders that have allowed massive illegal immigration are just as open to those who want to import new instruments of mass destruction. And, because there are significant profits to be made, there are suppliers who are willing to provide the new generation of portable nuclear weapons, chemical and biological delivery systems despite Washington's growing concern and the improving technical means to counter such threats. Furthermore, the next generation of terrorists will have the capability of effectively exploiting the highly competitive electronic and print media both to dramatize their conventional or ABC capabilities and to extort money.

  Technological changes will certainly have an impact on target selection. At the outset, the availability of more sophisticated conventional explosives could enable terrorists to inflict greater damage on potential targets while lessening the risk of capture that results from having to process or transport the material. Highly symbolic targets like government buildings and corporate headquarters will be more vulnerable to attack. Major public events, like the Super Bowl or the 1996 Atlanta Olympics are also prime targets.

  Despite more effective physical security and technological countermeasures it will be increasingly difficult to harden potential targets. Even if the range of the weapons is relatively short, it will be a considerable challenge to expand an anti-terrorist security zone beyond the immediate periphery of potential targets like sports facilities, government buildings, or nuclear power plants. Defense in depth will require broader protective measures.

  Even of greater concern is the potential threat of such weapons to aviation security. While anti-skyjacking measures have been largely successful in the industrialized West, the possibility of the threat or the destruction of commercial aircraft cannot be dismissed. It is exceedingly difficult to expand a security zone beyond the confines of an airport. Moreover, stand-off weapons provide the opportunity for highly flexible hit and run attacks. The resulting mobility will make it very difficult to predict or take appropriate action against terrorists. Finally, as potential targets continue to be hardened in urban areas, there is no reason to believe that terrorists will not seek softer targets of opportunity either in the suburbs (corporate headquarters) or rural areas (nuclear or thermal power plants and other installations). Despite these threats, it will remain difficult to develop the necessary awareness, technology and training among those corporations outside urban areas. Too many people may not take the threat seriously enough due to an "it can't happen here" syndrome.

  Most ominous, however, is the threat issuing from mass or super-terrorism. Cities may be held hostage by threats to poison the water supply or to disseminate any number of dangerous chemical or biological agents. Such threats must also be taken seriously given the proliferation of ABC capabilities. The threat might be overt, in which case the authorities will have the onerous task of reconciling the need to take appropriate action without creating a panic. Or the threat might be covert, in which case governments will be facing a form of nuclear, chemical, or biological blackmail unknown to the public. Finally, one can anticipate that there will be more incidents of criminal terrorism directed against senior executives, public officials, and their families. The terrorists will justify such acts of hostage-taking and kidnapping on the basis of political causation, but in many cases they will be motivated by nothing more than a desire for ransom money. There is no reason to believe that criminal extortion, which has become a major industry in Mexico and throughout Central and South America, will not be emulated within the United States. In sum, the constellation of potential targets and the means to attack them will continue to expand in the coming decade.

  The traditional motivation behind the resort to terrorism by various groups is sure to continue. Ethnic identification and hatred, the call to right perceived wrongs, and the demand for self-determination will continue to inspire terrorists. The ranks of the traditional terror mongers will be joined by religious extremist groups who have rejected what they view to be the excesses of Western and American secular society. These forces of reaction may come from the Middle East, but there will be the non-Islamic equivalents of the HAMAS and Hizbollah venting their anger and demanding the destruction of the "Great Satan." These true believers, in the conduct of what they view to be a "just war," may attack the symbols of their religious or secular rivals.

  Acts such as the bombings of the Israeli Embassy and the Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires might be emulated in Washington or New York. Moreover. domestic groups acting either independently or with the support of external terrorist organizations may launch their own assaults. One need only recall how a sectarian dispute within the United States was transformed into a mass hostage taking by the Hanafi Muslims in Washington, DC in 1977. The most alarming aspect of the religious extremists is the fact that they did not necessarily constrain their actions by using terror as a weapon to coerce or to propagandize for their causes. The new true believer, armed with the certainty of faith, may not be concerned with current public opinion or a change in the policy of an adversary. To them, being killed while undertaking an act of terrorism may be a way to paradise in the next life. The image of the smiling truck bomber driving his vehicle into the Marine barracks in Beirut may be duplicated in a large urban center in the United States. And the nightmare only becomes more horrific if such a perpetrator uses a nuclear device. While one does not want to overstate the threat, the strategic thinker must be willing to "think the unthinkable" so that appropriate responses may be conceived.

  The panoply of potential attacks, save for the nuclear option or other forms of super-terrorism, will probably not create a major change in US foreign policy or the articulation and pursuit of US strategic interests and national security objectives. However, in this new world disorder terrorism may come to the United States whenever foreign adversaries want to test Washington's resolve in continuing its support for activities of the United Nations and friendly governments. Given the lack of coherence in the international environment and the low threshold of pain in regard to the taking of American casualties in ill-defined conflicts and the emergence of neo-isolationism, one must recognize that future acts of terrorism, if skillfully executed, might have a strategic result. The bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut changed the course of US policy toward Lebanon. That kind of act could be duplicated in the United States with even more dramatic results.

CONCLUSION

  As noted at the start of this chapter, it is difficult to see through the smog of terrorism to assess America's vulnerabilities. Furthermore, it is dangerous to either understate or overstate the threat. If one minimizes the threat, little action may be taken. If one overstates it, the public and the authorities might overreact. What is needed is a realistic assessment which avoids both extremes. While recognizing that there is a threat, but not overemphasizing it, appropriate measures can be taken to lessen the likelihood of an attack. Moreover, a balanced and cautious view can assist both the public and policymakers in developing a consistent level of anti-terrorism awareness and countermeasures. Constant awareness and preparedness are fundamental to deterring terrorists. Such a prudent approach is far better than the overreaction that might occur after an incident. In the final analysis, the United States is vulnerable to the changing terrorist threat. But the threat can be met through heightened levels of awareness, resolve, counterterrorism measures, and consistent policies.7

ENDNOTES

  1.  Bruce D Berkowitz and Allan E Goodman, Strategic Intelligence for American National Security, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989, pp 304.

  2.  Stephen Sloan, "International Terrorism: Conceptual Problems and Implications," Journal of Thought: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly, Vol 17, No 2, Summer 1982, p 23.

  3.  Xavier Raufer, "Gray Area: A New Security Threat," Political Warfare: Intelligence, Active Measures and Terrorism Report, No 20, Spring 1992, p 1.

  4.  For a short chronology of chemical and biological incidents, see Joseph L Douglass, Jr and Neil O Livingstone, "Selected List of C/B Incidents by Terrorists and Other Nonstate Actors," in America the Vulnerable: The Threat of Chemical and Biological Warfare. The New Shape of Terrorism and Conflict, Lexington Books, 1987, pp 183-187.

  5.  Brian Jenkins, Intentional Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict, Research Paper No 48, California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, Crescent Publication, 1976, p 4.

  6.  See Stephen Sloan, "Acts of Terrorism or the Theater of the Obscene, in Simulating Terrorism, Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1981, pp 19-28. This book illustrates how the techniques of improvisational theater in the form of highly realistic simulations were prepared and conducted to test the ability of police and military forces who are responsible for responding to terrorist threats.

  7.  Stephen Sloan, "US Anti-Terrorism Policies: Lessons to be Learned to Meet an Enduring and Changing Threat," Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol 5, No 1, Spring 1993.

Dr Waheed Hamzah Hadhem

January 2006





 
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