Written evidence submitted by Dr Marcel
de Haas, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael
RUSSIAN-CHINESE SECURITY COOPERATION
INTRODUCTION
During the Sino-Russian military exercises of
August 2005 defence minister Ivanov stated that Russia has an
open mind for joint Russian-Chinese peacekeeping operations in
the Asia-Pacific region, under the condition that such operations
are based upon resolutions by the UN Security Council. Ivanov
also mentioned that Russia and Chinaalthough no plans had
yet been draftedmight conduct joint military exercises
on a regular basis. [29]Ivanov's
statements are in line with the current comprehensive improvement
of bilateral relations between China and Russia, a development
which can be described as remarkable. For instance, the long standing
border disputes between both states were settled in agreements
in 2005. Furthermore, Russia, in addition to its arms export,
will supply China with oil and gas. But even more important, both
countries have found each other in a strategic partnership aimed
at countering the (Western/US) "monopoly in world affairs",
as was made clear in a joint statement by the Chinese and Russian
Presidents in July 2005. [30]
This contribution on Russian-Sino security cooperation
focuses on the following topics: military exercises, arms sales,
energy policy, the demographic factor, the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation (SCO), and concludes with the future of Russian-Chinese
relations and its consequences for the West. The ordering principles
are the following: what is the meaning of the military and other
security related cooperation; is the Sino-Russian military liaison
likely to expand; and can the recent developments be considered
as a structural shift of power attempting to repel Western influence
in Central Asia and adjacent areas?
RUSSIAN-CHINESE
MANOEUVRES
Planning
From 18-25 August 2005 for the first time in
40 years Russian and Chinese armed forces have carried out joint
exercises, comprising 10,000 military personnel, navy vessels
and aircraft. According to Russia's minister of defence, Sergei
Ivanov, the decision to conduct bilateral exercises had been made
in Beijing, in December 2004. China took the lead in proposing
the size, participating type of forces and content of the manoeuvres.
In the process of drafting the exercise plan the number of Russian
troops decreased whereas the number of Chinese troops increased.
Allegedly, China also took care of most of the costs of the manoeuvres.
[31]
Exercise objectives
The Chinese Chief of the General Staff as well
as his Russian counterpart have more than once stated that the
manoeuvres were in line with United Nations (UN) principles and
were not aimed against third countries. [32]The
formal objectives of the exercises were to strengthen the capability
of joint operations and the exchange of experience; to establish
methods of organising cooperation in the fight against international
terrorism, separatism and extremism; as well as to enhance the
mutual combat readiness against newly developing threats. [33]Another
aim of these exercises, not suggested by official sources, but
in Russian and Western independent reports, would have been arms
export from Russia to China.
Assessment
The exercises comprised "ingredients"
such as the use of strategic long range bombers, neutralisation
of anti-aircraft defence, command posts and airbases, gaining
of air superiority, enforcing of a maritime blockade and control
of maritime territory. [34]However,
terrorist movements don't posses conventional land, sea or air
forces, nor do they deploy their military power in a symmetric
way. Therefore, these exercise objectives had little to do with
warfare against terrorism, but were actually nothing other than
practise of conventional warfare, employing all Services except
for nuclear forces. The most likely real main objective of the
manoeuvres was that in this way China and Russia made clear to
the (Western) world that they consider themselves to be in control
of the Asian-Pacific region and that others are denied interfering
in their sphere of influence.
From a military-operational point of view Russians
as well as Chinese have gained from the experience of these bilateral
exercises. The Chinese armed forces areas a consequence
of China's increasing political and economical powerin
a stage of growth, in size as well as in ambition. Therefore,
for instance practising command and control procedures but also
purely operational aspects, such as carrying out an airborne assault,
will strengthen the capabilities of the Chinese forces. As discussed
further on, if Russia considers that China might turn into a threat
in the long run, then these exercises have also been worthwhile
for the Russian General Staff, by providing it insight in how
the Chinese armed forces operate and what their current capabilities
are.
ARMS SALES
As mentioned earlier one of the aims of the
Sino-Russian exercises of August 2005 might have been arms export.
Demonstrating to China what the capabilities are of Russian military
equipment, might encourage China to buy it. This assumption was
strengthened by the fact that right after the closure of the exercises,
China announced that it was interested in acquiring 30 Il-76 transport
aircraft. [35]Currently,
some 45% of Russia's arms export belongs to China. Since 2000,
Russia has delivered weapon systems to Chinaincluding fighter
aircraft, submarines and destroyersamounting to an average
of $2 billion annually. Since China didn't have to be convinced
of Russian military equipment, perhaps the demonstration of weapon
systems was meant to impress some of the SCO-observers. India,
for instance, takes care of some 40% of Russia's arms export and
Iran is considered to be an interesting growth market for Russian
arms. [36]
Assessment
It is doubtful that arms export was one of the
(hidden agenda) aims of the bilateral military exercises, ie towards
China. China has been the best buyer of Russian military equipment
for a number of years. Russia's arms export to China is an important
factor in the cooperation between the two countries. However,
Russia seems to be well aware that China would like to obtain
its most sophisticated military technology, which, in case of
deteriorating relations, might turn against Russia. For that reason
Russia is reluctant to provide China with its state-of-the-art
products. Moreover, there are indications that China is steadily
acquiring enough knowledge to have a solid military industry of
its own. Subsequently, in the coming years China will buy less
and less arms from Russia, which will diminish the value of this
cornerstone of bilateral relations. [37]
ENERGY POLICY
In August 2005 during a visit to Beijing President
Putin stressed bilateral economic ties, especially the work of
Russian energy companies in China, bilateral projects that would
distribute those supplies to third countries, as well as the delivery
of Russian oil and gas to China. [38]Furthermore,
in November 2005 Russia and China agreed to double oil exports
to China and to consider constructing an oil pipeline from Russia
to China and a gas-transmission project from eastern Siberia to
China's Far East. [39]However,
China focuses on Kazakhstan as well in its need for energy. In
December 2005 the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline between the two countries
was opened. In due course this Sino-Kazakh pipeline will be enlarged
from 1,000-3,000 kilometres and will eventually provide China
with less than 15% of its crude oil needs. [40]
Assessment
China is not only approaching Russia but also
Kazakhstan for energy supplies. A reason for this policy might
be that China wants to avoid energy dependency from Russia. However,
another source states that in spite of Putin's contrary statement,
Beijing has failed to achieve a position on Russia's energy market
through an attempt with Yukos to build an oil pipeline from Angarsk
to Daging. After Yukos' Khodorkosky had been arrested this project
was stopped to the annoyance of China. [41]Another
argument is that by redirecting Kazakh oil pipelines through China
in stead of through Russia, China's influence over Kazakhstan
and Central Asia will increase at the expense of Russia's position.
Thus, Russia's energy tool of poweras used successfully
against Ukraineseems to be threatened by China's energy
game. However, although cooperating with China in energy, Kazakhstan
has a considerable Russian minority and therefore will be hesitant
to follow an anti-Russian political course.
THE DEMOGRAPHIC
FACTOR
In December 2005 Russia's interior minister,
Nurgaliev, stated that illegal migrationamong other aspectsis
creating a threat to national security in the Russian Far East.
[42]Although
Nurgaliev did not mention the word "Chinese", and in
spite of frequent formal statements contradicting such a development,
a continuous influx of illegal Chinese immigrants is taking place
in this region. Russia has a long border with China, some 4,300
kilometres and is sparsely populated in its Far East. The numbers
may vary but several sources mention the flood of Chinese entering
Russia. [43]
Assessment
Although continuously officially denied there
seems to take place a constant large Chinese immigration into
Russia's thinly populated Far East. It is not inconceivable that
this flood is more than a coincidence, it might well be a planned
policy directed from Beijing. Possibly, China is carrying out
a policy of "Finlandisation", in order to gradually
increase its influence over this Russian region. The reasons for
such a population policy might be to create an overflow area for
Chinese citizens from too densely populated areas in China proper,
but also to gain a political and/or economic foothold in this
area, which is rich on energy sources.
THE SHANGHAI
COOPERATION ORGANISATION
The Russian-Chinese military exercises should
not only be considered from a Sino-Russian bilateral point of
view, but also as an activity of the SCO, as was frequently stated
by Sergei Ivanov and other officials. Not only the Russian and
Chinese ministers of defence observed the manoeuvres, but also
representatives of the SCO. On 23 August Ivanov and his Chinese
counterpart, Cao Gangchuan, as well as the defence ministers of
the other SCO-members (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan) and military-attachés of the SCO-observersIran,
Pakistan, India and Mongoliaarrived at the scene of the
exercises. [44]
Formed in 1996 as the "Shanghai Five"comprising
Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstanin
2001, together with admitting Uzbekistan, the SCO was formalised
as an international organisation. Until 2005 the SCO mainly dealt
with regional securityin particular against the three "evils"
of terrorism, separatism and extremismas well as with economic
cooperation. However, at its last Summit of July 2005, in Astana,
Kazakhstan, the SCO proclaimed a radical change of course. The
last few years the governments of the Central Asian member statesfaced
with the Western backed regime changes in Ukraine and Georgia,
as well as with Western criticism of the Uzbek Government's beating
down of the unrest in Andijanincreasingly saw their existence
threatened, which forced them to choose for an alliance with Russia
and China and diminishing the (economic favourable) relationship
with the West. At the Summit this led to a final statement of
the SCO members, in which (US) unipolar and dominating policies
as well as foreign military deployment in Central Asia were condemned
and the withdrawal of the (Western) military troops was encouraged.
[45]This
Declaration of the Heads of Member States has revealed a watershed
in the SCO's range of policy from regional anti-terrorist activities
to claiming an important position in the international arena in
external security policy.
Besides the SCO's change of course, there was
another significant development at this Summit. In addition to
Mongolia, last July Iran, Pakistan and India have joined the SCO
as observers. By admitting these three states as observers, the
SCO now encompasses nearly half of the world's population. [46]Furthermore,
in addition to Russia and China, India and Pakistan bring together
four nuclear powers, whereas Iran possibly has the ambition to
become one. Comprising a considerable territory in and around
Central Asia, a large part of the world population and nuclear
arms, the SCO has a formidable political and military potential
with certainly will make an impact on the West.
The SCO as an instrument of Russia's security
policy
For Russia's foreign and security policy the
SCO is a rapidly rising organisation. In this regard, it is interesting
to note that in none of the current highest security documents
of Russia, the National Security Concept, the Military Doctrine
and the Foreign Policy Conceptall formally approved by
President Putin in 2000the SCO, at the time called "Shanghai
Five", was dealt with. It was only mentioned in the Foreign
Policy Concept as one of the cooperating organisations in Asia.
In "The priority tasks of the development of the Armed Forces
of the Russian Federation", a security policy document published
in October 2003, the SCO for the first time was brought up in
detail. In this "Defence White Paper" the SCO was described
as an important organisation for regional stability in Central
Asia and the Far East, especially in countering military threats.
For Russia the SCO apparently acts as a means to bring together
different policy objectives. Not only China, but India and Iran
as well have a special (economic) relationship with Russia. All
three states are important actors in Russia's arms export. In
addition to this, China and India are gaining a closer relationship
with Russia in the field of joint, bilateral military exercises.
Therefore, the fact that India and Iran recently have joined China
in its cooperation with Russia within the SCO, could prove that
the SCO serves as a platform for Russia's security policy. It
is evident that the SCO is winning power, in particular since
its Summit of last July. It is likely that this development of
the SCO will further continue in the coming years. Russia will
use this organisation, for instance to reduce Western (US) influence
in its backyard of Central Asia which was accomplished in the
aftermath of "9/11". In such a way, supported by China's
rising power status, much more than the CIS or its Collective
Security Treaty Organisationconsisting mainly of states
dependent on Russia's security umbrellathe SCO will represent
to Russia a vital instrument to achieve geopolitical objectives.
Assessment
If the portrayed developments continue, the
West no longer will have the liberty of acting "without limits"
in Central Asia. Russia and China will aim at developing the SCOuniting
important regional powers and China as a rising world powerinto
an organisation which the West has to take into consideration
in its international endeavours, in particular in regions such
as Central Asia, the Far East and the Pacific. However, in establishing
the future position of the SCO, it is important to note that cooperation
among its members and observers is essentially based upon a negative
strategic objective: to counter US/Western influence. To a large
extent common, positive targets are absent. For example, China
is seeking markets and energy sources, Russia is eager to regain
its leadership status within the CIS as well as that of a superpower
in the international arena, and the Central Asian regimes consider
the SCO as its guarantee for survival. Moreover, India and Pakistan
are probably showing the West that they follow their own independent
course and Iran's objective might be found in anti-Americanism.
This mixture of possibly divergent objectivesfor instance
Iran's support of extreme Islamists which are a threat to the
Central Asian statesdemonstrates that they don't have much
in common. Hence, it is not inconceivable that eventually deviating
objectives of SCO member states and observers will cause a split
in this organisation, which would paralyse its activities.
OUTLOOK ON
SINO-RUSSIAN
RELATIONS
Russia's position
In the coming years Russia is likely to strengthen
its ties with China. As was mentioned above, not only in the field
of security but also in areas such as military cooperation, energy,
(arms) trade and foreign policy, these states are seeking a closer
relationship. Russia has more than once stated that closer relations
with China is a geopolitical objective in order to strengthen
Russia's global position. [47]Nonetheless,
this close relationship with China could very well turn out to
be for the short term. In its Far East Russia is facing increasing
illegal immigration from China. Furthermore, Russia possesses
energy sources which China desperately needs. Russia is well aware
that China's growing economic and military importance could develop
into a threat. An indication of Russia's concern towards China
is possibly that at present in the Far Eastafter the first
one was set up in Russia's primary area of insecurity, the North
CaucasusRussia allegedly is creating a second joint military
grouping of defence forces and internal and security troops. [48]Sincein
contrast with the area of Chechnya and Dagestanin Russia's
Far East there is no threat of Islamic extremism, the formation
of a joint military command could only be related to a potential
threat from China. In due course this so far hidden fear of China
could cause Russia to draw back from China and to seek an intensification
of political and economic ties with the West, even if this abandonment
from China would mean that Russia has to accept Western influence
in its backyard of the former Soviet Union.
China's position
China is "using" Russia for its military
technology and energy resources. When China will have reached
its current strive for independence in military technology and
will have created alternative ways of gaining energyfor
instance through KazakhstanChina may well dump Russia.
Moreover, China will continue to use its neighbours, such as Russia,
the Central Asian states and other partners within the SCO, to
strengthen its global position. If so required, China will not
hesitate to use its power against one of its (former) partners,
as is demonstrated by China's efforts do divert energy routes
away from Russia.
Consequences for the West
The coming years the West will probably have
to cope with increasing ties between Russia and China and subsequent
policies contrary to Western activities in the Far East and the
Pacific. To a certain extent the West itself is to blame for this
rapprochement from Russia to China. All current Russian major
security documents clearly demonstrate disappointment in the West
for leaving Russia out of Western security policy. The climax
of this mistrust has been NATO's war on Kosovo. Although Russian-Western
relations since then have improved, the feelings of mistrust and
disregard are still valid in parts of Russia's security elite
and thus have resulted in closer ties with China.
In the longer run a possible security threat
of a Sino-Russian coalition is expected to change. First, when
China does not need it any more for energy and military hardwareand
perhaps also fed by its fear for a powerful ChinaRussia
might turn to the West for security cooperation. In any case it
is very doubtful that the current Sino-Russian cooperation will
develop into a solid security alliance, opposing the West. Secondly,
the SCO contains too much diverging interests which will prevent
it from becoming a dominating economic and/or military alliance.
It is not improbable that the SCO will fall apart as a result
of internal differences or a lack of a common course/threat. Therefore,
in the longer run the SCO, alike Russia, is not likely to form
a bloc with China threatening Western interests. Thirdly, conversely,
China's emerging economic and military power will have to be taken
into account. China will become a regional and possibly global
power with capacities and policies that may counter Western influence
not only in the Far East but elsewhere as well. Western security
policy should be aware of this development. If China indeed achieves
such a global position the West and Russia have a common ground
to seek closer cooperation.
Dr Marcel de Haas
Lieutenant-Colonel, Royal Netherlands Air Force
Netherlands Institute of International Relations
14 February 2006
29 "Joint peacekeeping operations with China
possible-defence minister"; "Russia, China may conduct
regular exercises-defence minister", RIA Novosti, 23 August
2005. Back
30
Antoine Blua, "Joint exercises underscore growing ties between
Moscow and Bejing", RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly,
Vol 5, No 28, 9 August 2005; "Putin stresses importance of
Sino-Russian economic, military cooperation", RFE/RL Newsline,
Vol 9, No 150, Part I, 10 August 2005; "Russian, Chinese
president discuss expanding political, economic, military cooperation",
RFE/RL Newsline, Vol 9, No 125, Part I, 1 July 2005. Back
31
Igor Plugatarev, "Kto platit, tot i zakazyvayet ucheniya",
Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, No 31 (440), 19 August
2005, p 3; "Russia, China may conduct regular exercises-defence
minister", RIA Novosti, 23 August 2005. Back
32
Veronika Perminova "All branches of armed forces taking
part in Russian-Chinese exercises", RIA Novosti, 18
August 2005. Back
33
Aleksei Ventslovski and Nikolai Litkovets, "`Mirnoy missii'
dan start", Krasnaya Zvezda, 19 August 2005. Back
34
Ventslovski, "`Mirnaya missii' speshit na pomoshch". Back
35
Vladimir Bogdanov, "Russia risks playing someone else's
game", Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 19 August 2005; "Sino-Russian
war exercise starting to pay off?", RFE/RL Newsline,
Vol 9, No 162, Part I, 26 August 2005. Back
36
Vitaly Strugovets, "Potentsial voyennogo eksporta pochti
ischerpan", Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, No
24 (433), 1 July 2005, p 6; Blua, "Joint exercises underscore
growing ties between Moscow and Bejing"; "Defence minister
says Russia, China, India may hold joint military exercises",
RFE/RL Newsline, Vol 9, No 195, Part I, 17 October 2005;
"Russia to increase military-technical cooperation with China",
RIA Novosti, 31 August 2005; "Putin steps in to revitalise
arms sales to China", RIA Novosti, 8 September 2005. Back
37
"Alliance with China cost Russia dearly", RIA Novosti,
22 November 2005. Back
38
"Putin stresses importance of Sino-Russian economic, military
cooperation", RFE/RL Newsline, 10 August 2005. Back
39
"Russia agrees to nearly double oil exports to China",
RFE/RL Newsline, Vol 9, No 209, Part I, 7 November 2005. Back
40
"Kazakh-China pipeline begins operations", RFE/RL
Newsline, Vol 9, No 234, Part I, 16 December 2005; "Circumventing
the bear", Stratfor, 16 December 2005. Back
41
"Alliance with China cost Russia dearly", RIA Novosti,
22 November 2005. Back
42
"Russian interior minister says criminal groups dominate
Far Eastern economy", RFE/RL Newsline, Vol 9, No 232,
Part I, 14 December 2005. Back
43
"Major players focus on the Great Game", Stratfor,
6 July 2000; "Military conflict over natural resources between
Russia, US and China by 2012", Moscow Zavtra, 13 May
2005. This source claims that in 2004 already four million Chinese
were residing in Russia and with an annual inflow of 600,00 will
lead to a number of 10-20 million Chinese in Russia by 2015; "Russian
politicians see no threat in Chinese power", RFE/RL Newsline,
Vol 9, No 189, Part I, 6 October 2005. According to this source,
citing formal statements, no more than 100,000 Chinese live in
Russia's Far East. Back
44
Ventslovski, "`Plokhiye' parni vybity s Beybeya"; "Russian-Chinese
games continue", RFE/RL Newsline, Vol 9, No 160, Part
I, 24 August 2005: "Russian and Chinese defence ministers
praise joint military exercises", RFE/RL Newsline,
Vol 9, No 161, Part I, 25 August 2005; Plugatarev, "Kto platit,
tot i zakazyvayet ucheniya"; Ventslovski, "`Mirnaya
missii' v zalive Lunvan". Back
45
http://www.sectsco.org Back
46
The SCO members and observers account for some 2.7 billion people
out of 6.4 billion of the world population (Source: 2005
World Population Data Sheet, www.prb.org). Back
47
"Presidential envoy: rapprochement with China is Russian
geopolitical goal", RFE/RL Newsline, Vol 9, No 133,
Part I, 18 July 2005. Back
48
Vladimir Mukhin, "Dalniy vostok priravnyali k Chechne",
Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, No 28 (437), 29 July
2005, p 2. Back
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