Annex 1
BY DR
NAZILA GHANEA
(FEBRUARY 2005)
1.1 Engagement with Iran on human rights
is not a new phenomenon. Both the UK and other states have been
"engaged" with Iran on human rights issues very actively
at least since the mid-1970s, hence for the past 30 years. This
long record of "engagement" is often forgotten, as is
the fact that the intemational community was concerned with Iran's
human rights record during the regime of the Shah (1941-78) as
well as that record since the Islamic Revolution (1979-present).
1.2 Forgetting this record of engagement
has implications for what concessions and allowances are made
for the shortcomings in Iran's human rights record, basically
the context in which these shortcomings are to be understood.
It also has implications for those that are overly sensitive about
critique of the Islamic Republic's human rights record being incorrectly
perceived as critique of Islam or Islamic countries, particularly
in the post-September 11th international arena. Whilst diplomats
may find it hard to disconnect Iran's human rights records from
the political context of Islamic defensiveness since 11 September,
such a separation is absolutely necessary for an honest appraisal
of Iran's human rights record.
1.3 The grounds of engagement on human rights
must be assessed in the light of human rights itself. This implies
a legal dimension and a principled dimension. Human Rights engagement
with Iran needs to be on the basis of legal agreements it has
voluntarily entered into and in congruence with the very basis
of human rights—that these are universal birthrights of
each and all. If engagement is not in congruence with these two
dimensions then it is not rightfully a "human rights"
engagement; it may be a political, diplomatic or other engagement,
but it cannot be identified as being an engagement on the basis
of human rights. It would seem to me that this has to be the point
of departure of engagement on human rights, but it can prove difficult
for government officials to be mindful of this distinctive dimension
of human rights engagement at all times. This has and continues
to lead to difficulties in engagement with Iran. Whilst understanding
the variety of interests states have in dictating their engagement
with another country, this author believes her role in this memorandum
to be to focus only on human rights engagement.
1.4 In relation specifically to the UK's
engagement with Iran, I would like to continue this logic on the
basis of three problematic areas. In each case my focus will be
on Iran's human rights record, taking that to be the primary basis
on which other state's can judge their response. The main purpose
will be to examine recent changes in Iran and the UK's response
to them, in order to suggest the optimal policy options now available
to the UK for engagement with Iran on its human rights record.
The areas of focus will be as follows:
(i) The Record Engagement
(ii) Giving Iran the Benefit of the Doubt
(iii) Engagement or Dialogue—What Criteria?
Engagement with Whom and on What Basis?
(i)— THE RECORD
OF ENGAGEMENT
2.1 As suggested above, present policy options
regarding engagement with Iran on human rights need to be mindful
of the history of engagement with Iran on human rights, which
stretches back at least three decades. The choices made about
the level and methods of engagement with Iran on human rights
should undoubtedly be informed by an assessment of what progress
has been made in Iran on human rights and what would be realistic
regarding the speed of future progress to be expected. Both of
these assessments require some understanding regarding the background
to this issue.
2.2 The primary human rights concems of
the international community (including the UK) with Iran's human
rights record in the 1970s related to political freedoms and freedom
of expression. This was in the context of a country that clearly
had many of the characteristics of a police state, a leader that
had set up a one party state and coerced Iranians to vote for
it under intimidation, where nation building was centralised and
at the cost of any acknowledgement of Iran's very diverse ethnic
make-up and where political expression was very strongly curtailed.
This curtailment of political expression included, but was not
confined to, that of Islamists.
2.3 The 1979 Islamic Revolution was brought
about largely as a response to the political repressions suffered
under the Shah. However, time demonstrated that whilst there may
have been a shift in the profile of those tortured or imprisoned,
certainly there had been no improvement in the likelihood of its
occurrence. To the existing list of human rights concerns—repression
of political freedoms, freedom of expression and the participation
of ethnic minorities—came to be added: the persecution of
religious minorities, gender discrimination, the use of inhuman
and degrading punishments, arbitrary executions and the widespread
use of torture. Whilst the extent of these human rights violations
may have changed somewhat in the years between 1979 and 2005,
the occurrence of each of those violations today unfortunately
remains highly evident.
2.4 For example, whilst some space for some
limited debate on some political issues is now tolerated, the
scope of such issues and the accepted participants in such a discussion
are certainly not unlimited. And whilst there is the semblance
of democracy in terms of regular public elections at various levels,
recent events have made obvious the harsh curtailment of the approved
candidature. What is less publicly realised is the limits of the
approved electorate. For example, only the constitutionally-recognised
religious minorities—Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians—may
vote amongst their own officially-sanctioned candidates and for
a limited number of parliamentary seats.
2.5 Further to the serious limitations regarding
democracy in Iran, there is a serious question over the relationship
between democracy and human rights. It is asserted that respect
for human rights should be considered as a foundational pillar
to democracy. Without ensuring such a respect for human rights,
emerging democratic patterns alone will not necessarily deliver
on respect for rights. Human rights are a necessary correlate
to democracy.
2.6 The response of the international community
to the massive rise in human rights violations in the early years
of the revolution was swift. In 1980, the United Nations Sub-Commission
on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (at that time
called the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities) started its annual resolution condemning
Iran for its human rights violations. These resolutions were adopted
annually until 1996 when the possibility of the Sub-Commission
adopting resolutions that duplicated issues on the agenda of the
Commission was terminated. Similarly, the United Nations Commission
on Human Rights adopted resolutions condemning Iran's human rights
violations annually from 1982 to 2001 inclusive. In the years
between 1984 until the failure to adopt the draft resolution in
April 2002 this resolution included the further sanction of the
appointment of a UN Special Representative to investigate the
human rights situation in Iran first-hand and report regularly
to the UN about that record. The Iranian government, however,
defied this request of the international community and the mandate
holder was only allowed four visits to Iran during those 18 years.
The April 2002 report of the Special Representative on the Human
Rights Situation in Iran was certainly not positive about the
human rights situation in Iran, and the record since then has
definitely deteriorated in almost every area. Despite that deterioration,
and the expectation that there will be an even sharper downward
spiral after the June 2005 Presidential elections in Iran, the
intemational community's engagement with Iran has been piecemeal
and inconsistent since it halted its condemnation of Iran's human
rights record through the UN in April 2002. This author is of
the opinion that the UK's responsibilities of engagement with
Iran on human rights should be judged and assessed in the context
of this reality.
(ii)— GIVING
IRAN THE
BENEFIT OF
THE DOUBT
3.1 There is a long, and disappointing,
recent history of giving Iran "the benefit of the doubt"
regarding her human rights record. In fact, even as a country
under condemnation by the international community for its human
rights record, Iran was adept at dictating terms and conditions
under which she was allegedly prepared to improve her human rights
situation. She has continuously argued that international condemnation
of her human rights record is detrimental to domestic efforts
to improve that record, without convincing arguments being put
forward as to why this may actually be the case.
3.2 Since the 1980s her argument was that
her co-operation with the UN Special Representative on the Human
Rights Situation in Iran was dependent on the UN dropping its
reference to "the human rights situation of religious minorities,
including the Baha'is. After the death of Ayatollah Khomeini,
there was a lot of hope that the apparently moderate new President
Rafsanjani would bring about positive human rights change in Iran.
The UN Commission resolutions of 1990 and 1991 reflected this
optimism as they were adopted by consensus rather than roll-call
vote. In the late 1990s, numerous dignitaries including the UN
Secretary-General and the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights
were invited to attend high profile events in Iran, which reflected
well on the regime, but the UN Special Representative with his
mandate to investigate the human rights situation was forbidden
access after his short 6 day visit in 1996. Despite this obvious
Iranian ploy to defy the international community and not allow
first-hand UN reporting of her human rights record, there was
again much optimism around after the partially-democratic popular
elections that brought President Khatami to power in 1997. Since
then, the record on some human rights issues did temporarily improve,
particularly press freedoms and the rights of women. These were
welcomed profusely by the international community, even though
each step forward was partial and, in many instances, followed
promptly by reversals. Finally, in the years leading to the dropping
of the Commission resolution in April 2002, Iran continuously
claimed that her human rights situation was improving. Whilst
admitting that there were areas of concem, she claimed that the
record was not bad enough to merit a resolution of condemnation.
Since then, of course, the situation has deteriorated yet further.
3.3 Despite disappointments following every
bout of optimism since the late 1980s, that Iran would once and
for all reverse its grave human rights situation and follow the
path of gradual but continual improvements in that situation,
there seems to be an irreversible trend of optimism, even now,
that Iran must be given the benefit of the doubt. It is questionable
why this benefit of the doubt needs to continuously be given despite
Iran's actual human rights situation? Is this just condemnation-fatigue
or is it acclimatisation to Iran's human rights violations?
3.4 This author is not at all convinced
that Iran's present human rights record merits a "hands off"
approach by the international community, combined with blind optimism
that the human rights record is on the path of improvement. It
is beyond doubt to any impartial assessor that the situation of
human rights in Iran has deteriorated in the years following the
ending of international condemnation of Iran's human rights record
at the United Nations. And it is, unfortunately, beyond reason
to expect that there will be any reversal in the fortunes of this
record in the near future. The Presidential elections of June
2005 are, by all accounts, going to strengthen the hand of the
more conservative elements of the regime, and a further deterioration
in the human rights record has, regretfully, to be expected.
3.5 Whilst Iran's argument that international
condemnation of her human rights record has been detrimental to
the domestic addressing of that record is decades long, my research
over the past decade suggests precisely the opposite. Iran has
long demonstrated her sensitivity to her international reputation.
My doctoral research focused on the most unrelenting of Iran's
human rights issues, that of the situation of the Baha'is in Iran.
Even on that issue, my findings suggested that international condemnation
had, at the very least, contributed to the stabilisation of their
situation and, in certain ways, to partial ameliorations in their
persecution. On that basis alone I would recommend that strong
reasons, consistent with international human rights standards,
are required before such condemnation is halted, and other countries
are thereby seen to be condoning Iran's human rights record.
3.6 Further to that, one has to be cognizant
of Iran's diplomatic unpredictability regarding human rights.
Even a sketchy consideration reveals a yawning gap between Iran's
promises and subsequent practice in the field of human rights.
Going by official UN records alone, my own research was able to
find numerous examples of such inconsistency. After all, Iran
has persistently promised an improvement in its human rights situation,
at least over the past fifteen years, and all of that to little
avail. One would be hard pressed to point to one arena in which
her human rights record had consistently and reliably improved
over that time. All in all, then, I would suggest that the "benefit
of that doubt" method has proven of little benefit with regard
to external engagement with Iran's human rights record, and consideration
should be given to the grounds for its continued practice.
(iii)— ENGAGEMENT
OR DIALOGUE—WHAT
CRITERIA? ENGAGEMENT
WITH WHOM
AND ON
WHAT BASIS?
4.1 The UK's diplomatic record with Iran
stretches back centuries and has a much longer history than most,
if not all, of the other EU countries. This alone would imply
her special role in proposing appropriate EU policy with Iran.
The EU policy on Iran's human rights record has taken the shape
of an official human rights dialogue over the past two years.
This is on the basis of the December 2001 EU Guidelines on Human
Rights dialogues. The desirability of following up the work of
the UN Commission on Human Rights and Third Committee of the General
Assembly is suggested in the Guidelines. In the case of Iran,
therefore, it would seem that the dialogue should take heed of
the human rights violations the international community had highlighted
in Iran's record from 1980 to 2002.
4.2 The initiation of an EU human rights
dialogue rests, as the Guidelines note, on an assessment that
the government is willing to improve the human rights situation,
the commitment it has shown regarding compliance with human rights
treaties, its readiness to co-operate with UN human rights procedures
and mechanisms and its attitude to civil society. It is surprising
to note how a positive assessment may have been made on the basis
of any of these criteria in 2002, and even more so in 2004 when
it was decided that there had been "added value" provided
by the dialogue—hence its continuation. It is not apparent
which civil society actors, and from where, were involved in this
assessment exercise, as required by point 10 of the Guidelines,
especially since the finer details of the benchmarks set by the
Union have not been make known to them.
4,3 There may be an incongruence between
"adding value" to the actual enjoyment of human rights
within the target state, in this case Iran, and the EU's aim of
"strengthening human rights co-operation" as outlined
in point 10 of the Guidelines. As the EU rightly points out in
the Guidelines, strengthening human rights co-operation demands
a focus "on those areas in which cooperation could be further
improved". This requires a pragmatic assessment of where
the target state herself indicates interest in making token or
actual changes. Important though they may be in their own right,
these may not be the areas where most deep-seated or widespread
violations are actually being suffered and, it seems, little scope
is offered to the EU to require the pursuit of other avenues.
Human rights dialogue certainly does seem ultimately to be perilously
dependent on the key condition of the target government's willingness
to improve her human rights situation, and her continued good
faith in this regard.
4.4 Furthermore, the UK is "engaged"
with Iran on its human rights record as one of the four areas
of concern of the EU-Iran Trade and Co-operation Agreement which
was restarted on 12 January 2005. The EU is Iran's main trading
partner, accounting for around 30% of her total trade. Considering
the immense unemployment and underemployment in Iran, the economic
importance of the EU relationship with Iran can scarcely be underestimated.
However, it is disappointing that the tremendous opportunities
offered by both the EU-Iran dialogue and EU-Iran Trade and Co-operation
Agreement have not been harnessed by the EU towards pushing adequately
for human rights.
4.5 In this vein, the EU's assessment of
improvements in Iran's human rights record, which has been necessary
to the continuation of both the dialogue and the agreement, frankly
beggars belief. How modest exactly were the expectations that
"improvements" have been noted? Were these consistent
with the expectations of the international community of Iran's
human rights record over the past 26 years? If not, what is the
human rights benefit of diluting internationally agreed legal
standards in light of the current Iranian context? These EU processes
are not transparent and open to civil society scrutiny within
Europe, even though the dialogue itself is supposed to concomitantly
rest upon the condition of encouraging a vibrant civil society
in Iran.
4.6 Furthermore, where exactly is it expected
that genuine improvements in Iran's human rights record will stem
from, and which governmental mechanisms will actualise them? Iran's
complex governmental machinery has demonstrated its reliance on
an arresting system of checks and balances. Domestic attempts
to bring about positive change on some human rights issues have
faced numerous hurdles within this system. There are a number
of cases where discrete attempts were made to initiate human rights
improvements, stemming from the initiatives of the previous (Sixth)
Majlis/Parliament and from President Khatami. Whether with regard
to ratifying the UN Convention Against Torture or the UN Convention
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, banning torture,
or giving some scope for women in seeking divorce or custody,
in all these instances the human rights-friendly initiative has
either been blocked or narrowed significantly in scope as a result
of the proposed legislation having to be approved by the Guardian
Council as being in line with Islamic precepts. At a minimum,
therefore, three arms of government need to approve any positive
legislative change with regard to human rights (Presidency, Parliament
and the Guardian Council). Even at the most "optimal"
moment of the most pro-human rights Iranian governmental machinery
yet, which perhaps can be found to be the 1999-2002 years; it
meant that the more reform-oriented elements of government could
be blocked by the more conservative elements of the Guardian Council—where
the 50% of the clerics appointed by the Supreme Leader
can veto any legislation that they deem to be un-Islamic. Only
the opinion of these six members, of the 12 member body, is valid
when it comes to deciding on the compatibility of legislation
with Islamic provisions.
4.7 To this author, these initiatives themselves
were disappointingly limited, framed as they were within the Iranian
Constitutional framework. That same Constitution leaves many serious
human rights issues beyond even the scope of political imagination.
Even in the apparent heyday of human rights possibilities in Iran
around the turn of the century, for example, the only unchanged
piece of human-rights promoting legislation that was adopted unchanged
was the 2002 Blood Money law. This was a law which itself started
from an extremely discriminatory premise. Even in that case, the
passage of the adoption of the law was not smooth. The Guardian
Council blocked the legislation and the Supreme Leader himself
intervened to call upon them to reconsider its adoption. The adopted
law equalised the blood money payable on the death of a Jew, Christian
or Zoroastrian man to that of a Muslim man. This may be all very
well, except for the fact that they had been valued at half of
a Muslim man for the previous 23 years. Furthermore, the question
of a penalty for a Muslim, Jewish, Zoroastrian or Christian woman
being raised to an equal value to that of the men was beyond the
scope of discussion, and the question of why Baha'is, whether
man or woman, were worthless in this estimation, again was beyond
the pale.
4.8 With both the Majlis losing its reformist
majority through the electoral machinations of the February 2004
elections and the Presidency being on the verge of becoming less
reformist in orientation as a result of the forthcoming June 2005
elections, I fail to understand where the EU is looking for human
rights change to stem from. If the source of such change cannot
even be imagined, then does this not just amount to blind optimism?
An honest appraisal of prospects for change need to be assessed
by the EU, so that the EU can better assess whether it can continue
its dialogue and, if so, what areas the debate on human rights
it needs to highlight and which actors in Iran it needs to focus
on.
THE MAIN
POINTS IN
SUMMARY
1. Engagement with Iran on human rights
needs to be understood and assessed within a historical context
of at least the past three decades.
2. Shortcomings in Iran's human rights record
today need to be assessed in the light of this record.
3. Concern with Iran's human rights record
is not new to the post-September 11 world. It does not imply a
critique of Islam or Islamic countries per se.
4. A genuine human rights engagement allows
little room for diplomatic flexibility, as its terms must be mindful
of both the legal underpinnings of human rights and ideological
congruence with the universality of rights. Engagement which is
not respectful of these criteria cannot correctly be labelled
a human rights engagement.
5. This memorandum focuses only on human
rights engagement with Iran.
6. In the 1970s the international community,
including the UK, were vocal regarding their concerns with the
lack of political freedoms and freedom of expression in Iran.
7. After the 1979 revolution, to this list
of human rights concerns was added the persecution of religious
minorities, gender discrimination, the use of inhuman and degrading
punishments, arbitrary executions and the widespread use of torture.
8. The extent of some of these violations
may have altered somewhat during the past twenty-six years, but
serious violations remain in all of these areas.
9. The international community was swift
and consistent in its condemnation of Iran's human rights record
between 1980 and 2002.
10. Despite serious outstanding concems,
and further deterioration in human rights, the international community's
engagement with Iran has been piecemeal and inconsistent since
2002.
11. The UK's responsibilities of engagement
with Iran on human rights should be judged and assessed in the
context of this reality.
12. There is a very long record of the international
community choosing to give Iran "the benefit of the doubt"
regarding its genuineness in intending to improve its human rights
record.
13. Iran has long argued that it would be
able to more effectively bring about positive human rights change
domestically if international condemnation was halted. There is
no evidence that this has been the case, in fact the evidence
suggests the contrary.
14. The human rights record since the 1997
coming to power of President Khatami did temporarily improve in
a couple of areas, notably press freedoms and the rights of women.
However, even these steps were partial and followed by reversals.
The record in other areas was largely untouched, in some areas
there have also been reversals in Iran's human rights record.
15. The "benefit of the doubt"
approach to Iran has failed. It seems to indicate mere condemnation-fatigue
or acclimatisation to Iran's human rights violations.
16. Iran's persistent promises that it is
improving its human rights situation fly in the face of reality.
17. Iran has long demonstrated her sensitivity
to her international reputation and has made relative improvements
in her human rights record as the result of such condemnation.
Strong reasons, consistent with international human rights standards,
are therefore required before condemnation is halted in favour
of other policies.
18. Condemnation where condemnation is due
plays a necessary role in the promotion of human rights where
massive violations continue. Iran is a case in point.
19. The UK has a long diplomatic record
with Iran, hence she has a special responsibility in ensuring
EU human rights policies with Iran are appropriate.
20. The EU-Iran dialogue should be honestly
monitored in the light of the human rights violations occurring
in Iran.
21. Mindful of the EU Guidelines on Human
Rights dialogue, it is not apparent how Iran fulfilled the criteria
for the initiation and continuation of EU dialogue. Civil society
was not, or at least not adequately and transparently, involved
in this assessment.
22. The EU Guidelines themselves reveal
some inconsistencies regarding aims and means.
23. The EU is critical to Iran as a trading
partner, but it has seriously underplayed its hand at effecting
human rights changes in Iran through this means. It has condoned
Iran's human rights record by noting positive change where, at
best, these have been horrendously tokenistic.
24. EU human rights dialogue and trade agreement
is ostensibly dependent on the willingness of the Iranian government
to effect positive human rights change, but where can such positive
change stem from?
25. The EU's appraisal of prospects for
human rights change in Iran needs to at least imagine the means
by which such change can emerge. The record suggests that it is
questionable whether there is actually the means to effect such
change within the Iranian governmental machinery. The means for
human rights change suffered a setback in the February 2004 Majlis
elections and will suffer another setback in the June 2005 Presidential
elections.
Nazila Ghanea
February 2005
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