Written evidence submitted by Dr Patrick
M Cronin, Director of Studies, International Institute for Strategic
Studies
Northeast Asian security challenges have shown
remarkable continuity in the past two decades. The issues of managing
North Korea, Cross-Strait relations, and China's rise have been
consistent themes throughout the post-Cold War era and well before,
too. More broadly, additional security challenges may arise from
threats from nuclear proliferation, transnational terrorism, and
even conventional conflict, as well as from indirect or untraditional
challenges such as energy security, economic upheaval, humanitarian
disaster, and disease.
For the purposes of this paper, I would like to place
the constellation of extant and potential security challenges,
traditional and untraditional, into a taxonomy arranged by three
basic groups: the Northeast Asian Nation-State; Northeast Asia
as a region; and Northeast Asia in the international system. Although
this framework is far from the only way of looking at challenges
(for instance, those who would focus on human security would focus
as much if not more on how transnational and domestic forces affect
individuals), it captures a wide set of challenges. Moreover,
despite some redundancy, it also affords a broader look at security
risks than the aforementioned big three of North Korea, Cross-Strait
relations, and a rising China. Within these three categories one
might point to the following "dirty dozen" challenges.
1. NORTHEAST
ASIA AND
THE NATION-STATE
The concept of the nation-state in Northeast
Asia today is dynamic rather than static, and thinking about the
states there as unchanging could well open one to surprise. As
in other regions, Northeast Asia has been affected and shaped
by the forces of globalisation, which in turn have eroded the
monopoly of power traditionally associated with the nation-state
since the Treaty of Westphalia. But the nation-state in Northeast
Asia suffers from three chiefly internal challenges: physical
separation, ideological schism, and socio-economic barriers.
The Korean peninsula
The most fundamental physical divide is the
division of the Korean peninsula into two states. Each half of
the peninsula is a member of the United Nations, and the two halves
are marked by growing disparities in economic power and political
freedom. But each is also significantly armed, the Republic of
Korea backed by the world's superpower. North Korea, meanwhile,
continues to pursue nuclear and missile weapons programs that
could rapidly and profoundly affect the future well-being of the
region. But even irrespective of weapons of mass destruction,
managing the changing relationship between the peoples of the
Korean peninsula remains one of the salient challenges of our
time. Korean family ties and nationalism further complicate this
picture, as the dominant policy in Seoul aims to bring the two
Koreas closer, whereas the surrounding powers, to varying degrees,
are more worried about the actions of a North Korean state on
its last legs.
Cross-strait relations
Almost equally, the division of China that resulted
after the Chinese civil war in the late 1940s and killed some
3 million in the process has today become a complex relationship
of growing economic interdependence but continuing political stalemate
and friction. At least two nationalisms are in conflict: those
that would unite China, by force if necessary, and those that
would codify the de facto independence of Taiwan into de
jure independence, even if that were to incite conflict. The
issue of Taiwan is significantly more vexing than the myriad other
boundary disputes that the PRC has grappled with since its inception,
including with Burma, Nepal, India, North Korea, Mongolia, Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Russia, Bhutan, Laos, Vietnam, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan,
Hong Kong, and various offshore disputes (especially the Paracel,
Spratly, and Senkaku Islands). How Chinese on either side of the
Strait determine their future relationship could easily create
conflict and have a lasting impact on the region and beyond.
The DPRK as a failing state
The first ideological internal problem is that
of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as a failing state
with a bankrupt philosophy of juche. Self-reliance has failed
in every sector of society save weapons of mass destruction, and
those weapons do not provide a sustainable basis for regime survival.
The eventual collapse of the current leadership and government
and its replacement by a successor may well pose one of the largest
challenges to regional security. It seems only a matter of time
before the clash of ideologies between North and South force new
variations on current ruling philosophies.
The quest for Japanese identity
A second ideological problem emanating from
with the nation-states of Northeast Asia might be labeled the
ongoing Japanese quest for its identity and role in the world.
In the aftermath of the Second World War, Japan's identity quest
took a sharp turn into economic and domestic affairs. Today, however,
the politics of Japan are shifting to the right, and Japan is
increasingly in search of a wider, more normal role in regional
and global affairs. This quest has been accelerating since the
end of the Cold War with the rise of a more diverse set of global
challenges, China's continuing rise, and America's shift from
Asia to the Greater Middle East since September 11, 2001.
China's internal troubles
The fifth problem of the nation-state in Asia
is China's growing internal unrest, which in no small part is
attributable to the rapid economic growth of the coastal regions
and the attendant disparities in socio-economic status and influence,
as well as municipal corruption and poor local governance in the
western and internal regions of China. These disparities and local
problems have, at least since the early 1990s, given rise to a
growing number of largely hidden rebellions. It is difficult to
know the potential for even wider civil unrest in China, or to
assign a value on popular political dissatisfaction with the central
regime and the Party. However, the recent actions of Hu Jintao,
including a new commitment to redistribute wealth from wealthier
to more impoverished regions suggests the problems are growing.
China's internal troubles can no longer be fenced off from China's
growing prominent on the international stage. As a result, China
appears to be moving from a programme of suppression of unrest
to a programme that purports to begin addressing root causes—although
the jury is still out as to China's ability to manage these internal
troubles. Because open civil war is unlikely, there is only an
indirect security challenge namely, the fact that a China beset
with domestic difficulties may be less inclined and less able
to play the kind of external foreign, economic and security policy
that will reassure the broad international community that it is
becoming a responsible global stakeholder and that it is able
to address its diverse problems, from energy and the environment
to economic growth.
2. NORTHEAST
ASIA AS
A REGION
If the nation-state itself is a challenge to
security, the region is also marked by significant concerns. In
today's world, moreover, the region's boundaries are blurred by
the complex realities of international relations in the 21st century.
At the centre of these security concerns are the potential for
friction reflected in, if not also spurred on by, growing military
capabilities and stagnant security relations and institutions
(despite growing and strong economic ties).
The unconventional proliferation threat
Since the end of the Cold War, the region has
been threatened by an insecure North Korea that has sought to
guarantee its survival not by outside powers but by nuclear weapons
and long-range missiles. The thus far unsuccessful search to dismantle
these systems poses one of the most significant challenges to
regional and international peace and security. And the prospects
for success in the near-term are not bright. The Six Party Talks
have provided a process, but that process has still not managed
to put all of North Korea's nuclear programmes on the table. In
particular, North Korea appears ready to sell its plutonium—again—but
it also seems equally committed to keeping its highly enriched
uranium programme out of any negotiations. Meanwhile, one could
argue that equally lacking is the provision of security guarantees
and economic incentives for North Korea to move in this direction.
The notion that North Korea can be taken seriously with claims
that the United States is preparing for an invasion is more a
reflection of America's standing in the world rather than an objective
analysis of American military power caught in two civil conflicts
in the Gulf and Southwest Asia.
Increasing Sino-Japanese rivalry
The multi-faceted Sino-Japanese rivalry that
has flared up in recent months is likely to loom as a major security
challenges as both China and Japan vie for greater influence in
the world in the decade ahead. For Japan, the challenge is seen
as partly how to balance close ties to the United States with
ties to an increasingly powerful China. For China, somewhat unaware
of its own rising power, tends to cast the problem as arising
out of Japan's allegedly unrepentent historical transgressions.
Although the rivalry is mostly non-military in nature, at least
at this point, the number of Chinese conventional force incursions
into Japanese waters is likely to grow in the coming years. The
reality is that Japan and China have no agreed upon framework
for thinking about their future relations with one another, and
the repercussions of a rising Sino-Japanese rivalry may well influence
the region in this century.
Potential economic upheavals
Notwithstanding the relatively good economic
ties in the region and between the region and the global economy,
a sudden downturn in the Chinese or Japanese or even Korea economy,
could well reverberate broadly and lead to growing security tensions
and competition. Sudden fluctuations in either Japan's or China's
economy cannot be cause ripples around the global economy. Meanwhile,
economic gains in Asia at the expense of other parts of the world,
namely North America and Europe, on the other hand, may well have
an impact on international security.
The absence of a regional security framework
The December 2005 attempt to demonstrate a regional
security ethos revealed the lingering problems preventing such
a single, acceptable structure. The main reason is that the dominant
Northeast Asia powers, especially China and Japan, simply do not
agree on a basic relationship or how to manage their own relations
in the region. Each feels the other is attempting to contain its
power and expand its own influence. Furthermore, it is still unrealistic
to speak of regional security without reference to the critical
role played by the United States. While it may be possible to
point to a gradual emergence of institutionalism or collective
security in East Asia, or even in Northeast Asia (with recent
mechanisms such as the Six Party Talks, which have dealt with
North Korea but may attempt to branch out into other issues, as
well), the complex triangular relations among China, Japan and
the United States make it difficult to take seriously the concept
of regional pan-securitisation. Meanwhile, Northeast Asia as a
region becomes overly circumscribed when dealing with broader
issues such as energy, the environment, and economics—all
of which are more easily considered with a wider numbers of actors,
from Russia and India to the ASEAN members.
3. NORTHEAST
ASIA AND
THE INTERNATIONAL
SYSTEM
Globalisation makes it increasingly difficult
to cut off the subregion of Northeast Asia from the rest of Asia—Southeast,
Central and South, and indeed from Europe, North America and beyond.
The chief tensions between Northeast Asia and the international
system may be referred to as the gap in addressing global issues,
global institutions, and the gradual transition in the global
balance of power.
Global issues
Energy, the environment, terrorism, epidemiological
risks have little respect for state or regional boundaries. Asia's
appetite for energy is already causing low-level competition around
the globe, even more so when major energy sources remain potentially
volatile or unsavory regimes such as those in Iraq, Iran, Nigeria
or Venezuela. The harder security challenge posed by radical Islamist
terrorism also requires more Asian participation and support,
whether in avoiding a clash of civilisations in general or grapping
with very particular transnational interactions on the part of
those pursuing their ends through terrorism.
Global institutions
The United Nations was created after the Second
World War to help preserve peace; today, the United Nations is
challenged by a need for fundamental reform. Of salient import
is the un-representativeness of the UN Security Council. If the
United Nations is to be relevant in the future, then reforming
the Security Council to better account for the distribution of
global power, including Asia's greater share of it, will have
to overcome the obvious political impedimenta. Global trading
institutions such as the World Trade Organisation will have to
bridge the current gap between developed and developing nation.
And new global institutions, for instance to deal with sudden
pandemics or environmental degradation, will have to receive greater
attention and support from the major actors—lest these threats
loom larger in future.
Rising Asia
China's rise, spurred by unremitting economic
growth, brisk diplomacy, and comprehensive military power, threatens
to eclipse not just Japanese power but, possibly, United States
global leadership. Political scientist John Mearsheimer is typical
of those who fear a nigh-inevitable clash among major powers as
China waxes and America wanes, replicating a perceived historical
pattern dating back at least to the long-drawn-out Peloponnesian
War and the struggle over the balance of power in the Hellenic
world between Sparta and Athens. As China's submarine activity
grows, it is an apt metaphor for the erstwhile China threat theory:
it remains submerged and does not appear to upsetting economic
interdependence any time in the foreseeable future. But these
fears and submerged concerns are real and could well take mutual
interests off course if left untended. Issues such as ending the
arms embargo against China are often placed in the context of
this long-term concern.
Perhaps the best way to treat deep distrust
and low-level competition is with frankness and transparency.
But here again is where the outlook for Northeast Asian security
clouded by the fundamental distrust among the major powers and
the absence of either a security community or even a web of interlocking
multilateral institutions that might keep the peace. Partly the
answer may reside at the moment in direct bilateral talks. Meanwhile,
let the private sector and market forces sow deeper integration
between China and the global economy. Peace is not assured, but
neither is it immediately at risk from a simmering military competition.
These 12 concerns, some overlapping to be sure,
underscore the unsettled nature of the Northeast Asian nation-state,
Northeast Asia as a separate or separable region, and Northeast
Asia's place in the international system. This essay is focused
on security challenges, and it has given little attention to each
of the positive forces at work in each realm of the state, region
and international system. Nonetheless, this framework is only
intended to be a starting point to help frame discussion about
possible security challenges emanating from Northeast Asia.
Dr Patrick Cronin
International Institute for Strategic Studies
14 March 2006
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