Written evidence submitted by the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office
CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
UK role and policies in East Asia
II. CHINA
Economic role
Political role
Human Rights
Tibet
III. HONG KONG
Implementation of the Joint Declaration
Political freedoms
Status of the Chief Executive
Basic rights and freedoms
IV. TAIWAN
UK Position on Status of Taiwan
Relations with the International Community
Taiwan's relationship with China
Role of the US
V. KOREAN PENINSULA
Security Issues
UK policy towards the DPRK
Future Challenges
VI. THE BALANCE
OF SECURITY
IN THE
REGION
Sources of tension:
— Risk of competitive nationalism
— Energy security and climate change
VII. OTHER MAJOR
REGIONAL ACTORS
Japan's Role
The Role of the US in the region
EU interests, policies and engagement
ANNEXES
1. China: Political History
2. China: Political Structure
3. UK/China Joint Statement (May 2004)
4. Hong Kong SAR Government
I. INTRODUCTION
1. We welcome this inquiry. It comes at
an important juncture in our evolving relationship with China
and in our overall engagement in East Asia and against a backdrop
of rapid economic change in Asia and the increasing recognition
of the potential impact of the global economy on UK domestic and
foreign policy.
2. Key UK strategic priorities are at stake
in the region, including the preservation of peace and strengthening
of international security; counter-proliferation of WMD; immigration;
development of democracy and the rule of law; promotion of improved
respect for human rights; and promotion of sustainable, cooperative
policies to meet global energy, environmental and human health
challenges. We pursue these concerns across the region, both bilaterally
and through multilateral fora like the EU, UN, and G8.
3. The UK's relationship with China is now
closer than at any time. In May 2004 the Prime Minister and Premier
Wen Jiabao signed a Joint Statement, which announced a "comprehensive
strategic partnership" between the UK and China, and made
a commitment to hold annual Summit meetings. The Deputy Prime
Minister's China Task Force, comprising of leading academics,
businesspeople and government officials with a knowledge of China
guides policy in priority areas—education, science and technology,
environment, trade and investment, development, health and culture.
4. Recent high-level exchanges including
the Prime Minister's visit to China in September 2005 for the
EU/China and bilateral Summits and President Hu Jintao's State
Visit in November 2005 provide us with a good basis to deepen
dialogue and seek to exert a positive influence on the rise of
China. We are working to step up our engagement with the Chinese
across the board, to reflect our assessment of China's increasing
economic weight and political influence.
5. The UK is the largest European investor
in China and its third largest trading partner within the EU (a
separate memorandum submitted by UK Trade and Investment explores
the UK trade and investment relationship with China and the region
in greater detail). The UK has made great strides in increasing
scientific and educational co-operation (50,000 Chinese students
in UK universities) in recent years, and the fruits of co-operation
on tourism are starting to show through, with an upsurge in Chinese
visitors to the UK since the granting of Approved Destination
Status earlier this year. Our shared Olympics interests offer
further opportunity for co-operation.
6. Japan and South Korea (Republic of Korea—ROK)
are major free market democracies, with economies respectively
the 2nd and 11th largest in the world. Both have high volume trade
and investment relationships with the UK. Japan is one of the
UK's strategic partners, sharing core UK and EU values and increasingly
ready to promote these internationally. The ROK too largely shares
our political outlook and is developing a greater international
commitment.
7. North Korea (the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea—DPRK), on the other hand, remains a potentially
destabilising factor, posing a WMD and proliferation threat, risk
of economic collapse and an appalling human rights record.
8. The US role in the region is central,
providing key security guarantees as well as being the most important
partner for all the major players in the region. It is allied
with Japan and the ROK. The EU is increasing its focus and developing
a strengthened dialogue with the US and Japan on East Asian regional
issues.
II. CHINA, INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS
CHINA'S
GROWING ECONOMIC
AND POLITICAL
ROLE
9. As a P5 member, a nuclear power and a
major regional political player, China's influential role in global
politics has been a fact of life for decades. However, sustained
economic growth and development over the past 25 years have made
China an established economic power with global reach. This in
turn has increased the country's geopolitical influence, and the
importance of ensuring that it contributes constructively to the
collective goals of the international community.
ECONOMIC ROLE
10. The Chinese economy grew by 9.5% in
2004 and annual growth of 9% is forecast this year. China's long
term goal is to quadruple GDP between 2000 and 2020 (an implied
average annual growth rate of 7.2%). Its share of world trade—now
at 8%—has doubled in the last decade and it is forecast
to become the world's largest exporter by 2010 and possibly overtake
Japan as the second largest economy in the world within a decade.
11. China is already the largest global
consumer of various goods and commodities (including coal and
steel, mobile phones, grain, meat). China's heightened demand
for imports of capital and consumer goods is more than matched
by its increasing export prowess, making it a leading trade partner
for most industrialised countries, the UK included. Moreover,
it is a major destination for global foreign direct investment—the
UK is a leading investor, with at least 4,000 joint ventures with
Chinese firms.
12. In economic terms, China is now large
enough for a whole range of its economic policy decisions to have
substantial international impact, and China could well become
the world's largest exporter by 2010. Current examples of China's
economic influence abound. These include official encouragement
for Chinese companies to become multinationals, and say, make
foreign acquisitions to support security of energy supply; recent
tentative moves to liberalise its currency; lacklustre efforts
to control violation of internationally-recognised intellectual
property rights; and the maintenance of state subsidies to industries,
further enhancing China's comparative advantage in mass production
and export of cheap manufacturing products.
13. China is already using its growing international
economic power to project some of its external political objectives.
Examples of its "soft power" strategy include the various
bilateral economic co-operation programmes in Africa, Latin America
and other parts of Asia that it has concluded in the past year
or so, and vigorous pursuit of free trade agreements with key
trading partners.
14. This growing international footprint
has implications for both business and government in the UK and
other industrialised nations. China epitomises globalisation,
with all the ensuing opportunities and threats. Indeed, for a
broad range of western companies, China's increasing role in shaping
global economic trends means that a China strategy is now de rigeur.
For some firms such a strategy may simply be directed towards
taking full advantage of the opportunity to source cheap goods
and services from China. For others, it relates to adjusting their
own production methods and costs to beat the competitive challenge.
But it can also entail actively seeking opportunities to base
export operations in China or, indeed, to sell to the growing
internal consumer market.
15. For governments, China's growing prominence
poses a different set of questions. China's relatively low endowment
of natural resources means that its material needs are substantial,
and this is exerting a powerful influence on world commodity prices.
As resource constraints are already constraining growth, the Chinese
government has been looking increasingly actively for energy security.
China currently accounts for 10% of global energy consumption,
second only to the US. But this is likely to rise to 14% over
the next decade.
16. China is already the world's largest
coal burner; by 2020 it will consume over 40% of the world's total
production. Most of its additional needs will be met by importing
oil from the Middle East and Africa and gas from Russia. In 15
years, many analysts expect China to be consuming the equivalent
of Saudi Arabia's entire oil production. This will have substantial
environmental impacts, including on neighbouring states.
17. That China's economic rise is unlikely
to be an entirely comfortable process for the rest of the world
makes it even more imperative that we seek to engage with China
on global economic issues, in tandem with our efforts to enhance
economic and trade relationships.
18. There is an unparalleled opportunity
to promote a positive Chinese mindset on economic and structural
reforms. For many years, China has been engaging in economic reforms
that have yielded notable successes, particularly in lifting people
out of abject poverty, and in developing an increasingly vibrant
private sector from scratch. But major reform challenges remain,
in particular on China's development towards transparent and accountable
government and a sustainable, open market economy. The UK and
other Governments stand to contribute by providing specific expertise
and in fostering technology transfer and professional know-how.
CHINA'S
POLITICAL ROLE
19. On the political front China is playing
an increasingly active role in international affairs. It has supported
the international war against terrorism, including in the UN Security
Council (where it holds one of the five Permanent Seats). China
has also been supportive on counter-proliferation issues, eg concerning
Iran, and is playing an active role in the 6 Party Talks (6PT)
aimed at solving the North Korea problem. It is showing increased
willingness to co-operate on sustainable development issues and
integrate with G8 processes.
20. However, China's actions are limited
by adherence to old-fashioned principles of "non-interference
in internal affairs" and respect for sovereignty (largely
defensive reactions to concerns about foreign interference in
China's own affairs—eg over Taiwan and Tibet). China did
not support military action against Iraq. And China strongly opposes
the threat of sanctions on Sudan. Elsewhere China continues to
support unsavoury regimes and block international pressure that
could force change (eg DPRK, Burma, Zimbabwe). China is also stepping
up its involvement in regional groups such as the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF) and ASEAN +3, and has shown a keen interest in the
East Asia Summit. A China/ASEAN Free Trade Area is under discussion.
21. The Chinese continue to view the US
as their primary foreign policy interest. There are frequent exchanges
at a senior level and principals hold regular phone conversations.
Despite a number of setbacks, the US and Chinese have worked hard
to develop their relationship, though Taiwan remains the most
intractable issue between them.
HUMAN RIGHTS
22. HMG recognises that over the last 15
years the Chinese government has done much to help reduce poverty
levels within China and promote economic development. Restrictions
on labour mobility have been relaxed; it is now possible for Chinese
citizens to choose their own career path, travel more widely (both
within China and abroad) and own their own homes. On the surface,
China is increasingly becoming a consumer society.
23. But contradictions exist: there is a
growing gap between the urban rich in the booming east coast cities
and the rural poor in the western provinces. Throughout China
there are 160 million people who still live on less than $1/day,
and 486 million on less than $2/day. China remains a major recipient
of overseas aid. President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao
have won respect among the population for the concern they have
shown towards improving the living conditions of ordinary Chinese,
particularly in the countryside, but underlying anxieties remain
about the impact on social order of widening inequalities, official
corruption the degradation of the environment.
24. At the same time Chinese political development
has not kept pace with the impressive economic changes in the
country. There is a lack of fundamental political rights: the
Communist Party maintains a monopoly on political power; there
is a lack of democratic elections and independent political parties;
political activists are harassed and arrested. Free trade unions
are not allowed.
25. There are serious restrictions on freedom
to practise religion. Members of non-registered churches can be
harassed and arrested. The new regulations on religion published
in March 2005 are not, in our view, compatible with the spirit
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)—which
China has signed but is only making slow progress towards ratifying—or
with other international human rights documents China has signed
up to.
26. The Government has serious concerns
about many other human rights issues in China, including the extensive
use of the death penalty; the use of torture; arbitrary detention
(including the practice of re-education through labour), freedom
of expression and association; the situation in Tibet and Xinjiang;
prison conditions and the treatment of prisoners; psychiatric
abuse; and treatment of Falun Gong supporters.
27. While sustainable change will only come
from within, the Government is working to encourage China in the
right direction through a policy of "critical engagement".
There are three main areas of activity. Firstly, Ministers raise
human rights with Chinese interlocutors, including at the highest
level. The Prime Minister did so, for example, during the Chinese
State Visit of November 2005 and during the EU China Summit of
September 2005. Ministers across Whitehall, and not only in the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, have raised human rights issues
of concern in their area of responsibility. For example Lord Falconer
raised the cases of two Chinese lawyers with visiting Chinese
Justice Minister Zhang Fusen in April 2005.
28. Secondly, the UK and EU China Human
Rights Dialogues are useful instruments which allow a number of
issues of concern to be raised and discussed in detail. In our
view the dialogue process does contribute to incremental change
(eg the last UK China Human Rights Dialogue round in June 2005
focussed on freedom of expression and civil society. Under the
UK Presidency the EU China Human Rights Dialogue round in October
2005 focussed on freedom of religion and the role of the judiciary
in the criminal justice system. The EU delegation at those talks
also visited Xinjiang and raised a number of concerns about the
situation there directly with officials.
29. Thirdly, HMG also supports various human
rights projects in China. In addition to training programmes for
judges and lawyers, HMG funds a number of projects aimed at improving
the rule of law, reducing application of the death penalty and
promoting freedom of expression. One example is a project working
with the Chinese Ministry of Public Security to develop a system
to improve detection and handling of instances of police misconduct.
Another project is working to reduce the use of the death penalty
in China by strengthening the capacity and role of defence lawyers
in capital crime cases.
TIBET
30. Successive British Governments have
regarded Tibet as autonomous whilst recognising the special position
of the Chinese authorities there. This continues to be HMG's view.
HMG does not recognise the so-called "Tibetan Government
in Exile".
31. We and our EU partners have welcomed
visits to China by the Dalai Lama's representatives between 2002
and 2004. The most recent round of talks took place in Berne from
30 June to 1 July 2005. We have pressed the Chinese repeatedly
to continue these contacts and enter a substantive dialogue without
pre-conditions and have made clear our view that negotiations
should work towards a long term peaceful solution acceptable to
the Tibetan people. China continues to insist that the Dalai Lama
abandon calls for independence; accept that Tibet is a part of
China; and acknowledge that Taiwan is a part of China, as a precondition
to substantive dialogue. The Dalai Lama no longer calls for independence
but has stated his desire for genuine autonomy for the Tibetans.
32. Nevertheless, we remain very concerned
about the human rights situation in Tibet, particularly the restrictions
on religious practice and the on-going political education campaign
in monasteries. We are concerned that economic development does
not take the wishes of the local Tibetan population into account,
nor do they benefit proportionately and of the impact of continuing
inward migration into the region on traditional Tibetan culture.
33. We monitor Tibet-related developments
closely and raise our concerns with the Chinese authorities at
every suitable opportunity. The Prime Minister discussed human
rights, including Tibet, with Premier Wen during his visit to
China in September 2005 and the Foreign Secretary and the Chinese
Foreign Minister spoke about Tibet-related issues when they met
during Hu Jintao's State Visit in October. Ian Pearson, Minister
for China, raised a number of human rights concerns, including
Tibet, during his visit to China in July and met with a group
of London-based Tibetan NGOs in November.
III. HONG KONG
INTRODUCTION
34. There have been major developments in Hong
Kong, particularly in the areas of human rights and political
freedoms, since the Foreign Affairs Committee's report on Hong
Kong in 2000. What follows draws on the reports on Hong Kong presented
by the Foreign Secretary to Parliament every six months since
the handover, and takes account of developments since the latest
report, covering the period January to June 2005. The next six-monthly
report will be published in February 2006.
35. Britain's signature of the Joint Declaration
provides the basis for Britain's continuing interest in, and commitment
to, the special arrangements for the protection of Hong Kong's
way of life.
36. We have a deep and wide-ranging bilateral
relationship, including co-operation in areas such as the environment,
education (the British Council's English language teaching operation
in Hong Kong is the largest in the world), legal and law enforcement
issues (including customs, drugs and illegal immigration). Our
Consulate General in Hong Kong is our biggest in the world.
37. The UK and Hong Kong are important trading
and investment partners with bilateral trade in 2004 amounting
to £8.5 billion. Hong Kong is the UK's thirteenth largest
export market and second largest in the Asia Pacific region after
Japan, with exports in 2004 of £2.6 billion. Hong Kong is
also a major long-term investor in the UK. Hong Kong's investment
in the UK represents around 80% of all Hong Kong investment in
Europe.
38. Visits in both directions continue at
a high level. The Hong Kong Chief Executive met the Prime Minister
in London in November 2005. Ministers (including Cabinet Ministers)
from the FCO, Home Office, Department for the Environment, Food
and Rural Affairs, Department of Health, Scottish and Welsh Offices,
Department for Education and Skills and the Department for Trade
and Industry have visited Hong Kong in 2004 and 2005.
39. There are nearly 3.5 million holders
of the British National (Overseas) (BN(O)) passport, most of whom
live in Hong Kong. There are also an estimated 200,000 British
Citizens in Hong Kong.
IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE JOINT
DECLARATION
40. The Sino-British Joint Declaration,
signed by the British and Chinese governments in 1984, paved the
way for Hong Kong's return to Chinese sovereignty in 1997 and
outlined the "One Country, Two Systems" model for the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR). Hong Kong's way
of life and capitalist system would remain unchanged for 50 years
after 1997.
41. The Joint Declaration and the Basic
Law provide that Hong Kong will have a high degree of autonomy,
except in foreign affairs and defence, which are the responsibility
of the Central People's Government in China.
42. While we have expressed concerns at
certain developments in Hong Kong, we continue to believe that
on the whole the Chinese and SAR Governments remain committed
to safeguarding Hong Kong's systems and way of life and that the
principle of "One Country, Two Systems" has generally
worked well in practice. Where we have concerns we have raised
them with the authorities in Beijing and Hong Kong (see below
for further details).
43. We will continue to watch developments
in Hong Kong closely and, as co-signatory of the Joint Declaration,
will continue to comment on how the Joint Declaration is observed
by the Chinese and SAR Governments. We will also continue to report
regularly to Parliament.
POLITICAL FREEDOMS
Constitutional reform
44. The major political issue in Hong Kong
in the past two years has been constitutional reform. The Basic
Law sets out how elections will be held in Hong Kong until 2007
and lays down the ultimate aims of the election of the Chief Executive
and all members of the Legislative Council by universal suffrage,
although there is no precise timetable for reaching this goal.
45. Pressure for early democratisation has
increased following the major demonstrations on 1 July 2003 and
1 January 2004. In 2003 the SAR Government promised to issue a
timetable for discussion of constitutional reform by the end of
2003 and to hold a public consultation on the subject in early
2004. In the event, the SAR Government chose not to issue a timetable
in December 2003; and in January 2004 the Chief Executive announced
the formation of the Hong Kong Constitutional Development Task
Force to study the detailed provisions in the Basic Law and to
consult with the central authorities in Beijing before taking
things further.
46. However before the Task Force had completed
its consultation process the Standing Committee of China's National
People's Congress (NPCSC) on 6 April 2004 conducted a self-initiated
"interpretation" of Hong Kong's Basic Law. Former FCO
Minister Bill Rammell commented on the "interpretation"
in a statement on 7 April "that the procedure set out by
the NPCSC requiring a submission from the Chief Executive adds
a further step to the procedure set out in the Annexes to the
Basic Law. This appeared to us to erode the high degree of autonomy
which is guaranteed under the terms of the Joint Declaration and
which underpins Hong Kong's stability and prosperity".
47. The "interpretation" prepared
the way for a second ruling on 26 April 2004. The subsequent ruling
(termed a "decision") set limits on Hong Kong's constitutional
development by ruling out the possibility of universal suffrage
for the selection of the Chief Executive in 2007 and the election
of all members of the Legislative Council by universal suffrage
in 2008. Mr Rammell issued a further statement on 26 April 2004
that" this decision seems to us to be inconsistent with the
high degree of autonomy which Hong Kong is guaranteed under the
Joint Declaration". Mr Rammell also made representations
to the Chinese Ambassador on 26 April and the Prime Minister discussed
Hong Kong with Premier Wen during the Chinese leader's visit to
London in May 2004 and agreed to continue an exchange of views
on these issues.
48. The Task Force published its proposals
on reform to the methods for electing the Chief Executive (2007)
and LegCo (2008) on 19 October 2005. The proposals will be put
to the Legislative Council on 21 December 2005 in the form of
two resolutions. To become law they need the support of 40 of
the 60 legislators, and the approval of the NPCSC. On 4 December
2005 a substantial number of people marched peacefully through
the streets in support of universal suffrage.
49. The Government supports early moves
towards universal suffrage. The SAR Government's proposals, by
widening the franchise for elections in 2007-08, are an incremental
step in this direction. We look forward to further progress towards
universal suffrage in future elections. We hope that the SAR Government
will take into account the wishes of the people of Hong Kong.
CHIEF EXECUTIVE
50. Following Chief Executive Tung's resignation
in March 2005 the NPCSC, at the request of the SAR Government,
amid some controversy, approved an interpretation of the Basic
Law stating that the term of office of Hong Kong's next Chief
Executive should be two years.
51. We recognise that the SAR Government
did not lightly seek an interpretation of the Basic Law and was
alive to the sensitivities of taking such a course and that it
is important for Hong Kong's stability and prosperity that constitutional
processes are able to function properly, and according to the
provisions of the Basic Law. However, given the importance of
demonstrating Hong Kong's judicial independence and high degree
of autonomy we consider that it would have been preferable for
a referral to the NPC to have been the outcome of due process
in the Hong Kong courts.
52. Donald Tsang was unopposed in the Chief
Executive election having secured 674 nominations out of a possible
796 from members of the Election Committee on 16 June 2005.
BASIC RIGHTS
AND FREEDOMS
53. We continue to attach the highest importance
to the rights and freedoms of Hong Kong people and to follow closely
the SAR Government's commitments to uphold and protect these rights.
Although our overall assessment is positive we continue to take
note of issues of concern.
54. Hong Kong has a diverse, open and vibrant
press and media. But there are constant concerns that Chinese
influence may seek to restrict this, either directly or indirectly.
Fears that freedom of expression was under threat emerged in May
2004 when three popular radio show hosts abruptly resigned, citing
"political pressure" as the reason.
55. The freedom to demonstrate is also a
fundamental right in a free society. We welcome the fact that
peaceful and orderly public demonstrations have continued to take
place in Hong Kong, most noticeably in July 2003 and 2004 and
December 2005 when substantial numbers of people marched peacefully
through the streets.
56. The Falun Gong is proscribed in mainland
China, but its lawful activities have continued to be permitted
in Hong Kong, and they conduct frequent protests against their
treatment in China. Their right to protest was challenged when
16 Falun Gong members were convicted for public order offences
in August 2002. The convictions were appealed in September
2003 and in November 2004 the Court of Appeal, in a unanimous
decision, overturned the convictions for public obstruction. In
making their decision the judges cited the Basic Law, the Bill
of Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights as protecting "fundamental freedoms" of assembly,
demonstration and expression in Hong Kong. Appeals by nine of
the protesters against charges of obstructing and assaulting a
police officer in the execution of his duty were dismissed but
eight of the Falun Gong practitioners appealed to the Court of
Final Appeal which overturned the convictions on 5 May 2005. The
court said that the police had no reasonable grounds to suspect
that obstruction had occurred and that the freedom to demonstrate
peacefully was a constitutional right.
57. The SAR Government has to meet its obligations
under the International Covenant on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (ICERD). It has committed to implement legislation
prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of race in order to
comply with its Hong Kong's obligation under the ICERD. Public
consultation on the proposed legislation ended on 8 February 2005
and the SAR Government intends to submit a draft bill before July
2006. HMG hopes that the views of all the community in Hong Kong
will be taken into consideration and that legislation, which fully
meets Hong Kong's legislative obligations under the ICERD, will
be implemented this year.
58. Hong Kong is a signatory to the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). On
April 27-29 2005 SAR Government delegates attended a hearing in
Geneva as part of a Chinese government team to determine progress
in implementing the ICESCR. The UN Committee, in its concluding
comments, welcomed the establishment of the Sexual Minorities
Forum and the planned establishment of the Gender Identity and
Sexual Orientation Unit within the Home Affairs Bureau. The UN
Committee also welcomed the extensive efforts taken by the SAR
Government, including sensitisation campaigns to combat prejudices
and discrimination against persons with physical and mental disabilities.
59. However, the UN Committee also called
on the SAR Government to extend the protection afforded under
the draft race discrimination legislation to internal migrants
from the mainland. They expressed concern that present anti-discrimination
legislation did not cover discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation and age. The UN Committee also expressed concern that
the Equal Opportunities Commission did not have the broad remit
of a human rights institution.
60. A number of pro-democracy politicians
continue to face difficulties in travelling to the mainland. We
have raised this issue several times with the SAR and Chinese
Governments and have recorded our concerns in the Foreign Secretary's
reports to Parliament. (Many had not been allowed to visit the
mainland since the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown.) There have been
recent and welcome positive developments. In September 2005 the
new Chief Executive, Donald Tsang, organised and led a two-day
tour of the Pearl River Delta by 59 Legislators (Miriam Lau, the
60th Legislator, was out of town). This was the first time that
all Legislators in Hong Kong had been invited to the mainland.
We hope that these visits signal a closer dialogue between pro-democracy
politicians and the mainland authorities and that these will extend
in the future to meetings with the central authorities in Beijing.
61. In 2003 the SAR Government attempted
to introduce national security legislation to meet its obligations
under Article 23 of the Basic Law. However, it decided to delay
passage of the legislation following a major demonstration on
1 July 2003 by over 500,000 people, in order to allow more time
for further discussion of the issues in Hong Kong. Since then
the SAR Government has withdrawn the draft legislation from the
Legislative Council. The SAR Government is still committed to
passing legislation on this issue but no timetable has been set
out for taking things forward. We believe that it is important
not only that the final legislation does not undermine the basic
rights and freedoms of the people of Hong Kong but also that people
perceive this to be the case.
IV. TAIWAN
INTRODUCTION
62. Taiwan holds a unique position in the
world. It has an economy of global importance and its own democratic
political system. Yet the UK, like most other countries, does
not recognise Taiwan as a state and does not have diplomatic relations
with Taiwan. Under the terms of a 1972 agreement with China, HMG
acknowledged the position of the Government of the PRC that Taiwan
was a province of China and recognised the PRC Government as the
sole legal government of China. This remains the basis of our
relations with Taiwan. We do not deal with the Taiwan authorities
on a government-to-government basis, and we avoid any act which
could be taken to imply recognition. Consequently, any contact
with Taiwan on issues such as cross-Strait relations is at official
level through informal channels. The UK nonetheless enjoys a flourishing
relationship with Taiwan based on trade, investment, financial,
educational, cultural and other exchanges.
UK POSITION ON
THE STATUS
OF TAIWAN
63. Our interests are unofficially represented
through the British Trade and Cultural Office (BTCO) at Taipei,
established in 1993 and headed by a senior Diplomatic Service
Officer on secondment. The principal role of the BTCO is to promote
our trade and investment interests. It also has a Visa Handling
Unit, set up in 1989. Because of its unofficial nature it cannot
carry out any formal consular functions. However, it does seek
to carry out some basic consular protection work by assisting
distressed British citizens. There is also a small branch office
in the southern port of Kaohsiung.
64. Taiwanese representation in London is
similarly unofficial. It comprises the Taipei Representative Office
in the UK which carries out similar functions to the BTCO. It
has a branch office in Edinburgh which opened in 1998. Because
of its unofficial nature, neither this organisation nor its staff
are accorded privileges or immunities.
65. HMG's principal objectives in relation
to Taiwan are economic. We seek to develop UK trade and commercial
involvement with Taiwan, including inward investment. We also
seek to develop a wide range of unofficial links, particularly
in the educational and cultural fields. We support the further
economic development of Taiwan. We also welcome Taiwan's political
development and the democratic elections that have taken place
there. In developing our relations with Taiwan we act within the
restraints imposed by our formal position on the status of Taiwan
and bear in mind China's sensitivities in order to ensure that
unnecessary damage to that relationship is avoided.
66. We also make it clear that we consider
the Taiwan issue is one to be settled by the people on both sides
of the Taiwan Strait. We are strongly opposed to any use of force
and urge both sides to engage in constructive dialogue.
RELATIONS WITH
THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY
67. At the time of writing the countries
with which Taiwan has diplomatic relations number 25 (12 in Latin
America, six in Africa, six in the Pacific and one in Europe—the
Holy See). Taiwan has representative offices, without diplomatic
status, in 62 countries. China opposes Taiwan's participation
in international organisations in which statehood is a prerequisite.
It has sought to limit Taiwan's participation in other international
organisations, insisting it do so under a name other than the
"Republic of China'. Taiwan is a member of Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) and the Asian Development Bank under the titles
"Chinese Taipei' and "Taipei, China" respectively,
and joined the World Trade Organisation in 2002 under the title
"The Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen
and Matsu", or Chinese Taipei for short.
68. Because of our formal position on the
status of Taiwan we do not support Taiwan's membership of international
bodies whose membership is limited to states. We do support and
encourage Taiwan's membership of appropriate international economic
and other fora. Together with EU partners, we have pressed the
Secretariat of the World Health Organisation (WHO) to find pragmatic
solutions to allow the inclusion of Taiwan in the global health
safety net. As a result, the WHO signed a MOU with China earlier
in 2005 to allow such co-operation, though the practical effects
of the MOU, of which details remain secret, are only just beginning
to be felt.
TAIWAN'S
RELATIONSHIP WITH
CHINA
69. Taiwan's relations with China are principally
determined by the "Act Governing Relations Between the Taiwan
Area and the Mainland Area". The Taiwanese authorities have
long abandoned the notion that they are the legitimate Government
of China but structures still exist to promote eventual reunification,
such as the National Reunification Guidelines and the National
Reunification Council.
70. The Government of the PRC continues
to maintain that Taiwan is an indivisible part of China, that
China is the ultimate sovereign authority of Taiwan, and that
China's ultimate aim is reunification. The Taiwan question is
an emotive issue for China. China regularly points to a shared
culture and language and often cites both the Cairo Declaration
(1943) and the Potsdam Declaration (1945) to support its claim
to sovereignty.
71. In fact, quasi-official dialogues have
taken place in the past between China and Taiwan to explore the
possibility of establishing a modus vivendi, at least on
technical issues if not on the fundamental questions of Taiwan's
status and the possibility of agreeing terms for eventual reunification.
Reports of a "consensus" having been reached during
1992 talks in Hong Kong are exaggerated; but both sides made a
commitment, however informally, to a nominal "One China"
principle. Definitions of what each side meant by this were deliberately
avoided. Contacts were abruptly halted following former "President"
Lee Teng-hui's statement in July 1999 that relations across the
Strait should be conducted on a "special state to state"
basis.
72. At the beginning of 2005 there was a
distinct thaw in relations between China and Taiwan when special
cross-Strait flights for the Chinese New Year were agreed. Direct
transport links across the Strait have been suspended since 1949.
But tensions were raised again when the Chinese leadership re-asserted
its position with the enactment of its Anti-Secession Law, principally
a codification of China's existing principles and practices. Among
other things, it refers to China's determination to reunify the
country at some stage, peacefully if at all possible, but using
"non-peaceful means" if necessary. It was designed to
check and oppose movement towards "de jure" independence
by "President" Chen Shui-bian, who in 2004 called for
a new constitution supported by a referendum. The EU issued a
statement at the time recalling its opposition to the use of force
to solve the Taiwan question.
73. Since then, tensions have eased somewhat
with members of the opposition parties (KMT and People's First
Party) making historic visits to China. Plenty of media coverage
was given to the visits in both China and Taiwan. Many Chinese
initiatives have arisen as result of these visits. China has been
reaching out to constituencies in Taiwan such as farmers, the
tourist industry, businessmen and students. Significantly, these
visits took the "sting" out of the Anti-Secession Law,
and subsequent initiatives have had the effect of marginalising
Taiwan's authorities. As a result, the Taiwanese authorities remain
highly sceptical of China's motives and "charm offensive"
and do not acknowledge a reduction in fundamental political tensions.
China refuses to resume dialogue with the Taiwanese authorities
until they acknowledge a "One China" principle.
THE ROLE
OF THE
US
74. The three joint US-China communiqués
and the Taiwan Relations Act guide US policy on China and Taiwan.
The first joint US-China communiqué, which forms the basis
of those relations between the US and the PRC, was issued in 1972.
In 1979 the US switched its recognition from Taiwan to the PRC,
and shortly afterwards US Congress passed the Taiwan Relations
Act. This Act states that the US decision to establish diplomatic
relations with the PRC rested upon the expectation that the future
of Taiwan would be determined by peaceful means and that the US
would view any effort to resolve Taiwan's future by any other
means with grave concern. It also states that the US will provide
Taiwan with arms of a defensive nature.
75. US policy has been deliberately ambiguous
on the subject of defending Taiwan in the event of an attack from
China. The Taiwan Relations Act does not oblige the US to come
to the defence of Taiwan in the event of an attack by China. It
does however require the US to maintain a capacity to resist any
resort to the use of force or other forms of coercion that would
jeopardise Taiwan. But the US is also clear that it does not support
Taiwan independence, and that it opposes unilateral steps on either
side of the Taiwan Strait to change the status quo.
76. This policy of strategic ambiguity has
prompted US Presidents to challenge each side at different times.
In 1995 President Clinton ordered carrier battle groups to sail
through the Taiwan Strait after the PRC launched missiles tests
in waters near Taiwan. President Bush commented in 2001 that the
US would "do whatever it takes" to defend Taiwan. That
year the US Administration also announced a US$18 billion arms
package for Taiwan. Yet during the visit of Chinese Premier Wen
Jiabao to the US in December 2003, in response to statements by
Chen Shui-bian which China would have regarded as provocative,
President Bush said: "`We oppose any unilateral decision
by either China or Taiwan to change the status quo, and the comments
and actions made by the leader of Taiwan indicate that he may
be willing to make decisions unilaterally, to change the status
quo, which we oppose.'"
77. Security in the Taiwan Strait will remain
high on the list of US priorities, particularly in the light of
China's increasing military capabilities. Earlier this year the
US and Japan jointly issued a statement which listed Taiwan as
a common security concern. It said that in the region one of its
common strategic objectives was to encourage the peaceful resolution
of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue. But the
repeated failure since 2001 of the Taiwanese legislature to pass
the special arms budget has lead some in Congress to question
Taiwan's commitment to provide for its own defence.
V. KOREAN PENINSULA
SECURITY ISSUES
78. Hostilities between the DPRK and the
UN ended under the 1953 Armistice, but there is no Peace Treaty.
A heavily guarded De-Militarised Zone (DMZ) continues to separate
DPRK and ROK. Both sides have nevertheless committed to work for
the reunification of Korea. The DMZ continues to be supervised
by the UN Command Military Armistice Commission under the Armistice
Agreement.
79. The DPRK army of over one million is
the fourth largest in the world. The ROK's is the sixth largest
with 600,000. The 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty between the ROK and
the US forms the basis of the US-ROK alliance, which ensures security
on the Korean Peninsula. The US is re-configuring its presence
to a smaller but more potent force of 25,000 stationed within
the ROK. The US has other forces in the region on which it could
call if necessary.
80. The DPRK acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) in 1985, but since December 2002 the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has not been able to carry out any
verification activities. In January 2003 the DPRK stated its intention
to withdraw from the NPT. On 10 February 2005 the DPRK publicly
claimed to have manufactured nuclear weapons. We have no reliable
confirmation of this claim, but there is little doubt that weapons-grade
plutonium could have been produced from spent fuel removed from
the DPRK's 5-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon. We are also concerned
at reports that the DPRK may be trying to develop a uranium enrichment
programme for weapons purposes.
81. Dismantlement of the DPRK's nuclear
weapons programmes under verifiable conditions is being sought
through the Six Party Talks (6PT) process, involving the DPRK,
the ROK, US, China, Russia and Japan. These began in 2003, and
in September 2005 the parties agreed a joint statement in which
the DPRK undertook to abandon its nuclear weapons and programmes
and return at an early date to the NPT. The statement also included
a number of commitments by other parties in the 6PT. The statement
did not contain provision for sequencing or implementation of
these commitments. These are supposed to be the subject of future
rounds of talks within the 6PT.
82. The DPRK is also believed to have chemical
weapons capabilities and the infrastructure to support a biological
weapons programme. It is not a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC), but has ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
(BTWC). It possesses and has tested missiles which we believe
are capable of delivering payloads, possibly including nuclear,
to the ROK, Japan and beyond. It has also demonstrated expertise
in technologies that could enable development of missiles with
ranges of over 10,000 km, allowing it to target the UK.
83. The ROK is a party to the CWC and the
BTWC, has declared possession of chemical weapons, and is destroying
its stockpile in accordance with the provisions of the CWC. The
ROK is believed to have made some progress on a nuclear weapons
programme during the 1970s when ruled by a military dictatorship,
but has long since acceded to the NPT.
UK POLICY
84. Following the 1953 Korean Armistice,
the UK was one of 16 signatories to a joint declaration pledging
to resist if armed attack in Korea were renewed. The UK however
does not acknowledge an automatic commitment to get involved if
hostilities were to continue. It is widely accepted that the US-ROK
Mutual Defense Treaty would be invoked in the event that hostilities
resumed. The UK however continues to play a role in upholding
the Armistice; the British Defence Attache in Seoul is the one-star
Commonwealth Member of the United Nations Command.
85. Whilst not a participant in the 6PT,
the UK and the EU strongly support the process, and the EU has
made clear its readiness to assist in whatever way it can. The
EU is a member of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation
(KEDO) Executive Board. KEDO was set up in the 1990s to provide
energy assistance to the DPRK and began construction of a nuclear
power reactor for this purpose. This reactor project was terminated
in November 2005, having been suspended since renewed doubts surfaced
over DPRK nuclear intentions in 2002. KEDO itself is also to close,
probably during 2006. The EU would be likely to remain on the
Executive Board until closure, and continue to be involved in
any future energy settlement under the 6PT.
86. The UK and EU take every opportunity
to press the DPRK to honour NPT obligations and negotiate constructively
and in good faith in the 6PT towards early, verifiable dismantlement
of its nuclear programmes. We are also concerned by reports of
possible DPRK proliferation activity in the nuclear weapons and
missiles areas, and work with the EU and the international community
to try to reduce this threat.
87. HMG does not consider the DPRK to have
met the withdrawal provisions of the NPT when announcing its departure
from the NPT in 2003, though we accept that others take a different
view. Following that announcement, we halted bilateral activity
which might be held directly to support the DPRK regime eg economic/technical
assistance and trade promotion. We have made clear to the DPRK
that relaxation of these restrictions will not be considered without
progress on the nuclear issue and also on human rights concerns.
Other EU Member States adjusted their approach to the DPRK on
similar lines.
FUTURE CHALLENGES
88. Notwithstanding its public statements, it
remains unclear whether the DPRK has taken the strategic decision
to negotiate away its nuclear weapons capability in return for
security assurances from the US and the provision of large-scale
energy assistance. Should the US and others come to regard the
DPRK's stance in the 6PT as delaying tactics rather than genuine
negotiation, pressure for action within the UN Security Council
may grow. The DPRK has stated it would regard UN sanctions as
an act of war.
89. Stability within the DPRK is not assured.
Much of the population lives in poverty and near-starvation. In
August 2005, the DPRK announced that all humanitarian assistance
should cease by 31 December, claiming there was no longer a need,
and the wish was for developmental aid only. The international
community rejects this analysis of humanitarian needs, and continues
to press the DPRK to reconsider. Economic reform is essential
if things are to improve, but significant movement towards a market-oriented
economy is unlikely under the current system, which favours centralisation
and is preoccupied with security and social controls. China provides
fuel, which is essential for the DPRK regime's survival. ROK also
provides large amounts of food aid, but applies less conditionality
than other international donors would like. Both China and ROK
are aware of the risks to their interests if there were regime
collapse and a refugee crisis.
VI. THE BALANCE OF SECURITY IN THE REGION
90. East Asia and the wider Asian region
contain some of the world's most pressing security challenges.
China, Japan, the ROK and the US are the major political and security
players in the region. The EU is a major economic player; but
up to now has not played a significant political role. The UK's
direct involvement in the region's security declined with Empire.
The rise of China and reactions to it have prompted a re-assessment
of the UK's and indeed the EU's engagement in the region. By 2020
the Asian economy may account for a greater share of world GDP
than the US or the EU. As China develops it will become an important
investor in developed economies. The security and stability of
the region is a pre-condition for this continued economic growth.
91. China's rise presages major changes
in the regional political and security balance. Its overriding
objective is economic growth, which it sees as central to restoring
China's regional pre-eminence and global importance. China will
continue to work within the international system in pursuit of
its economic objectives, but there is a sense amongst many in
the Chinese Government that it is a system which they had little
say in establishing. An increasingly engaged China may seek to
challenge established norms, and mobilise friendly countries in
support of these efforts. It has worked hard to reassure neighbours
of its "peaceful rise", but suspicions are never far
from the surface and can easily re-emerge.
92. The EU imposed an arms embargo on China
following the violent suppression of the Tiananmen Square pro-democracy
demonstrations in 1989. The embargo is politically, not legally,
binding at the EU level and in practice Member States interpret
it as covering only lethal weaponry. The great majority of applications
for the export of licensable defence or other sensitive equipment
to China do not fall into this category: these are assessed instead
against the criteria of the EU Code of Conduct. Under the criteria
of the Code, the Government would not permit the export of goods
if there was a clear risk that the export would be used for internal
repression or external aggression or would upset the regional
military balance or cause instability.
93. The embargo is therefore now of largely
symbolic significance. The Chinese Government consider the embargo
outdated and an example of political discrimination. Following
Chinese lobbying of the UK and other EU countries, the European
Council in December 2003 agreed to launch a review of the embargo.
Until the review process is complete, the Government continues
to implement the embargo fully. The review continues, and there
is at present no consensus among Member States as to when a decision
on lifting the embargo should take place. The European Council
in December 2004 stated that the result of any decision should
not be an increase in arms exports from EU member states to China
"in quantitative or qualitative terms". Member States
have reached agreement on newly strengthened and more transparent
common procedures to govern future exports of arms and sensitive
equipment. These would replace the existing Code of Conduct, although
an implementation date has yet to be agreed. Agreement is also
close on a "toolbox" of additional transparency measures
in respect of exports to countries coming out of embargoes.
94. The US and others with an interest in
the balance of security in the region have also expressed their
concerns that embargo lift (and any resulting increase in arms
sales) will lead to a change in the dynamics of the security balance
in the region. Under the UK Presidency strategic dialogues to
discuss regional security issues have been taken forward with
the US and launched with Japan.
SOURCES OF
TENSION
DPRK—nuclear programme and proliferation
95. The DPRK's nuclear weapons and ballistic
missiles programmes are the most immediate threat to security
in the region. Besides the potential threat to the DPRK's neighbours
(in particular Japan) and the wider risk from onward proliferation,
an unchecked DPRK nuclear programme would undermine global non-proliferation
norms weakening our ability to counter proliferation elsewhere.
The DPRK regime appears to be currently stable, but any collapse
could easily draw in China, ROK and the US. A military clash between
the two Koreas, while unlikely, would have disastrous consequences
for the Korean peninsula.
Taiwan
96. China would be prepared to use force
to prevent Taiwan moving to "de jure" independence,
as it made clear in its Anti-Secession Law in March 2005. A clash
over Taiwan, while unlikely, would have potentially disastrous
consequences for the region and internationally, bringing the
US (and possibly Japan, given US use of Japanese bases) into direct
conflict with another nuclear power. More recently, China's apparent
acceptance that time is working in its favour through the gradual
increase of economic and social contact between Taiwan and the
mainland has contributed to the easing of political tensions.
But the situation is not inherently stable and could be upset
quickly if there were, for example, a change of policy in Taipei
or Beijing. There is also the risk of miscalculation.
Risk of Competitive Nationalism
97. Political relations between China and
Japan are currently distant and cool, despite vibrant economic
relations. The Japanese recognise the benefits to their economy
of China's growth, but many are concerned that the rise of China
may be at the expense of Japanese and US influence in the region.
China's opposition to the Japanese bid for a permanent seat in
the Security Council, and China's assertive attitude to territorial
disputes in the East China Sea are seen as evidence for this.
These strategic tensions are compounded by unresolved historical
antagonisms. The Chinese complain about what they see as signs
of revisionism in Japan's attitude to its history, most obviously
Prime Minister Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine (commemorating
Japanese war dead including war criminals). Many Japanese in turn
see the Chinese government's "patriotic education",
with its emphasis on Japanese war crimes, as a ploy to shore up
legitimacy by stoking nationalist, anti-Japanese feeling among
young Chinese. Historical and territorial disputes also continue
to cause friction at the political level between Japan and the
ROK. Japanese/Chinese and Japanese/Korean tensions are likely
to remain an obstacle to regional integration for the foreseeable
future. The stabilising role played by Japan's security alliance
with the US will remain vital.
Energy security and climate change
98. Rising energy demand in Asia and competition
between Japan, China and India for resources affect our security,
energy and climate change interests. Japan imports more crude
oil than China, but Chinese and Indian demand is growing strongly,
driving up oil prices and increasing volatility. China and India
are investing in maritime capabilities to protect transit routes;
state owned companies are buying oil and gas assets in countries
that will influence their foreign policies in ways we will find
difficult (eg Sudan and Iran). China and India will make decisions
on energy resources, particularly coal, in the coming years, which
could have huge implications for our climate change objectives
for decades to come.
VII. OTHER MAJOR REGIONAL ACTORS AND THEIR ROLES
JAPAN
99. Japan is a key strategic partner for
the UK, globally as well as within the region. It is a rich, stable
democracy, with similar values and approaches to most of the major
foreign policy issues, on which it has become more active and
assertive under Koizumi. It is a reliable member of and substantial
contributor to the international system, paying nearly 20% of
the UN budget. It is the UK's largest trading partner and source
of foreign investment after the EU and US, and we have close financial,
academic and scientific links.
100. Japan is the most energy efficient
of the world's major economies, but is also the world's 2nd biggest
importer of oil by some margin because of its limited natural
resources. 85% of this oil comes from the Middle East. Japan depends
on imports for some 80% of its total energy requirements and with
increasingly fierce competition for resources in the region, energy
security is likely to move even higher up the agenda.
101. Under Koizumi Japan has aligned itself
closely with US policy in the war on terrorism and Iraq, and reinforced
the security alliance, including through joint development of
Ballistic Missile Defence. These developments have been motivated
in large part by heightened Japanese perceptions of a threat from
North Korea, following overflight of Japan by a DPRK missile test
in 1998, the start of the "second nuclear crisis" in
2002, and the North Korean admission in the same year that it
had abducted Japanese citizens. The Security Consultative Committee
Document agreed by US and Japanese Foreign and Defence Ministers
in October 2002 represents a further significant step in the evolution
of the security alliance. Although this included a provisional
agreement on the reduction of the US Marine presence in Okinawa,
it also committed Japan and the US to work more closely on international
as well as regional security issues.
102. Koizumi has said that he regards a
strong relationship with the US as a "necessary foundation"
for Japan's relations within the region. Despite the political
tensions outlined in Section II, Japan's economic and other links
with China, the ROK and others are flourishing. But it is clear
that Japan will take a cautious attitude to any proposals for
regional integration, especially Chinese-led, which seem to downplay
the US's role in the region, especially on security issues.
103. Japan has substantial and well-equipped
armed forces, though they are subject to legal and political constraints.
Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, written in the aftermath
of the Second World War, severely constrains the ability of the
Self Defence Forces (SDF) to play hard security roles overseas.
However, Japan has crossed several major policy thresholds since
Koizumi came to power. For example, the Anti-Terrorism Special
Measures Law was passed in November 2001, paving the way for Japanese
naval logistical support in the Indian Ocean to US-led operations
in Afghanistan, including the refuelling of Royal Navy vessels.
This was followed by the deployment of Japanese troops to work
on reconstruction in southern Iraq, where they worked closely
with UK and Australian troops.
UNITED STATES
104. The US is the largest Pacific power.
It has an essential national interest in peace and stability in
the western Pacific. It has kept the lid on a regional arms race
by guaranteeing Japanese and South Korean security and their non-nuclear
status. In the absence of any indigenous regional security structures,
the US network of bilateral alliances is the chief guarantor of
peace and stability. The US maintains large numbers of troops
and military assets in both Japan and ROK, and has a legal and
political commitment to help Taiwan defend itself. The US has
an extensive political and economic relationship with China: every
US Administration since Nixon has followed a policy of engagement.
But China's rise could disturb the military balance in the region
which the US has maintained for half a century. This creates a
complex and sometimes uneasy relationship between the US and China.
Even as the US works to integrate China into the international
community, it is also building closer relations with countries
on China's periphery. Many in the US see China as the strategic
threat; others recognise that China's rise needs to be absorbed
by the US so that the two countries are not always in tension.
105. China will not become the military
equal of the US for decades to come, but its economic growth is
likely to make it a much more significant military power, shifting
the balance of power in East Asia and increasing the cost to the
US of its military presence. China's military modernisation programme
has accelerated in recent years. China's aims may include deterring
US military intervention in any cross-Strait operation and deterring
Taiwanese independence or otherwise coercing Taiwan. Some analysts
also assess that China may be trying to acquire the capacity to
project power in other areas.
106. The US says it opposes any unilateral
change in the status quo over Taiwan because unilateral change
could cause conflict. In practice this means not only deterring
China from military aggression but also deterring Taiwan moves
toward "de jure" independence. The US argues that China's
military build-up goes beyond the requirements of self-defence
and is destabilising because it suggests that China has ambitions
of regional and perhaps wider domination.
EUROPEAN UNION
Emerging engagement
107. East Asia is of major strategic importance
for the UK and the EU. EU engagement has to date nevertheless
been largely defined through Member States' economic interests
in the region rather than the political or security concerns of
regional partners. This is partly because the EU does not share
the US's responsibility for maintaining peace and security in
the region. This relative political passivity is reflected in
the fact that the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy says
little about East Asian issues. But the EU is increasingly recognising
its vital interest in the reservation of peace and security in
East Asia, and the leverage which its economic weight give it
eg in urging greater market access for foreign firms and encouraging
structural improvements in China's economic system in return for
granting China the Market Economy Status it covets. It also has
unique experience in post-war reconciliation and in political
and economic integration on which to draw. For these reasons it
is timely for the EU to seek a strengthened role in the region
and the UK has been a prime mover, under its Presidency, to put
in place a more developed, coherent and focussed EU foreign and
security policy in East Asia and in establishing Strategic Dialogues
with the US, Japan and China.
EU interests
108. The economic interests which the EU—and
with it the UK—have at stake in the region are large. China,
Japan, ROK, Taiwan and member states of the Association of South-East
Asian Nations (ASEAN) account for 26% of the EU's global trade;
and this proportion is rising. The EU is now China's largest trading
partner, and China is the EU's second largest trading partner
after the US. East Asian economies hold the greatest volume of
the world's foreign currency resources and consequently have significant
influence on global financial stability. The security and stability
of the region has direct consequences for Europe; and for the
region itself, it is a precondition for continued economic success.
109. The EU's security interests in the
region embrace a broad sweep of issues: preservation of peace
and strengthening of international security in accordance with
the principles of the UN Charter; the promotion of a rule-based
international system; the promotion of regional integration; the
development and consolidation of democracy, the rule of law and
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and the promotion
of cooperative and sustainable policies to meet global challenges
such as energy, environment and health. Progress towards these
goals will contribute significantly to stability both in Europe
and in the region.
EU strategy
110. The emerging EU strategy is to establish
and broaden its strategic dialogue with China, develop its strategic
dialogues on East Asia with Japan and the US; deepen its political
dialogue on regional issues with the ROK; develop its exchanges
on regional issues with other important players such as Australia
and members of ASEAN and increase its engagement in the region,
including through regional fora such as the Asia-Europe Meeting
(ASEM), EU-ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).
111. These dialogues will serve to deepen the
expertise of Member States, the Council Secretariat and the Commission
on regional foreign and security policy matters. They will establish
better channels, which the EU can use to exert its own influence
on the regional players. They will also over time help to develop
common analysis and approaches, allowing the EU to deploy its
weight more effectively in concert with others.
Specific policies
112. We expect EU policy on the changing balance
in the region to focus on promoting harmonious and co-operative
relations among the key players, promoting confidence-building
measures and encouraging peaceful and cooperative solutions to
territorial disputes. The EU should urge China to be more transparent
about its military doctrine, institutions and expenditure; and
seek to lead regional political leaders away from competitive
nationalism towards relationships defined in terms of shared interests
and promoting effective multilateralism.
113. The relationship with China will be critical
to the EU's global agenda. We expect EU policy to evolve in a
way which reflects the UK's broad goal of working actively to
foster China's emergence as a successful and responsible member
of the international community. To achieve this, deeper engagement,
will be required in key areas such as non-proliferation, counter-terrorism,
illegal migration, serious crime, conflict prevention, peacekeeping
and China's increasing activities in the developing world, setting
out clearly where the EU has difficulties or commonalities of
approach. It should continue to support China's adherence to its
World Trade Organisation commitments and develop a dialogue with
China on energy and environment issues. Under the UK Presidency
work has begun on a new Framework Agreement, which will serve
to define the breadth and depth of the EU's future relationship
with China.
114. The EU should also develop co-operation
with Japan, the ROK and ASEAN Member States on a range of global
issues, expanding dialogue and cooperation into new areas; continue
its engagement for the promotion and protection of human rights
and fundamental freedoms in the region; continue to promote cultural
and civil society exchanges; and step up its work in particular
with China, stressing the need for swifter progress towards rule
of law and personal freedoms and gradual progress towards democracy.
115. The EU's long-term aim should be to
increase regional integration and encourage the emergence of strong
regional institutions based on clear recognition of shared interests.
There is no current system or forum within which shared regional
security concerns can be addressed. In this situation the US's
alliances and presence in the region supply essential guarantees.
Policy guidelines wording. In this situation the credibility of
US defence guarantees in the region remains essential for the
preservation of peace and stability. The EU recognises this geo-strategic
reality. It will now develop and continue through its strategic
dialogues an understanding of the existing security framework
and an ability to influence the key actors, and concert action
with them where necessary.
116. Looking further into the future, the
EU will over time seek to develop the authority and the effectiveness
of the regional organisations and fora, promote outward-looking
models, work to build up the activities of the ARF and ASEM; strengthen
dialogue with ASEAN; support the development of the East Asia
Summit in an open and inclusive way; explore the possibility of
an OSCE-type organisation in the region; seek out opportunities
to add value to regional organisations, as for example with the
EU-ASEAN monitoring mission in support of the Aceh Peace Deal;
and encourage greater involvement of regional players in multilateral
peacekeeping operations.
117. The EU should be ready to encourage
initiatives aimed at promoting cross-Straits dialogue, practical
co-operation and confidence-building; openly praise positive developments;
encourage an inclusive process of dialogue that involves all parties
concerned; and encourage both sides to pursue pragmatic solutions
to questions regarding the position of Taiwan with regard top
specialised multilateral fora. The EU should also develop its
understanding of the military balance affecting the cross-Strait
situation, and of related risks.
118. The EU should continue to express its
willingness to gradually deepen and widen relations with the DPRK
provided that significant progress is made on EU matters of concern
such as the resolution of the nuclear issue and on the improvement
of the human rights situation. It should maintain its support
for peace and stability on a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula; stress
its continuing support for the 6PT process and its insistence
on the verified full dismantlement of the DPRK's nuclear weapons.
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