Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Sixth Report


4  Enlargement

Bulgaria and Romania: the next stage

65. Bulgaria and Romania are neighbours, and their applications to join the EU are taking place within the same time frame. They are, however, very different countries and they do not regard themselves or their EU aspirations as being inextricably linked.

66. Bulgaria established diplomatic relations with the EU in 1988 and submitted its application for EU membership in December 1995. Accession negotiations began in February 2000 and were concluded in June 2004, since when Bulgaria has effectively been on probation while its preparedness for full membership is assessed.

67. Romania's formal links with the European Community go back to 1974 and it applied to join the EU in June 1995. Its application was given the go-ahead at the Luxembourg European Council in December 1997, and at the Copenhagen Summit in December 2002, 2007 was agreed as the target date for Romania's accession.

68. The Accession Treaty between the Member States and Bulgaria and Romania, signed in Luxembourg in April 2005, provides for both countries to join the EU on 1 January 2007. It includes a 'safeguard clause' for both Romania and Bulgaria, which, if activated by unanimous agreement of the Council on the recommendation of the Commission, can delay accession of one or both countries by one year if either or both show a serious risk of being "manifestly unprepared" to meet the requirements of EU membership in a number of important areas.[89] Romania is additionally subject to a year's deferral if the Council, acting by qualified majority, decides it has not met its commitments in competition policy or a number of other specified areas.[90] The Council also has the option of imposing post-accession conditions on either country if they fail to implement or to meet commitments for a period of up to three years from the date of eventual accession.[91]

69. Charles Grant told us that he believed it had been a mistake to give Romania and Bulgaria a firm date for accession before they had complied with all the requirements for membership.

I think the problem in both those countries is one of administrative capacity. Politically I think they are fairly stable and reasonable countries these days, but do they have the administrations to administer EU rules and regulations efficiently, and do they have legal systems that can do that? The answer is probably 'no'. They are very corrupt. There are already some countries in the EU that are quite corrupt, but I think Bulgaria and Romania are particularly bad; and I think that letting countries in a bit too soon is very bad for the EU because it will give enlargement a bad name.[92]

Ruth Lea added that Bulgaria and Romania are "very, very poor countries indeed; … so that adds extra difficulties for those countries to absorb all the changes they will be expected to absorb."[93]

70. The Commission's document of 16 May 2006, Key findings of the May 2006 monitoring reports on Bulgaria and Romania, found there were still six areas in which Bulgaria's performance gave cause for serious concern:

  • setting up a proper integrated administration and control system in agriculture—agricultural payments represent a significant part of the EU budget. Any member state must guarantee the proper spending of such funds. Any shortcoming in this respect may delay the disbursement of funds or give rise to correction or recovery of the EU taxpayers' money;
  • building-up of rendering collection and treatment facilities in line with EU acquis on TSE and animal by-products—food safety is a main concern for all EU citizens, food products must fully respect all EU requirements;
  • tangible results in investigating and prosecuting organised crime networks—the existence of organised crime puts into question the rule of law in Bulgaria, it affects directly all citizens and their basic rights;
  • more efficient and systematic implementation of laws for the fight against fraud and corruption—corruption undermines public and business confidence in Bulgaria. It represents ongoing risks of fraud against the EU budget and funds, indirectly it has consequences on current EU taxpayers, it also hampers the economic development of Bulgaria by deteriorating the business climate;
  • intensified enforcement of anti-money laundering provisions—money laundering is a financial crime, linked to terrorist activities, tax evasion or false accounting. The fight of such a criminal activity is key for the security and financial interest of all Bulgarian and EU citizens;
  • strengthened financial control over structural and cohesion funds—it is in the direct interest of all Bulgarian citizens to fully benefit from EU funds, in particular for important infrastructural projects, so as to allow Bulgaria to catch up with other Member States and to become fully integrated in the EU.[94]

71. The same document found four areas of serious concern in relation to Romania:

  • fully operational paying agencies accredited for handling direct payments to farmers and operators under the common agricultural policy;
  • setting up proper integrated administration and control systems in agriculture—agricultural payments represent a significant part of the EU budget. Any member state must guarantee the proper spending of such funds. Any shortcoming in this respect may delay the disbursement of funds or give rise to correction or recovery of the EU taxpayers money;
  • building-up of rendering collection and treatment facilities in line with the EU acquis on TSE and animal by-products—food safety is a main concern for all EU citizens, food products must fully respect all EU requirements;
  • tax administration IT systems ready for inter-operability with those of the rest of the Union, to enable a correct collection of VAT throughout the EU internal market—the resource based on VAT is part of the revenue of the EU budget, therefore the proper collection of VAT is key for the financial interest of the Union.[95]

While it believes that both countries are on course for a 2007 accession if the present rate of progress is maintained and intensified, the Commission has deferred until October 2006 its final recommendation to the Council on the preparedness of Bulgaria and Romania for accession.

72. The Foreign Secretary was clearly concerned about some of these difficulties when she gave evidence to us in June:

I think there is a very clear and strong message going from the whole of the European Union's existing membership to Bulgaria and Romania, and because they are accession countries they are in attendance at the Council so they are not under any illusions, they hear all of this all the time, that they have to meet these standards and it is very important and crucial and if this requires a substantial increase and extension of effort then that is what will have to happen. But, of course, there is also the question because there is a timescale under the Accession Treaty, and I do not want to dwell on this too much because the emphasis has to be on 'You must meet these standards and that is required by the European Union before you become full members' and that has to be the emphasis for them. It is perhaps worth reminding the Committee, I am sure you are conscious of the fact, written into the Accession Treaty is the possibility of applying some post-accession measures so that, for example, access to the internal market could be restricted in some way, or there are areas on JHA issues where you could establish further monitoring. There is scope for that but obviously the pressure now wants to be on meeting them before they become members, not on a process afterwards.[96]

73. We had earlier discussed the position of Bulgaria and Romania with the then Minister for Europe, Douglas Alexander. He also referred to the possible application of post-accession conditions on these countries, if they join while concerns about aspects of their preparedness remain.[97] Mr Alexander's successor, Geoff Hoon, helpfully set out these provisions in a Note for the Committee:

The general economic safeguard clause is designed to deal with adjustment difficulties experienced in a particular economic sector or area following the entry of a new member state into the internal market. This would normally relate to sudden strong competitive pressure in a product market. During the three years following accession, a new member state may apply for authorisation to take protective measures while adjusting its economy to the pressures of the internal market, and an old member state may apply for authorisation to take protective measures with regard to a new member state.

The internal market safeguard clause may be applied in the first three years if a new member state has not met commitments it made in the accession negotiations, or the functioning of the internal market is under serious threat. It covers the area of the four freedoms and includes sectors such as competition, energy, transport, telecommunication, agriculture and consumer and health protection—including food safety. Measures are taken on a case-by-case basis. They may be decided before accession, to be applicable as from accession, and they may be extended as long as the situation is not remedied.

The justice and home affairs safeguard clause may be applied during the first three years after accession if there are risks of serious shortcomings in the way a new member state has transposed or implemented EU rules on mutual recognition in criminal law or civil matters. They may also be applicable beyond that date if the situation is still not remedied.[98]

74. The Committee intends to visit both Bulgaria and Romania later this year, to hold discussions with the governments and parliaments of those countries about their preparedness for membership of the EU. If we judge it appropriate, we will make a further report to the House. Meanwhile, we conclude that there are strong political reasons for the Government to maintain its support for the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in accordance with the agreed timetable. We recommend, however, that the Government be prepared to agree to the imposition of post-accession safeguards on either country, if the Commission's reports show that these would be justified.

Croatia

75. The decision formally to start Croatia's process of accession was taken under the British Presidency, in October 2005. Douglas Alexander told us that:

… obviously the opening of accession negotiations under our Presidency in the second half of last year we believed to be an important step, but it is now up to Croatia to work towards meeting those European Union standards and enable them to meet the standards in full before accession can take place, and, as you would expect, both the United Kingdom and the European Union is providing assistance to the Government of Croatia in those endeavours. Obviously, not least given the importance of full co-operation, the International War Tribunal, with the former Yugoslavia, as I mentioned, welcomed the capture of Ante Gotovina back in December and I think we reached the right decision to open negotiations with Croatia back at that 3 October meeting.[99]

76. There appears to be a general consensus that Croatia's accession is proceeding well and that Croatia will join the EU after Bulgaria and Romania. Charles Grant was particularly impressed by the way Croatia is handling the process:

The Croatians have put one chap in charge of it all and given him complete authority to boss around the various ministries and all the people around, and they have given him a huge negotiating team with the best advisors and officials, and he reports directly to the prime minister. There should not be a problem with the Croatian negotiations.[100]

77. We conclude that Croatia's proposed accession to the EU deserves the full support of the United Kingdom, assuming that it meets all the necessary criteria. We further conclude, and hope, that a successful accession process by Croatia could play an important role in stimulating other states in the Western Balkans to make the necessary adjustments that will enable them to qualify for full membership of the EU in due course.

Is Europe going cold on Turkey?

78. The history of Turkey's on/off relationship with the EU was set out by our predecessor Committee in a Report in 2002:

In a speech in 1924, Atatürk said 'The decline of the Ottomans began when, proud of their triumphs over the West, they cut their ties with the European nations. This was a mistake which we will not repeat.' It was this context that drove Turkey to be among the first countries to apply for membership of the European Economic Community, signing an Association Agreement as long ago as 1963. However, Turkey's progress towards membership has been slow. The Customs Union envisaged in the Association Agreement was put in place only in 1995. Turkey's rejection as a formal candidate for membership of the European Union at the Luxembourg European Council in December 1997, when many countries were accepted as candidates which until only a few years before had been communist dictatorships, engendered much anti-European feeling in Turkey. Turkish leaders claimed that Turkey's candidacy was being blocked on religious grounds, following comments by the Chairman of the European People's Party that 'the European project is a civilisational project. Turkey's candidature for full membership is unacceptable', and reports that the then German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, had described the EU as 'a Christian club'.[101]

Polls have consistently shown that throughout much of Europe, there is public hostility towards Turkey's membership. According to a Eurobarometer survey in July 2005, popular support in EU countries for Turkish membership ranged from a high of over 50 per cent in Hungary, to a low of just 10 per cent in Austria. The average support across the EU was just over one third.[102] The accession of Cyprus in 2004 has added a further complication for Turkey.

79. Charles Grant agreed that public opinion in the EU as a whole is not sympathetic to Turkey's accession as things stand, but he did not rule out a change over time.

If there were referendums tomorrow the result would be in no doubt at all; there would be a resounding 'no'. It is possible that when Turkey finishes negotiations, which I guess would be 10, 12 or possibly 15 years hence, the world will look different. … I do not think it is impossible that Turkey can join.[103]

Mr Alexander reflected the British Government's enthusiasm for Turkey's accession:

I stand by my earlier theory that I think it was of genuine historic significance that that decision was reached on 3 October. I think it is the right decision, not just for Turkey but also for Europe, and I think we would have sent a very damaging signal if we had suggested that there was not the prospect of a European future for a country like Turkey and obliged it to turn elsewhere in terms of its future economic, social and political development. All that being said, I have never hidden the fact, and nor has the British Government, that there are very considerable challenges which Turkey will have to rise to in the years, and it will be many years of work, between now and that accession being achieved.[104]

80. Our predecessor Committee last year reiterated its "previous strong support for Turkish membership of the European Union."[105] We conclude that the accession to the European Union of a Turkey which fully meets all the entry criteria remains in the interests of both the EU and Turkey. We recommend that the Government continue to offer strong support to Turkey in its accession process.

IS TURKEY GOING COLD ON EUROPE?

81. Mrs Beckett was upbeat about Turkey's chances of completing the accession process. She told us that she was "clear that Turkey is moving in the right direction."[106] Charles Grant was less impressed by Turkey's approach to accession:

… the whole Turkish attitude to the negotiations worries me a bit. They do not really understand that negotiating to join the EU is not a negotiation; the EU tells you what to do and you do it. That is what happens, and you can argue about the timing of certain things, and right at the end when you get to the budget and you argue a bit about money there is a real negotiation; but most of the negotiations are not negotiations at all. If you are the negotiator for Turkey or Croatia, what really happens is that you have to negotiate with your domestic bureaucracy, with your domestic ministries, media and public opinion; and you have to persuade them that it is all good for them. One should not pre-judge Turkey because they have only just started, but I am not encouraged at the moment.[107]

We put this to Douglas Alexander, who observed that:

… the experience of the discussions prior to 3 October, both the weeks and the hours, suggest that the Turkish Government are strong negotiators, shall we say.[108]

82. Mr Grant went on to describe one possible scenario:

One thing that could easily happen is that Turkey walks away from the negotiations. A lot of people in Turkey are not going to be happy at the prospect of being bossed around by Brussels bureaucrats, if I could put it that way. The Turks are a very proud people, and they may decide that it is not worth going ahead. That is quite plausible. I know senior Turks who believe that that will happen several years down the road.[109]

Ruth Lea also felt that "It may be that if there are all these problems about negotiating membership, Turkey will say that it just is not worth the candle."[110]

83. Our predecessors were concerned in 2002 that, if Turkey were rebuffed by the EU, it might walk away, and look to the East for its allies. They were clear, however, that the bar could not be lowered for Turkey, and that Turkey must meet the same criteria as apply to any applicant state.[111]

TURKEY AND CYPRUS

84. One particular hurdle that Turkey finds more difficult to jump than do other applicant countries is the entry into a customs union with the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey does not recognise the Republic of Cyprus as a state with sovereignty over the whole of the island of Cyprus; since 1983, it has recognised the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' (TRNC) as the sovereign power in the northern third of the island, which is garrisoned by its own troops. The government of Cyprus has, meanwhile, successfully maintained an embargo on direct trade and transport links with the 'TRNC'. However, Turkey is required to extend its customs union with the EU to all ten new member states, including Cyprus, under a protocol attached to the Ankara Agreement which has since 1963 formed the legal basis for Turkey's accession. Mr Alexander referred obliquely to the need for Turkey to recognise Cyprus when he gave evidence to the Committee:

Turkey must apply the Ankara Agreement Protocol fully to all Member States and the EU will monitor this closely and evaluate full implementation in 2006; so that will be a particular challenge facing Turkey in the course of this calendar year.[112]

85. The Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Erdoðan, is facing re-election next year and has been unwilling to risk the electoral consequences of breaking the link between Turkish insistence on opening up the ports and airports of northern Cyprus, and Turkey opening up its ports and airports to carriers registered in the Republic of Cyprus.[113] Turkey's progress towards accession will be assessed later in 2006 and there is a strong possibility that if it has failed by then to open its ports to Cypriot-flagged vessels it will be held to be in breach of its obligations under the Ankara Agreement.

86. By no means all the obstacles to Turkey's accession in connection with the Cyprus problem have been of Turkey's making. Speaking in January 2006, Charles Grant told us that:

… the Greek Cypriot Government has really been very, very difficult and obstructive and has prevented the EU from giving the aid to northern Cyprus which it promised, and it has prevented flights going from Turkey to northern Cyprus, which really destroyed the northern Cyprus tourist industry. The Greek Cypriots have been very difficult indeed. I am not saying that the Turks have been that reasonable either on letting Cypriot ships into their ports, but I think the real problem at the moment is that the Greek Cypriots are getting away with blue murder and nobody is prepared to get tough on them, namely the Greeks or the Americans or the British.[114]

This echoes a conclusion our predecessor Committee reached in their 2005 Report on Cyprus, in which they stated, in the context of the attitude of the Republic of Cyprus towards EU plans to improve the economy of the Turkish Cypriot part of the island:

… there is as yet little evidence that the Republic of Cyprus has fully taken on board that its membership of the EU involves obligations, as well as opportunities.[115]

The decision of 8 July by the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders to resume intercommunal talks under UN auspices is evidence of a more positive approach.[116]

CONCLUSION

87. We agree with Charles Grant that Turkey has to accept the conditions under which membership of the EU is offered, and which are the same for all applicants. At the same time, existing member states, including Cyprus, should not treat Turkey's application any differently from how they treat those of other countries. We conclude that it is the interests of Turkey, the Turkish people and Turkish Cypriots alike that Turkey should move swiftly to accept in full its obligations under the Ankara Agreement. We further conclude that a far more constructive approach by the government of the Republic of Cyprus is necessary to assist this process.

The EU's 'absorption capacity'

88. There is of course a tension between enlarging Europe to include more members, and deepening the integration of its existing members. To make Europe both wider and deeper is a great challenge, a challenge which the Constitutional Treaty was intended to meet. Charles Grant articulated this in evidence to us:

There was an unwritten deal at the heart of the EU for the last twenty years, which has been a bit more deepening for a bit more widening. Successive waves of enlargement for the last twenty years have been matched by successive waves of treaty-based integration. If we are agreed, as perhaps we are in this room, that treaty-based integration has stopped because there is not going to be any big new treaty for a very long time, I am afraid that means that enlargement scepticism grows, and there is a great reluctance amongst political elites in Europe to enlarge. They think that more enlargement without changing the institutions significantly will lead to a looser, less effective, less efficient European Union.[117]

Ruth Lea said that "it was always the British strategy to widen, so they would not have deepening, but the truth is that we have got both."[118]

89. We asked Mr Alexander about the EU's 'absorption capacity', but he declined to suggest any limit on the Union's expansion and was enthusiastic about the prospect of further enlargement, although he underlined the need for the conditions of membership to be fully met by candidate countries.[119] Neither is the failure to adopt the Constitution seen as a bar to further enlargement; the Foreign Secretary told us that "Enlargement certainly can proceed without a constitutional change."[120]

90. Mrs Beckett, too, declined to place a limit on the EU's potential membership, preferring to stress that "what I do think is key is that the enlargement process is properly and rigorously conducted. I think that is the key and that is more likely to be a relevant factor in the pace of change or the pace of enlargement than anything else."[121] Charles Grant said that he was "rather pessimistic" that further enlargement would take place after Croatia joins, partly because France is committed to holding a referendum on any future enlargement, which Mr Grant sees as symptomatic of a wider European disenchantment.[122]

91. Some countries, notably Austria, which held the presidency directly after the United Kingdom in the first half of 2006, have been lukewarm or even hostile to further enlargement. The United Kingdom Government however, has maintained its enthusiasm for a widening of the EU. The FCO's memorandum to us in advance of the June European Council stated,

We want to ensure the EU sticks to its existing commitments on enlargement and to ensure that any changes to the EU's policy do not rule out the possibility of future enlargements.[123]

At the Council, the United Kingdom, Sweden and other member states successfully faced down an attempt by Austria, France and Germany to define the term 'absorption capacity' and to include it among the criteria for deciding whether to accept new candidate states.[124] However, the Council agreed to return to the issue in December, by when the Commission will have prepared,

… a special report on all relevant aspects pertaining to the Union's absorption capacity [which will] also cover the issue of present and future perception of enlargement by citizens and should take into account the need to explain the enlargement process adequately to the public within the Union.[125]

92. However, the United Kingdom has not clarified which countries might be in, and which might stay out in the longer term. Although some of the countries in the Maghreb have talked up their own chances of joining Europe—Morocco is no more distant from Europe than is Asiatic Turkey—North Africa is by definition not part of Europe. Are Ukraine, Moldova and even Belarus, all of which are definitely part of geographical Europe, potential members of the EU? We certainly heard views that they should be when we visited European capitals last January. But even if some of these countries were to satisfy the Copenhagen criteria and to be accepted as candidate members of the EU, there must be serious doubt concerning the EU's capacity to absorb them, and their ability to adjust to membership given their economic and social problems.

93. We agree with the Foreign Secretary that what is key to the enlargement debate is the rigorous application of the criteria for membership. We conclude that it is this, rather than any abstruse debate about 'absorption capacity', which must determine the future shape and scope of the EU. But we also conclude that popular opinion will be an important factor in deciding future enlargements and that this reinforces the need for a Union which engages the public.


89   Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Treaty concerning the accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union, Cm 6657, August 2005, Article 39  Back

90   Ibid., Annex IX, points I and II Back

91   Ibid., Articles 36-38 Back

92   Q 126 Back

93   Q 126 Back

94   "Key findings of the May 2006 monitoring reports on Bulgaria and Romania", European Commission, May 2006 Back

95   "Key findings of the May 2006 monitoring reports on Bulgaria and Romania", European Commission, May 2006 Back

96   Q 236 Back

97   Q 189 Back

98   Ev 59 Back

99   Q 192 Back

100   Q 134 Back

101   The Foreign Affairs Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2001-02, HC 606, para 7 Back

102   See "Analysis: EU views on Turkish bid", BBC News Online, 30 September 2005, news.bbc.co.uk Back

103   Q 110 Back

104   Q 193 Back

105   Foreign Affairs Committee, Second Report of Session 2004-05, Cyprus, HC 113, para 163 Back

106   Q 242 Back

107   Q 134 Back

108   Q 194 Back

109   Q 134 Back

110   Ibid Back

111   Foreign Affairs Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2001-02, HC 606, para 24 Back

112   Q 195 Back

113   "Fronts between Turkey and EU harden over Cyprus", EurActiv.com, 20 June 2006 Back

114   Q 135 Back

115   Foreign Affairs Committee, Second Report of Session 2004-05, HC 113, para 103 Back

116   "Cyprus leaders agree peace moves", BBC News Online, 8 July 2006, www.news.bbc.co.uk Back

117   Q 114 Back

118   Q 118 Back

119   Qq 183, 186 Back

120   Q 232 Back

121   Q 234 Back

122   Qq 117, 118 Back

123   Ev 63 Back

124   "New entry hurdle for EU hopefuls removed", EU Observer, 16 June 2006 Back

125   Presidency Conclusions 15-16 June 2006, para 53 Back


 
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