House of Commons - Foreign Affairs

Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Sixth Report

2 The UK's relations with Europe

The United Kingdom Presidency, July-December 2005

5. The United Kingdom assumed the presidency of the Council of Ministers with the dust from the French and Dutch referendums yet to settle. The 'period of reflection' had just been declared and great expectations of continuing progress towards ratification and implementation of the Treaty had given way to a more downbeat mood of apprehension.

6. There were nonetheless many substantial issues on the new presidency's agenda, including the budget settlement for the period to 2013; reform of the Common Agricultural Policy; Turkey's membership aspirations; and, not least, the fate of the constitutional Treaty. The then Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, identified four priority areas for the British Presidency in a statement to the House of Commons on 30 June 2005: future financing of the EU; economic reform; external relations; and enlargement.[11] We consider in brief how the Presidency fared in relation to each of these objectives, before we discuss in greater detail those which relate most closely to our terms of reference as a Committee.

FUTURE FINANCING

7. In June 2005, Mr Straw described the United Kingdom's objectives on future financing in the following terms:

Discussions on future financing will continue under the UK's Presidency. Any new Financial Perspective must, at the very least, set out a process which leads to a more rational budget, shaping the second half of that Perspective up to 2013. We recognise our responsibilities as EU Presidency, and we will work hard to reach agreement on future financing by the end of the year.[12]

The Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) sympathised with the scale of the task facing the Government, noting that:

… it is unfortunate for the UK to have found itself so central to disagreement on the EU's future finances ... Other EU member state governments will judge the UK on whether it reaches a deal on the EU budget. The British government will measure its success on this issue by its ability to reach a settlement that preserves the UK EU budget rebate on the basis of a formula that will not place the government in domestic political difficulties.[13]

8. Appearing before this Committee in the throes of the negotiations over the budget in December, Mr Straw said that "These are complex negotiations. They always are; they always will be."[14] He set out for us the numbers which formed the basis of the discussion in the European Council:

The Commission recommended a budget set at 1.24 per cent of what is called GNI (gross national income) of the European Union Member States, which would have been 1,025 billion euros over the seven-year period, and that was impossible. The Luxembourg Presidency recommended a budget of 1.06 per cent of GNI, which is 870 billion euros. We are proposing in last Wednesday's negotiating box a budget of about 1.026, and it is 847 billion.[15]

The final settlement achieved in the European Council was for a seven-year budget of €862 billion, representing 1.045 per cent of GNI. The Council also agreed as part of the 2007-13 financial perspective to ask the Commission "to undertake a full, wide ranging review covering all aspects of EU spending, including the CAP, and of resources, including the UK rebate, to report in 2008-09."[16]

9. Before the commencement of the British Presidency, the Prime Minister had declared in June 2005 that "The UK rebate will remain and we will not negotiate it away. Period."[17]

10. At the December European Council, however, the Government agreed that, as part of the overall budget settlement, the United Kingdom's rebate of total allocated expenditure—except for CAP market expenditure—in the ten new member states will cease by 2011.[18] This will mean that in the period 2007-13 the United Kingdom will receive approximately £7 billion less in rebate than it would otherwise have done,[19] and will be paying a net contribution to the EU budget which will rise from the present average of £3.5 billion per year to some £6 billion per year.[20]

11. The Prime Minister summed up the budget deal when he made a statement to the House of Commons on 19 December:

The reason it was so important to reach agreement at this European Council is as follows: as all central and eastern European leaders made clear to me, it was essential to have a December deal, to allow these countries to plan and prepare for using the EU funds when those funds start in twelve months' time. It was clear that the prospects for a deal next year were negligible. And were there to be no deal, then in 2007, the European Parliament would take over the budget process. This would mean the Parliament setting annual budgets, on the existing financial agreements, which would have meant that countries like Poland would have lost around two thirds of their EU funds.

That is why they wanted a deal now. Of course, there is also a need for fundamental reform of the EU Budget. As I said in June, what we need is to settle the Budget on the basis of everyone paying their fair share of the costs of enlargement now; and then to open up the prospect of a radically reformed Budget midway through the next Budget period.[21]

12. Charles Grant felt that the fact that agreement had been reached on the budget was of greater importance than the agreement itself:

One would have liked a different deal, with a radical agreement to reform the CAP and so on, but I think it was the best deal that was possible in the circumstances. I part company from some commentators and my former employers at The Economist who would have said it was better to do no deal at all. The important thing is that there was a deal. The details are less important, and the fact that it is off the agenda is a good thing. It was a poisonous thing while it was on the agenda. If we had not done a deal, we would have spent the rest of this year arguing about it instead of dealing with real problems in the real world.[22]

However, he described the outcome as "a fair deal" for the United Kingdom.[23]

13. Ruth Lea acknowledged the significance of the budget settlement for 2007 to 2013, but felt that:

… arguably, of course, it was a very disadvantageous agreement in the end for Britain; and the Chancellor of the Exchequer has made it very clear that we will be losing another 7 billion over that particular period by way of our abatement. The Government was making the point that it wanted to negotiate the abatement in connection with the reform of CAP, but that, of course, did not happen and will not happen for quite some time.[24]

14. In May 2006, the then Minister for Europe, Douglas Alexander, told us that:

I would argue that in what was ultimately agreed among the heads of government at the December European Council and what is now being followed through in the institutional process, we achieved what many regarded as being very unlikely, which was to find the common ground and consensus on the issue of the European budget.[25]

The final verdict on whether the deal reached on the budget was a good one for the United Kingdom and, indeed, for the European Union as a whole, will have to await the outcome of the mid-term review of the CAP and other expenditure.

ECONOMIC REFORM

15. On economic reform, Mr Straw had this to say as the British Presidency began:

At issue here is not a choice of prosperity or social justice, but rather, what combination of policies can best deliver prosperity and social justice in today's European Union. In this context, we will continue to work for more effective European regulation. … And we will be looking to improve the policy-making process with better consultation and impact assessments. Meanwhile we will pursue discussions on the Services Directive. We will continue work on financial services, and on resolving the difficulties over the Working Time Directive in a way which preserves the freedom of individuals to work the hours they choose, and which maintains the Government's ability to deliver high-quality health and public services. We will also pursue discussions on the review of the EU's Sustainable Development Strategy.[26]

The language in this statement is very cautious: the extent of the Government's ambition was limited to continuing previous work, "looking to improve" processes, and pursuing discussions.

16. Such caution was well-advised, as progress on deregulation and economic reform under the British presidency was unspectacular. Ruth Lea was particularly dismissive about this, although she did not blame the government for it.

I do not see anything coming from Brussels that suggests for a second that they would wish to deregulate the European economies. On the contrary, there is still the push towards bringing in extra regulation and the extra aspects of the social model and social protection.[27]

17. Economic reform of the European Union is not going to be achieved overnight, or even within the six-month term of a presidency. The modest aims set by the Government for its presidency were always likely to be achieved, but this does not mean that the Presidency was a success in this area; clearly, much remains to be done.

EXTERNAL RELATIONS

18. The former Foreign Secretary set out the Presidency's stall on external relations as follows:

Over the next six months we will chair EU summits with India, China, Russia, Ukraine and Canada, and host a Summit jointly with Spain marking the tenth anniversary of the Euromed process. We will pursue EU work on key foreign policy issues such as the Middle East Peace Process, Iran, and EU support for Iraq. The UK will represent the EU at the United Nations Millennium Review Summit in September, and follow up Europe's welcome new commitments on increasing aid and on developing a stronger action plan on Africa. … .[28]

19. The "key foreign policy issues" identified by the Government—the Middle East Peace Process, Iran and EU support for Iraq—each presented the British Presidency with huge challenges. In the Middle East, the unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and the realignments in both Israeli and Palestinian politics that began in 2005 meant that the Road Map to peace appeared increasingly irrelevant. The EU did, however, make an important contribution under the international agreement on movement and access to Gaza, by sending a multinational team of police and customs officials under Italian command to the crossing point at Rafah, which members of this Committee visited in November 2005.[29]

20. The situation with regard to Iran deteriorated significantly in 2005, with the inflammatory statements on Israel and the Holocaust by President Ahmadinejad and a continuing failure by Iran to abide by its commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The efforts of the EU3—the United Kingdom, France and Germany—which had achieved encouraging progress in 2003 and 2004, were insufficient to bring Iran back into line. The human rights situation in Iran also failed to improve.[30]

21. On Iraq, the EU has been unable to make substantial progress due to the continuing insecurity in that country. Speaking almost six months after the end of the British presidency, the Foreign Secretary told us that:

… the new Iraqi Foreign Minister … was giving the Council an update on the position in Iraq. He was also seeking an expanding role for the European Union as an entity and support from Member States in the UN in order to assist in getting economic reforms and security reforms as the new Iraqi Government of National Unity is seeking, and there seems to me to be quite a warm response to that and a recognition of the importance and the value that can be achieved if we can establish a stable democratic government in Iraq.[31]

The security situation has remained very difficult. When members of the Committee visited Baghdad and Basrah in January we saw for ourselves the difficulties faced by international bodies such as the UN or EU working in Iraq, which are at present so great as to call into question the value of those organisations maintaining a significant presence on the ground.[32] This does not mean that there is no value in continuing EU political and economic support, but it clearly imposes limitations on the effectiveness of that support.

22. The action plan on Africa, The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership, was duly adopted at the December 2005 Council.[33] In its own words, the strategy:

… sets out the steps the European Union will take with Africa between now and 2015 to support African efforts to build such a [peaceful, democratic and prosperous] future. It is a strategy of the whole of the EU for the whole of Africa. It takes into account regional and country-specific needs and African countries' national strategies. Its primary aims are the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and the promotion of sustainable development, security and good governance, in Africa.[34]

It is of course beyond the capacity of the EU alone to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, but so far there are few signs of real progress towards many of them.

ENLARGEMENT

23. We consider the substance of the issues relating to enlargement in the next Chapter of this Report. For the purposes of the present discussion on the British Presidency, we ask whether the United Kingdom met the goals it set itself on enlargement. These were described by Jack Straw in his statement to the House:

Bulgaria and Romania signed a joint Accession Treaty with the EU on 25 April this year, and are scheduled to join in January 2007. Both still have much to do to implement the commitments which they have made, and the European Commission will report on their readiness this autumn. Last December, the EU agreed to open accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October this year, a decision which was reconfirmed by the European Council two weeks ago. Turkish membership of the European Union is a controversial issue for public opinion in parts of Europe. But the British Government remains strongly committed to Turkey joining the EU, and I know that we can draw on the support of Hon Members on all sides of this House. The European Commission yesterday published a draft framework for Turkey's accession negotiations. The EU and Turkey alike stand to gain greatly from a democratic and prospering Turkey anchored in Europe, a demonstration that Islam is compatible with the values of liberal democracy which form the bedrock of the European Union. The EU also stands ready to open negotiations with Croatia, provided that it co-operates fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. We strongly support the membership aspirations of the other countries of the Western Balkans, but they must, like all other EU applicants, meet the necessary requirements.[35]

24. Bulgaria and Romania still, in the words of Mr Straw, "have much to do", but Macedonia took its first steps as a candidate country under the British presidency. Accession negotiations with Turkey commenced on schedule in October 2005, when Croatia also opened its account.

25. Charles Grant was of the view that the EU's decisions on enlargement were the greatest achievement of the British presidency, and that British diplomatic skills had been instrumental in this:

I think that the Turkish deal in particular was really on a knife-edge, and might not have happened. The incredibly hard work by the British politicians and diplomats really helped that to happen, perhaps, as I say, against the odds.[36]

26. The opening of accession talks with Turkey was far from a foregone conclusion. As Douglas Alexander told us, the talks in October 2005 went "right down to the wire" and were only completed by changing the clocks to Greenwich Mean Time:

I think by almost any standard the achievement of the opening of accession talks was adjudged to be of historic significance and is therefore one of the other elements of which we are very proud in the course of the Presidency.[37]

We heard for ourselves when visiting Brussels just after the conclusion of the British Presidency that the negotiating skills of FCO officials had played a vitally important role in achieving the target of starting Turkey's accession process on time.

CONCLUSION

27. The British Presidency got off to a well-received start when, a few days before its formal beginning, the Prime Minister addressed the European Parliament. Mr Blair said to MEPs:

It is time to give ourselves a reality check. To receive the wake-up call. The people are blowing the trumpets round the city walls. Are we listening? Have we the political will to go out and meet them so that they regard our leadership as part of the solution not the problem? … The people of Europe are speaking to us. They are posing the questions. They are wanting our leadership. It is time we gave it to them.[38]

Towards the end of the Presidency, a Chatham House briefing paper suggested it had not fulfilled its early promise. The authors described the Prime Minister's speech as "a remarkable exercise in (briefly) boosting morale and raising expectations that the UK was to initiate a far-reaching debate on the future of European integration." However, "the speech, which was universally praised across Europe, was not systematically followed up by the UK government and was an early source of disappointment for other EU member state governments."[39]

28. Douglas Alexander's overall verdict on the Presidency was, unsurprisingly, positive.

I would reflect on those six months of the British Presidency as being six months during which we did make solid and in some cases substantial achievements against a set of circumstance which did not appear propitious when we inherited the Presidency in July.[40]

Ruth Lea's assessment was more downbeat; she labelled the Presidency "a rather disappointing performance".[41] She was also concerned that the way aspects of the Presidency were handled—such as the budget negotiations—had reflected badly on the United Kingdom, although the outcomes had in fact shown how conciliatory the British position had been:

I was surprised at how badly the British image suffered during the presidency because there were a lot of negotiations. Obviously the Budget was a very poisonous affair, as Charles has said. One of the aspects discussed in relation to the Budget was the idea that money should be concentrated on the new accession states and not so much on the relatively rich Member States that still take a lot of structural funds from the EU. That, in itself, seemed wholly sensible, although it did not get anywhere, but in relation to the way the debates developed, when Britain was arguing about keeping its abatement, its rebate, it seemed as though we were 'taking money away from the new accession states.' The way it seemed to be handled seemed to give the British image rather a bad deal, if I may say so.[42]

29. Charles Grant, too, was concerned about the way some of the discussions had been handled by the FCO:

We had a very good image at the start of the British presidency. The image was very good earlier this year for the reasons we are aware of, and then it started going wrong in June, when Britain vetoed the deal that most countries were prepared to sign up to. The east Europeans were particularly unhappy with the delay on agreement on the Budget. The British diplomats were rather surprised at how badly the east Europeans took it. I think that we took them for granted and assumed they were our natural friends, that they could not stand the French and that they would follow our lead. However, when they saw their own economic interests being affected by British policy they got rather annoyed. Subsequently during the presidency I do not think we spent enough time scratching their backs and being nice to them.[43]

When we visited a number of European capitals in January 2006 this subject certainly came up, but we do not believe that lasting damage has been caused to other countries' perceptions of the United Kingdom in Europe. Indeed, part of the problem may have been that some of the newer member states had unrealistic expectations of the British Presidency. Although it would be wrong for any country to take the support of another for granted, we believe that in the longer term, shared interests and values will ensure that the United Kingdom and many of the newer member states continue to work together closely in the institutions of the EU. The new Foreign Secretary, Margaret Beckett, told us that "My overall general impression … is that the EU is coming together in a way which has the potential to be very positive."[44]

30. Charles Grant also pointed out that some of the non-achievements of the Presidency were good outcomes for the United Kingdom, such as the failure to make progress on removing the United Kingdom's opt-out from the Working Time Directive.[45]

31. The Economist was less than overwhelmed by the British Presidency.

The score-sheet for Britain … looks poor. The British say that the start of accession talks with Turkey on October 3rd was a great achievement, but the original deal was struck last December. Nobody else thinks Britain has done much. … Normally, the game of assessing presidencies is just that: a game. But this time it may reflect something that is happening on the ground: Britain is becoming more isolated in the EU. This could have profound consequences for both Britain and Europe.[46]

32. The Chatham House paper, entitled Two Cheers for the UK Presidency, concluded that the Presidency "has been competent but uninspirational, rather than a disaster, and has a number of achievements to its credit."[47] The Financial Times, on the other hand, reported that:

Aides to Jose Manuel Barroso, the European Commission president, say there are signs that a 'new spring' could be in the air, claiming that relations between the 25 member states have been steadily improving. Mr Barroso believes the British EU presidency in the second half of 2005 played a key role, and the Hampton Court summit in October could be seen as a turning point.[48]

33. We conclude that the British Presidency took place at a time when Europe was facing a deep and largely unforeseen crisis of confidence. We further conclude that notwithstanding this difficult context, the Presidency was on the whole well-run and achieved some important successes, along with a number of disappointing outcomes. It failed to generate the fresh thinking on democracy and reengagement with the public which the Prime Minister called for in his opening speech to the European Parliament. We recommend that the Government build on the successes and, in particular, that it work to consolidate and where necessary improve its good working relations with other member states, especially with those that broadly share the United Kingdom's perspective on the EU.

Post-Presidency developments

Transparency and openness

34. During its Presidency, the United Kingdom proposed greater transparency for proceedings in the Council of Ministers.[49] The Council has tended to meet in private, not only when negotiating on sensitive issues, but also for most routine business. Since 1992, it has met from time to time in public—that is, its proceedings have been broadcast live to the press room—to debate the Commission's work programme or for set-piece debates. In 2000, the Council amended its rules to provide for a public debate on a major policy issue if a qualified majority of member states requested one.[50]

35. Following the Seville European Council in June 2002, the Council started meeting in public when some major legislative proposals subject to the co-decision procedure were presented or voted upon. This meant that discussions on foreign and security policy, and on many other important areas, were still held in private. In 2005 the EU's Ombudsman, Nikiforos Diamandouros, ruled that by conducting most of its business in private the Council was in breach of the obligation conferred by the Treaty of Amsterdam on all EU institutions to act "as openly as possible."[51] The Council retorted that the Ombudsman had acted beyond his remit, but the European Parliament gave its unanimous support to Mr Diamandouros in April 2006.

36. Possibly in an attempt to head off calls for full transparency in its proceedings, the Council agreed under the United Kingdom Presidency in December 2005 to meet with the cameras present for the presentation and final vote on all co-decision matters, but to continue meeting in private for most other business.[52] Two countries, the Netherlands and Sweden, added a declaration to the record of this decision, calling for "all stages of the Council deliberations on legislative acts open to the public as a general rule."[53]

37. Our colleagues on the European Scrutiny Committee asked Mr Alexander why the United Kingdom had not supported the Netherlands and Sweden in their call for greater transparency. In March 2006, he replied that the Government's objective "remains to push for all of the Council's legislative business to be opened up to the public". While the Government "fully supported" the views of the Netherlands and Sweden, "as Presidency we did not deem it appropriate for the UK to join their declaration."[54] The European Scrutiny Committee described this response as "feeble".

38. When the new Foreign Secretary, Margaret Beckett, appeared before us in June, we asked her about the apparent difference between Mr Alexander's previous comments and her own lack of enthusiasm for opening up Council meetings to the public. She said that the term 'legislative business', as used by Mr Alexander, did not include 'legislative proceedings'.[55] The former, she suggested, referred to initial discussions on the introduction of a proposal and to the final vote, whereas the latter comprised the detailed deliberations. To allow public scrutiny of these would, Mrs Beckett suggested, inhibit frank discussion in the Council and could mean that the real decisions were thrashed out elsewhere. This does not square at all with the former Europe Minister's "full support" for all stages of the Council deliberations on legislative acts to be open to the public as a general rule. The distinction between 'legislative business' and 'legislative proceedings' is not, so far as we have been able to discover, one that he made in those terms.

39. In the event, the June 2006 European Council moved further towards a policy of openness and transparency, resolving that the Council of Ministers should hold initial meetings on all legislative matters—not just those under the co-decision procedure—in public, and providing for all stages of such proceedings to be held in public where there is agreement to that effect.[56] The United Kingdom was apparently the only member state to argue against this step.[57] The Finnish Presidency in the second half of 2006 has already announced that it intends to make further progress with transparency.[58]

40. We conclude that the Government was wrong to retract its previous support for all stages of the Council's deliberations on legislative acts to be open to the public as a general rule. We recommend that the Government support efforts by the Finnish Presidency to promote greater transparency in the Council and more generally in the proceedings of the European Union.

NATIONAL VETO

41. There has been a tendency, reflected in the constitutional Treaty, for more of the Council's business to be conducted under the 'co-decision' procedure. Under this procedure, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament have equal roles in considering legislative proposals put forward by the Commission. Decisions in the Council are taken by qualified majority vote (QMV) and no country may exercise a veto.

42. In the period leading up to the June European Council, the French government formally proposed activating the 'passerelle' or bridging clause in the Treaty on European Union. Activation of the 'passerelle' clause requires a unanimous decision of the Council. The effect of activating the clause would be to enable legislative proposals concerning police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters to be agreed by co-decision and a form of majority voting (to be determined by the Council). This would remove the United Kingdom's veto from proposals for Europe-wide police and judicial cooperation. Early drafts of the presidency conclusions of the Council were understood to reflect this proposal.[59]

43. Historically, the United Kingdom has opposed moves towards greater use of QMV. In a White Paper published shortly after the draft constitutional Treaty, the Government stated that "we will insist that unanimity remain for Treaty change; and in other areas of vital national interest such as … key areas of criminal procedural law".[60] It appears that, by the time of the British Presidency, the Government's thinking had moved on.

44. Shortly before the June Council, we asked Mrs Beckett for her views on QMV in justice and home affairs. She told us that:

… there is a legitimate argument that runs that since, unfortunately, organised crime in particular, but crime in a number of other issues in this area are themselves cross-boundary, they are pan-European, and to insist that all of this can only be dealt with on the basis of not having QMV, not having a pan-European potential approach could be an area of weakness.[61]

However, she also insisted that "there are a number of areas, certainly some areas in this dossier, where the Government could well have red lines where we are simply not prepared to consider giving up the veto."[62]

45. The June European Council did discuss the decision-making process on justice and home affairs, but in its conclusions issued a relatively uncontroversial call to the Finnish Presidency "to explore, in close collaboration with the Commission, the possibilities of improving decision-making and action in the area of Freedom, Security and Justice on the basis of existing treaties."[63] On 28 June, the Commission made a new proposal to activate the 'passerelle' and thus to remove the national veto from a range of areas involving cooperation between national police and court services.[64]

46. We welcome the decision of the Council of Ministers to seek further improvements in decision-making and action in justice and home affairs on the basis of existing treaties. However, we oppose attempts to use the bridging clauses in the current treaties to introduce core objectives of the constitutional Treaty in the field of justice and home affairs. We recommend that the Government seek the views of Parliament before agreeing to any further extension of qualified majority voting.

ENERGY POLICY

47. Although the Government's January White Paper stated that "Advancing this [the EU Energy Policy] agenda will be a real priority this year", energy policy did not play an especially prominent part in the British Presidency.[65] It has since assumed a greater prominence. The March European Council 'invited' the Commission to "prepare a set of actions with a clear timetable enabling the adoption of a prioritised Action Plan by the European Council at its 2007 spring session." On 2 June, the Commission and High Representative Solana produced a joint paper, An external policy to serve Europe's energy interests.[66]

48. The FCO's pre-Council memorandum stated that:

Our aim for this Council is to maintain the momentum on this work, giving a clear mandate to the next (Finnish) Presidency to develop this work with the Commission. In addition, we want to ensure that external aspects of energy policy will be reflected fully in the Commission's Strategic Energy Review which is due for Spring 2007.[67]

This work is important, not least because of the EU's growing dependence on Russian gas supplies, and the construction of a gas pipeline from Russia to Germany. As Charles Grant told us, "whatever we do, we in Europe will depend on Russia for gas. Whatever scenario we plan, we will need a lot of Russian gas."[68]

MINISTERIAL APPOINTMENTS

49. The Government's ministerial 'shuffle' of 5 May 2006 brought Margaret Beckett to the FCO as Foreign Secretary and Geoff Hoon as Minister for Europe—a job Mr Hoon had previously filled for ten weeks in 1999.[69] Like his predecessor, Mr Hoon attends meetings of the Cabinet, but he is not a member of the Cabinet. When Mrs Beckett gave oral evidence to us on Europe within a few weeks of taking on her new role, she told us that neither she nor the Prime Minister favoured the Minister for Europe being a member of the Cabinet.[70] We look forward to continuing this Committee's regular pre-European Council scrutiny with the new ministerial team at the FCO.

11 HC Deb, 30 June 2005, cols 1450-52 Back

12 Ibid, cols 1450-51 Back

13 "Two Cheers for the UK Presidency", Chatham House Briefing Paper, available at www.riia.org/ Back

14 Q 1 Back

15 Q 15 Back

16 Council document 15915/05, 19 December 2005, available at www.eu2005.gov.uk Back

17 HC Deb, 8 June 2005, col 1234 Back

18 Council document 15915/05, 19 December 2005, available at www.eu2005.gov.uk Back

19 HC Deb, 19 December 2005, col 1564 Back

20 HM Treasury, European Community Finances: Statement on the 2006 EC Budget and measures to counter fraud and financial mismanagement, May 2006, Cm 6770 Table 3; and HC Deb, 31 January 2006, col 399W Back

21 HC Deb, 19 December 2005, cols 1564-5 Back

22 Q 91 Back