Written evidence submitted by Professor
Jude Howell, Director, Centre for Civil Society, London School
of Economics
KEY GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES IN CHINA
1. INTRODUCTION
1A. China has enjoyed unprecedented rates
of growth for well over two decades. It is now the fourth largest
economy in the world, a significant trade partner for the USA
and Europe, and the world's largest manufacturing workshop. To
fuel its feverish expansion and the growing demand of consumers,
Chinese producers have been hurriedly criss-crossing Africa, Latin
America and the Pacific in search of minerals, energy, and land.
The Chinese economic miracle presents on the one hand a model
for development for ailing Sub-Saharan Africa countries and on
the other hand a threat both to developing countries and increasingly
nervous Western governments. Its economic rise has in turn been
matched by a growing presence in global institutions and politics
and, for the USA—particularly in relation to the Asia-Pacific—a
disturbing modernisation and strengthening of its military capabilities.
1B. The fundamental restructuring of the
economy coupled with the rapid rates of growth have in turn brought
about significant changes in the structure of society, in the
distribution of wealth, in values, attitudes, and expectations.
The breakdown of rural-urban barriers to mobility, the changing
nature of China's working class, the emergence of a new Chinese
bourgeoisie and the rising inequalities across regions, generations
and classes have considerably complicated the processes of governance.
In this paper we outline some of the key governance challenges
facing the Chinese Communist Party, their efforts to address these
and the constraints they encounter in doing so. We also consider
the implications of these for the future trajectory of Chinese
politics.
2. GOVERNANCE
CHALLENGES, REFORMS
AND CONSTRAINTS
2A. Whilst China's economic system has undergone
fundamental change over the past quarter of a century, its political
institutions such as the Chinese Communist Party, the state administration,
the National People's Congress, the legal establishment, its mass
organisations such as the All-China Federation of Trade Unions
have varied considerably in their desire for and capacity to adapt
and change. This in turn has affected their ability to deal with
a range of complex governance challenges that have emerged in
the process of reform. How the Chinese Party/state has dealt with
these reveals not only some of the pathologies of the Leninist-state
machinery but also some of the emerging ideas about the direction
of institutional and political reform. We address here four closely
related governance challenges, namely, legitimacy, social order,
state administration and social welfare.
2B. Legitimacy
2Bi. Throughout China's post-Liberation
history political leaders have utilised ideology in their struggles
for power both to discredit their opponents and to justify their
right to rule. Mao's radical interpretation of Marxist-Leninism
led to a new version of socialist ideology, namely Maoism, that
gave peasants as well as workers a leading role in the process
of revolutionary transformation. During the heady days of the
Cultural Revolution contending political factions deployed the
language of class struggle and Maoism in their efforts to gain
control of the Party and assert their dominance over society.
With the downfall of the Gang of Four in 1976 and the subsequent
rise of the economic reformers centred around Deng Xiaoping, the
mobilising force of socialist ideology began to wane. Credentials
of "redness" gradually gave wave to the merits of expertise.
The devastating experiences of certain social groups and individuals
during the Cultural Revolution, and in particular, intellectuals,
those with a so-called capitalist background, and those labelled
as Rightists, coupled with a general fatigue with political campaigns,
rallies, and meetings, rendered the interpretation and making
of ideology increasingly a matter for Party members and dedicated
political scientists and philosophers rather than the general
public.
2Bii. In the reform period the Chinese Communist
Party has nevertheless tried continuously to rework socialist
ideology to reflect its goals of modernisation, the direction
of economic reforms, and the changing fabric of society. In its
most recent formulation the term "socialist market economy"
is used to capture the momentous changes in the economy and the
vision of the future. However the Party is unable to use any longer
socialist ideology as a mobilising discourse to rally support
for its policies. Though in international political engagements
China uses its ideological armoury to position itself in relation
to others, it cannot rely upon socialist ideology to legitimise
its rule domestically. This is not only because of a general tiredness
amongst the populace with political ideology, and amongst the
younger generation an increasing sense of its irrelevance, but
it is also because of the disjuncture between the content of ideology
and reality. To illustrate, the persistence in maintaining that
the working class and peasantry are a leading force in society
clashes with the actual decline in the social and economic position
of many workers and peasants in China. In his July 2001 speech
Jiang Zemin's introduced the notion of the "Three Represents",
which acknowledged the role of private entrepreneurs in China's
economy and society and paved the way for the re-opening of Party
membership to them. Whilst such a move may be strongly inspired
by pragmatism and expediency, the idea of capitalists joining
a communist party is an oxymoron.
2Biii. Given the declining potency of socialist
ideology as well as its increasingly contradictory elements, the
Chinese Communist Party has to rely on other means for justifying
its rule and filling this ideological vacuum. In moments of perceived
external threat the Chinese government has played on nationalist
sentiments to rally support, as illustrated in the protests following
the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia or the recent
demonstrations against Japan. Recourse to nationalism has been
episodic rather than a recurrent theme in everyday political life.
However, it has considerable appeal both domestically and amongst
China's recent diaspora and can be readily mobilised to demonstrate
China's disapproval of specific external events or relations.
2Biv. Legitimacy is of course a complicated
concept. Given the weak resonance amongst the Chinese populace
of socialist ideology and the episodic nature of nationalism,
the Chinese government relies also on two key capacities to justify
its rule. These are first, its capacity to create and maintain
an environment in which growth and prosperity can flourish; and
second, its capacity to maintain social order. China's astounding
economic performance over the last two decades is an important
source of legitimacy for the government. There is then the risk
that any decline in economic performance, and/or any serious negative
consequences of say WTO entry will backfire on the legitimacy
of the government. How the government manages the economy in adverse
conditions will thus be crucial to the validity of its claims
to rule. Related to this is the maintenance of social order, which
as we will see below has become increasingly worrisome for top
Chinese leaders.
2C. Social order
2Ci. The idea of chaos or disorder (luan)
is a powerful concept used by Chinese leaders to express caution
about and to resist any attempts at unwelcome change. It evokes
memories and accounts of periods of disorder in China's history,
the most recent major period being the Cultural Revolution. Maintaining
social stability is thus a key concern of China's reformers. The
rapid restructuring of the economy since 1978, and in particular
the decollectivisation of agriculture, the expansion of the private
sector, greater global economic integration, and the relaxation
of barriers to rural/urban mobility has led to changes in the
nature of society. The social composition of the working class
has diversified, with rural migrants now forming the mainstay
of employees in foreign companies and many domestic exporting
factories. The closure of state-owned enterprises has created
a new phenomenon of laid-off workers and expanded the army of
the unemployed. The growth in the domestic private sector, especially
since 1992, has cultivated a new stratum of entrepreneurs. Managers,
technical experts and graduates working in foreign businesses
are part of a new emerging middle class. At the same time the
reform process has exacerbated certain inequalities such as regional
disparities between coastal and inland areas, and created new
forms of vulnerability and deprivation as seen in China's urban
poor.
2Cii. Dissatisfaction with the growing income
disparities across generations and between different social groups
has fuelled an ever-rising number of protests across China. Pensioners
who have not received their pensions, former state enterprise
workers who have been laid-off, migrant workers who have not been
paid their wages or been subject to abusive managerial practices,
farmers who have not been adequately compensated for their land,
urban-dwellers whose houses have been demolished to make way for
new roads and office-blocks; all have voiced their grievances
through various kinds of actions such as street protests, blockades,
storming of government buildings, strikes, petitions, writing
letters, and court cases. Over the past two decades letters and
complaints and petitions received by courts at all levels have
risen almost 500 times. In 2004 alone over 3.76 million people
took part in 74,000 protests. In 2005 the number of protests rose
to 87,000. Given the restraints on reporting, these figures are
likely to be underestimates.
2Ciii. In addition to these grievances that
relate to the rapid processes of change, the Chinese government
has also to deal with ongoing ethnic unrest, particularly in the
provinces of Xinjiang and Tibet. It recently signed an agreement
with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Commonwealth
of Independent States to work together against the "terrorist"
activities of groups seeking a united Turkestan. Also worrying
for Chinese leaders are any perceived attempts to mobilise a political
challenge to its rule, recent examples being Falun Gong, the 1989
Democracy Movement, and the short-lived rise of the Democracy
Party in 1998. The Chinese government has responded to these forms
of social unrest by using its coercive and repressive powers to
quell any challenge to its political authority and by deploying
a range of measures for other forms of social protest such as
resolving matters through the courts, higher-level intervention
to appease, negotiate and resolve, detaining the leaders of protests
and so on.
2Civ. These manifestations of social unrest
highlight not only growing awareness of rights and the rule of
law, but also the inadequacies of existing institutional mechanisms
for mediating interests. In the pre-reform period the Chinese
Communist Party relied upon its mass organisations, and in particular
the All-China Women's Federation, the All-China Federation of
Trade Unions and the Communist Youth League, as channels for the
dissemination of Party policy downwards to respectively women,
workers and youth, and the reflection of their interests back
upwards. With the changes in the fabric of society and economy
in the reform period, these institutions have struggled hard to
adapt to the changing needs of their constituencies and have varied
in their degree to innovate, restructure and adapt. At the same
time new forms of more autonomous organisation have mushroomed
in the more relaxed ideological climate of the reform period,
both supplementing and implicitly challenging the authority of
these Leninist institutions of interest intermediation. However
the restrictive regulatory framework governing social organisations
continues to be a key barrier to the flourishing of this realm
of non-governmental organisation and therefore to the open, public
expression of grievances and interests. To the extent that the
Chinese government attempts to contain the realm of autonomous
organisation and activity, the more likely it is that grievances
become expressed through social protest and issues of social order
abound.
2D. State administration
2Di. In the wake of the Cultural Revolution
one of the key goals of the reformers was to modernise the state
administration, and in particular, to recruit "experts"
rather than "reds" into its machinery. Over the course
of the next decade Deng's followers gradually eased out any "leftist"
opposition, poorly educated or incompetent administrators at all
levels by appointing reform-minded leaders to key positions and
changing the entry and promotion requirements for state bureaucrats.
To this end it called for a younger and more educated administration,
lowered the retirement age, and introduced civil service exams.
However, there are stark differences in the capacity of the administration
across regions, with levels of competence and technical expertise
tending to decline at lower levels and in poorer regions.
2Dii. In China the state administration
and the Party are closely fused systems. Most leadership positions
in the state bureaucracy are held by Party members and promotion
is contingent upon approval from the relevant Party committee.
Though there have been attempts to separate the Party from the
government, the two systems do not function independently, not
least because the Party has considerable interest in retaining
control over the administration. Corruption in the administration
thus also creates a problem for the Party, as corrupt leaders
are also likely to be Party members. The Party has continuously
sought to reduce pervasive corruption by strengthening disciplinary
processes within the Party, by investigating cases of corruption
and using the law courts to prosecute deviant officials. In 2005,
115,000 Chinese Communist Party members were punished for bribery,
influence peddling and other offences. The opportunities for corruption
created by government involvement in business contracts, coupled
with tight controls over the media and the limited spaces for
public monitoring, continue to thwart the Party's attempts to
clean up their act.
2Diii. Aware of growing public distrust
and dissatisfaction with government officials, particularly at
lower levels, and the endemic problem of corruption, the Party
has sought to improve the accountability of government officials
in various ways such as through responsibility contracts and at
lower levels through elections to leadership positions. Though
village leaders are not officially part of the state administration,
they play a key role in disseminating and implementing Party policies.
For example, they are required to raise taxes and grains from
farmers, to ensure the implementation of the Family Planning Policy,
and organise contributions in the form of labour to any local
infrastructural schemes. In the early 1980s it was already apparent
that there was a growing problem of order in the country side.
In some villages village committees had virtually collapsed; in
others the possibilities of pursuing alternative paths to wealth
creation rendered the positions of village leadership less desirable;
and in others village committees were staffed by old, or incompetent,
or corrupt leaders.
2Div. The gradual introduction of competitive
village elections across China from the 1980s onwards was part
of an attempt by the Party to re-establish order in the rural
areas, to enhance the accountability of leaders and thereby to
strengthen the base of the Party. In particular by encouraging
young, popular and competent candidates to stand for election,
the Party hoped that villagers would vote to oust corrupt, unpopular
and incompetent leaders, who brought the work of the Party into
disrepute. The village elections established mechanisms for greater
transparency such as the public display of accounts and for greater
accountability such as reporting back to villagers at annual village
assemblies. Competitive village committee elections in turn led
to the introduction of elections for village Party branch leaders
in some areas and to the experimental extension of the idea to
township level. In urban areas competitive elections for leadership
positions in communities and neighbourhood committees have also
taken off. Though the Party has promoted competitive elections
at lower levels, it remains resistant to extending these up the
hierarchy and to the idea of party-based elections.
2E. Social welfare
2Ei. The idea of a benevolent ruler has
been a key ingredient of state legitimacy in China's long history.
Faced with the enormous ruptures in society over the past two
decades, and in particular the widening disparities across different
regions and social groups, it is important for central Party leaders
to pay attention to protecting the vulnerable and less advantaged.
In this vein it is of note that in the last three years some senior
leaders have called for a shift away from a singular focus on
growth towards a more balanced approach to development. However,
in attempting to address issues of inequality and vulnerability,
which are increasingly a source of discontent, the Chinese Communist
Party faces considerable institutional challenges.
2Eii. With the diversification of ownership
forms and the restructuring of state enterprises the social and
welfare functions of work units (danwei) have been gradually
whittled away. In the pre-reform era the work unit in urban areas
often provided to varying degrees child-care facilities, housing,
entertainment, access to medical care and pensions. In order to
increase productivity and remain competitive, enterprises have
gradually shed these responsibilities. Similarly in rural areas
the disbanding of communes contributed also to the breakdown of
child-care provision, of access to and the provision of medical
care (which in any case was limited), and the weakening of support
systems for the elderly, disabled and vulnerable.
2Eiii. In the meantime the Chinese government
has attempted to establish new systems of social security and
social welfare such as unemployment benefit systems, medical insurance
and pension schemes, concentrating its efforts in urban areas.
Aware that it is unable to provide universal systems of welfare
provision, it has also increasingly looked towards communities
and social organisations to play a role. Cities such as Shanghai
have experimented with the establishment of community centres
that take on the functions of welfare provision. The government
has encouraged the formation of charities and associations such
as the China Charities Federation, the Shanghai Cancer Recovery
Club or the Centre for Women's Law Studies and Legal Services,
which set out to meet the needs of particular vulnerable groups.
In order to address issues of poverty in rural areas it established
a Poverty Alleviation Office, channelled funds to poor counties,
and encouraged international development agencies to fund projects.
2Eiv. However the institutional architecture
for the provision of social welfare and security remains fragmented
and piecemeal. As long as adequate systems for addressing poverty
and vulnerability are not in place, then any claims to be acting
as a benevolent ruler sound increasingly hollow, and undermine
the legitimacy of the Party. Though Party leaders encourage non-governmental
organisations to take on the delivery of social welfare services,
there is a reluctance to create a more conducive regulatory and
financial environment for their activities, such as providing
tax breaks or easing the registration requirements for social
organisations. This is not least because the Party also fears
that yielding more space to non-governmental actors might rebound
and undermine its power and authority. In other words it may be
prepared to tolerate an expanded and more active civil society,
but only so long as this serves the purposes of social welfare
and stability, a tension that is indeed not peculiar to China.
3. CHINA'S
FUTURE TRAJECTORY?
3A. A country of China's size and complexity
inevitably faces enormous governance challenges. In this paper
for reasons of space we have alluded to but some of the key governance
issues; others might have included the changing role of the National
People's Congress, the rule of law, elite politics, the control
of international crime, the role of the military, religion and
human rights. From the perspective of the UK two key related issues
are whether China will remain stable and whether, and in what
direction, it will reform politically. In politics it is always
difficult to predict with any accuracy what might happen next.
The fall of the Berlin Wall, the tanks rolling into Tiananmen
Square in 1989 and the events of 9/11 are all testimony to that.
There is always the unexpected, the contingent, the unimaginable.
3B. However it is likely that China will
remain stable over the next decade. The Chinese Communist Party
is unlikely to want to jeopardise the country's staggering economic
growth, its ascendancy in the global economy, and its growing
significance in international institutions. Secessionist struggles
on its Western borders and political developments in Taiwan will
be the key worries for Chinese leaders in terms of their external
relations. The high degree of decentralisation in China will continue
to be a source of tension between central and local governments
but China is not on the point of breaking up. Nevertheless the
Chinese Communist Party will have to work hard at maintaining
the country's stability. Crucial here will be its ability to address
the growing regional and income disparities, to establish effective
institutions for the mediation of interests, to strengthen its
own legitimacy, to develop adequate systems for protecting the
poor and vulnerable, and to relax its control over the spaces
for non-governmental action and for open public debate.
3C. In the run-up to the 16th Party Congress
in 2002 some Chinese intellectuals discussed openly the need for,
and indeed inevitability of, political reform. Further economic
reform would only happen if there was also political reform. China's
new generation of leaders remain quiet and cautious for the moment
about introducing political reform. The emphasis over the next
decade will likely be on enhancing the accountability of Party
and government leaders at all levels, of opening up somewhat debate
over public policy, albeit it in limited way, and of managing
the tension between encouraging and restraining civil society
so as to address social welfare issues. The idea of China becoming
a multi-party state engaging in competitive elections is remote.
However, it is likely to liberalise politically, not least because
with the internet, opportunities for travel, the return of internationally
trained graduates, and the increasing exposure of China to the
world, the demand for a more open regime will become harder to
resist. The trend towards political liberalisation will, however,
be punctuated by periods of coercion and repression as the Chinese
Communist Party struggles to manage dissent. The recent statement
by 13 retired senior officials and academics calling for greater
openness was an unusual response to government efforts to crack
down on the media, and in particular, to the closure of the liberal
publication, Bing Dian (Freezing Point) in January 2006. Such
high-level intervention coupled with mounting grassroots protests
suggest that recourse to coercive measures by the Chinese Communist
Party so as to stymie debate will not go unchallenged. In brief,
China will remain authoritarian but the boundaries of that authoritarianism
will be increasingly contested.
Professor Jude Howell
Centre for Civil Society
London School of Economics
6 March 2006
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