Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1-19)
RT HON
JACK STRAW
MP, AND DR
DAVID LANDSMAN
OBE
8 FEBRUARY 2006
Q1 Chairman: Good afternoon. Welcome.
Thank you for coming along at relatively short notice to see the
Committee. We appreciate that, we know you are very busy. Can
I begin by asking you whether you are absolutely sure that Iran
is seeking a nuclear weapons programme?
Mr Straw: No, I am not absolutely
sure. No-one is absolutely sure. Indeed, I have never suggested
that we are absolutely sure. What we are absolutely sure about
is that Iran failed to meet its very clear obligations under the
Non-Proliferation Treaty. That is not a matter of intelligence
or a dossier; it is a matter of fact. For 20 years they covered
up their nuclear fuel cycle programme; it was only exposed to
view when some dissidents leaked the information about it and
that was how the Government of Iran ended up before the IAEA Board
of Governors. What that showed when the details came out was that
Iran had been developing a programme to produce nuclear fuel on
a scale which is disproportionate to any known programme they
have for nuclear power stations. There is a separate issue about
whether a country which is sitting on such huge reserves of oil
has an economic interest in a nuclear power station but that is
a matter for them in the end because they have a clear right,
the same as any other signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty,
to have nuclear power stations if they wish. However, they have
very clear obligations not to develop the fuel cycle. That is
one element of suspicion, the fact they covered up the scale of
the programme, the fact that the only power station currently
being built is the one at Bushehr which relies on fuel exclusively
from Russia and none of this fuel will go to it. There are no
other nuclear power stations I am aware of under construction
the Iranians say, although some are at a planning stage. Secondly,
there has been research on polonium and plutonium. They were seeking
to develop a research heavy water reactor which produces plutonium,
not necessarily the best buy if you are generating electricity
but an essential buy if you are trying to make hydrogen bombs.
Then there is the fact that this manual from AQ Khan, which showed
how to produce depleted uranium hemispheres which have a use only
in hydrogen bombs and not in nuclear power generation, was unearthed
by the IAEA inspectors sometime in the autumn. So you add all
that up and it is a case to answer by Iran. Not least because
of the decision in September when the Board of Governors formally
found Iran in non-compliance, the international community said,
"The onus is now on you to disprove you are not using this
programme in order to produce nuclear weapons capability".
Q2 Chairman: But the Iranians say
other countries in their region bordering them have developed
nuclear weapons—India, Pakistan, Israel—and there
are other nuclear weapon states in the world. What would be so
difficult about Iran having nuclear weapons?
Mr Straw: They are right, of course,
India, Pakistan and Israel have nuclear weapons programmes. We
would wish them not to have those programmes. Those three countries
are the only countries of any significance which are not signatories
to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We continue a campaign for them
to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but that is a separate issue.
We have also called for and voted for resolutions in the General
Assembly of the United Nations for a nuclear-free Middle East
but my response to that is this: let us just deal with the Middle
East first of all. There used to be four potential nuclear weapon
states in the Middle East. In addition to Iran and Israel there
were Iraq and Libya. As a result of action taken by the international
community over a 10 year period, Iraq, which had a well developed
nuclear weapons programme, no longer has that programme. As a
result directly of UK and US intelligence and diplomacy, which
went on for many years covertly, and probably as a result of the
action we were firmly taking in respect of Iraq, the Libyan Government
agreed to abandon their nuclear weapons programme which was at
a greater stage of development and on a larger scale than we had
anticipated. They began to do that in December 2003 and the process
has continued. Of the four countries, we are down to two with
nuclear weapons potential in the Middle East. Iran has signed
up solemnly to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and as a non-nuclear
weapons state they have rights to develop nuclear power under
Article IV but they have obligations not to do anything in the
way in which they develop a nuclear power capability which could
lead to the development of a nuclear weapons capability. Let me
make this clear—I have made it clear time and time again—Iran
has every right to nuclear power stations. The regime is claiming
to their own people that what we are seeking to do is to stop
them developing nuclear power plants, which is palpably untrue.
As I pointed out to the Iranian media just this morning, Brazil
has nuclear power plants and a fuel cycle and no-one is seeking
to stop them because there is no question about Brazil's intentions
being other than for peaceful purposes. The problem about Iran
is its intentions. If you want to see a nuclear-free Middle East
and then in time get back to a situation where there are no nuclear
weapon states, you need to start in the Middle East. I say to
the Iranians, as I said to their media this morning, the worst
way of achieving peace and security in the Middle East is to have
Iran developing a nuclear weapon, or leading to that suspicion,
because that will then lead to other states in the region almost
certainly developing their own nuclear weapons. I cannot speak
for them but I offer this speculation: some of the larger Arab
states would not stand idly by for a second if they thought that
Iran was developing a nuclear weapon. If we are going to get to
a situation where we can effectively say to the Israelis, "Sign
the Non-Proliferation Treaty, become a non-nuclear weapons state",
then we have to remove the very profound risks which that country
faces to its very existence from Iran. Israel has run some controversial
policies but Israel has never threatened the existence of any
other state in the region. Israel has never said of Iran it wants
to wipe Iran off the face of the map; Iran, of course, has said
that of Israel.
Q3 Mr Hamilton: That is a good lead-in
to what I wanted to ask, Foreign Secretary. We have heard President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on many occasions say he wants to wipe Israel
from the face of the map or see Israel completely destroyed. Should
we not be far more worried than we seem to be about the prospect
of Iran's nuclear weapon being developed, especially in the light
of the fact that we know from media reports that they have the
delivery systems capable of delivering a nuclear warhead into
the heart of Israel?
Mr Straw: The whole world is worried
about this. I would not have spent more time and effort on the
Iran dossier than any other since the Iraq war were I not deeply
concerned about this threat and the threat that it poses to international
peace and security. Increasingly, there is a wide international
consensus which shares our opinions. The vote in the IAEA Board
of Governors on Saturday just gone should give the Iranian Government
very strong pause for thought because until last September the
votes were either unanimous, because they were kind of milk and
water resolutions, or in September we won a vote but with 22 out
of 35 with the rest abstaining, apart from Venezuela that voted
against, but we did not have any significant countries apart from
India from the Non-aligned Movement on board, nor Russia or China.
This vote, 27 out of 35, notwithstanding the fact it was a more
difficult composition, it had changed, had three against: Venezuela,
Cuba and Syria. A number abstained but the 27 who voted in favour
included India, China, Russia, Brazil, Sri Lanka, the Yemen and
Egypt. It was a tough resolution. Of course we are worried about
it, the question is what do we do about it. I think the strategy
we are adopting is the right one. I just repeat what we have is
a high level of suspicion, we do not have absolute proof and I
am conscious of the fact, not least because of the experience
in respect of Iraq, that we have to be very precise about what
we are claiming.
Q4 Mr Hamilton: Can I just move away
slightly from the nuclear issue but still concentrate on Iran's
desire to see the eradication of Israel. Do you have any evidence
that Iran is funding Hamas both with money and with arms that
are coming out of Iran to the Palestinian Territories? If so,
what are we doing about it?
Mr Straw: We have a well-founded
belief that Iran is funding Hezbollah and the Palestinian Islamic
Jihad and has strong connections with them. We believe they are
also funding Hamas as well although it appears that a good deal
of the funds for Hamas comes from around the Arab world.
Q5 Mr Hamilton: Hamas has the same
stated intention of destroying Israel.
Mr Straw: I understand that. Certainly
there is political support for Hamas and that is reflected also
in statements by President Ahmadinejad. Can I just say that one
of the problems of dealing with Iran is that this position which
President Ahmadinejad articulated in such a dreadful way is a
longstanding one of the post-revolutionary republic. At one of
my meetings with President Khatami, who genuinely was a moderate,
I said to him when he was talking about Israel that it would help
if, number one, they recognised the rest of the world thought
a two-state solution was appropriate and, number two, if he as
president of this republic ordered that the Shahab 2 missiles
should not have painted on their side in English "Death to
Israel" when they were paraded in the national parade each
year. I was received with a shrug.
Q6 Mr Hamilton: One final question.
In response to the controversy over the cartoons of the Prophet
Muhammad, the Iranians have said, and they repeated their views
about the Holocaust and Holocaust denial, we know about that,
not only are they going to publish cartoons in one of the newspapers,
or at least this newspaper is going to publish a cartoon which
makes fun of the Holocaust, and okay that is Iranian free speech
if you like, but I understand the Iranians are going to hold a
conference about whether the Holocaust ever happened or not. Is
there anything we can do about that or is that just a matter for
the Iranians to—
Mr Straw: I would encourage people
not to attend and to boycott it because it is a revolting idea.
It is as revolting an idea as if those who oppose the way Iran
behaves were to say that the million plus people who were killed
by the Iraqis during the war against Iran, in which Iran was the
unprovoked victim, were never killed. I think we have to put it
in language which most Iranians would readily sympathise with.
Q7 Sir John Stanley: Foreign Secretary,
the Sunday Times on 29 January began its extensive piece
on Iran's nuclear options as follows: "The drab compound
that houses the Iranian Embassy in Pyongyang is the focus of intense
scrutiny by diplomats and intelligence services who believe that
North Korea is negotiating to sell the Iranians plutonium from
its newly enlarged stockpile, a sale that would hand Tehran a
rapid route to the atomic bomb." Do you give any credence
to the reports that have been extensive that negotiations are
under way between Iran and North Korea for a plutonium transfer
between the two countries and, if so, what steps are the British
Government taking to try to ensure that does not happen?
Mr Straw: I have seen the reports
but there is no publicly available evidence to corroborate them.
Q8 Sir John Stanley: I would not
expect there to be much publicly available evidence. Do you give
the reports any credence, Foreign Secretary?
Mr Straw: Let us leave it there,
thank you.
Q9 Sir John Stanley: Can we be assured
in this Committee that the British Government and others are taking
all possible steps to ensure that such a transfer does not take
place?
Mr Straw: You can indeed. We are
alive to all reports of transfers of such material which are against
international conventions.
Q10 Mr Purchase: Foreign Secretary,
the balance of fear, mutual destruction, all those phrases were
used in the post-war period when Britain, America, France and
Russia held nuclear weapons as a matter of course. It was said
by many to have given us a peace in those years. Why would it
not do the same in the Middle East given that Israel already is
a nuclear power and Pakistan has been mentioned, India? Why not
Iran? We hear all the rhetoric I know.
Mr Straw: It is an important question
to answer. Let me offer you an answer. It is this: the more states
that have nuclear weapons and the less the behaviour of those
states is constrained by international laws and obligations, the
greater the likelihood is that there will be either by accident
or by design a nuclear war. If you were identifying countries
who fitted the category of being undesirable candidates to hold
nuclear weapons, Iran would be quite near the top of the list.
Let us be clear about this, if I may, Mr Purchase. While it is
easy to make points that the Permanent 5 have got nuclear weapons,
the Permanent 5 have nuclear weapons in historical circumstances
we all know about but by international agreement, and that was
the purpose of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. President Kennedy
and others said in the early 1960s that if the world carried on
this arms race it could by the turn of the century just gone,
end up with 20-30 countries with nuclear weapons and who knows
what would be the consequences. That was the political origin
of what became the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It was a deal between
the so-called nuclear weapon states, the P5, and all others by
which everybody agreed that there would be no more nuclear weapon
states. In return for that, the non-nuclear weapon states would
have this very clear right—it is not an unqualified right—to
develop nuclear power and in certain circumstances nuclear weapon
states would be able to ensure the availability of civil nuclear
technology to the non-nuclear weapon states. Meanwhile, the nuclear
weapon states were under an obligation to reduce their reliance
on nuclear weapons. We, in this country, have got a better record
than any of the other nuclear weapon states. We have reduced the
number of weapon systems from three to one. We were in the forefront
of trying to secure a constructive outcome to the Review Conference
which took place in May of last year. I regret that no such outcome
was possible but it was not for the want of trying by us. The
last point I would make is this: this time four years ago there
was a mobilisation on either side of the line of control in Kashmir
between India and Pakistan. Those two countries came very, very
close to nuclear war. I know because I was shuttling backwards
and forwards between Islamabad and Delhi at the time. Thankfully,
both of them backed away but what was shocking was that neither
had a developed nuclear doctrine. Neither had worked out clearly
the circumstances in which nuclear weapons could be deployed.
Neither knew properly the nature of fallout. Although, thanks
to statesmanship on both sides, they backed away from a conventional
war, an accident or a misjudgment could have happened and we would
not be sitting here with any kind of complacent suggestion that
you have the more the merrier. What I want to see is the fewer
the better and that is the purpose of our policy.
Q11 Mr Purchase: Thank you for that
because I also would like to see the fewer the better but the
International Strategic Studies organisation believes that Iran
could, in fact, become a nuclear power by the end of the decade.
Simultaneously we will probably be renewing our programme of Polaris.
Is it a bit awkward for you in diplomatic circles that these two
events seem to be happening simultaneously?
Mr Straw: No, it is not, as a
matter of fact. I will set out the context in which it is taking
place. What we want to see is a world where there are no nuclear
weapons but there is a very big difference between the highly
regulated circumstances in which the P5 hold their nuclear weapons
by agreement with all the other non-nuclear weapon states, and
states like North Korea or Iran which choose to misuse—these
are poor countries—their resources that serve no particular
strategic purposes we think to develop nuclear weapon systems.
It is not going to make the world a safer place. What will make
the world a safer place is the policy which we and to some degree
the other members of the P5 have been pursuing, which is a gradual
reduction in reliance on nuclear weapon systems. Mr Purchase,
what you are running into is the argument whether in the special
circumstances of P5 we should unilaterally disarm. I do not happen
to take that view. I do happen to believe that we should use every
effort to reduce the arsenals of all members of the P5 and we
do accept that.
Chairman: Can we get back to the process
that is going on now.
Q12 Mr Illsley: Foreign Secretary,
a few moments ago in response to my colleague you said the resolution
passed over the weekend was a tough resolution and it was the
right thing to do. In reality, do you really have any confidence
in the UN process which is underway in Iran at the present time
as a result of that?
Mr Straw: I do. First of all,
what I hope may happen is even at this stage it may encourage
the Iranian Government to recognise that their future lies in
the kind of path that we proposed to them and the previous administration
were following, and even they were proposing to follow as late
as December when they said to the Russians they were not going
to break the seals on their enrichment processes. Secondly, I
do not think anybody should underestimate the effect the authority
of the Security Council can have. The question I ask is if the
Security Council means nothing at all, why did the Iranian Government
go to huge lengths, astonishing lengths, to lobby every single
member of the Board of Governors they could find against this
resolution? Why did they imply to many of these states that they
would lose contracts in terms of oil? There were all sorts of
insinuations made in order that this matter could not get before
the Security Council. My answer to that is they are worried about
being isolated and being before the court of world opinion. The
last point I make on this is if you look at what has happened
with Syria following the passage of 1559 and 1595, Syria is an
incredibly difficult country to deal with, almost as difficult
as Iran, nothing else has been decided in those resolutions but
because of the pressure of Security Council resolutions Syria
has by stages had to come into compliance with those resolutions,
they have had to withdraw the whole of their army from the Lebanon,
they have had to comply and co-operate with the Investigatory
Commission and many other things. I do not ignore the authority
of the Security Council.
Q13 Mr Illsley: I hope that you are
right, but some Members of the Committee had a discussion a couple
of weeks ago with Mohammed ElBaradei about referral to the Security
Council and whether that was the right way to go. I know the resolution
was only to report. We had a discussion as to whether that would
be productive or counterproductive in that once it is referred
to the Security Council there is nowhere else to go other than
through sanctions or some other action. If you have confidence
in what is going on, why did the European Union ask ElBaradei
to report prior to the February meeting?
Mr Straw: Why?
Q14 Mr Illsley: Why did the European
Union ask him to produce a report in advance of the February meeting?
Was there any reason for that? He gave the impression that perhaps
the European Union wanted a more speedy process.
Mr Straw: We are a little impatient.
These negotiations started actively in October 2003, which was
a long time ago, and what is frustrating about it is that with
the previous administration we were getting close to a serious
long-term deal which was the one we proposed to the Government
of Iran in early August of last year. There was discussion with
Mohammed ElBaradei. Let me say that I know him well, I have got
the highest regard for him and I have talked to him in very great
detail about this, including two weeks ago before this process
of discussions took place, and also to Kofi Annan. In drafting
this resolution—it is ours, not his—we took account
of his views, which is why in operational paragraph two the DG
report required these steps of Iran to the Security Council and
in paragraph eight effectively we wait until the large board.
That was where we wanted to come out. That followed a late night
dinner that I chaired in Carlton Gardens two Mondays ago—it
was only a week ago, nine days ago, it seems like two years ago—with
the Permanent 5 members of the Security Council in Germany where
we agreed the approach reflected in this resolution.
Q15 Sandra Osborne: The resolution
is a strong resolution but it does fall short of formal referral
to the Security Council and obviously a consideration of sanctions,
but it does commit to continuing the diplomatic effort. If there
was a need to take stronger steps, how likely is it that there
would be an international consensus on that? Is it the case that
the international community is divided on what to do about Iran
and Iran is well aware of that?
Mr Straw: The Prime Minister said
yesterday, in answer to your Chairman, one step at a time, which
is a hymn which I also think of as wise advice. There are available
to the Security Council, as you will be aware, non-military sanctions
under Article 41 and everybody knows what those are and how they
have been used in the past. I do not want to anticipate decisions
that the Security Council might or might not make in respect of
sanctions except to say that it does not follow at all that just
because the matter is considered subject to a resolution in the
Security Council there have to be sanctions as well. What we have
sought to do in having this dossier is to follow a very careful
stage by stage approach. On the issue of a consensus, it is always
possible there will be disagreements in the Security Council but
I think they are unlikely for this reason: I do not believe the
Russian Federation, China and other members of the Security Council
would have voted for this resolution if when the matter got to
the Security Council Russia and China, for example, were going
to veto proposals that were put forward in a sensible way by France
and the United Kingdom as the European members of the Council.
I think the Iranians throughout this case have miscalculated the
reaction of the international community. One of the attractions
for them of the E3 process, of one country—Iran—negotiating
with three countries on the other side of the table, was that
they thought they could split the United Kingdom from France and
Germany. They have comprehensively failed to do that. I think
they then calculated that when push came to shove they would be
able to ensure that China and Russia remained detached from the
E3 and the United States. China and Russia showed on Saturday
that was simply not the case. It would be an error by Iran to
rely on divisions in the international community. The recent history
of this has been that the international community is becoming
more and more united. One of the things that have added to its
unity is a strong sense of revulsion at President Ahmadinejad's
remarks about the State of Israel, the Holocaust and much else.
Q16 Richard Younger-Ross: In resolving
any situation it is a matter of both pressure and patience. I
heard a Member of this House, sadly, who seemed to have very little
patience with the situation and was implying more rapid pressure
in another committee earlier today. Could you give us some outline
of the timescale in which decisions have to be made? Can you tell
us what your perception of the US position is in terms of that
timescale? Are they really tied into the idea that we need to
be patient on this matter in terms of resolving it? As I say,
governments come and governments go and the Government of Iran
may be there today but it may not be there tomorrow.
Mr Straw: I cannot give you an
exact timescale, it is not possible.
Q17 Richard Younger-Ross: Ballpark?
Mr Straw: I will have to be trite:
we are going to stick it out for as long as it takes. I was not
anticipating when Joschka Fischer, Dominique de Villepin and I
agreed this approach in the summer of 2003 that it would become
an even more active dossier getting on for three years later,
nor did anybody anticipate that the results of the General Election
in Iran last June would be the election of Mr Ahmadinejad who
was at that stage a rather obscure Mayor of Tehran. There is a
process but I think it would be unwise to put particular times
to it, except to say that Iran needs to understand that the international
community and the E3 will be preoccupied with this issue as long
as the suspicions about their programme remain where they are
and they have failed to provide the objective guarantees which
the Government of Iran promised they would provide that their
programme is solely for peaceful purposes. That is the first thing.
The second thing on the United States is that it is fair to say
the United States initially were sceptical about this E3 process.
They understood that in the aftermath of the Iraq war the architecture
of diplomacy of the E3 made sense but there was worry in the United
States—to go back to a previous point—that the Iranians
would pick off France and Germany from the United Kingdom. I am
happy to say that has not been the case from day one and the Iranians
understood that in the early key negotiations we had on 20 October
2003. Since then, I think it is fair to say, the United States
Government's confidence in the E3 process has increased. There
has been more and more active co-operation between the E3 and
the Government of the United States. This led to some key confidence
building measures being offered by the United States Government
through me in negotiations which took place in Geneva at the end
of May last year where we were quite close to the final stages
of a deal where we agreed to produce these proposals which could
easily have led to a deal had there not been a change of government.
The United States Government—Condoleezza Rice—authorised
me, subject to what the Iranians were doing in return, to make
two really important concessions by the United States. One was
that the US Government would lift its block on access by the Iranian
Government to World Trade Organisation negotiations. The second
was it would lift its block on access by the Iranians to American
spare parts for Iranian aircraft. One reason why Iranian aircraft
are amongst the most unsafe in the world is because they cannot
get access to these spare parts. The US was happy to co-operate
with that and also send out a message that a lot more could be
on offer in return for moves by the Government of Iran. Just to
repeat a point; Condoleezza Rice played a very important a part
in the dinner that I chaired nine days ago.
Q18 Mr Keetch: Foreign Secretary,
I think you should be congratulated sincerely for the work that
you did on the E3 because it demonstrates that Europe can work
together on a huge important issue in a very sensible way and
I am sure the support that we got in the IAEA was only because
of the work that the E3 had done in the run-up to that. Just developing
what my colleague was saying about the United States. You rightly
said that there have been some calls in the US for a different
approach. Do you feel now that the processes of the E3 and the
United States have converged together and we are on the same track,
as it were, in diplomacy? In terms of what President Bush said
in his State of the Union address, he specifically made the point
that he wanted his nation to be the closest of friends with "a
free and democratic Iran". Clearly Iran is not free and democratic
in the same way that the United States is, but do you actually
believe that President Ahmadinejad speaks for most of the Iranian
people when he wants to pursue this nuclear programme?
Mr Straw: First of all, thanks
for the congratulations, it was very nice of you. I said in the
House yesterday that one of the things I think has helped on this
issue is the fact that there is very broad backing, all-party
backing, to what we have been seen to do on this, and I will do
my best to ensure this continues. Secondly, it is a very good
illustration of operational European foreign policy. The fact
that it has been led by the three largest countries in the EU
has been an essential part of that. I should also say, however,
that Javier Solana, the High Representative on foreign policy,
has played an increasingly important role in this and so has his
staff. You asked whether we are completely knitted up with the
United States, yes and no is the answer. They have been very co-operative
and supportive. I cannot say what approach they would have adopted
if they had been negotiating but the truth is they could not have
been negotiating because they do not have diplomatic relations
with Iran. Their history with Iran is much more fractured than
is Europe's. It has been difficult in Europe, if you think of
the problems we have had and of the problems that Germany has
had particularly, but we have all had relations for quite a long
history. None of us have had the equivalent of the 444 day siege
which humiliated an American President, some say that led to his
demise, and all that has gone on since then. Nor do we in Europe
have the same kind of very vocal and vociferous Iranian Diaspora
that the American Government has to cope with. There is that difference.
On the question is Iran free and democratic, Iran is not free
and democratic by customary norms and this is not the occasion
to discuss this but their human rights record is lamentable and
we chart this in our annual Human Rights Report. Iran is a very
complicated society. It is replete with ambiguity, indeed their
literature celebrates ambiguity. Aspects of it appear to be democratic
and certainly responsive to public opinion, aspects of it are
very autocratic. One of our officials, who knows Iran very well,
described it as a pluralist theocracy with some pressure towards
democracy but some pressure away from it, and I think that is
probably the best way of describing it. Essentially what you have
got is a series of democratic institutions, including the presidency
and Majlis, the parliament, paralleled by a series of undemocratic
institutions which are appointed, which are the guardian council,
council of ecclesiastical experts, the supreme leader and this
expediency council which is there to negotiate in-between. For
the position of these undemocratic bodies read the position of
the divine right of kings before the glorious revolution in 1688
or the situation we would face where the Bishops in the House
of Lords had the power to overrule the elected House of Commons.
In that circumstance it would not be that the House of Commons
had no power but it would sometimes be frustrating. You asked
also whether President Ahmadinejad is articulating a widespread
desire by the Iranian people for a nuclear programme. He is when
it comes to a nuclear power programme. It would be an error by
everybody else if it was thought that it is unpopular in Iran
for Iranian governments not to have an aspiration of a nuclear
power programme, it is popular, and it is popular with opponents
of the regime as much as it is with supporters of the regime,
let us be clear about that. Of course, President Ahmadinejad is
playing on the suggestion—completely wrong—that we
are trying to stop Iran developing a civil nuclear power programme
because he is aware of that aspiration. If I may detain the Committee
for a moment, Chairman, you have got to understand how isolated
Iran feels in that Iran is not an Arab state, it may be Muslim
but just as in Europe there were religious wars between Catholics
and Protestants, and one in our country over decades, centuries,
so the fact they are Muslim does not mean that they have been
immune from conflict between these states, internal conflicts
over many decades, not least the Iran-Iraq war. Secondly, Iran
feels over the last 100 years it has been humiliated by great
powers, by the United Kingdom. There was this constitutional revolution
in 1906 and in 1908 we came along backing the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company and ensured that we got the lion's share of oil revenues
and that went on for decades. We supported the Shah in what amounted
to a takeover of that country and did not do anything when he
implemented very crude anti-Islamic policies, including making
it a criminal offence for women to wear even the hijab, the headscarf,
on the street. We and the Soviet Union occupied the country for
five years in the north from 1941-46 and then elements of British
intelligence and the CIA stopped a perfectly democratic prime
minister, Mossadeq, from office and failed to see the signs of
the decadence of the Shah's regime and many Western countries,
actually less so the United Kingdom and some continental countries,
actively supported Iran in the Iran-Iraq war. You have got to
see it from their point of view and if we do not see it from their
point of view as well we will make mistakes in the way we handle
this. As to whether there is widespread support for a nuclear
weapon programme, that we do not know because the Iranian Government
consistently say that they do not want it and have no intention
of having a nuclear weapon programme.
Q19 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: Is it a consequence
of the Iraq war that it sends out the message, "if you want
to behave badly internationally first get your nuclear weapon"?
Mr Straw: Of the Iraq war, certainly
not.
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