Further written evidence submitted by
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
SUPPLEMENTARY BRIEFING ON TIBET AUTONOMOUS
REGION (TAR)
HAN CHINESE
INFLUENCE IN
TIBET
The Chinese government estimates the number
of ethnic Tibetans in China to be over five million. Around half
of these live outside the borders of the present Tibet Autonomous
Region (TAR), mainly in neighbouring Qinghai, Sichuan or Yunnan
Provinces. The most recent Chinese government statistics gave
the population of the TAR as 2.76 million in November 2005. Of
these, 2.5 million (92%) were ethnic Tibetans, and 180,000 were
Han Chinese (6.5%). The remainder were from other ethnic groups.
In addition to these settled Han Chinese, official statistics
from 2003 counted a further 245,000 migrant workers from elsewhere
in China (mainly—81% of them—from neighbouring Sichuan
Province) as currently working in Tibet. The majority of these
will be ethnic Han Chinese, though some will be from other ethnic
groups, including Tibetans whose official place of residence is
outside the TAR. The number of migrants is likely to have risen
since this survey was carried out, and a realistic estimate would
be that the number is now over 300,000.
The presence of Han Chinese is felt disproportionately
in the cities, since 80% of the Tibetan population (around two
million) continue to live in rural areas, often at subsistence
level, and some still as nomads. The Han Chinese and other migrant
workers are concentrated almost exclusively in Lhasa and one or
two other urban areas. In urban areas, the number of Han Chinese
is almost equal to the number of ethnic Tibetans. The official
population of Lhasa is 420,000. Though ethnic Tibetans make up
around half this number, they live and work mainly in the more
crowded old town around the Jhokand temple. Han Chinese tend to
live in the more spacious and more recently developed suburbs,
which is also where most larger scale businesses operate.
With the imminent opening of the Qinghai-Tibet
railway, it is expected that more migrants from outside the TAR
will arrive, and perhaps settle along the route of the railway
as well as in the urban areas. But it is difficult to measure
migrant flows, as it is very difficult for Chinese citizens to
move their official place of residence (unless they are public
servants), and the official estimates of migrants make no distinction
between temporary or seasonal workers and those who have settled
almost permanently even without official status.
A number of recent surveys have moved away from
criticising Beijing's presence in the TAR per se to more
nuanced studies looking at the question of economic discrimination.
There have been a number of recent studies of Beijing's development
policies in the TAR which criticise the authorities for overlooking
the majority of the Tibetan population and adopting policies that
favour key sectors where Han Chinese tend to dominate. In a 2002
study Andrew Fischer (who spent some time at LSE) broke down the
TAR's excellent growth figures (over 10% since 1998). He noted
"the dynamic and growing parts of the economy are concentrated
in services, administration, construction and a limited amount
of industry, all of which are closely tied to the state"
and which "are exclusively located in urban areas and townships
where non-Tibetan immigrants and government administration increasingly
congregate. Government spending and investment reinforces this
bias within the economy". In contrast the agricultural/rural
sector grew by only 2% annually from 1998-2001. As a result inequality
between rural Tibetans and urban residents (including both Han
and Tibetan) is one of the worst in China. Fischer also highlights
the continuing low social indicators, ie on literacy and health,
in rural areas of the TAR.
Increasingly campaigners are calling for a development
policy which focuses on:
— Development of skills of local population
in relevant areas for the local economy.
— Greater investment in agriculture,
where the majority of local Tibetans live, and the development
of non-agricultural work in rural areas (a key plank of rural
development in other areas of China).
— Development of infrastructure in
rural areas ie roads (where Beijing has a good story to tell)
and alternative forms of energy.
— Greater use of micro credit.
TALKS BETWEEN
THE CHINESE
AUTHORITIES AND
THE REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE
DALAI LAMA
The Chinese have joined in informal talks with
representatives of the DL since 2002 (the most recent meeting
taking place in Beijing in February this year). However, the Chinese
have set a series of pre-conditions (including renouncing independence
for Tibet and recognising Taiwan as a province of China) to be
met before any serious negotiations can begin. While the Tibetans
have made some positive movements towards meeting these demands—most
notably that the Dalai Lama has stated he no longer seeks independence
but genuine autonomy and self-rule for Tibet (through his Middle
Way approach)—the Chinese have yet to respond and reports
suggest they are not yet convinced of the Dalai Lama's good faith.
They point to his recent visit to the United States, ostensibly
for medical treatment, but coinciding with President Hu's visit,
in which he gave high profile interviews, and suggested that an
autonomous Tibet might be able to take responsibility for its
external relations. There are key stumbling blocks to real negotiations
beginning, not least differing interpretations of what constitutes
"Tibet". The Chinese have recently refused requests
for the Dalai Lama to visit China (on a religious pilgrimage)
on the grounds that the time "is not yet ripe". We use
every appropriate opportunities to encourage the Chinese to engage
in meaningful dialogue with the representatives of the Dalai Lama
(see para 33 of FCO Memorandum for further details—FAC Evidence
Ref EAs06).
Asia Pacific Directorate
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
5 May 2006
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