Examination of Witnesses (Questions 160-179)
DR DAFYDD
FELL, DR
PATRICK CRONIN
AND DR
JOHN SWENSON-WRIGHT
22 MARCH 2006
Q160 Ms Stuart: Can I probe a little
bit more on the riots. Previous witnesses to the Committee have
suggested that the number of riots which are being reported is
probably an underestimate but at the same time we should not regard
this as a problem to the establishment because it is a safety
valve for a system that does not have democratic accountability,
that actually the establishment is not as unhappy about these
riots because it lets off steam. The second thing I want to probe
you a little bit more is in relation to both the Japanese and
Chinese society. It is a society which is inherently suspicious
of things which do not conform. I think the West has got a real
problem of assuming that diversity is something desirable, which
I do not think, over the centuries, is something the Chinese have
always found desirable. To what extent are we reading these events
which we see in their appropriate context? It is not the simmering
dissent which would lead to democracy as we know it; it is a safety
valve of a society that will not achieve democracy as we see it
for quite a long time to come and it is just simply their way
of surviving.
Dr Fell: I think in the actual
context of these riots and demonstrations, it depends what is
the actual target of them whether or not they are seen as a threat.
Most of them tend to be locally organised anti-pollution demonstrations
directed at a certain factory. That is not seen as particularly
threatening. Often the target of these riots or demonstrations
will be a local township government. Again, as long as it is not
directed at the central government or the Communist Party itself,
I think you are right that there is a kind of pressure valve there.
Dr Swenson-Wright: Of course the
importance of the pressure valve argument is the impact that it
has in terms of economic relations. Thirty per cent of Japanese
firms in a recent survey argue that, as a result of the riots,
they were willing to reconsider their investment strategy within
China, but it has not had an appreciable impact yet on the trade
figures or the investment figures. Japan's trade with China has
been growing at a rate of 12% over the last year, despite these
tensions. On the question of the extent to which these are two
societies that are inherently suspicious of foreigners, I cannot
speak for China; but I think in the case of Japan there is an
element of that but also Japan sees itself as predominantly an
internationalised society. It went through a great wave of internationalisation
in the 1980s. Because of demographic pressures, invariably, in
order to gain access to low-cost labour, Japan is going to have
to substantially reconsider its attitude to allowing foreign migration
to Japan, which will, I think, fundamentally over the long-term,
quite significantly change some of those attitudes, make Japan
inherently more open. Whether that leads to improvement in relations
with in China or not I do not know.
Q161 Chairman: Can I ask you some
questions about Japan's military policy and posture? Since 1945
Japan has had self-defence forces and it has not had, at least
in name, armed forces for wider activities but it has been involved
more and more in United Nations peace-keeping. I saw a Japanese
man in a helicopter when we were in Iraq in January taking a medical
evacuation, and clearly Japan has changed its view of its role
in the world. How is that affecting the issues of its defence
posture, where is that likely to go and how is that perceived
in China and also in Taiwan?
Dr Cronin: There is still an important
role to be played by outside powers. Let us roll back the history
a little bit to the United States' withdrawal from South East
Asia during the time of the Vietnam War and the Nixon doctrine,
which said, "We will keep air forces for the Asian Pacific
region, but we are basically pulling out ground troops."
It was then when the Japanese secretly decided that they would
even consider having a nuclear weapon. They were basically saying
this was the time for them to re-arm. I say this as a close friend
of the Japanese and the Japanese Government, but they went through
this period saying, "My goodness, if the Americans suddenly
go away, Japan has to forget about the posture of the immediate
aftermath of the Second World War and become a normal power",
and they started to think that. That led to a revitalisation of
the US/Japan alliance, which was codified during the early Reagan
period, and that strengthened it. That again started to unravel
at the end of the Cold War. I was part of the group inside the
US Government that helped put together a post Cold War rationale
for the US/Japan relationship, in part to help steer Japan for
increasing international co-operation and participation, getting
away from their isolationism and away from thinking that they
will be left on their own one day but growing into that role;
and that is what one sees with the roles and missions Japan has
been adapting ever since the first Gulf War pushed them into the
embarrassment that they were not doing more than sending mine
sweepers after the fighting stopped and they had been asked to
pay for money. Remember, they were considered the cash-point of
the world, the ATM machine of the world, for operations at this
point. They have been increasing the peace operation role; they
have been more active in peace building; they take a very active
role diplomatically in terms of development policy and with the
military forces. All of this, though, is of some consternation
to China, which does not look at Japan as a small island country
with self-defence forces. It looks at Japan as the high technology
country. There is this antipathy that we have talked about, even
while there are other forces as well. I think Japan is going in
a good direction, but could it change and veer off in a bad direction?
Yes, it could, not because history will repeat itself but because
there is still so much anxiety, distrust and historical baggage
in North East Asia that the outside powers, not just the United
States, have an important role to play in making sure that two
major East Asian powers, China and Japan, for the first time in
modern history, can co-operate and get along; and we do this from
the United States' perspective as an ally of Japan and we do this
as a partner with China, but we have to find a way for these two
countries to have defence capabilities, be normal countries and
yet still not go to war.
Dr Fell: The Taiwan perspective
on Japan's military normalisation tends to be fairly positive.
I think the idea is that there is an extra counterweight against
the PRC. Another factor here is that the general perspective on
Japan and Taiwan is quite distinct from many of its other former
colonies where there is a strong anti-Japanese sentiment. There
is some anti-Japanese sentiment but it tends to be very small
and marginalised among extreme Chinese nationalists. The proportion
is very, very small.
Q162 Chairman: Finally on this area,
you have mentioned in passing the dispute over the Senkadu Islands
and there are other islands where there is a dispute. I understand
that there is potential for very large gas and oil deposits in
the area concerned. How big a factor is that in discussions and
how much is it to do with feelings of national aspiration?
Dr Cronin: China grows a blue
water navy capability, increases its air forces. As Japan normalises
and considers, the next prime ministers watch a new constitution
that goes beyond self-defence forces and the causes of the old
constitution. China and Japan are going to increasingly bump into
each other, and more than metaphorically. That does not mean they
will come to blows, but we have seen Japan very anxious over Chinese
incursions into territorial waters. We have seen a very assertive
China when it comes to oil, gas and mineral rights. China has
got an economic strategy right now. It is a quiet strategy, but
on resources it is very aggressive and they will push it to the
limit, and Japan is being pressed to the limit in the East China
Sea. They are not likely, because they are two major powers, to
go into a war over this issue in the near term, but they are likely
to continue to have very tense negotiations, debates and even
dust-ups at sea over some of these territorial rights. That is
how I see it.
Chairman: Can we move on to Taiwan.
Q163 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: Dr Fell,
relations between China and Taiwan are obviously bad at the moment,
but this has happened before and the relationship has been managed.
Is the relationship getting more unstable with possibly unpredictable
consequences?
Dr Fell: You are right that things
have been quite tense. I think you could go back 10 years. Since
the 1995, 1996 missile crisis things have been tense, but they
have managed to resolve or get over the worst crises. An important
event occurred last year when the leaders of the two main opposition
parties visited the PRC. The former ruling party, the KMT's leader,
visited and met with important CTP leaders. There were some positive
sides to those visits last spring. There would appear particularly
to have been a reduction in tensions and also the perception of
tensions within Taiwan but also within the PRC itself. However,
there were also some negative impacts of those visits, particularly
the idea of visiting only a month or two after the passing of
the Act of Secession law, which was to an extent destabilising
for the elected government of Taiwan. I think that was probably
a negative impact. In the short term it is quite likely that there
may be continued tensions up until 2008. In 2008 we expect that
there will be another Presidential election when most of us expect
a change in ruling party. Following that we expect a more co-operative
relationship between Taiwan and the PRC. There may be some short-term
tensions but in the medium term I am fairly optimistic on cross-Strait
relations. Another factor here that we need to consider is the
elections that are going on in late 2007 and 2008. The 2007 parliamentary
elections will be under a single member district system, which
tends to encourage more centralist positions. Similarly in 2008
we have a presidential election. Traditionally presidential elections
in Taiwan have encouraged more centralist positions. Again, this
should have a positive impact on relations. If we look at opinion
surveys generally in Taiwan, public opinion is far more moderate
than the actual political parties themselves, so the parties are
severely constrained by moderate public opinion. Parties are clearly
aware, at least in terms of the interviews I have done, of a concern
about being punished by this moderate public opinion. This is
quite a positive constraining role.
Q164 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: Is this
general optimism shared by our other witnesses?
Dr Cronin: The situation in Taiwan
was considered to be one of the best situations we have had in
recent times until this past year, which shows you how fragile
the relations are across the Strait despite the tremendous economic
interaction. Basically there is a breakdown of trust between Beijing
and Chen Shui-bian. That is why the elections in 2008 become very
important. Before then the most likely catalyst or trigger for
conflict may be political manoeuvrings inside Taiwan by the DPP
for adding amendments to the constitution, which are probably
not the real "red meat" amendments of national identity
but the Chinese are likely to be quite reactive to almost anything,
frankly, because they do not trust Chen Shui-bian. So this could
become the cause again for little dust-ups across the Strait which
are not likely to lead to war and conflict in the short term but
things can always slide out of control. There is enough distrust
and there is a growing military balance on both sides of the Strait.
Q165 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: And is the
American Government still adamant about its de facto guarantee
or are they beginning to regard this as a relic and essentially
disposable?
Dr Cronin: There are concerns
both in Washington and Taipei about the deterioration in the relationship.
It is partly reflected in things like the $20 billion procurement
package that has not come to fruition but is being argued about
quite a lot in Taipei, and the US policy of ambiguity of "but
wink, wink, nod, nod, we are there for Taiwan, especially if the
mainland takes action" which is still the paramount fundamental
principle. However, now we have got this new dynamic under Chen
Shui-bian which is what if Taipei takes provocative action, and
that is what we have been living with and adjusting to in recent
years. There is no categorical answer to your question. My supposition
is that Washington would be pretty hard pressed to go to the defence
of Taiwan unless it was truly reckless.
Q166 Mr Keetch: Just following on
from that, it seems to me that the prospects for there being a
military conflagration could actually come from Taipei in that
it might well be Taipei that does something stupid or reckless,
as you say, as opposed to China doing something reckless. If that
strange event happened and if there was a Chinese attack, how
defendable is Taiwan, particularly given the increase of what
we have seen in the PLA; is it defendable?
Dr Cronin: It is obvious in the
age of modern militaries that it is easier to defend than to attack
and occupy. Is it defendable? Yes, it is defendable and Taiwan's
military posturing has been changing radically because of the
perception of the kind of war that could ensue across the Strait.
Air defence is priority number one and that is where they are
putting their money. The second priority is to keep the Strait
open. So they have got clear ways of countering a potential Chinese
onslaught that could come and punish them. The Chinese are not
likely to want to do that, by the way. The Chinese are much more
adept than that. They have learned from previous missile exercises
during the 1990s that there are ways that they can have influence
without ever really firing a shot—exercises, deployments
and so on—and that is the way you signal intent. So there
are ways. These things could slip out of control. It is defendable,
but at the same time, from the mainland's perspective, they would
be willing to put good relations and economic strategy and all
that aside if they really and truly were pushed across the line.
I truly believe that they would act. I have seen places where
they do this planning in China. They certainly do not want to
do that but they could be pushed to that. If you saw Taipei doing
something really stupid you will see—or you will hear later—about
the manoeuvrings behind the scenes to say, "Wait a second,
what's going on here?" The stakes are very high across the
Strait. There are hundreds of millions of dollars of trade, by
the way, going throughout the region and across the Strait alone,
so there is a lot at stake, and that is why I think the argument
will be for stability, regardless of nationalism and some of the
local domestic constituencies.
Q167 Mr Keetch: Is that "stupid"
scene a declaration of independence?
Dr Fell: I think there is a limit
to how reckless the Chen Shui-bian administration can be in its
last two years, particularly when a constraining factor, apart
from the elections, is the fact that the DPP government does not
have a majority in parliament. It is a minority government. For
example, there is a lot of talk about a new constitution and constitutional
reform, but to actually pass constitutional reform they need a
two-thirds or three-quarters majority in the parliament and they
do not even have 50%. There were some tensions created by scrapping
the National Unification Guidelines and Council, which occurred
in February, but again this was essentially a symbolic move. It
was something that could be done without parliamentary agreement.
Dr Cronin: Which is why you are
more likely to see the mainland trying to isolate the DPP, posturing
for 2008, and you are more likely to see Chen Shui-bian and the
DPP trying to test the limits of what they can get away with,
with their constrained and limited power.
Dr Fell: I think also that the
PRC has learnt from some of its previous mistakes that putting
too much heavy pressure on Taiwan can actually backfire. If we
look at the presidential elections in 1996 and also in 2000, in
both cases PRC threats actually resulted in the wrong candidate
winning the election. So we can see in subsequent elections they
have been much more cautious on their policy pronouncements. Let
me give you one interesting example. The Anti-Secession Law was
raised just a couple of weeks after the legislative election in
Taiwan. If it had been done a couple of weeks earlier it could
have backfired quite seriously.
Q168 Chairman: But the fact is the
Anti-Secession Law was adopted and caused enormous alarm all around
the world. How significant is that vote in China?
Dr Fell: In many ways the Anti-Secession
Law just formalised what had been PRC policy in the past, so in
that respect there was nothing new. The reaction in Taiwan initially
was very negative. There were some pretty large demonstrations.
However, the opposition visits to the PRC just one month after
the Anti-Secession law seem to have taken that issue off the agenda
in Taiwan.
Q169 Mr Maples: I just wanted to
clarify something Dr Cronin said. You did say, did you not, that
the United States would be "hard pressed not to come to the
aid of Taiwan unless it did something really stupid"?
Dr Cronin: It would be likely
to come. I am sorry, it was a double negative. They would be likely
to, almost surely.
Q170 Mr Maples: They would have to
unless Taiwan had done something really stupid?
Dr Cronin: Unless Taiwan is clearly
the aggressor in some way.
Q171 Mr Maples: At the moment there
is no treaty commitment to do so or is there?
Dr Cronin: Yes, the Taiwan Relations
Act, and there is a whole series of communiqués and messages
and policies.
Q172 Mr Maples: So there is a treaty
commitment covering that?
Dr Cronin: Yes, Congress would
hold the administration to that but I think, even before it got
to that, the executive branch would be hard pressed to act quickly
if there was any escalation in tensions and if there was conflict,
and they would obviously go to the defence of Taiwan if that was
the case. It may be much more murky than that; I expect it will
be.
Q173 Mr Maples: I just wanted to
make sure I had heard you correctly.
Dr Fell: I guess it would depend
whether or not Taiwan crosses a certain red line.
Dr Cronin: That is right, that
is the point. If Taiwan is doing something that is so flagrant
that they are clearly provoking Beijing, and maybe it is a single
politician and his party doing this, then I think you have seen
in recent years the United States saying, "Wait a second,
we want stability, we want peace. We have agreed to this principle
so there is no unilateral change of the status quo."
Q174 Chairman: Can I take this a
bit further forward. If the Kuomintang leadership come back into
power and you then have a moderation of the rhetoric on both sides,
is there a prospect of some deal of "one country, two systems"
or "one country, two systems and a half", or some variation
of the position with regard to Hong Kong, or something else that
could be a realistic prospect in the long term, or is public opinion
in Taiwan such that that would never be acceptable?
Dr Fell: They have been doing
opinion polls on this "one country, two systems" issue
in Taiwan for well over 10 years. Support has never been over
15%. All the major political parties have taken a position opposing
the one country, two systems idea so I would say that is off the
agenda in Taiwan. I believe that only one party has ever actually
been supportive of one country, two systems and despite the visits
to the PRC, the KMT's position is still opposed to one country,
two systems. However, the visits to China by the KMT last year
do show that there is some potential for agreement. I think perhaps
that having such an anti-Chinese government in power for the last
six years may have some kind of positive impact on forcing the
PRC to accept better conditions for Taiwan in future negotiations,
for example the idea of "one China" but different interpretations
of what that one China is. This was the basis of negotiations
in the early 1990s and this is acceptable to the KMT. This means
that they agree to accept the one China principle but their definition
of one China is different. In the past this was not acceptable
to the PRC but now it is, so that is a significant change.
Q175 Chairman: But that would have
serious implications in terms of international organisations and
representation to the rest of the world and all kinds of other
things, would it not? You would still be faced with the competition
between the PRC and Taiwan in different venues like Africa to
get votes, to get diplomatic recognition, and so on?
Dr Fell: I guess that would continue
but I think the KMT position has shifted slightly. They are not
so concerned with formal diplomatic relations as they were in
the 1990s. In terms of PRC/ROC relations I could see some improvement
in the post-2008 period.
Dr Cronin: This continuing stand-off
and the inability to have even a dialogue on this across the Strait
does affect Britain, Europe and the world on things like avian
flu when Taiwan is not represented; it is not as though their
birds are not affected, and we saw this with SARS. There are real
implications of not incorporating somehow Taiwan into the international
community.
Q176 Chairman: So what should we
in the UK and the European Union do to try and assist this process
in the region?
Dr Fell: Personally I would suggest
that on the Taiwan issue that perhaps we should learn a little
bit from our US cousins and take a slightly more pro-Taiwan position.
If we are going to have an ethical foreign policy, we need to
consider the fact that Taiwan is a liberal democracy, perhaps
one of the few functioning liberal democracies in Asia. We can
see the way that it has a very strong system of party competition,
perhaps more institutionalised than any of the other East Asian
democracies, even Japan or South Korea. In our relations with
Taiwan we need to consider these issues.
Q177 Chairman: Do your colleagues
want to come in?
Dr Cronin: I certainly would agree
with getting closer to the US policy on Taiwan, but the difficulty
of that in the European context is obvious in the sense that China
is seen as a big market and China is quite punitive. Just as if
there is some relationship in Africa or if you go to Nicaragua
you can find a state building that was built by Taiwan but you
cannot find many more of those because the PRC has bought off
everybody else, such is the size of their economy. Maybe there
is a special role for parliaments and legislative branches to
especially uphold the support of liberal democracies, the support
of the rule the law, being the honest broker and shining a spotlight
on abuses of this. So there is maybe a role here for parliaments
to play in ensuring this. Being democratically elected does not
guarantee good policy, as we find out in many countries, and Taiwan
may be paying the price partly for that as well, but nonetheless
it is a liberal democracy and it is one that makes the world a
better place overall, even if it is not stable in any given week.
Q178 Ms Stuart: I am glad that you
have moved on to pointing out that Taiwan is a liberal democracy
and maybe we are constrained in our actions by the perceived threat
of China and its trade sanctions. I do not think the fact that
they stopped trading with Nicaragua should make Europe quake in
its boots. The real question is do you think the European Union
is quite cowardly because within the European Union the individual
Member States are pursuing their own trade policies and are fearing
that they are losing trade and that trade sanctions are going
to be imposed and in exchange for that we are accepting China
having human right violations which in a sense we would not accept
from any other country if it were not such a big potential trading
partner?
Dr Cronin: I do not see any profit
in calling our major ally "cowardly". I think that I
would say that people are—
Q179 Ms Stuart: "No good, crummy
ally" is a phrase I once heard in America!
Dr Cronin: The mantra from Washington
of course is on results and effective partnerships and alliances,
and so they want to see the results of this; there is no doubt
about that. We have to look at China as more than a profit-making
opportunity. It has to be about more than trade policy. We have
to see China in the round and that includes its human rights abuses.
We were talking earlier about the Internet and so on. Go to China
and try to use the Internet and try to type in a dot.org and find
out how quickly they close you down. It is a very oppressive system,
even with all the remarkable progress they have made. They have
lifted more people out of poverty than most of the development
programmes in the world—
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