Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Written Evidence


Written evidence submitted by Daniel Feakes, University of Sussex, and colleagues

  As you may be aware, 2005 marked the 30th anniversary of the entry into force of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) which totally prohibits the development, production, stockpiling and use of biological and toxin weapons. Since a biological weapons convention was first proposed (by the UK) in1968, the UK has been a strong supporter of the Convention and efforts to strengthen it. However, in 2001, almost ten years of effort to negotiate a compliance protocol designed to improve implementation and verification of the Convention spectacularly collapsed. This was made worse by the failure of states parties to adopt a final declaration at the subsequent 5th review conference. After a year's hiatus, the conference reconvened in November 2002 and agreed a programme of work whereby states parties would discuss five specific issues relating to implementation at annual meetings of the states parties during 2003-05. The UK participated actively in the meetings and, notably, chaired the 2005 sessions. Attention is now turning to the 6th BWC review conference which is due to be held between 20 November and 8 December this year.

  In April 2002, the Government initiated a dialogue with parliamentarians and others under a Green Paper on the BWC (Cm 5484). Subsequently, the Foreign Affairs Committee published two reports on the Green Paper (HC l5O and HC 67l) and has also commented on the BWC in its reports on foreign policy aspects of the war against terrorism, most recently during its 2004-05 session (HC 36-I). In addition, the House of Lords European Union Committee stated last year that there is to be a review conference of BTWC parties in 2006, but it is unclear what might be achieved. In our view, the search for new ways forward needs to be energetically pursued. (HL Paper 96).

  We believe that, with careful preparation and with leadership from the UK, the 6th review conference can achieve a successful outcome. To this end, we suggest that the Foreign Affairs Committee continues its constructive role by undertaking another inquiry into the BWC. The Committee should review the achievements of the annual meetings and what needs to be done by the Review Conference ideally reporting back before the 2006 summer recess. This would be a useful contribution to the UK Government's preparations for the 6th review conference. Attached is a selection of some issues we believe warrant parliamentary attention. We stand ready to provide any assistance which you might require.

1972 BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

Possible issues for parliamentary attention

  In the years since the Government published its Green Paper on the BWC (Cm 5484) (2002) and the Foreign Affairs Committee (HC 150 and HC 671) conducted its inquiries (2002 and 2003), enough has changed to warrant renewed parliamentary attention to the BWC. Scientific advances have continued apace, just recently for example, the reconstruction in the laboratory of the extremely virulent 1918 `Spanish Flu' has been announced. The spectre of `bioterrorism' has alarmed governments and people around the world and led to new legislation. While earlier concerns about biological weapons programmes in Iraq and Libya have been allayed, concerns remain about other countries and also about some `biodefence' activities in the USA. In response, a number of new initiatives have been adopted including UN Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), the Proliferation Security Initiative, the GB Global Partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction and the Global Health Security initiative.

  The states parties to the BWC have met annually since 2003 to discuss the following five topics:

    "(i)  the adoption of necessary national measures to implement the prohibitions set forth in the Convention, including the enactment of penal legislation;

    (ii)  national mechanisms to establish and maintain the security and oversight of pathogenic microorganisms and toxins;

    (iii)  enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating and mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease;

    (iv)  strengthening and broadening national and international institutional efforts and existing mechanisms for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases affecting humans, animals, and plants;

    (v)  the content promulgation, and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists".

  The UK has played an active role in each annual meeting and Ambassador John Freeman chaired the 2005 meetings. The 6th review conference will take place in November/December 2006, following a Preparatory Committee meeting in April. It is essential that states parties carry out a comprehensive and effective review of the treaty at the 2006 review conference, as this has not been achieved since the 3rd review conference in 1991. (The 5th review conference (2001) could not even adopt a final declaration, while the 4th review conference (1996) focussed on the negotiations for the compliance protocol, which subsequently failed). Such a review will contribute to a successful outcome of the 6th review conference. A successful outcome is vital to avoid the risk that the BWC may be seriously undermined at a time when biological weapons are recognised as a growing threat to international security. It is therefore imperative that constructive preparations and consultations for this year's review conference begin as early as possible.

  Given the challenges faced by the BWC, new responses to those challenges adopted by some states outside the treaty regime, the voluminous information arising from the annual meetings of states parties held during 2003-05 and the forthcoming 6th review conference, we believe that an inquiry by the Foreign Affairs Committee is timely. We suggest the following as possible areas of inquiry for the Committee:

UK objectives for the 6th review conference

  Does the Government expect a Final Declaration that reaffirms and extends the extended understandings developed at previous review conferences? What effective actions does the Government wish to see emerge from the review conference?

Progress in UK priorities

  To what extent has the Government achieved success in the "five specific areas for immediate action" listed in its Green Paper? How does the Government assess the results of the annual meetings from 2003-05 and how would it like the achievements from these meetings to be taken forward into the review conference?

Compliance concerns

  Given the collapse of negotiations on the BWC protocol in 2001 and the improbability of resumed negotiations in the foreseeable future, how does the Government intend to address concerns which it has about compliance by other states parties? How will it promote the need to strengthen and expand the UN Secretary-General's investigation mechanism?

Scientific oversight

  Given the rapid advances in the life sciences and biotechnology, is reviewing the BWC every five years adequate? Will the Government seek the establishment of a mechanism for more frequent review of advances of science and technology relevant to the Convention at the forthcoming review conference?

Linkages between the BWC and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention

  In view of the accelerating convergence of biology and chemistry, will the Government be considering possible overlaps between the 2006 6th BWC review and the 2008 2nd CWC review, which is an opportunity for international action to which the Lemon-Relman report on Globalization, Biosecurity and the Future of the Life Sciences from the US National Academies has just drawn attention? (The report can be viewed at http://fermat.nap.edu/books/O3091OO32l/html)

Addressing the institutional deficit

  Given the success of the annual meetings of experts and states parties under the BWC between 2003 and 2005, will the Government support a further programme of annual meetings following this year's review conference? What subjects would the Government like to see such meetings consider? Will the Government seek a wider mandate for future annual meetings so that effective action can be agreed each year rather than deferring further consideration until the 7th review conference? Would the Government support the creation of a small BWC secretariat to undertake specific tasks related to the implementation of the BWC?

Enhancing transparency

  The Government recently placed the BWC confidence-building measure returns made by the UK for 2003 and 2004 on the FCO website. The UK therefore joins Australia and the USA as the only BWC states parties to publish their returns in this way thereby enhancing International transparency and confidence. In what way will the Government be seeing a strengthening of the confidence-building measures at next year's review conference?

The BWC in the UK's counter-proliferation strategy

  Where does the BWC fit into the Government's counter-proliferation strategy? What role does the Government foresee for multilateral treaties such as the BWC? What is its relationship to more recent measures such as UN Security Council resolution 1540, the Proliferation Security initiative and activities under the European Union's WMD strategy? Does the Government continue to see a possible role for International criminal law in strengthening the present array of constraints on acquisition and use of biological weapons? And how does the Government see the BWC In relation to public health activities such as the Global Health Security initiative and the Word Health Organization's International Health Regulations (2005)?

Daniel Feakes

Research Fellow, University of Sussex

On behalf of the following:

Mr Michael Crowley

Executive Director

Verification Research, Training and Information

Centre (VERTIC)

Dr Ian Davis

Executive Director

British American Security Information Council

(BASIC)

Professor Julian Perry Robinson

Professorial Fellow

University of Sussex

Ms Angela Woodward

Deputy Director

Chair, BioWeapons Prevention Project

Verification Research, Training and Information

Centre (VERTIC)

Professor Malcolm Dando

Professor of International Security

Department of Peace Studies

University of Bradford

Professor Graham S Pearson CB

Visiting Professor of International Security

Department of Peace Studies

University of Bradford

Mr Nicholas A Sims

Reader in International Relations

London School of Economics

February 2006





 
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