Written evidence submitted by David Shambaugh,
Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Director,
China Policy Program, Elliott School of International Affairs,
The George Washington University; and Non-resident Senior Fellow,
Foreign Policy Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, Washington,
DC
TRENDS IN EAST ASIA, AMERICAN INTERESTS,
AND TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS
PROLOGUE
I am indeed greatly honoured to be invited to
submit written evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the
House of Commons on this occasion. I had the honor of doing so
once before on the occasion of the Special Inquiry on Policy Toward
China and Hong Kong in 1996. Ever since my time on the faculty
of the School of Oriental and African Studies (1987-96) and as
Editor of The China Quarterly (1991-96), I have keenly
followed both British and EU relations with China specifically
and Asia more broadly. Thus, this is a welcome opportunity for
me, and I hope that my evidence can assist the committee in its
inquiry. I hasten to add that my views are nothing more than those
of an individual scholar—I certainly do not represent the
United States Government in any manner, and my views are not necessarily
even representative of non-governmental experts in the US. I will
leave it to the US Government, and the Foreign Affairs Committee,
to identify US interests and policies in East Asia. What I can
offer is a personal assessment of the principal trends current
in the region.
PRINCIPAL TRENDS
IN THE
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
OF EAST
ASIA
Needless to say, East Asia is a dynamic region—perhaps
the world's most dynamic region. Consider the following facts.
Economic and social indicators
— Constitutes half of the world's population.
— Is the center of world trade (both
the US and EU trade more with East Asia than with each other).
— Is the world's fastest growing economies
measured by annual GDP growth.
— Is the world's second and third largest
economies in aggregate (Japan and China).
— Has the world's largest capital inflows
(60% of the global total, approximately $150 billion in FDI per
annum).
— Possesses one-third of global GDP.
— Has the world's highest savings rates
(approx. 35% of GDP).
— Possesses half of total global foreign
exchange reserves (approx. $1 trillion).
— Includes several of the world's most
important producers of high-technology.
Strategic indicators
— Major power interaction among US,
China, Japan, Russia.
— Six of the world's eight largest
standing armies.
— Modernising militaries throughout
the region, but particularly China.
— Three nuclear weapons states (China,
Russia, North Korea).
— Two of the world's most dangerous
military flashpoints—Korea and Taiwan.
— Danger of North Korean development,
and potential proliferation, of nuclear weapons.
— Forward deployment of approximately
93,000 US forces, backed by an additional 124,000 in Hawaii, Alaska,
and west coast of the United States.
— Five bilateral US defence alliances
(Australia, Japan, Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand) and
cooperative security partnership with Singapore.
— Increased importance of Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a regional actor, and growth
of regional multilateral organisations.
— World's third largest defense expenditure,
after the United States and European NATO members ($164.3 million
in defense expenditure out of a global total of $997.1 million
in 2003).
— World's second largest regional importer
of weaponry (after Middle East).
— Territorial disputes (South and East
China Seas).
Political indicators
— Eleven full or partial democracies
(Australia, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Cambodia, Thailand,
Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines).
— Four communist party-states (China,
North Korea, Vietnam, Laos).
— One military dictatorship (Myanmar).
— One sultanate (Brunei).
— Subordination of militaries to civilian
rule as democracy has spread across region.
— Improved human rights in countries
where democracy has developed.
— Growth of regional multilateral institutions
and regional cooperation.
If these are some of the principal facts that
define East Asia as a region today, what are the principal trends?
PRINCIPAL REGIONAL
TRENDS
The East Asian sub-system of the international
system is in the midst of significant systemic change. New features
are appearing while old characteristics are being redefined. The
system is in flux and the properties of the emerging sub-system
have not yet become fully fixed or clear. Below I outline the
six elements that currently constitute the emerging regional system.
The US-led security system
First, the US-led security system remains the
predominant regional security architecture across all of Asia
(consideration necessarily extends beyond the geographic confines
of East Asia). This includes a number of elements: the five bilateral
alliances in East Asia; non-allied security partnerships in Southeast
Asia, South Asia and Oceania; the build-up of forces in the Southwest
Pacific; the new US-India and US-Pakistan military relationships;
and the US military presence and defence arrangements in Southwest
and Central Asia. Taken together, these comprise the dominant
security architecture across all of Asia. No country can match
the United States in these regards.
The alliance system is commonly referred to
as the "hub and spokes" model, with the United States
serving as the hub of a wheel with each of the five bilateral
alliances (Australia, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and
Thailand) serving as the spokes. The system has benefited the
United States and its Asian allies for more five decades and has
been the predominant regional security architecture since the
end of the Vietnam War. It has been central to the maintenance
of strategic stability and economic development throughout the
East Asian region. Even China has benefited from the regional
security and stability engendered by the system, which has provided
a conducive environment for China's recent explosive economic
development.
During the second Clinton administration, but
particularly during the George W Bush administration, the United
States has sought to strengthen each of these bilateral alliances.
Strengthening has involved some redefinition as well. The alliances
with Australia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea have undergone
the greatest redefinition and strengthening.
In the case of the US-Australian alliance this
has involved stepped-up joint military training and intelligence
sharing, as well as the pre-positioning of supplies and logistics
support. Australia has also contributed to the "coalition
of the willing" by deploying troops to Iraq.
In the case of Japan this has involved collaboration
on theater missile defense (TMD), a resolution of the nettlesome
Okinawa bases issue (with redeployment of the Third Marine Expeditionary
Force), and the issuance of a Joint 2+2 Statement on mutual security
interests (which outlined twelve common strategic objectives,
including a controversial clause identifying Taiwan as a matter
of "mutual security concern"[1]).
The US Global Defence Posture Review also envisions changes in
deployments and command structures that increase joint military
interoperability and further facilitate Japan's involvement in
global peacekeeping operations.
The US-ROK alliance has also undergone redefinition
insofar as the Pentagon has decided to redeploy some forces out
of central Seoul and away from the DMZ, but the alliance has also
undergone substantial strain owing to rising anti-Americanism
in South Korea as well as divisions between Seoul and Washington
over handling of the North Korean nuclear crisis.
The US-Philippines and US-Thailand alliances
have also been upgraded. Both have been designated as "major
non-NATO allies," thus qualifying them for large security
assistance packages. In both cases, cooperation on counter-terrorism
operations has assumed a central place in joint training and other
assistance.
In addition to strengthening these alliances,
the United States has moved to solidify non-allied security partnerships
(sometimes dubbed "Cooperative Security Locations" by
Pentagon planners) with India, Mongolia, Pakistan, and Singapore.
In each case, these security partnerships involve joint exercises,
training, intelligence sharing, arms sales, military educational
exchanges, and a wide range of military assistance programs. Indonesia
has recently requalified for US military assistance programs,
and military-military exchanges have also commenced between the
US and Vietnam. In Central Asia, the US maintains air bases in
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, in connection with the ongoing wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Each of these security partnerships are significant
in their own right, but taken together strongly supplement the
five bilateral alliances and constitute a dense web of security
and military relationships between the United States and the majority
of Asian nations stretching from Northeast to Southwest Asia.
Only North Korea, Laos, China, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Nepal lie
outside the purview of US defense arrangements. Notable too is
the fact that these alliances and security partnerships geographically
ring China. This is no accident, and represents US "strategic
hedging" against the potential for a disruptive China.[2]
In addition to such strategic partnering with
various nations, the United States has also undertaken its own
unilateral military buildup in the western Pacific. Guam in particular
is being built up into a forward base of major significance. The
forces deployed there are directly relevant to China, potential
contingencies in the Taiwan Strait or Korean Peninsula, and can
also be used deployments into the Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf,
and broader Middle East. Andersen Air Force base on Guam is home
to the 13th Air Force command, and includes growing numbers of
B-1, B-2, and B-52 strategic bombers; C-17 Globemaster long-range
transports; Global Hawk and E-2 Hawkeye reconnaissance aircraft;
F/A-18 Hornet fighters; in-flight refueling tankers and other
aircraft. Guam is also now home to a growing number of Los Angeles
class nuclear attack submarines, and a growing number of surface
combatants. Consideration is also being given to homeporting an
aircraft carrier battle group there. The Third Marine Expeditionary
Force is also being relocated from Okinawa to Guam.
Thus, any consideration of the regional system
and security architecture in the Asia-pacific region must begin
with, and take full account of, US security ties with these nations.
Despite the pervasiveness of this US-led security system, it cannot
be claimed that the system is truly and fully regional. A number
of countries—most notably China—remain unaffiliated,
and have no compelling reasons to join. Nonetheless, it is this
US-led system that provides for regional stability and security-public
goods from which all Asian nations derive benefit.
A Proactive China
One of the most significant developments of
the past decade has been China's proactive engagement of its periphery.[3]
China's new proactive regional posture is reflected in virtually
all policy spheres—economic, cultural, diplomatic, and strategic—and
this parallels China's increased activism on the global stage.
In each of these realms, the efforts and progress of China in
reaching out to its neighbors has been truly impressive (with
the notable exceptions of Japan and Taiwan).
As China has reached out, all nations around
China have reciprocated and have redefined their relations with
Beijing, as well as with one another. As China's influence continues
to grow, some of these countries are looking to Beijing for regional
leadership or, at a minimum, are taking China's views and sensitivities
more into account. Others are less certain of Beijing's short-term
motives and long-term consistency, and are hence hedging their
bets by tightening their relationships with the United States
(see above) and simultaneously seeking to bind China into a dense
web of institutional arrangements that will constrain its potential
for disrupting regional security. Nonetheless, China's proactive
engagement of its periphery is of major importance in defining
the emerging regional order. Overcoming its earlier hesitancy
to engage in regional multilateral forums, China has taken an
active role in many. Beijing has also worked hard to address and
alleviate one of the region's most contentious issue: the North
Korean nuclear crisis.
Bilaterally and multilaterally, Beijing's diplomacy
has been remarkably adept and nuanced, earning praise around the
region. As a result, most nations (the notable exceptions being
Japan and Taiwan) in the region now see China as a good neighbour,
constructive partner, and non-threatening regional power. This
regional perspective is striking, given that just a few years
ago many of China's neighbours voiced growing concerns about the
possibility of China becoming a domineering regional hegemon and
powerful military threat. Today these views are more muted. Even
former adversaries—such as Vietnam, India, Indonesia, South
Korea, and Russia—now enjoy steadily improving relations
with Beijing. To be sure, Beijing's strained relations with Japan
are a major blight on this otherwise positive trend, and various
countries (particularly Singapore, Vietnam, and India) are hedging
by strengthening their ties with the US—but, overall, China's
cooperative diplomacy has become a defining—and positive—feature
of the emerging regional order.
"Hedged Engagement" between the United
States and China
The relationship between the United States and
China remains the most important bilateral relationship, with
truly regional (if not global) consequences. On balance, this
complex relationship is characterised by substantial cooperation
on bilateral, regional, and global issues—while, despite
this tangible and positive cooperation, there remain evident suspicions
and distrust of the other's motives and actions. As a result,
the state of Sino-American relations today may be characterised
by David M Lampton's phrase "hedged engagement."[4]
Both sides are engaging to a significant extent, yet are hedging
against the possibility of a deterioration of ties. Looking to
the future, the Sino-American relationship is likely to continue
to exhibit these dialectical features.
While the two nations cooperate on a number
of regional and global issues, the relationship is not a condominium
of two-power domination. While they occasionally display traditional
balance of power and strategic hedging features, it should be
recognised that Sino-American cooperation is real and significant.
Further, it must be recognised that the absence of Sino-American
antagonism is an important feature of the regional order. While
some Asian countries may hedge against either US or Chinese regional
domination, and adroitly acquire whatever resources and benefits
they can from both China and the United States, every one of
these countries seeks a stable, cooperative Sino-American relationship.
Should Beijing and Washington one day confront each other, all
regional states would be put in the awkward position of having
to choose sides—and this they seek to avoid at all costs.
To be sure, there are tensions in the Sino-American
relationship at present. The ballooning trade deficit is probably
primary, as both sides appear to have worked well together to
manage the Taiwan issue and the Chen Shuibian Government in Taipei
(effectively curtailing its independence inclinations). Intellectual
property rights (IPR) are a concern. North Korea is as well. Human
rights remain an irritant. China's military modernisation is viewed
warily by Washington, while the US security partnerships and military
buildup in the Pacific (described above) are of concern to Beijing.
These are all real concerns, but none are grounds for a significant
cleavage in the relationship.
The past few years have witnessed significantly
increased bilateral dialogue in all sectors and at all levels.
This represents a real institutionalisation of the relationship,
and while there are frictions (which are discussed), the very
fact that the two governments interact so intensively across the
full spectrum of relations—including now military—is
a good and positive indicator that a "floor" exists
beneath the often fluctuant relationship.
A Deteriorating China-Japan relationship
While Sino-American relations are characterised
by a mixture of engagement and hedging, with significant cooperation
and extensive exchanges, unfortunately the same cannot be said
for Sino-Japanese relations. This relationship between two of
Asia's four leading powers (India and the United States being
the others) has progressively atrophied in recent years. It is
on the verge of being dysfunctional, despite the robust economic
relationship between the two nations. Some describe it as "hot
economics, cold politics," but in fact the relationship is
more complex than that. Suspicions, nationalism, and hostility
run deep in each society. Mutual perceptions are increasingly
negative. The "history issue" hangs as a dark cloud
over the entire relationship, and repeated visits to the Yasakuni
Shrine by Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi is an unnecessary irritant.
To make matters worse, the potential for military engagements
over disputed maritime claims in the East China Sea/Sea of Japan
and around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands is growing.
This is a combustible environment. The maritime/energy
dispute could ignite a broader confrontation that could quickly
escalate, and would put the United States into a very delicate
and uncomfortable position. Given its alliance with Japan, Washington
would have little choice but to side with Tokyo in any such dispute
(although this may not be in America's best strategic interests).
The atrophy in relations needs to be arrested immediately, and
a series of confidence-building measures established. The United
States can, and should, play a constructive role in this process.
The deteriorating Sino-Japanese relationship is not simply a bilateral
matter—it has truly regional implications. If China-Japan
relations are not stable, East Asia is not stable.
An emerging normative security community
The fifth defining feature of the evolving regional
order is the gradual emergence of a regional security community
and growing multilateral architecture that is based on a series
of increasingly shared norms (about interstate relations and security).
The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is the cornerstone of this emerging
regional community, but the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
(SCO) in Central Asia and the South Asia Association for Regional
Cooperation (SAARC) are also important component parts. These
organisations are forms of cooperative, rather than collective,
security. China's growing embrace of the ARF and a potential "regional
security community" is a positive sign and may move the region
gradually in the direction of further institutionalisation. Consideration
being given among security specialists in Northeast Asia for evolving
the Six Party Talks into some kind of Northeast Asian cooperative
security mechanism should also be further explored.
In non-traditional security, regional cooperation
is already occurring in a wide variety of areas: economic security;
nonproliferation; resource management; public health; counter-terrorism;
countering narcotics; countering smuggling; countering piracy;
countering organised crime; countering human trafficking; container
security; disaster relief, etc. Asian nations are also increasingly
engaging in combined military exercises. Energy security is an
issue ripe for multilateral cooperation.
Although the growth of multilateralism in Asia
has had a late start compared with Europe or the Americas—and
it has a long way to go to reach comparable levels of institutional
integration—there has nonetheless been significant progress
in recent years. One reason for the increase in the number of
dialogues, groupings, and multilateral mechanisms in Asia has
been the growing acceptance of common norms within the region.
Such ideational agreement must precede the formation of institutional
architectures; but once norms are institutionalised, they have
a kind of binding effect on member states. To be sure, the diversity
of Asian societies, cultures, and economic and political systems
will be a challenge for Asian states to overcome, but there are
increasing signs of normative convergence around the region.
Regional interdependence
The final feature of the evolving Asian system
is oriented not around security affairs or major power relations,
but around the increasingly dense and interdependent web of economic,
scientific, technological, cultural, societal, educational and
other ties being forged among Asian nations in the era of accelerating
globalisation. The core actor in this model is not necessarily
the nation-state, but a plethora of non-state actors and processes—many
of which are difficult to measure with any precision—that
operate at the societal level. These multiple threads bind societies
together in complex and interdependent ways. The statistics and
indicators of this increasing interconnectedness and interdependence
are many. Indeed, they point up another significant way in which
the Asian region is changing: its traditional geographic subcomponents—Northeast
Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Southwest Asia, and Central
Asia—are no longer useful intellectual constructs for dividing
or distinguishing the macro processes occurring throughout the
region. In the 21st century, these five sub-regions are all increasingly
interconnected and interdependent at numerous levels.
Regional interdependence is a rapidly accelerating
trend, it serves as a powerful deterrent to conflict, and it is
conducive to peace and stability (including across the Taiwan
Strait). Yet as profound as this dynamic is, interdependence by
itself is insufficient to establish a dominant regional system
in Asia. It does not operate at the nation-state level, nor does
it necessarily require the creation of security arrangements—features
that any truly regional system must exhibit.
IMPLICATIONS FOR
REGIONAL STABILITY,
SECURITY, AND
ORDER
These are (from this observer's perspective)
the principal macro trends emerging in the (East) Asian order.
Some are directly related to security, while some are more peripheral.
But, the security architecture does not exist in a vacuum—it
depends on the "oxygen" of these other regional dynamics
in order to survive. Asia is a dynamic region, in which these
multiple macro processes simultaneously combine together to characterize
and shape the regional order.
As the component parts of the regional order
might be thought of as a "mosaic," so too can the regional
security architecture. That is, there are different layers that
address different aspects of regional security.
Clearly, the US-led security system addresses
the "hard security" dimensions and provides the all-important
collective good of assuring the peace and overall stability of
the region. Since the end of the Cambodian conflict the US-led
system has deterred conflicts from erupting in Southeast Asia,
while the US alliances with Japan and South Korean have helped
to prevent the outbreak of hostilities on the Korean peninsula.
The forward deployment of US forces in the region, taken together
with the alliances and non-allied security partnerships, has helped
to deter China from aggressive or destabilising behavior (or so
the US Government tells itself). Thus, it can be concluded that
the US-led security system, now extended to South and Central
Asia, has been a net plus in guaranteeing regional security and
stability.
The ARF and SCO cooperative security mechanisms
have also done much to address pressing non-traditional security
concerns in the region—which are, in fact, paramount for
Southeast Asian nations. Together, the ARF and SCO have also contributed
to the gradual emergence of a regional consensus about the norms
of interstate relations. As a result, a normative "soft security"
community is gradually taking shape-which supplements, rather
than supplants, the "hard security" institutions noted
above.
I would also count the significant engagement
by China of its periphery as a positive contributing factor to
regional security and stability. Beijing's signing of the Treaty
of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and Code of Conduct on the South
China Sea are particularly noteworthy actions. The Chinese Government's
general embrace of regional multilateralism is very significant,
as no regional institution can be considered effective unless
China is not only a member, but an active one. Beijing's active
regional diplomacy places it increasingly at the centre of all
regional issues-bilateral and multilateral. China's growing centrality
to the economic and technological networks of production and supply
chains, which criss-cross the region, also serve as a stabilising
factor.
Interdependence, which is mushrooming rapidly
across Asia, is inherently conducive to stability and security.
There may be no better deterrent to conflict than this accelerating
interdependence.
US-China and China-Japan relations are also
critically important to the regional architecture, insofar as
they involve three of the four major powers in the region (India
being the other). The region cannot be secure or stable if relations
among these powers are unstable. This was the case for the century
stretching from the 1870s to the 1970s. However, the détente
following the Nixon opening to China ushered in a new era and
did much to ensure stability in the region (including the normalisation
of Sino-Japanese relations). Yet, three decades later one cannot
help but observe that there is some fragility in relations on
two sides of this regional triangle.
Clearly, the current estrangement in Sino-Japanese
relations is cause for considerable concern—and it behoves
all parties to arrest the atrophy in relations as soon as possible.
Yet this will not be so easy, unless a series of unilateral gestures
concerning the "history issue" are undertaken by Tokyo.
Until this transpires, Japan's relations with China, the two Koreas,
and all of Southeast Asia will remain strained and non-normal.
Concerning US-China relations, as noted above,
there is an obvious ambivalence currently apparent in the relationship.
This is not new, although the current phase tends to emphasise
the angst and unstable features. Yet, if one takes the long and
macro views, the overall depth and institutionalisation of the
relationship—at both the governmental and non-governmental
levels—is cause for optimism. The two nations are simply
so intertwined that a conflict is almost unthinkable, as it would
so damage their respective national interests. Similarly, a US
policy of "containment"—suggested by some—is
equally fallacious, as (a) no other government would cooperate
in such a policy and (b) the two societies are so intertwined
that it would immediately undercut any such government effort.
Thus, on balance, while there may be a strong element of uncertainty
and ambivalence at the perceptual level, in terms of hard interests
and bilateral ties, the two nations remain deeply engaged. From
the perspective of the regional order, the depth of this engagement
is a very positive and conducive element to stability and security.
From this observer's perspective, taken together,
all of the elements discussed above constitute the evolving regional
order in Asia—and, in one way or the other, they all contribute
to the regional security architecture. Except for the Sino-Japanese
relationship, they auger for continued stability and security
in the near term.
POSTSCRIPT: THE
RISE OF
CHINA
Of all the issues of importance affecting East
Asia, perhaps the most important is the "rise" of China.
It is impacting the region in virtually every way, as noted above:
economic, diplomatic, militarily, socially, technologically, culturally,
multilaterally. That China is "rising" is not in dispute—what
is less certain are (a) the implications of this phenomenon and
(b) how the United States, Asia, and Europe react. Above we briefly
discussed how Asia is reacting—a combination of trying to
engage and enmesh China in a dense web of diplomatic and multilateral
interactions and commitments that will give Beijing a strong stake
in the maintaining the status quo in the region and limit China's
potential for disrupting the regional order. Thus far, this has
proven a smart and effective strategy.
But what about Europe and the United States?
How do they interpret China's rise? There are both important
differences and important similarities. These I have summarised
in a recent article in The Washington Quarterly, which
I append to this document for the Committee's consideration.[5]
It makes little sense to reiterate the arguments here, but I do
think it important that Committee members and staff take the time
to digest it, as it has many important implications for the UK—in
its dealings with the US, with the EU, and with China.
David Shambaugh
6 December 2005
1 See Joint Statement of US-Japan Security Consultative
Committee, 19 February 2005, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/42490.htm. Back
2
See Evan Medeiros, "Strategic Hedging and the Future of
Asia-Pacific Stability," The Washington Quarterly (Winter
2005-06). Back
3
For further elaboration, see David Shambaugh (ed), Power Shift:
China & Asia's New Dynamics (Berkeley and London: University
of California Press, 2005); David Shambaugh, "China Engages
Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order," International Security,
Vol 29, No 3 (Winter 2004-05); Pan Zhongying, "Yazhou Diqu
Zhixu de Zhuanbian yu Zhongguo" [China and the Transformation
of the Asian Regional Order], Waijiao Pinglun, No 4 (2005),
pp 41-49. Back
4
David M Lampton, "Paradigm Lost," The National Interest
(Fall 2005). Back
5
Not printed. Back
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