Written evidence submitted by Steve Tsang,
Reader in Politics, St Antony's College, University of Oxford
A rising power that is often deemed a potential
superpower with the ability to rival the United States, China
is generally seen as the most important emerging regional power.
While such a view appears to be justified if one looks at China's
military capabilities, growth rate and the focus of its security
and economic policies, this is also misleading. Both historically
and since the founding of the People's Republic in 1949, China
in fact sees its relations with the rest of the world in a global
rather than a regional perspective. Its short-term focus upon
East Asia is dictated by realism and its particular approach to
dealing with the outside world, which is intricately tied to its
view of history. Whether China can and will become a superpower
is an open question.
THE CHINESE
PERSPECTIVE
Even though the mainstream or Communist Party
approved view of history in China deviates significantly from
a judicious reconstruction and assessment of Chinese history in
key areas, it nevertheless reflects and reinforces the way how
the Chinese leadership sees China and its place in the world.
In its officially endorsed history China was the most advanced
country and the centre of civilization at least since it became
united under the First Emperor in 221BC—until this was changed
by the rise of Western imperialism in the nineteenth century.
In this view civilization flourished when China was a united country
and dominated in a "benign way" the world within its
reach—those who lived beyond the reach of its civilization
were generally dismissed as barbarians. There is therefore an
unspoken understanding that the restoration of China to the pre-eminent
position that it historically enjoyed, before it was successfully
challenged by Queen Victoria's British Empire, will be a positive
and civilizing development for the world.
To make this view easily comprehensible, imagine
how the citizens of Rome would have felt if the Roman Empire,
a contemporary of China's first empire, had continued to exist
as a united empire (albeit interrupted by periods of disunity)
and as the world's premier power and technologically and administratively
the most advanced state governing most of Europe for almost 2000
years. Such a view of history underpins China's worldview.
Seizing on Western powers and Japan's imperial
activities in China following the first Anglo-Chinese War (1839-42),
which marked the beginning of China's "century of humiliation",
the Chinese Communist government played up the theme that China
was a victim of imperialism. In the officially approved view in
China, imperialism is either Western or Japanese or even Soviet
in origin but it is never Chinese regardless of the nature of
Chinese rule in, say, Tibet or Xinjiang. Following this line of
thinking China has a right to redress this "century of humiliation"
and to restore itself to its "rightful place" in the
world. The retrocession of Hong Kong from Britain in 1997 was
therefore seen as a landmark in this direction. What is now deemed
the most important legacy of Western, in this case American, imperialism
is the separation of Taiwan from China.
China also tends to look at the world in a global
rather than regional perspective as the concept of Asia was an
alien one in pre-modern China. The idea of China being part of
Asia is a modern import.
To say that the Chinese worldview is essentially
global does not imply China does not behave like a regional power
as well, particularly before it can build up sufficient "comprehensive
national strength" to enable it to challenge US dominance.
Realism and a hard-nosed calculation of interests and capabilities
apply as much to the Chinese as it does to most governments. Thus,
the Chinese government accepts that in capability terms it is
still only a major regional power, and must still adhere to the
late Deng Xiaoping's dictum to bide its time before seeking to
restore its "rightful place" in the world.
In this interregnum, and in light of the US
pre-eminence in the post-Cold War world, China puts great importance
on international organizations in general and on its United Nations
Security Council seat in particular. They are useful in countering
the preponderance of the US. Furthermore, while it is still building
up its "comprehensive national strength" it refrains
from taking an assertive role in world affairs other than protecting
its interests. Although it is not articulated China reserves the
right to change its attitude towards multilateralism and international
organizations when it is ready to assert its "rightful place"
in the world.
Another key concept that underlays the Chinese
approach to relations with the rest of the world is that of the
United Front. This is not a policy but a methodology inherited
from the era of Mao Zedong. In the simplest terms, the United
Front requires the Chinese Communist Party to identify a principal
enemy, its supporters outside the Party, and the intermediate
zone full of "wavering elements" that can be won over
by either the Party or its principal enemy. The Party's task is
to destroy the principal enemy, which requires the Chinese Government
to work hard to win over the intermediate zone and isolate the
principal enemy. Once this has been accomplished the Party will
move on and identify from the intermediate zone a new principal
enemy. This will become the target of focused attack in this new
stage until it too is destroyed. The process is to be repeated
until all in the intermediate zone have been transformed into
"friends" of China.
CHINA'S
APPROACH TO
THE WORLD
By drawing together its worldview and the united
front approach and apply them to the current international scene,
China's policy towards the outside world can be put in context.
There are three dimensions that come out strongly:
— In general terms while China is building
up its "comprehensive national strength" it needs a
stable and peaceful international environment to ensure rapid
growth under the leadership of the Communist Party.
— In national security terms, China's
main focus is Taiwan, and until this "principal contradiction"
has been resolved to its satisfaction, it is China's policy to
reassure the rest of the world that China has no territorial or
aggressive ambitions.
— In the long term and when China is
ready it will assert its "rightful place" in the world.
This may require appropriate changes being made to the international
system.
The first dimension requires China to present
itself and act as a "status quo power" in the foreseeable
future notwithstanding its own agenda to change the status quo
over Taiwan. This policy is driven by a key domestic imperative
and long-term strategic thinking about bidding time to enable
China to rise.
The domestic imperative is rooted in the existence
of a de facto "social contract" between the Communist
Party leadership and the people of China after the Tiananmen crackdown
of 1989. This involves the Party delivering social stability and
steadily improving living standards on the basis of rapid and
sustained growth in return for the general public's acquiescence
to continued authoritarian Party rule. This underlines the great
importance the Communist leadership puts on deepening economic
reform and promoting steady growth whilst staying in control.
For this condition to sustain China requires
a benign international environment and continued inflow of foreign
investments. Since it will need at least a couple of decades before
it can reform its economy to make it genuinely competitive globally
and build up sufficient capabilities to assert itself, China needs
to behave like a status quo power. With this in mind the idea
that China's rise will be peaceful was introduced. Despite a shift
in the propaganda emphasis involving a replacement of "peaceful
rise" by "peaceful development" after Hu Jintao
took over leadership from Jiang Zemin, the rationale behind has
not changed. It is to ensure the outside world will not respond
negatively to China's emergence as a great power.
In line with this thinking, China wants to maintain
the status quo in East Asia. It will not use its leverage over
North Korea to the full to resolve the current nuclear impasse
between North Korea and the US unless it is forced to do so. To
be sure China would have preferred North Korea not to have developed
nuclear weapons or to have brought about the current tension.
However, once the US-North Korea standoff started in 2002, China
found itself caught in the middle. On the one hand it tries to
avoid a show down and on the other hand works to pre-empt an implosion
of the North Korean regime. Either will upset the stability, order
and basis for rapid economic growth in Northeast Asia and, as
such, harm Chinese interests. Provided it is not leading to an
uncontrollable escalation a continued standoff that allows sufficient
progress to sustain the six power talks is the most appealing
option to China, as long as it can resist external pressure to
use all the leverages it has to rein in North Korea.
Maintaining the status quo in East Asia generally,
including Taiwan in the short to medium term, is the objective
of China even though its main focus on security is Taiwan itself
and it wants to gain control of Taiwan. There is no question that
China is ultimately prepared to use force against Taiwan if the
latter should assert de jure independence or all other options
to pre-empt such an eventuality should fail. However, this is
the last resort for China.
In its long-term strategic view, the best outcome
is to weaken Taiwan's international standing and capacity as well
as political will to resist so much that Taiwan would eventually
agree to negotiate for unification under overwhelming Chinese
military pressure but without requiring Chinese forces actually
staging a full scale invasion of Taiwan. This will enable China
to acquire Taiwan and all the capabilities and resources Taiwan
has for its own benefit.
A less desirable outcome would be for China
to use decisive force to subdue Taiwan quickly and before the
US could respond and interfere. However, given the current military
situation across the Taiwan Strait and the disposition of the
US to help Taiwan defend itself against an unprovoked attack,
the Chinese prefer to keep the status quo, which includes
pre-empting Taiwan from asserting de jure independence.
China's approach towards Taiwan reflects a classic
application of the United Front principle. While Taiwan is being
identified as its principal contradiction, its real obstacle to
secure Taiwan is the US. The rest of the international community
is in general terms seen as "the intermediate zone"
though Japan is deemed sufficiently close to the US over Taiwan
that it is, like the US, subjected to creative tension and wooing.
Given the effect of the Communist Party's own
propaganda over Japan's imperial past, its expectation that Japan
is its key rival in the region, the fact that Taiwan was a Japanese
Colony between 1895 and 1945, and the long-standing US-Japan defence
pact, the Chinese government believes it can at best neutralize
Japan rather than win it over in a showdown over Taiwan. Thus,
while the immediate cause for the recent tension between the two
countries was the release of new Japanese textbooks and Prime
Minister Junichiro Koizumi's insistence to visit the Yasukuni
Shrine, the Chinese government took a very robust position towards
Japan while it also offered to ease tension.
As to the US, since it is not at this stage
militarily prepared to take on the US over Taiwan China sees much
value in taking advantage of their temporary coincidence of interest.
It is to make sure the Chen Shui-bian administration in Taiwan
does not probe Beijing's bottom line too hard.
China's courting of the European Union (EU),
in contrast, reveals the other side of the United Front at work.
From the Chinese perspective the EU can be induced not to support
the US over Taiwan. Hence, the assiduous Chinese efforts to enhance
links with the EU, encourage EU leaders to think of the EU as
a key player in a multi-polar world, and lobby the EU to lift
its arms embargo against China. Even if the last should fail it
will have the effect of creating serious tension between the US
and the EU.
In a similar way, the rest of East Asia has
been reassured of China's good neighbourly intentions. It explains
why China is playing up the value of multilateralism in the region,
and stressing the uniqueness of "the Taiwan question".
Within Taiwan itself, the Chinese United Front
also requires its government to attempt divide and rule. Thus
China focuses its hostility upon President Chen Shui-bian and
a small group of politicians openly advocating independence. It
refrains from ruling out talking to others in Chen's party while
it works untiringly to court the opposition parties in Taiwan.
This is meant to complement its longer term strategy to promote
economic integration between Taiwan and China, so much so that
it would become economically suicidal for Taiwan to allow hostilities
to erupt. The increasing number of Taiwanese working and living
in China further gives China a critical instrument—hostages
with over a million votes through family members back in democratic
Taiwan—to undermine Taiwan's will to resist when China is
finally ready to force Taiwan accept unification under overwhelming
military pressure.
The real long-term test of China as a member
of the international community will come only after it has resolved
the Taiwan issue to its satisfaction. Unless the situation within
Taiwan itself should change dramatically, to the extent that it
would either present an opportunity for China to seize it at little
cost or force China to use force whatever the costs, China will
not seek a resolution until it has build up sufficient "comprehensive
national strength" to deter the US from coming to Taiwan's
aid successfully. Such a development may take a long time if indeed
it can be reached at all.
If the nature and disposition of the Communist
Party leadership and the political system remain essentially unchanged
when China reaches a state of development that it can afford to
assert its "rightful place" in the world, such a turn
of events will almost certainly not be as peaceful as Chinese
propaganda today portrays. It will involve a contest of strength
and diplomacy between the established superpower and the emerging
one. This point will not be reached in the coming decade as China
cannot develop fast enough to turn itself into a superpower in
such a timeframe.
SUPERPOWER IN
THE MAKING?
In making a long-term assessment of how China
will approach its relations with the rest of the world it is essential
to take into account two intricately linked caveats. The first
is whether China's rapid growth of the past quarter of a century
can be sustained on the longer term basis. The second is whether
China's authoritarian system based on the monopoly of power by
the systemically corrupt Communist Party can last without transforming
itself.
In an important sense there is no authoritative
answer to the first question. One can turn to history for guidance,
particularly by looking at the experience of other East Asian
"miracle economies" post-war, but there are alternative
approaches. A historical overview will suggest there is a serious
question whether China can sustain such a high rate of growth
uninterrupted for another two to three decades. Indeed, with so
much of China's growth being driven by foreign investments, it
faces a grave danger that its growth momentum may collapse if,
for example, a critical mass of the largest foreign investors
no longer accepts that it is worthwhile to take substantial losses
for many years before turning a profit. Whether the Chinese economy
can avert collapse should major foreign investments scramble to
leave China for other more profitable destinations is a serious
question that needs to be bore in mind.
Should the Chinese economy be hit by a recession
or a significant and sustained downturn, the capacity of the state
to deal with the many problems that were created or accentuated
in the last quarter century of economic reforms will be weakened
drastically. The problems include environmental degradation in
the air and on land and water, widening gaps between the rich
and poor as well as between the rural and urban areas, bankruptcy
of the banking sector protected primarily by the lack of transparency,
unemployment, the end of social safety net, and social problems
created by a huge gender imbalance. In such an eventuality the
legitimacy of the Communist Party rule will be challenged and
the de facto "social contract" can collapse. The capacity
of the regime to reassert its authority and sustain itself will
be sapped further should there be an intense struggle for power
at the top causing political paralysis. In other words the Communist
regime and the Chinese economic juggernaut are in reality brittle
in nature. When all is well they look hard and strong but they
can disintegrate quickly with little warning should their key
weak points be hit hard simultaneously.
If the Chinese economy should turn out to be
a real miracle and continue to sustain an average compound growth
rate of seven to eight percent per annum it will result in a dramatic
expansion of the middle class in the coming two to three decades.
Despite tight government control over the media, communication
and the Internet, the new expanding middle class will witness
and be part of the ever quickening changes worldwide. Like people
of different nationalities, including the Chinese of Taiwan, once
they have a taste of middle class life-style, most will find the
Communist authoritarian system stifling, repressive and intolerable.
Will they continue to accept the de facto "social contract"
with the Party? When sufficient momentum has been gathered for
political reform, the Communist regime will either have to face
down such a challenge by repression or reform itself drastically.
The important point to note is that steady and
sustained growth of the Chinese economy, and the continuation
of the existing political regime should not be taken for granted
in the long term. This applies without having to underestimate
the capacity and the political will of the Communist Party regime
to deal with any challenge harshly. Whether repression can succeed
in the long term is an open question. The implications for China's
relations with the rest of the world are that China's rise and
the trajectory of its rise may turn out to be very different from
what China preaches, and domestic developments in China will have
a huge impact on its external relations.
While it will be ill-advised for any major power
to designate China as an enemy since this may turn into a self-fulfilling
prophesy, it will be equally ill-advised to take the Chinese narrative
of its rise at face value. The key to making sure that China will
not in the long term turn out to be a major revisionist and therefore
destabilizing force in the world is to ensure China reforms itself
politically. If the Communist Party regime can transform itself
into something that is recognizably democratic, liberal and respectful
of the rule of law, it will have greater capacity to deal with
corruption and power abuses through checks and balances, and face
up to its huge socio-economic problems by persuading its citizens
that its government is doing what it can with their voices being
heard. It should also enable the Chinese government to jettison
its historic "chip on the shoulder", gradually abandon
its worldview inherited from the era of Mao Zedong, and eventually
accept that its "rightful place" in the world is that
of a responsible member of the international community as it is
rather than as the Communist Party would like it to be.
Steve Tsang
St Antony's College
University of Oxford
14 December 2005
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