Examination of Witnesses (Questions 180-199)
MR DOUGLAS
ALEXANDER MP, MR
ANTHONY SMITH
AND MR
SIMON MANLEY
3 MAY 2006
Q180 Andrew Mackinlay: I listened
carefully to David Heathcoat-Amory's questioning of you which
I actually enjoyed. I am completely at the other end of the pole
to him, but I certainly deem myself to be pro-European, enthusiastically
so, similar to yourself, but it did seem to me, listening and
watching you, that were you were handicapped by one thing. The
British Government had gone along with this is fiction that the
Constitution was needed, whereas what you probably would have
wanted to say to David Heathcoat-Amory, which I invite you to
agree with, is basically, "Come off it. You are not suggesting
that there should not be any more treaty changes." The history
of the European Union is organic change. There have to be treaties
from time to time to deal with circumstances to make the thing
work. Surely that should be the response, that you cannot rule
out treaty changes to meet what is sensible and agreed negotiated
arrangements to facilitate the good management and stewardship
of the European Union. What you do not need is all the paraphernalia
and hype of the Constitution, which, I put to you, is actually
now a handicap to you, because we went down that road, but what
there will clearly be, and you would encourage it because it is
good governance, are sensible and agreed changes and they will
inevitably involve some treaty changes.
Mr Alexander: I suppose our exchange
reflected the extent to which, with no disrespect to our absent
colleague, the debate has moved on, in the sense that when I read
the comment of the Prime Minister saying, "Don't start with
the rules, start with the reasons; they are needed", I think
perhaps the honourable gentleman had difficulty believing that
we were sincere in saying the focus of the Union's work should
not be continually and exclusively institutional change. We actually
made it worse for him than he imagines. We actually believed what
we said during the British Presidency that you should start with
whatever are the reasons but sensible rule changes are necessary
and have an appropriate focus on those issues, and that is why
the work that we initiated at Hampton Court did not conclude at
the end of the British Presidency, but we are pleased to see it
being continued in entering the next period of European policy-making,
and so we are absolutely sincere in saying the focus of any reflection
should not be a period of simple institutional internal conversation
but instead the opportunity to say why is it that there are questions
of efficiency in the minds of citizens cross Europe about the
added value of the European Union? What practical steps can we
take, both as the Presidency and as a Member of the European Union,
to advance those practical issues—for example, the issue
of energy that I have spoken of? As I say, I think the exchange
perhaps reflected a certain degree of scepticism in his mind that
the Europe Minister could be sitting in front of him telling us
that the first known priority of the British Government was not
institutional change. Our authority is actually practical policies
which affect and benefit the lives of citizens across Europe.
Chairman: We move on to enlargement.
Q181 Mr Horam: Fascinating and eclectic
as the Constitution Treaty may be to aficionados, of which
I take it you are not one—
Mr Alexander: You know me fairly
well.
Q182 Mr Horam: —perhaps we
can go on to broader themes, and particularly the issue of enlargement,
because even there, a very important issue which Britain has played
a major role in, there are slightly contrasting views. The Dutch
Commissioner, for example, said the European Union should maximise
at 27 members—it has 25 at the moment—which is a very
small change, whereas, perhaps understandably, the Enlargement
Commission is talking about not having a break, let us carry on
with this process. Where does the UK Government stand on this?
Mr Alexander: We have solidly
continued to be strong advocates of enlargement. Let me explain
why. I think, if you were to again take a broader view and take
perhaps the most recent example, the accession of 10 predominantly
former Soviet countries in the European Union in 2004, championed
initially by the British Government and by our Prime Minister,
by any reckoning, that would be judged to be of genuine historic
significance. Why is that judged to be of such historical significance?
Because what we have managed to do is not simply grow the European
Union and the single market but effectively helped change those
societies and those economies for the better. I do not believe
that we have concluded the capacity of the European Union to undertake
that important work. I was strengthened in that conviction by
the visit I paid to the Western Balkans during the Presidency
where it was made very clear to me repeatedly, in country after
country, that Membership of the European Union in those states
has come to be seen as the equivalent to both modernity and normality.
Whether, in fact, their revelation is to be part of the world's
largest single market or to uphold the democratic norms of the
European Union, it succours anything is as important as the changes
that the prospect of European Union Membership can effect in those
countries.
Q183 Mr Horam: Good for them, but
what about this question of the absorption capacity of the existing
European Union?
Mr Alexander: The absorption capacity
has been there—if I recollect, it was part of the convening
criteria—for many years, and, of course, that is one element
of the conversation; but if you are saying is it good for Europe
to have grown, for example, in the 10 accession countries that
I mentioned who joined in 2004, look at the respective rates of
growth that have been achieved by those countries, look at the
dynamism and vigour that they have brought to questions of the
need for economic reform within the European Union, or, indeed,
look at the diplomatic reach that a country such as Poland has
brought to our engagement with a country like Ukraine at the time
of the Orange revolution. I categorically believe that enlargement
has strengthened and helped Europe in recent years, and I believe
that the progress of future enlargement continues to hold out
those potential positive gains in the future.
Q184 Mr Horam: I am sorry to go back
to the issue of the Constitution, but can we continue to expand
Europe without any changes in the Constitution?
Mr Alexander: The basis on which
those countries entered in 2004 was, of course, not the Draft
Constitutional Treaty, and, as somebody who took through the Bill
in the Commons in the autumn in relation to Bulgaria and Romania,
there are mechanisms outside of the Draft Constitutional Treaty
by which enlargement can take place.
Q185 Mr Horam: So you are in favour
of that happening even if there is no constitutional change?
Mr Alexander: I have not ever
argued that the issue of enlargement should be seen as a mechanistic
link to the fate of the Draft Constitutional Treaty. I think that
the merits of enlargement stand on their own terms.
Q186 Mr Horam: You recognise that
that could mean a very large number of countries being added to
the European Union, for example there are five in the former Soviet
Union countries as well as Romania, Bulgaria and Serbia. That
is a lot of countries.
Mr Alexander: Of course, this
is a discussion which we continue to have with our partners, but
it is hard to envisage any enlargement as large, simultaneously,
as the enlargement which took place in 2004 when 10 came in. If
you talk about enlargement then, in the light of the decisions
that were reached on 3 October, you would also discuss Turkey,
but on the Turkish Government's own estimation, it will be upwards
of 10 years before accession could be possible; so in that sense
I think there is plenty of time both for the necessary conditionality
to be achieved. You mentioned the Enlargement Commissioner. I
think all your aids working at the Commission has done a great
deal to strengthen the sense that there is a very clear sense
of conditionality, rightly, around which countries have to work
if they want to secure membership of the European Union. The way
I described it when I was in the Western Balkans was to say that
the bar on European Union membership has not been raised. On the
other hand, the tolerance, I think, within the European Union
(and I think your question reflects this) of countries slipping
under that level of conditionality in order to secure membership
has undoubtedly dissipated, and that is why I stand with the Commission
in saying that we should have rigorous transparent procedures
but that conditionality needs to be a central element of that
discussion about enlargement.
Q187 Chairman: How close are Romania
and Bulgaria to meeting the bar, the threshold, the criterion?
Is there not a danger that they will not meet it in 2007 and that
you will have to bring the emergency procedure next month for
at least one of them?
Mr Alexander: To use a football
term: the ball is at their feet. I was in Bulgaria on Thursday
and Friday of last week. I met the Bulgarian Foreign Minister
and discussed with him the progress that he and his government
have been making, but all of us will be looking very carefully
at the next Commission Report, which I understand is due out later
this month on the 16th, and that will give us the basis on which
a decision will be reached at the June European Council. Of course
there was a previous Commission Report which identified particular
areas of work. I do not, frankly, believe it benefits exactly
the transparency and conditionality that I was just describing
to your colleague for us to get into a running commentary on what
the next report of the Commission is going to say. Frankly, I
have not seen the report and I will give it very careful attention,
as will my colleagues in the Foreign Office, when we receive it.
Q188 Chairman: Can I put it to you
that, if there is insufficient progress and it either becomes
clear that one or both of them are not able to meet the criteria
by 2008, that we would then be facing a very difficult situation
within the European Union, given that there is an implicit assumption
that automatically one or both of them will be—
Mr Alexander: A Treaty obligation?
Q189 Chairman: Exactly. Where will
we be if that is the situation, if Bulgaria or Romania or both
of them are in some important respects, whether it is to do with
judicial systems or whether it is to with corruption, whether
it is to do with some other matters, not meeting the criteria?
Mr Alexander: You are right in
imposing the so-called super safeguard clause, which means that
there could be a delay of 12 months from 1 January 2007 to 2008,
but, notwithstanding the existence of the super safeguard clause,
and this was a matter that was discussed on the floor of the House
in the course of the Bill here, there are considerable powers
available to the Commission which would provide a degree of comfort
to the rest of the Union if there were specific areas of concern
still identified, notwithstanding the fact that the threshold
had been reached for full membership. If it would be helpful,
I will certainly set out for you our understanding of the powers
the Commission have available to them.[4]
My understanding is that those powers were not used in 2004 against
the A10 countries, but that does not diminish the fact that there
are still powers available to the European Commission whatever
the area of concern they continue to have.
Chairman: That would be helpful. Can
we move on to the Balkans?
Q190 Andrew Mackinlay: After disagreeing
with you, Chairman, I am very grateful you raised it. Of course,
in 2004 there was the ultimate sanction that they might not come
in. The difference between 2004 folk and Bulgaria and Romania
is that under the Treaty Obligation they shall be in at 2008.
There is a qualitative difference?
Mr Alexander: In response to that,
I would make a couple of points. One is, I think, partly through
the experience of the 2004 accession there has been a strengthening
of capacity within the Commission to actually benchmark and to
judge candidate countries transparently, rigorously and effectively
and, secondly, I think there is also an issue, not least because
the potential membership involves both Bulgaria and Romania, where
neither of the countries in question, and this is on the basis
of discussions I have had with colleague ministers from both of
these countries, want to be the country that finds they have not
reached the deadline as quickly as the other country; so I think
there are factors driving performance which were not there at
the time of the 2004 accession.
Q191 Andrew Mackinlay: For speed,
can I say Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro and Serbia Montenegro: because
there are three potential scenarios. Also news this afternoon,
the European Union has closed talks with Serbia—I assume
it is Serbia and not Serbia Montenegro; it is a bit unclear—on
the question of Mladic. I wonder if you could give us a view of
where we are at with regard Croatia. If Montenegro goes independent,
presumably there will be at least an open invitation for them
to fast-track meeting the criteria. What is the position regarding
the breaking off of talks today, and is that with Serbia or is
that the Serbia and Montenegro federation?
Mr Alexander: I will start with
the last point, because I issued a statement in response to the
Commission decision today, which is available and is on the FCO
website, in which I support fully the Enlargement Commissioner's
decision to effectively disrupt the SAE talks, which is both for
Serbia and Montenegro, not to give them the Constitutional position
of a state of the Union ahead of the referendum. We fully support
that, given that we believe Serbia and Montenegro have missed
a number of self-imposed deadlines for full co-operation and it
is a longstanding position with the British Government that we
want to see Mladic and Karadzic brought to justice, and in that
sense that explains the decision, which is one the British Government
fully supports. In terms of if Montenegro gains independence from
the State Union following the referendum, which I think is on
21 May, later this month, it is hoped that both countries will
continue their commitment to make progress towards European Union
integration. The current twin-track mechanism for the Serbia and
Montenegro EU accession should facilitate this, but I cannot anticipate
what will be out outcome of the referendum.
Q192 Andrew Mackinlay: I am genuinely
surprised by your response there. Presumably if Montenegro re-establishes
its sovereign independence, it is a new ball game and they can
apply and they can presumably anticipate, with regard to the British
Government's reaction, the same facilities which are afforded
to any other applicant or potential applicant? I think it is important
for Montenegro to know that the British Government will not discriminate
against an independent Montenegro. If they knock on the door,
we will say, "Copenhagen criteria", and presumably there
should be an opportunity to open negotiations?
Mr Alexander: I can assure you
we do not have a policy of discrimination towards anyone. What
I will say is that I think it would be ill-judged of a Foreign
Office minister at this stage, only a matter of days and weeks
before the referendum, to anticipate what will be the judgment
that will be reached by the people of Montenegro. In terms of
other countries that you asked about, in terms of Croatia, obviously
the opening of accession negotiations under our Presidency in
the second half of last year we believed to be an important step,
but it is now up to Croatia to work towards meeting those European
Union standards and enable them to meet the standards in full
before accession can take place, and, as you would expect, both
the United Kingdom and the European Union is providing assistance
to the Government of Croatia in those endeavours. Obviously, not
least given the importance of full co-operation, the International
War Tribunal, with the former Yugoslavia, as I mentioned, welcomed
the capture of Ante Gotovina back in December and I think we reached
the right decision to open negotiations with Croatia back at that
3 October meeting.
Q193 Mr Horam: On Turkey briefly,
which you regard as one of the two major tests of the Presidency,
Charles Grant on European reform, when he came before the Committee,
was very pessimistic about the situation there. He said on the
one hand he did not think the Turks entirely appreciated this
was not a negotiation—"The European Union says what
it wants and either the country applicant agrees with it or not"—and,
equally, it is clear there is opposition to Turkey amongst several
countries and they could at any moment simply block any further
progress under the various treaties. What is your view?
Mr Alexander: I stand by my earlier
theory that I think it was of genuine historic significance that
that decision was reached on 3 October. I think it is the right
decision, not just for Turkey but also for Europe, and I think
we would have sent a very damaging signal if we had suggested
that there was not the prospect of a European future for a country
like Turkey and obliged it to turn elsewhere in terms of its future
economic, social and political development. All that being said,
I have never hidden the fact, and nor has the British Government,
that there are very considerable challenges which Turkey will
have to rise to in the years, and it will be many years of work,
between now and that accession being achieved.
Q194 Mr Horam: Would you agree with
Charles Grant that they do not entirely appreciate these are not
negotiations?
Mr Alexander: I am not sure it
is always helpful to pass comment on the conduct of other governments.
As I say, the experience of the discussions prior to 3 October,
both the weeks and the hours, suggest that the Turkish Government
are strong negotiators, shall we say. That being said, the obligations
under which they now operate are clear, and in that sense I would
recognise that perhaps the sentiment underpinning Charles' statement,
which is that, as a country that has been granted accession talks,
the process for Turkey is exactly the same as for any other prospective
Member of the European Union, the initial screening process, the
opening of chapters and also the closing of chapters.
Q195 Mr Horam: I think the underlying
thought of Charles Grant (to limit your response) was that they
are a proud nation and that when they realise what is happening,
and the process may be very long, they may object?
Mr Alexander: Well, let us not
prejudge where the process will go. My understanding is that the
screening process has now begun under the Austrian presidency.
There are obligations, in particular the case was declared in
September 2005 that Turkey must apply the Ankara Agreement Protocol
fully to all Member States and the EU will monitor this closely
and evaluate full implementation in 2006; so that will be a particular
challenge facing Turkey in the course of this calendar year, but
my understanding, and I spoke to officials in anticipation of
appearing before you today, is that progress does continue to
be made in terms of the formal processes of membership being taken
forward essentially through European Chapters.
Q196 Mr Maples: I want to pick up
the Cyprus angle of Turkish membership issues. We have tail wagging
the dog situation here in a really serious way and this Committee
has taken quite an interest in Cyprus over the years, and we have
produced a couple of reports on it. I wonder if you can tell us
what is the state at the moment of the package that we have supported
of both aid and transport links, trade links, physical trade links,
I mean sea and air, into Northern Cyprus. Is that still stuck
on a Cyprus veto or a threat of a Cyprus veto?
Mr Alexander: In terms of the
financial aid regulation, that has now been agreed and was an
important first step forwards lifting Turkish/Cypriot isolation.
There were concerns in terms of the timing of that, but in February
that decision was reached in terms of aid. During the British
Presidency, as I recollect, there had been continued discussions
about our capacity to hold together the aid regulation with the
trade regulation, but ultimately we were unable to secure consensus
on that and the two were decoupled so that the aid regulation
has gone through but the trade regulation still continues to be
a matter for discussion.
Q197 Mr Maples: When we had the Foreign
Secretary giving evidence some time in the last 12 months, and
I cannot remember exactly when, we split the trade links issue
into area C1, C1B and E was, as I understand it, an EU issue,
at least under EU competence and jurisdiction, air links having
nothing to do with the European Union at all, and there was some
confusion, I think, both among us and among those who were giving
evidence to us as to whether countries could establish bilateral
air links with Northern Cyprus or whether that had to be done
multilaterally, and I think that confusion still exists. What
I think is clear to most of us who have taken an interest in this
issue, and I am not asking you to clarify it, but if you want
to you are welcome to, was that the trade link was much more important
to Northern Cyprus than the aid. I am sure that aid will be very
welcome, but what Northern Cyprus needs is direct links to the
outside world for its tourist business. I wonder if you can tell
us if that is something that the British Government is pushing
for and whether or not we have considered, and if so would be
prepared to, allow bilateral air links to be established between
the United Kingdom and Northern Cyprus?
Mr Alexander: I hesitate to add
to the gloom that clearly descended the last time this issue was
raised on the Committee but my understanding of the key issue
here is not so much the issue of individual countries as the designation
of the airport, air carrier port, and can it be designated as
an international airport, essentially, in order to be able to
provide the necessary criteria for the arrangements which multilaterally
are in place for international air travel. So the question turns
in part on the designation of the airport as an international
airport. Given that that has not been designated as an international
airport there remain very complex legal difficulties, frankly,
for any country, certainly multilaterally but, also, individually,
in terms of flights operating internationally to the airport.
Q198 Mr Maples: If you can answer
the next question now that is fine but if you cannot I would be
very happy to take yet another note from you on what are the procedures
for authorising the airport as an international airport for these
purposes. It would be ironic if Greece, of all countries, with
its air safety record, were allowed to veto whether or not an
airport in Northern Cyprus was designated for international travel.
If you can answer the question now that is fine, but if you cannot—
Mr Alexander: I will resist the
temptation to even implicitly criticise one of our European partners,
and provide a note.[5]
Q199 Mr Maples: Certainly, as Members
of this Committee who did these two visits to Cyprus, we felt
that the Greek-Cypriot Government did not negotiate in good faith
with the Annan proposals, certainly after Papadopoulos became
President and we have been comprehensively hoodwinked or taken
for a ride over this and we have now got a situation where we
have, inside the cabinet somebody who ought to have been firmly
outside it until the Cyprus issue was resolved. Now inside they
are in a position not just to use the EU in pursuit of its problems
and the issues it has with Northern Cyprus but, also, to pursue,
frankly, much more importantly from our point of view, over the
negotiations for Turkish accession. It seems to me, and I would
be grateful if we could have your response to this, that unless
we start winning some of these arguments with Cyprus and we continue
to allow the smallest countries in the European Union to dictate
very important aspects of its policy and progress, we are simply
storing up trouble of, at some stage, them stopping the negotiations
for Turkish entry. Whether you are in favour of Turkish entry
or not it ought to be decided on its merits and not because of
some very small, regional, ethnic dispute on a little island in
the Mediterranean. If we do not get tough with Cyprus, that, I
suggest to you, is what is going to happen. It may not be you
or this Government but somebody is going to have to pick up the
pieces of this.
Mr Alexander: Let me begin with
where we stand in terms of the Annan 5. The Foreign Secretary,
I understand, following his appearance before your Committee in
December, at the turn of the year travelled to the Republic of
Cyprus and, indeed, then visited the so-called TRNC and met with
Turk leaders there. The reason that the Foreign Secretary made
that visit was to reflect the concern that we do feel about finding
a way forward in the dispute. Clearly, there was genuine disappointment
in relation to the failure to achieve support on both sides of
the island to Annan 5 in terms of the referendums, but nonetheless
we continue to work with the Secretary General on this matter.
Indeed, prior to the Foreign Secretary's visit there was a statement
made by Kofi Annan welcoming the visit and encouraging the sides
to participate therein. Since that visit that has been made by
the Foreign Secretary there has been an agreement and I think
this followed the meeting between Papadopoulos and Kofi Annan
and by communal discussions on common concerns, and obviously
we welcome that. The reason I cite that is that, as you recognise,
this is not simply an issue for the European Union. The process,
in terms of a settlement, has been led through the good offices
of Javier Solana and we continue to support the Secretary General's
efforts in that regard. On your subsidiary point in terms of the
role of Northern Cyprus within the European Union, I suppose again
I would return to October 3 as rather a counter-point to the one
made in the sense that it is no secret that there were concerns
raised by the country of Cyprus in the course of those negotiations,
even in the final hours, but nonetheless on the basis of a great
deal of hard work and effort both by our diplomats and, also,
by the Foreign Secretary we were able to prevail and secure an
opening of accession talks. I do think, given what I have said
in terms of the need for transparency, conditionality and rigour
in the process, Turkey deserves to be treated in exactly the same
way—no more favourably and no less favourably—than
any other candidate country, and that will continue to be our
position and we will continue to argue that case within the European
Union.
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