Conclusions and recommendations
The UK's relations with Europe
1. We
conclude that the British Presidency took place at a time when
Europe was facing a deep and largely unforeseen crisis of confidence.
We further conclude that notwithstanding this difficult context,
the Presidency was on the whole well-run and achieved some important
successes, along with a number of disappointing outcomes. It failed
to generate the fresh thinking on democracy and reengagement with
the public which the Prime Minister called for in his opening
speech to the European Parliament. We recommend that the Government
build on the successes and, in particular, that it work to consolidate
and where necessary improve its good working relations with other
member states, especially with those that broadly share the United
Kingdom's perspective on the EU. (Paragraph 33)
2. We conclude that
the Government was wrong to retract its previous support for all
stages of the Council's deliberations on legislative acts to be
open to the public as a general rule. We recommend that the Government
support efforts by the Finnish Presidency to promote greater transparency
in the Council and more generally in the proceedings of the European
Union. (Paragraph 40)
3. We welcome the
decision of the Council of Ministers to seek further improvements
in decision-making and action in justice and home affairs on the
basis of existing treaties. However, we oppose attempts to use
the bridging clauses in the current treaties to introduce core
objectives of the constitutional Treaty in the field of justice
and home affairs. We recommend that the Government seek the views
of Parliament before agreeing to any further extension of qualified
majority voting. (Paragraph 46)
The Constitutional Treaty
4. We
conclude that although the Treaty is not dead, it is comatose
and on life support. At some point, Europe's leaders are going
to have to decide whether to switch it off. We conclude that the
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe is unlikely ever
to come into force, although attempts may be made to enact some
of its provisions by other means. We recommend that the Government
encourage its European counterparts to face up to this reality
and explicitly to abandon the Treaty as a package, in the interest
of making progress on some of the real and important issues which
are at present caught up in the paralysis created by its rejection.
(Paragraph 64)
Enlargement
5. We
conclude that there are strong political reasons for the Government
to maintain its support for the accession of Bulgaria and Romania
in accordance with the agreed timetable. We recommend, however,
that the Government be prepared to agree to the imposition of
post-accession safeguards on either country, if the Commission's
reports show that these would be justified. (Paragraph 74)
6. We conclude that
Croatia's proposed accession to the EU deserves the full support
of the United Kingdom, assuming that it meets all the necessary
criteria. We further conclude, and hope, that a successful accession
process by Croatia could play an important role in stimulating
other states in the Western Balkans to make the necessary adjustments
that will enable them to qualify for full membership of the EU
in due course. (Paragraph 77)
7. We conclude that
the accession to the European Union of a Turkey which fully meets
all the entry criteria remains in the interests of both the EU
and Turkey. We recommend that the Government continue to offer
strong support to Turkey in its accession process. (Paragraph
80)
8. We conclude that
it is the interests of Turkey, the Turkish people and Turkish
Cypriots alike that Turkey should move swiftly to accept in full
its obligations under the Ankara Agreement. We further conclude
that a far more constructive approach by the government of the
Republic of Cyprus is necessary to assist this process. (Paragraph
87)
9. We agree with the
Foreign Secretary that what is key to the enlargement debate is
the rigorous application of the criteria for membership. We conclude
that it is this, rather than any abstruse debate about 'absorption
capacity', which must determine the future shape and scope of
the EU. But we also conclude that popular opinion will be an important
factor in deciding future enlargements and that this reinforces
the need for a Union which engages the public. (Paragraph 93)
Foreign, Security and Defence Policy
10. We
conclude that, whatever the merits of the proposal to establish
a Foreign Minister and an external action service for the EU,
it is important that the European Commission should not develop
a diplomatic service or 'embassies' by stealth. We recommend that
the Government take steps to prevent the official use of the term
'ambassador' to refer to the Commission's representatives and
that it ensure that, at a time when the funding of British diplomatic,
consular and trade posts around the world is under great pressure,
expenditure by the Commission on its overseas delegations and
properties is subject to rigorous scrutiny. (Paragraph 101)
11. We conclude that
foreign policy is and should remain primarily a matter for each
nation state to decide for itself. We further conclude, however,
that there can be real value in co-ordinating foreign policies
at EU level and in undertaking joint missions on matters where
the EU25 can agree and where they have a shared interest. (Paragraph
106)
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