Written evidence submitted by Daniel Feakes,
University of Sussex, and colleagues
As you may be aware, 2005 marked the 30th anniversary
of the entry into force of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention
(BWC) which totally prohibits the development, production, stockpiling
and use of biological and toxin weapons. Since a biological weapons
convention was first proposed (by the UK) in1968, the UK has been
a strong supporter of the Convention and efforts to strengthen
it. However, in 2001, almost ten years of effort to negotiate
a compliance protocol designed to improve implementation and verification
of the Convention spectacularly collapsed. This was made worse
by the failure of states parties to adopt a final declaration
at the subsequent 5th review conference. After a year's hiatus,
the conference reconvened in November 2002 and agreed a programme
of work whereby states parties would discuss five specific issues
relating to implementation at annual meetings of the states parties
during 2003-05. The UK participated actively in the meetings and,
notably, chaired the 2005 sessions. Attention is now turning to
the 6th BWC review conference which is due to be held between
20 November and 8 December this year.
In April 2002, the Government initiated a dialogue
with parliamentarians and others under a Green Paper on the BWC
(Cm 5484). Subsequently, the Foreign Affairs Committee published
two reports on the Green Paper (HC l5O and HC 67l) and has also
commented on the BWC in its reports on foreign policy aspects
of the war against terrorism, most recently during its 2004-05
session (HC 36-I). In addition, the House of Lords European Union
Committee stated last year that there is to be a review conference
of BTWC parties in 2006, but it is unclear what might be achieved.
In our view, the search for new ways forward needs to be energetically
pursued. (HL Paper 96).
We believe that, with careful preparation and
with leadership from the UK, the 6th review conference can achieve
a successful outcome. To this end, we suggest that the Foreign
Affairs Committee continues its constructive role by undertaking
another inquiry into the BWC. The Committee should review the
achievements of the annual meetings and what needs to be done
by the Review Conference ideally reporting back before the 2006
summer recess. This would be a useful contribution to the UK Government's
preparations for the 6th review conference. Attached is a selection
of some issues we believe warrant parliamentary attention. We
stand ready to provide any assistance which you might require.
1972 BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
CONVENTION
Possible issues for parliamentary attention
In the years since the Government published
its Green Paper on the BWC (Cm 5484) (2002) and the Foreign Affairs
Committee (HC 150 and HC 671) conducted its inquiries (2002 and
2003), enough has changed to warrant renewed parliamentary attention
to the BWC. Scientific advances have continued apace, just recently
for example, the reconstruction in the laboratory of the extremely
virulent 1918 `Spanish Flu' has been announced. The spectre of
`bioterrorism' has alarmed governments and people around the world
and led to new legislation. While earlier concerns about biological
weapons programmes in Iraq and Libya have been allayed, concerns
remain about other countries and also about some `biodefence'
activities in the USA. In response, a number of new initiatives
have been adopted including UN Security Council resolution 1540
(2004), the Proliferation Security Initiative, the GB Global Partnership
against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction
and the Global Health Security initiative.
The states parties to the BWC have met annually
since 2003 to discuss the following five topics:
"(i) the adoption of necessary national
measures to implement the prohibitions set forth in the Convention,
including the enactment of penal legislation;
(ii) national mechanisms to establish and
maintain the security and oversight of pathogenic microorganisms
and toxins;
(iii) enhancing international capabilities
for responding to, investigating and mitigating the effects of
cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or suspicious
outbreaks of disease;
(iv) strengthening and broadening national
and international institutional efforts and existing mechanisms
for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious
diseases affecting humans, animals, and plants;
(v) the content promulgation, and adoption
of codes of conduct for scientists".
The UK has played an active role in each annual
meeting and Ambassador John Freeman chaired the 2005 meetings.
The 6th review conference will take place in November/December
2006, following a Preparatory Committee meeting in April. It is
essential that states parties carry out a comprehensive and effective
review of the treaty at the 2006 review conference, as this has
not been achieved since the 3rd review conference in 1991. (The
5th review conference (2001) could not even adopt a final declaration,
while the 4th review conference (1996) focussed on the negotiations
for the compliance protocol, which subsequently failed). Such
a review will contribute to a successful outcome of the 6th review
conference. A successful outcome is vital to avoid the risk that
the BWC may be seriously undermined at a time when biological
weapons are recognised as a growing threat to international security.
It is therefore imperative that constructive preparations and
consultations for this year's review conference begin as early
as possible.
Given the challenges faced by the BWC, new responses
to those challenges adopted by some states outside the treaty
regime, the voluminous information arising from the annual meetings
of states parties held during 2003-05 and the forthcoming 6th
review conference, we believe that an inquiry by the Foreign Affairs
Committee is timely. We suggest the following as possible areas
of inquiry for the Committee:
UK objectives for the 6th review conference
Does the Government expect a Final Declaration
that reaffirms and extends the extended understandings developed
at previous review conferences? What effective actions does the
Government wish to see emerge from the review conference?
Progress in UK priorities
To what extent has the Government achieved success
in the "five specific areas for immediate action" listed
in its Green Paper? How does the Government assess the results
of the annual meetings from 2003-05 and how would it like the
achievements from these meetings to be taken forward into the
review conference?
Compliance concerns
Given the collapse of negotiations on the BWC
protocol in 2001 and the improbability of resumed negotiations
in the foreseeable future, how does the Government intend to address
concerns which it has about compliance by other states parties?
How will it promote the need to strengthen and expand the UN Secretary-General's
investigation mechanism?
Scientific oversight
Given the rapid advances in the life sciences
and biotechnology, is reviewing the BWC every five years adequate?
Will the Government seek the establishment of a mechanism for
more frequent review of advances of science and technology relevant
to the Convention at the forthcoming review conference?
Linkages between the BWC and the 1993 Chemical
Weapons Convention
In view of the accelerating convergence of biology
and chemistry, will the Government be considering possible overlaps
between the 2006 6th BWC review and the 2008 2nd CWC review, which
is an opportunity for international action to which the Lemon-Relman
report on Globalization, Biosecurity and the Future of the
Life Sciences from the US National Academies has just drawn
attention? (The report can be viewed at http://fermat.nap.edu/books/O3091OO32l/html)
Addressing the institutional deficit
Given the success of the annual meetings of
experts and states parties under the BWC between 2003 and 2005,
will the Government support a further programme of annual meetings
following this year's review conference? What subjects would the
Government like to see such meetings consider? Will the Government
seek a wider mandate for future annual meetings so that effective
action can be agreed each year rather than deferring further consideration
until the 7th review conference? Would the Government support
the creation of a small BWC secretariat to undertake specific
tasks related to the implementation of the BWC?
Enhancing transparency
The Government recently placed the BWC confidence-building
measure returns made by the UK for 2003 and 2004 on the FCO website.
The UK therefore joins Australia and the USA as the only BWC states
parties to publish their returns in this way thereby enhancing
International transparency and confidence. In what way will the
Government be seeing a strengthening of the confidence-building
measures at next year's review conference?
The BWC in the UK's counter-proliferation strategy
Where does the BWC fit into the Government's
counter-proliferation strategy? What role does the Government
foresee for multilateral treaties such as the BWC? What is its
relationship to more recent measures such as UN Security Council
resolution 1540, the Proliferation Security initiative and activities
under the European Union's WMD strategy? Does the Government continue
to see a possible role for International criminal law in strengthening
the present array of constraints on acquisition and use of biological
weapons? And how does the Government see the BWC In relation to
public health activities such as the Global Health Security initiative
and the Word Health Organization's International Health Regulations
(2005)?
Daniel Feakes
Research Fellow, University of Sussex
On behalf of the following:
Mr Michael Crowley
Executive Director
Verification Research, Training and Information
Centre (VERTIC)
Dr Ian Davis
Executive Director
British American Security Information Council
(BASIC)
Professor Julian Perry Robinson
Professorial Fellow
University of Sussex
Ms Angela Woodward
Deputy Director
Chair, BioWeapons Prevention Project
Verification Research, Training and Information
Centre (VERTIC)
Professor Malcolm Dando
Professor of International Security
Department of Peace Studies
University of Bradford
Professor Graham S Pearson CB
Visiting Professor of International Security
Department of Peace Studies
University of Bradford
Mr Nicholas A Sims
Reader in International Relations
London School of Economics
February 2006
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