Examination of Witnesses (Questions 220-239)
RT HON
JACK STRAW
MP, MR DAVID
RICHMOND CMG AND
DR PETER
GOODERHAM
15 MARCH 2006
Q220 Mr Keetch: The Treasury, I think,
is the foreign power, not the British Government!
Mr Straw: We have some diplomatic
relations with the Treasury!
Chairman: We were going to move on to
Iraq, but a quick question on Afghanistan first.
Q221 Sir John Stanley: Thank you
very much, Foreign Secretary, and thank you colleagues. I have
a Westminster Hall debate, so I am grateful to you for taking
me out of order, Chairman. Foreign Secretary, yesterday The
Independent carried a report of evidence given by the Director
of the US Defence Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Michael
Maples, and he was giving evidence to the Senate Armed Forces
Committee in Washington. He expressed the view that the Taliban
and their allies were at their most powerful since the official
end of the war five years ago. It goes on to say that he and other
US and British commanders expect a major Taliban offensive starting
in the spring. That view very much accords with a very wide range
of reports which have appeared in the British press from independent
journalists out in Afghanistan, who have been reporting the rise
in Taliban militancy and insurgency, sadly but characteristically
directed against the education system, with schools being told
that if they do not close their doors to girls reprisals will
follow, reports of the beheading of teachers where those intimidatory
instructions have not been followed, and also taking the position
that the only appropriate education for boys is in the Madrasses.
I think many would agree that one of the big problems and mistakes
perhaps which we made in Iraq is that we never had enough security
forces on the ground to provide adequate security for the Iraqi
civilian population. The question I must put to you is, are we
about to repeat the same mistake in Afghanistan of simply not
having sufficient security forces there, our own and Afghan trained
forces, to be able to cope with the degree of tide of militancy
and ruthless activities which show alarming signs of growing now
in Afghanistan?
Mr Straw: I do not think so, is
the answer. A great deal of work has gone on in a different environment
as well in Afghanistan. This is not an invasion to remove a government;
it is done with the full compliance of the legitimate and elected
Karzai Government. Decisions about the exact numbers of troops
have to be made by the Defence Secretary on the advice of the
Chief of Defence Staff and not by me, but obviously I have discussed
it with John Reid at some length and I think he is satisfied—and
he spelt this out to the House in a statement he made just six
weeks ago on 26 January—about his assessment that these
troops would be there in sufficient number, aside from anything
else to ensure their own protection. So I think we have made the
right judgment and a huge amount of careful work has gone into
this. This, of course, is part of the ISAF[3]
stage 3 process with other international partners.
Q222 Sir John Stanley: Do you agree with
the view that there is now a clear rising tide of Taliban militancy,
and indeed terrorism, which is taking place in Afghanistan at
this moment?
Mr Straw: The Taliban threat is
certainly at least as severe as at any stage since the original
removal of the Taliban four years ago. I cannot say exactly whether
it is worse than at any other period. I do not know whether my
two colleagues want to offer their two penn'orth. Let me say that
it is serious and that is understood, and it is serious down in
the Helmand province. It is one of the reasons we are going down
there, because if we want to try and establish the writ of the
elected government and deal with the drugs problem, we have to
deal with the Taliban.
Chairman: Thank you very much. If we
have got time, we will come back to Afghanistan later, but I will
take Paul Keetch now on Iraq, because I am conscious we want to
cover a number of areas.
Q223 Mr Keetch: Foreign Secretary,
you are hearing about some of our travels today and we actually
went to Iraq, or some of us went to Iraq, in January and for those
of us who had been before (and most of us had) we found it a depressing
experience for a number of reasons. The security situation has
clearly declined, and other things. There are a number of positive
aspects, of course. The election turnout was huge, more than we
had in our own General Election. The politicians and the President
we met, and the people clearly are committed to their own country
and are very, very talented individuals, but really life for the
average Iraqi on the ground in many respects is worse now than
it was three years ago. That is certainly the view of some of
the religious leaders we met in Basra. Organised crime is rampant,
smuggling is an epidemic, kidnap and ransom are major industries,
and undoubtedly there is a feeling that we have not delivered
on reconstruction in a way that we would have liked to, partly
because of corruption, partly because of the security situation.
What concerned us most, though, was that we had great optimism
that the new government might be formed soon and yet in the course
of the two months that we have been away there does not appear
to have been much progress on the formation of that government.
Could you tell us when you think that government will be formed,
because quite clearly there are very talented, very able Iraqi
politicians and until they have a government the people on the
ground, the ordinary Iraqis, I do not believe will start to see
some of the infrastructure changes and some of the day to day
improvements that quite clearly they need to see before we can
see a result?
Mr Straw: I spoke to President
Talabani just before I came over for this evidence session. He
was actually being quite upbeat about the current situation and
the possibility of reaching agreement over the Prime Minister.
That has been the key blocker in recent weeks. He has called a
meeting of the Council of Representatives. It was going to be
on the 12th, it was then moved to the 19th, and it is now, I think,
back to the 16th, which is tomorrow. It was not so clear, because
the line was so bad, whether it was definite. Both myself and
my Private Secretary were listening, and it literally was not
clear, because the line was bad, whether it was definitely going
ahead tomorrow, but he was, as I say, bullish about the prospects.
Let me say that I share your frustration. I have been there three
times since November. The last time I was there was three weeks
ago and I was there on the Monday and Tuesday of the week when
on the Wednesday there was the attack on the Holy Shrine in Samarra.
As I left, the word that was ringing in my ears was "optimistic",
because that was the adjective used by one of the Sunni leaders
with whom I had had a pretty intensive relationship, but going
back to last year quite a difficult relationship when I first
started to get to know him but gradually it warmed up, and I was
one of those who encouraged him and his party to take part in
the elections. So he was saying, to my astonishment, to be honest,
"I am optimistic about the future." He then had this
attack on Samarra and I think there have been 500 deaths since
then. It has been terrible, a very determined effort by the terrorists
to sabotage the democratic process. But they are extraordinarily
resilient, the Iraqis, which is great. The vast majority of people
in the country are showing faith in democracy. The only problem
is that they do have this tendency to do things at the last minute
and certainly for us in the British system, where we are used
to governments being formed in the space of 24 or 48 hours, it
is very odd. Anyway, we have got to stick with it. Of course,
I agree with you that it is this vacuum in terms of governance
which is certainly making much else in the country more difficult.
Q224 Mr Keetch: We also discovered
what we perceived to be a slight difference in approach by the
British and the American authorities in relation to the Iraqis
who are held without trial or process, some 14,000 I think held
in the US sector but just 40 in the British sector. Is there a
difference of approach, and can we try and persuade our American
coalition partners that if they were able to process these individuals
as speedily and quickly as we appear to be able to do, that actually
again would give more faith to the Iraqi people that this is not
an army of occupation but actually an army which is there for
their good?
Mr Straw: There is obviously a
quantitative difference; the Americans have 14,000 in detention
and we have 40 or so. The security situations are very different,
of course. I have not got a confessional breakdown of the 14,000,
but I think it is highly probable that most of those would be
people who are of the Sunni confessional grouping rather than
Shia; not all of them, but most of them. It is also the case that
the Americans are responsible for security in the Baghdad area,
where the bulk of the terrorism arises. It is hardly secret that
there is a difference of approach, partly because their circumstances
are different. There are discussions taking place at the moment
between the Americans and the Iraqis about the future of these
detainees but, Mr Keetch, it should not be assumed that there
is unanimity amongst either Iraqi politicians, or amongst the
Iraqi public, about whether these people should be released. There
are vocal calls always by some groups for the release of some
detainees, but alongside that there will be very strong demands
by other groups who may have been the victims of terrorism by
a particular faction for these people to stay locked up.
Q225 Mr Keetch: Very swiftly, a different
subject. We were also astonished at the large number of private
security operations which are going on out there.
Mr Straw: Do you mean overseas
funded or—
Q226 Mr Keetch: No, I mean private
security staff protecting the British Embassy, protecting British
staff, et cetera, many of whom seem to be coming from my constituency,
I have to say. You actually promised in a White Paper some time
ago new legislation on the way in which private security companies
are organised and the way in which they are dealt with. That has
not been forthcoming, yet we are relying upon these individuals
day in, day out, not just in Iraq but in Afghanistan and other
places. When are we likely to see such legislation?
Mr Straw: I am glad you reminded
me of this. I will pass on to business managers and others, should
the Committee wish it, the concern of your Committee because I,
too, wish to see legislation in hand and I have been working on
this for the last two weeks. There is a discussion going on about
the precise architecture for control. I frankly do not think this
is too difficult an issue, because under the Security Industries
Act (which I may say was mine when I was Home Secretary) there
is the Security Industries Authority which has now got experience
of regulating security cameras operating within the UK. Certainly
my proposal is to have the same body do the regulation of British
companies operating overseas, and indeed some of the ones who
operate domestically also operate overseas and that is essentially
to determine whether the companies are fit and proper people to
operate. Then there is the issue of whether you license individual
activities. You can do that, I think, at another adjunct to the
arms control arrangements. So I do not think it is a difficult
administrative or intellectual challenge, but as ever there is
always a queue. So if the Committee wishes to say something on
this, I would be happy to receive it, as I am of all the recommendations
of the Committee, I must say.
Q227 Chairman: Can I take you back
to the impressions we got during our visit in January? I think
four of us here were on that visit.
Mr Straw: Who was it who visited,
Mr Gapes?
Q228 Chairman: Mr Keetch, Mr Pope,
Mr Illsley, myself and two others who are not with us today. I
want to ask about Basra. I have been to Basra three times now
and I am quite worried about the change in the mood. While we
were there in January there was a problem relating to incidents
whereby some people had been arrested and the Governor had basically
broken off contact. We did, however, meet members of the Provincial
Council and we met people from both the Sunni and Shia religious
leaders. The message we got at that time was, "It's okay.
There are particular problems with the Governor, but other people
are engaged. The process is a bit difficult, but nevertheless
it will be solved." Then a few days later all contact was
broken off and the Provincial Council was also in a similar position.
Can you update us? Where are we now compared with January? Has
the situation improved since we were there in January, or has
it got worse, and what is now the feeling amongst our people in
Basra about the local community and its attitude towards the British
presence in Basra?
Mr Straw: Kim Howells was there
last week, three days ago, and he met the Governor, so I do not
think the situation has got worse. It is a complicated situation.
Part of the problem with the Provincial Council has been in respect
of the detainees, because although the number of detainees which
we hold is only 40, some of these people are quite significant.
I did not go to Basra on this last occasion, but when I was there
in January I was lobbied by the Governor for the release of some
of these individuals, so it is complicated. What has got worse,
certainly compared with two or three years ago, is the overall
security situation, so it is more difficult for our staff to travel
around and that is a matter of great regret.
Mr Richmond: I think the visit
of Dr Howells has helped considerably, and I think there are signs
that we are now getting back to normal in terms of the relationship
with the Provincial Council and some signs of getting back to
normal with the Governor as well, though he is more difficult.
Q229 Chairman: Can I also throw in
something in relation to the discussion about Iran earlier? My
impression was that the people in Basra, ironically, who were
the most sympathetic to the coalition and most engaged with us
were actually the people who were denounced in Iraqi politics
as being pro-Iranian, the SCIRI Badr people, whereas the more
nationalistic and more, therefore, hostile to the Iranian people
were the most difficult for us to work with. Is this not, therefore,
potentially a very dangerous situation should the situation with
Iran deteriorate, that the people in the Shia community who have
been most co-operative in the transition process will actually
become less co-operative and therefore we might have a more difficult
problem even than we have got now?
Mr Straw: I understand what you
are saying and it runs into the point Ms Stuart was making earlier.
I have been very careful not to denounce groups because they are
pro-Iranian. It is just a fact of life. First of all, there is
bound to be a natural association between the Shia in Iran and
the Shia in Iraq, although it does not mean that the Shia in Iraq
are in the pocket of the Iranians.
Q230 Chairman: No. I wished to make
that distinction between different Shia groups, between the Sadirists,
who were anti-Iranian—
Mr Straw: The Sadirists are very
nationalistic, but all of the groups who were opposed to Saddam,
quite sensibly, developed good relations with Iran and many of
them actually lived in Iran. So that was also true for both the
PUK and the KDP, the Kurdish groups, the Taliban, Infasani and
that lot, as well as both the SCIRI, the Sadirists and the Da'a
wa, Dr Al-Jaafari's party, and some of the other parties. As for
relationships, I think I have got good relations with Dr Al-Jaafari,
the current Prime Minister, but also with Ayatollah Al-Hakim,
who is of SCIRI, and Ahmed Minai, who has been one of the vice-presidents
of the government. I think it is very important we do maintain
these relations and do not assume that just because parties have
got historic associations with the Iranians we therefore should
deal with them. That is certainly no part of our approach. Iran
is nationalistic. There is also a variety of opinions in Iran.
It is entirely legitimate for Iran to take an interest in its
neighbour Iraq. It is not legitimate for it to interfere with
it, but if it was our neighbour we would be taking an interest
in it.
Chairman: Thank you. Could we then move
on to some questions relating to what I could call human rights
matters.
Q231 Mr Illsley: Foreign Secretary,
you would not want to come before the Foreign Affairs Committee
without having had the opportunity to be questioned on extraordinary
rendition!
Mr Straw: I think I have got another
appointment, actually, just now!
Q232 Mr Illsley: We will not let
the opportunity pass!
Mr Straw: How about a secret session?
Q233 Mr Illsley: One of your colleagues
last week appeared to admit that the Ministry of Defence actually
knew that certain flights travelling in and out of the UK were
registered to the CIA in spite of previous denials, which again
has added weight to the argument that perhaps the British Government
still has not released its full knowledge of rendition issues.
Just a simple question: do you have anything to add to your previous
robust denials of Government involvement in view of that admission?
Mr Straw: No. By the way, I have
not got the answer in front of me from Adam Ingram, but it did
not add a scintilla of evidence in support of the claim that there
had been secret CIA flights coming through here with prisoners
on them about whom we knew nothing. Not a scintilla. I was talking
to one of our parliamentary colleagues, who was irritated about
all this, who said to local journalists, "Show us your evidence.
Where is the evidence?" It does not follow for a second that
because there are flights here with CIA aeroplanes that on those
aeroplanes, in breach of undertakings given by successive American
administrations, there were people being rendered through UK air
space or territory without our agreement. I just say, Mr Illsley,
if there had been people who were being rendered in this way,
I think it is a fair bet that somebody would have spotted this,
somebody on the ground, or somebody would have told somebody.
No one has come forward, nobody at all. A bit of paper might have
leaked out of the US administration to make us look silly, or
worse. I have said to the Committee before that we conducted the
most thorough of searches through the records and I have given
the Committee the evidence that I have. If further evidence comes
to light, I will bring it before the Committee. The only thing
I am currently considering in this respect is a request for the
names of the people whom I authorised for rendition back in 1998
and the chances are that I will publish them, but there are some
data protection issues there.
Q234 Mr Illsley: A couple of weeks
ago in the United States two of the more interesting exchanges
the Committee had related to Guantanamo Bay, the first of which,
with John Bellinger, was an invitation for this Committee to actually
visit that facility, which we hope we might be able to take up.
Another was a meeting with Senator McCane, who actually said that
he believed it is now time for a process for the people detained
at Guantanamo, to bring some sort of legal process into that.
Our own Prime Minister has said that Guantanamo is an anomaly
and perhaps should be closed. Is that the Government's position?
Mr Straw: Yes.
Q235 Mr Illsley: Does the Government
agree that there should be an early closure of Guantanamo? As
a fall-back, what would your comment be on Senator McCane's position
that perhaps there is now time for some process?
Mr Straw: The American Government
is committed to bringing Guantanamo to an end. It begs the question
of when. You are better off in a sense asking them rather than
me, but the problem they face is what to do with these individuals,
which countries they go back to. In the case of British citizens,
it would be straightforward, we would have them back here. I was
able to negotiate that, and that has been true for citizens of
a number of other countries, but their concern is that quite a
number of these are Afghans. Do they go back to Afghanistan? Some
are Pakistanis. Do they go back to other countries? In what circumstances
can they transfer them? There is a process taking place. I think
we all understand the concerns about Guantanamo Bay. I think the
American Government understands them pretty acutely.
Q236 Mr Illsley: Is there any possibility
that the Government will now make louder calls for the closure
of Guantanamo?
Mr Straw: I do not think this
is an issue where the effectiveness of the call is related to
its volume, to be honest. The American Government know our opinion
on this. I talk about the issue quite regularly to my American
counterparts. They are also well aware of opinion around the world
and in the United States on it, but they have just got practical
problems they have got to deal with, and if we were in that situation
we would have a practical problem, too. I do just say that if
September 11 had happened in this country rather than the United
States, it would have changed our politics and security parameters
just as it has changed the Americans'. It just would have done.
Q237 Mr Keetch: Is not the reality,
Foreign Secretary, about Guantanamo Bay and also about rendition
that this is a huge public relations blunder for the United States
and therefore for Britain in terms of our ongoing campaign, our
ongoing war against terrorism? Certainly that was accepted by
Members of Congress whom we spoke to last week about Guantanamo,
and it is certainly, I think, the case about rendition. Even if
we accept everything you say—and we do, of course—that
there is not actually a problem, why are you still saying that
you would not allow this Committee to actually investigate that
problem, because surely if there is nothing to hide, if there
is no rendition, why would you not allow this Committee, as you
said on 13 December to this Committee, not to actually properly
investigate this? Does this not just add to the suspicion which
members of the press and other people may have that there is a
problem which is somehow being concealed?
Mr Straw: I know that some people
in the press believe that there is a problem being concealed and
it is logically impossible finally to prove a negative. Every
so often you get shock, horror headlines and when you read the
story there is absolutely nothing there. Could I just say, Mr
Keetch, it is really important to separate rendition from Guantanamo
Bay. The circumstances in which the British Government has been
involved in rendition have been spelt out, as I recall, on two
occasions where the authorisation fell to me as Home Secretary
and I think there were two occasions where they were refused,
one by Mr Cook and one by me, all in 1998. As I have said, I am
as satisfied as I can be that there have been no renditions by
us, obviously not by us, but not through the United Kingdom territory
or air space—and by "territory" I include overseas
territories—since the Bush administration came into office.
Again, I just repeat the point I made earlier: if there had been
hundreds of people, or even one or two who had come through the
UK without the British Government knowing, or with our connivance
which we then decided wilfully to keep from the Committee, I rather
fancy that somebody would have produced some evidence about this;
apart from the fact that I am not in the habit of telling fibs
to Committees or to the House. On Guantanamo Bay, just to repeat
it, it is an anomaly which, as the Prime Minister said, will come
to an end and should come to an end sooner or later, we all hope
sooner. The American Government is aware of that and it is working
on it, but again I simply, at the risk of repetition, say that
they have practical problems. On the issue of damage to the United
States' reputation, I think views vary but it is just worth bearing
in mind that the September 11 terrorist atrocities actually happened
and they were not caused by the CIA or Mossad but by al Qaeda.
Q238 Mr Keetch: In terms of that
ongoing campaign, when you were Home Secretary you introduced
in 2000 the Terrorism Act.
Mr Straw: One of a number, or
a library of excellent pieces of legislation!
Q239 Mr Keetch: I read them all regularly,
Foreign Secretary! Under Schedule 7 of that Act you actually made
it a mandatory requirement of any aircraft transiting the UK in
respect of either Ireland or Northern Ireland to fill in a general
aviation report detailing the names of passengers and the purpose
of that flight, et cetera.
Mr Straw: Another liberal measure!
3 International Security Assistance Force. Back
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