Examination of Witnesses (Questions 200-219)
RT HON
JACK STRAW
MP, MR DAVID
RICHMOND CMG AND
DR PETER
GOODERHAM
15 MARCH 2006
Q200 Mr Hamilton: Do you think that reference
to the Security Council and the possibility of sanctions will
make any difference to the aims and ambitions of the current regime
in Iran?
Mr Straw: Over time, yes. I am
quite clear that we have no alternative but to refer the dossier
to the Security Council, and in doing so to reinforce the authority
of the IAEA. Of course there are questions of, would this lead
to the Iranians doing what they threatened to do, which is to
resume suspension? They did not have to do that. We offered them
endless opportunities to re-suspend enrichment-related activities
in a way which was consistent with their national dignity, but
we did not achieve that. What we are seeking to do here are two
things: first is to bring Iran into compliance with the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, and secondly to preserve and sustain the integrity of
the whole non-proliferation regime. That is why we have had to
go to the Security Council.
Q201 Mr Hamilton: What chance do
you think there is that Iran might, in a fit of pique if you like,
in reaction to being referred to the Security Council, withdraw
from the Non-Proliferation Treaty?
Mr Straw: I think those chances
are limited, although (as ever with Iranian spokespeople) you
can usually find some quotation which fits with the particular
sentiment. But overall—and I have some quotation somewhere
here—they have recognised it would be very unwise to withdraw
from the Non-Proliferation Treaty because, after all, if they
were to do that it would seem to confirm everybody's suspicions.
Mr Hamilton: Precisely. Thank you.
Q202 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: If Iran
did agree to safeguards and to keep its fuel cycle within what
is permitted for a civil nuclear programme without going over
the line to a nuclear weapons capability, and this was verified
and monitored by the IAEA, would that satisfy you?
Mr Straw: We have never said to
the Iranians that we think Iran should be banned for ever from
running a fuel cycle. What we have said to them is that their
right to run it should be suspended until there are what we described
as "objective guarantees" that it had a peaceful purpose,
and we were talking there for some years but not forever at all.
We were reinforced in that judgment by the fact that Iran only
has one nuclear power station under construction, the one at Bushehr,
and that has been under construction for 25 years plus, a very
long time. All the fuel for the next 10 years, the first 10 years
of its operation, will come from the Russians by contract and
the Russians have offered to supply fuel for the remaining life
of the power station, which I guess will be another 20 years or
so. Even if the Iranians make a credible argument that they want
to ensure their own supply, they would have no need for fuel for
a good 10 years. What we have been seeking to do, working closely
with the Russians, was to ensure that there were other ways in
which Iran could be guaranteed a fuel supply whilst the international
community had its confidence built up that Iran was not seeking
to use its fuel cycle for military purposes. That includes the
Russian offer. It also could tie in with proposals which separately
Dr ElBaradei and the American Government have made for international
guarantees to countries which are members of the NPT who do not
want to develop their own fuel cycles. All of that could be achieved.
What I may say I am against, and we in the E3 are against, is
Iran for the time being going in for what has been called "research
and development" on enrichment. It is because it is not actually
research and development. The research is available on the internet
as to how you enrich uranium, that has all been done years ago.
This is essentially a practice and you start with 20 or so centrifuges
and have a practice and then once you iron out those problems
you then move up to 200, and we are objecting to that because
it would lead from small-scale to large-scale enrichment in conditions
in which we could not be satisfied about the ultimate end use.
Q203 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: If you were
satisfied you would permit a civil programme in Iran and you do
not share, therefore, the American concern that this would simply
be a precursor to a nuclear weapons programme which we would not
be able to stop because they would have the capability?
Mr Straw: The Non-Proliferation
Treaty allows non-nuclear weapon states access to and the use
of nuclear technology and, in principle, that includes the fuel
cycle, provided the exercise of those rights under Article 4 of
the NPT do not conflict with the obligations under Article 2 not
to do anything which could lead to a nuclear weapons capability.
Iran is in a jam at the moment because the international community
has judged that they are, indeed, in potential breach of their
obligations under Article 2 and the only way they can deal with
that breach is by having their fuel cycle activity suspended for
a period. It has to be a period of years because we are talking
here of technologies which take some time to develop. Down the
track, we accepted in the proposals we made last August that in
due course—and, as I say, we may be talking five to 10 years
here—if Iran provided those objective guarantees to the
international community, it would indeed be able to resume or
start the fuel cycle. For the reasons I have explained, this would
not inconvenience their programme for regeneration of electricity
by nuclear power.
Q204 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: If the worst
happens and Iran does step over the line and develops a nuclear
weapons programme, you have ruled out the use of force in any
circumstances. In a meeting which this Committee had in New York,
a difference was noted between your position and that of the Prime
Minister, who has not been explicit in ruling out force. Can you
explain your exact position on this without, please, resorting
to the cliché that it is not on the agenda. We know it
has not been planned, but I just want to get from you your view
as to whether there are any circumstances in which force might
not be necessary against a nuclear armed Iran?
Mr Straw: The circumstances in
which force might be necessary against any country are those in
which the country concerned offers up a casus belli to
countries which may be the victims of aggression under Article
51 of the UN Charter; everybody knows that. When I said it is
inconceivable, certainly I do not conceive that those circumstances
will arise in respect of the United Kingdom; nor do I believe
that because there is a problem here—and there is a problem—the
way forward for this is either by contemplating or threatening
military action. As I have said, it is a serious situation, but
there are plenty of other serious situations. There is a serious
situation between Syria and the Lebanon and just because a situation
is serious it does not follow that the way to resolve the situation
is by either the threat of force or the use of force, and I do
not judge it to be appropriate. Of course, if there is no casus
belli, there could be no legal base for the use of force in
any event. We are bound to be asked this question, Mr Heathcoat-Amory,
not least because of the recent history in respect of Iraq, and
I understand that. If Iraq had not happened, I think people would
be a lot more relaxed about asking to some extent theoretical
questions about this, but I am happy to answer them and to explain
the British Government's position. If Iran attacked another country,
if it was to attack us or we were facing a clear threat then a
right of self-defence arises and nothing I have said contradicts
that. In the absence of that—and I do not conceive that
to be possible or likely—then I think this is something
which has to be resolved by all sorts of means of pressure on
the Iranian Government, but I do not think the military action
has a purpose in that, which is why it is not on the agenda. That
is not a cliché, it is absolutely true, it is not on the
agenda.
Q205 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: It is not
consistent with what we did in Iraq. We were not attacked by Iraq.
The doctrine has altered. We used military action, and have recently,
against countries before they attack other countries. Are you
ruling this out in the case of Iran?
Mr Straw: With great respect,
so far as Iraq is concerned, I know that this is controversial
and it has been discussed often enough in this Committee, Iran
is not Iraq. We have a problem with Iran, but in respect of Iraq,
just to remind you, Iraq had launched missile attacks on five
of its neighbours; it had invaded two of its neighbours and it
had had a nuclear weapons programme. It was not a matter of speculation,
it had one. It had had a chemical weapons programme and had used
chemical weapons. It had had a biological weapons programme. Moreover,
because of its actions, it was the subject of about a dozen or
more Chapter 7 resolutions, at least two of which authorised the
international community to use all necessary means, for example
military action, to deal with the threat. That is a very different
circumstance from where we are with Iran, and if you can anticipate
a circumstance in which we end up with a Chapter 7 resolution
authorising all necessary means against Iran, well, that is fine,
but that is beyond my imagination.
Q206 Andrew Mackinlay: In your parliamentary
replies yesterday, the FCO question time, you alluded at one stage
to Iran being either promoters of terrorism or terrorism emanating
from Iran. I wonder if you can elaborate on that, because I think
that is a very material point and you said that at the Despatch
Box—I think it was lost in the context of other things—but
I really would like to hear you on this.
Mr Straw: They are active supporters
and funders of Hezbollah which, as it happens, I banned as a terrorist
organisation in this country. They are also known to give support
to other rejectionist terrorist groups operating out of the Occupied
Territories against Israel and if you talk to them they have a
very equivocal view of terrorism. On the one hand, as they demanded
of me as Home Secretary, they object thoroughly to any terrorism
taking place within Iran and asked the international community
to ban the MEK organisation, which I may say I did, at the request
of the late Robin Cook, and Robin was right to ask me to do so.
Q207 Andrew Mackinlay: Which we have
discussed before.
Mr Straw: Yes. On the other hand,
they are supporters of Hezbollah and of other rejectionist terrorist
organisations, and funders of them.
Q208 Andrew Mackinlay: Is there any
evidence of them either directly or indirectly bringing terrorism
to Western Europe?
Mr Straw: There have been incidents
in the past, including the incident in Germany—I think it
was a murder attempt but I will have to get you some details of
that—but not recently, is the answer.
Q209 Andrew Mackinlay: Okay, if you
could let us have that.[2]
The other thing is that in reply to Mr Heathcoat-Amory you referred
to Lebanon and Syria, and I think one ought to fully realise around
the world and in that region there is a number of hot spots, but
in terms of a league table of gravity this must surely be one
of the most serious international crises since the fall of the
Berlin Wall.
Mr Straw: Which one, the Syria
and Lebanon one?
Q210 Andrew Mackinlay: No, I meant
in relation to Iran developing nuclear weapons, where we are at.
You legitimately pointed and referred to Syria and the Lebanon
saying that there are other things going on, point taken, but
I am saying this stands out in the sense of gravity as enormous.
Just to complete this, because I want to put it to you, whilst
I agree with you, and I think most people here would, that military
intervention is not an option which could either be justified
or would be prudent, the clock is ticking because even the most
moderate Israeli Government would probably take a different view.
Firstly, I wanted to put that to you, and the final part of this
is to say, therefore, are we sending the right signals robustly
and swiftly enough? The programme of sanctions would you support?
Is there preparatory work being done as to what could be targeted
sanctions? Ought we not to indicate that to Iran? Indeed this
very afternoon, is there not a case for you stating, "These
are the consequences," in order to avoid not military conflict
even between the United States but between Israel and Iran?
Mr Straw: The situation is serious,
I do not want to put it in relative scale, but I have to say—and
it is very important that I emphasise this—the evidence
of Iran's intentions is circumstantial; it is not conclusive.
If it becomes conclusive, I will tell Parliament and tell this
Committee, but it is not conclusive at the moment. It is my working
assumption, too, and it is everybody else's that I know internationally,
but I am very conscious of the fact that misjudgments have been
made in the past and it is extremely important that we do not
make them for the future. That is the first point. Secondly, what
the Security Council is willing to do depends on achieving a consensus
from the Security Council, so I honestly do not think there is
a lot of point speculating about measures not under Article 51
but under Article 41, which are the non-military measures in the
Charter, in the absence of a clear consensus. I did say, and I
have said this two or three times in recent days, to Iran that
at each stage they have made a calculation that if they are obdurate
they can split the international community and at each stage actually
they have had the opposite effect. So it is a good idea for them
not to miscalculate.
Q211 Ms Stuart: I read an article
at the weekend which is 20 years old which was written by Jean
Kirkpatrick and she made an analysis where she thought the Carter
administration went wrong over Iran. She thought the fundamental
flaw was an assumption that the people were different from their
leader, that what needed to be done in order to resolve the problem
was to separate the people from their leader, and that all you
needed to do was remove the leader and democracy would sprout
naturally. Are we not making the same mistake?
Mr Straw: I do not think so, is
the answer. I understand the point you are making very clearly
and it is naive to assume that just because the election process
was flawed that President Ahmadinejad does not have some popular
resonance for some of the positions he is striking. I certainly
myself volunteered the fact that in the short term the position
adopted by the Ahmadinejad government in respect of the nuclear
dossier is more likely to be popular than unpopular. Indeed when
they interviewed me yesterday on Iranian television about this
I acknowledged that across the political spectrum this is seen
very much as a nationalistic issue. Some in Iran also say, "Why
shouldn't we have nuclear weapons? If we'd had nuclear weapons,
it's unlikely that Saddam would have invaded in the way that he
did," so I understand that. What I hope we have been able
to achieve, not least because we have maintained diplomatic relations
with Iran all the way through this period, is a much subtler appreciation
of what is going on in Iran. Certainly I sought to do that myself
by talking a lot to Iranians and by reading a great deal about
its history, trying to understand why they have this very powerful
sense of national dignity and a willing determination not to be
humiliated, how they feel as part of their psyche, as much as
their political history, that they have been pushed around for
too long by great powers, which includes the United Kingdom, the
Soviet Union, Russia, and the United States particularly. I understand
that. Also, the fact that the Shia religion or denomination is
as much about Iranian nationalism as it is about Islam; the one
gets completely subsumed into the other. I hope we have got a
more subtle appreciation of the situation as well as of the flaws
of what is presented as a democracy but, as one of our officials
said, is a theocracy with some tendencies towards aspects of democracy.
Q212 Ms Stuart: Given what you have
just said and given that when we were in the United States some
people suggested that Iran could quite easily withstand sanctions
for five, 10, 15 years economically, what kinds of sanctions would
work, which would have an impact on the public opinion in Iran?
Mr Straw: For similar reasons
which I offered to Mr Mackinlay, if you will excuse me, I do not
want to get into speculating about different measures. What I
would say, however, Ms Stuart, is that the Iranian Government
has already imposed sanctions itself. The position it has adopted
internationally, which is to defy the International Atomic Energy
Agency, has not been without a cost to them. That is already happening.
You have got a significant drop in the Tehran Stock Exchange when
others around the world over the same period have gone up, you
have got a flight of people out of Iran, young people leaving
the country, and it is a big, big problem to the Iranian Government
to find three-quarters of a million new jobs each year. Having
the oil price at $60 a barrel helps them, for sure, for the time
being, but it does not deal with some of the endemic economic
and social problems which they face. They will get worse as long
as they are isolated. They could easily get much better if they
came in from the cold.
Q213 Mr Purchase: Given that non-proliferation
has at least slowed down the spread of the access to nuclear weapons,
but that the world has changed and that communication, globalisation
and all those other matters which we have become familiar with
now make it absolutely possible for as many nations as want to
develop, capture or, in fact, buy one way or another nuclear devices,
in this new situation it may not be possible to capture what is
going on in a new Non-Proliferation Treaty unless we first accept
that we may have to live with the idea that as many nations as
wish to have nuclear devices can have them, but under a new regime
and under a new method of monitoring all of this is going on.
In the short-term, it seems inevitable to me that people will
proceed down this track. Will Britain and the UN live with the
idea that Iran (and maybe others following quickly behind) will
have nuclear weapons? What will we do?
Mr Straw: I accept the statement
at the beginning of your question that the non-proliferation regime
has slowed down proliferation very significantly.
Q214 Mr Purchase: It has been absolutely
tremendous.
Mr Straw: It has been. President
Kennedy suggested in the early 60s that there could be, I think
the figure was, 25 to 30 nuclear weapon states just by the end
of the 1970s. Thirty years after that, it is either eight or nine,
according to whether you judge that North Korea has got a weapon.
Q215 Mr Purchase: It is a huge achievement.
Mr Straw: It is a huge achievement.
I remain optimistic about this. I think we are doing the right
things in terms of enforcing the non-proliferation regime. To
those who say, "Well, we should put military action on the
table, or we should do other things," I simply say, "If
you have got a better strategy, let's see it." I am not saying
that there is no alternative, I am just saying that if there is
a better strategy, I have not seen it, and it is about managing
the situation and raising the price to Iran of having a nuclear
weapon system if indeed that is their intention and purpose. Right
at the beginning of this discussion, Mr Purchase, I said that
there were two purposes in pursuing this: one was to deal with
Iran, the other was to maintain the integrity of the non-proliferation
system, and I think we have to be relentless in getting Iran into
compliance not only in respect of Iran but also pour encourager
les autres to ensure that others do not go down that path.
What has happened in recent years has been good rather than bad.
Two states, Iraq and Libya, had nuclear weapons programmes; they
do not any more. Going back a further distance, South Africa had
nuclear weapons; they do not any more. That is good news rather
than bad.
Q216 Mr Purchase: In this scenario,
what do you make of President Bush's visit to India and Pakistan
to virtually welcome them into the club?
Mr Straw: What I make of it is
that it is an effort by the Government of the United States to
bring the non-proliferation regime to a country which up to now
has refused to sign up to it. There are three countries which
refused to sign up to the NPT. They have all acquired nuclear
weapon systems, Israel, Pakistan and India. Then we are left with
the issue that we cannot accuse them of not meeting their obligations
because they did not sign up to these obligations in the first
place.
Q217 Mr Purchase: So it is okay?
Once you have got it, you can sign up, that is great?
Mr Straw: No, no, it is not okay,
but it happens to be the case that once you have got it, it is
much more difficult to deal with, which is why we are trying to
deal with Iran at this stage. That is just a reality everybody
understands. It is not okay. The United Kingdom was co-sponsor
of a Security Council resolution (I think under the Conservative
government) calling on India and Pakistan to give up on their
nuclear weapons ambitions. So it is not okay at all, but it is
a reality which we have got to deal with. You either become blind
to this situation or you take active steps to bring the country
concerned into a non-proliferation regime, and that is what the
United States is seeking to do.
Q218 Chairman: If I could just take
you back to the answer you gave to Gisela Stuart. On Monday you
gave a very interesting speech at the International Institute
of Strategic Studies, in which you seem to be calling for international
communication, dialogue with the Iranian people, to give them
a sense that the world was not against the Iranian people. Do
you think it would be very helpful if the United States was to
adopt that approach? I remember watching this television programme
the other day about their closed embassy for the last 25 years.
American diplomats whom we met when we were in Washington said
to us, "Well, we don't have any real close contact. We don't
have people there. You know more about Iran than we do."
Is there not a case for the US giving the Iranians what they really
want, which is a sense of security guarantee that they will not
be threatened, and thereby taking away one of the motivating factors
of why Iran is going down this route of its nuclear programme?
Mr Straw: It would be much better
if there were diplomatic relations and just closer relations altogether
between the United States and Iran. The United States has put
out quite a number of olive branches in that respect, which the
Iranians these days seem to forget, but maybe I could enunciate
them. Under what was called the Tehran Agreement, the October
2003 one, and the Paris Agreement of November 2004, we entered
into detailed negotiations with the Iranians and last May, just
10 months ago, in Geneva, in return for Iran agreeing to continue
the suspension of uranium enrichment related activities the American
Government authorised me to say that the American Government would
lift the block on access by Iran to World Trade Organisation negotiations
and also lift the ban on the export of spare parts for aircraft,
which may sound a trivial issue but which is fundamental to them
with the bad safety record of Iranian aircraft. In the proposals
we put forward in August of last year there were hints and suggestions
about security guarantees and discussions about this. So there
was a big agenda there. It is just, in my view, tragic that our
timing (which we had agreed with the Iranians) coincided with
the transfer of power from the Khatami regime to the Ahmadinejad
regime and they have taken a very different and harder line. The
American Government will have to speak for itself, but presumably
if the conditions were right it is in its interests to resume
diplomatic relations. I have to say there is a lot of institutional
hostility to the United States in Iran, as you may have noticed.
Q219 Chairman: Finally, before we
move on to another area, can I take it then that you will be sympathetic
to funding the Farsi BBC World Service television station if that
proposal came forward as a way to engage with the population of
Iran?
Mr Straw: The BBC is doing some
work for us at the moment on scoping this. I am sympathetic to
funding it, in fact I would be delighted to fund it. The only
difficulty is I do not have the cheque book, which is held in
the Treasury under arrangements which we have in the British Government.
Mr Purchase: You speak as though it is
a foreign power, the British Government!
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