House of Commons - Foreign Affairs

Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Written Evidence

Written evidence submitted by Dr Marcel de Haas, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael

RUSSIAN-CHINESE SECURITY COOPERATION

INTRODUCTION

During the Sino-Russian military exercises of August 2005 defence minister Ivanov stated that Russia has an open mind for joint Russian-Chinese peacekeeping operations in the Asia-Pacific region, under the condition that such operations are based upon resolutions by the UN Security Council. Ivanov also mentioned that Russia and China—although no plans had yet been drafted—might conduct joint military exercises on a regular basis. [29]Ivanov's statements are in line with the current comprehensive improvement of bilateral relations between China and Russia, a development which can be described as remarkable. For instance, the long standing border disputes between both states were settled in agreements in 2005. Furthermore, Russia, in addition to its arms export, will supply China with oil and gas. But even more important, both countries have found each other in a strategic partnership aimed at countering the (Western/US) "monopoly in world affairs", as was made clear in a joint statement by the Chinese and Russian Presidents in July 2005. [30]

This contribution on Russian-Sino security cooperation focuses on the following topics: military exercises, arms sales, energy policy, the demographic factor, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and concludes with the future of Russian-Chinese relations and its consequences for the West. The ordering principles are the following: what is the meaning of the military and other security related cooperation; is the Sino-Russian military liaison likely to expand; and can the recent developments be considered as a structural shift of power attempting to repel Western influence in Central Asia and adjacent areas?

RUSSIAN-CHINESE MANOEUVRES

Planning

From 18-25 August 2005 for the first time in 40 years Russian and Chinese armed forces have carried out joint exercises, comprising 10,000 military personnel, navy vessels and aircraft. According to Russia's minister of defence, Sergei Ivanov, the decision to conduct bilateral exercises had been made in Beijing, in December 2004. China took the lead in proposing the size, participating type of forces and content of the manoeuvres. In the process of drafting the exercise plan the number of Russian troops decreased whereas the number of Chinese troops increased. Allegedly, China also took care of most of the costs of the manoeuvres. [31]

Exercise objectives

The Chinese Chief of the General Staff as well as his Russian counterpart have more than once stated that the manoeuvres were in line with United Nations (UN) principles and were not aimed against third countries. [32]The formal objectives of the exercises were to strengthen the capability of joint operations and the exchange of experience; to establish methods of organising cooperation in the fight against international terrorism, separatism and extremism; as well as to enhance the mutual combat readiness against newly developing threats. [33]Another aim of these exercises, not suggested by official sources, but in Russian and Western independent reports, would have been arms export from Russia to China.

Assessment

The exercises comprised "ingredients" such as the use of strategic long range bombers, neutralisation of anti-aircraft defence, command posts and airbases, gaining of air superiority, enforcing of a maritime blockade and control of maritime territory. [34]However, terrorist movements don't posses conventional land, sea or air forces, nor do they deploy their military power in a symmetric way. Therefore, these exercise objectives had little to do with warfare against terrorism, but were actually nothing other than practise of conventional warfare, employing all Services except for nuclear forces. The most likely real main objective of the manoeuvres was that in this way China and Russia made clear to the (Western) world that they consider themselves to be in control of the Asian-Pacific region and that others are denied interfering in their sphere of influence.

From a military-operational point of view Russians as well as Chinese have gained from the experience of these bilateral exercises. The Chinese armed forces are—as a consequence of China's increasing political and economical power—in a stage of growth, in size as well as in ambition. Therefore, for instance practising command and control procedures but also purely operational aspects, such as carrying out an airborne assault, will strengthen the capabilities of the Chinese forces. As discussed further on, if Russia considers that China might turn into a threat in the long run, then these exercises have also been worthwhile for the Russian General Staff, by providing it insight in how the Chinese armed forces operate and what their current capabilities are.

ARMS SALES

As mentioned earlier one of the aims of the Sino-Russian exercises of August 2005 might have been arms export. Demonstrating to China what the capabilities are of Russian military equipment, might encourage China to buy it. This assumption was strengthened by the fact that right after the closure of the exercises, China announced that it was interested in acquiring 30 Il-76 transport aircraft. [35]Currently, some 45% of Russia's arms export belongs to China. Since 2000, Russia has delivered weapon systems to China—including fighter aircraft, submarines and destroyers—amounting to an average of $2 billion annually. Since China didn't have to be convinced of Russian military equipment, perhaps the demonstration of weapon systems was meant to impress some of the SCO-observers. India, for instance, takes care of some 40% of Russia's arms export and Iran is considered to be an interesting growth market for Russian arms. [36]

Assessment

It is doubtful that arms export was one of the (hidden agenda) aims of the bilateral military exercises, ie towards China. China has been the best buyer of Russian military equipment for a number of years. Russia's arms export to China is an important factor in the cooperation between the two countries. However, Russia seems to be well aware that China would like to obtain its most sophisticated military technology, which, in case of deteriorating relations, might turn against Russia. For that reason Russia is reluctant to provide China with its state-of-the-art products. Moreover, there are indications that China is steadily acquiring enough knowledge to have a solid military industry of its own. Subsequently, in the coming years China will buy less and less arms from Russia, which will diminish the value of this cornerstone of bilateral relations. [37]

ENERGY POLICY

In August 2005 during a visit to Beijing President Putin stressed bilateral economic ties, especially the work of Russian energy companies in China, bilateral projects that would distribute those supplies to third countries, as well as the delivery of Russian oil and gas to China. [38]Furthermore, in November 2005 Russia and China agreed to double oil exports to China and to consider constructing an oil pipeline from Russia to China and a gas-transmission project from eastern Siberia to China's Far East. [39]However, China focuses on Kazakhstan as well in its need for energy. In December 2005 the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline between the two countries was opened. In due course this Sino-Kazakh pipeline will be enlarged from 1,000-3,000 kilometres and will eventually provide China with less than 15% of its crude oil needs. [40]

Assessment

China is not only approaching Russia but also Kazakhstan for energy supplies. A reason for this policy might be that China wants to avoid energy dependency from Russia. However, another source states that in spite of Putin's contrary statement, Beijing has failed to achieve a position on Russia's energy market through an attempt with Yukos to build an oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daging. After Yukos' Khodorkosky had been arrested this project was stopped to the annoyance of China. [41]Another argument is that by redirecting Kazakh oil pipelines through China in stead of through Russia, China's influence over Kazakhstan and Central Asia will increase at the expense of Russia's position. Thus, Russia's energy tool of power—as used successfully against Ukraine—seems to be threatened by China's energy game. However, although cooperating with China in energy, Kazakhstan has a considerable Russian minority and therefore will be hesitant to follow an anti-Russian political course.

THE DEMOGRAPHIC FACTOR

In December 2005 Russia's interior minister, Nurgaliev, stated that illegal migration—among other aspects—is creating a threat to national security in the Russian Far East. [42]Although Nurgaliev did not mention the word "Chinese", and in spite of frequent formal statements contradicting such a development, a continuous influx of illegal Chinese immigrants is taking place in this region. Russia has a long border with China, some 4,300 kilometres and is sparsely populated in its Far East. The numbers may vary but several sources mention the flood of Chinese entering Russia. [43]

Assessment

Although continuously officially denied there seems to take place a constant large Chinese immigration into Russia's thinly populated Far East. It is not inconceivable that this flood is more than a coincidence, it might well be a planned policy directed from Beijing. Possibly, China is carrying out a policy of "Finlandisation", in order to gradually increase its influence over this Russian region. The reasons for such a population policy might be to create an overflow area for Chinese citizens from too densely populated areas in China proper, but also to gain a political and/or economic foothold in this area, which is rich on energy sources.

THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANISATION

The Russian-Chinese military exercises should not only be considered from a Sino-Russian bilateral point of view, but also as an activity of the SCO, as was frequently stated by Sergei Ivanov and other officials. Not only the Russian and Chinese ministers of defence observed the manoeuvres, but also representatives of the SCO. On 23 August Ivanov and his Chinese counterpart, Cao Gangchuan, as well as the defence ministers of the other SCO-members (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) and military-attachés of the SCO-observers—Iran, Pakistan, India and Mongolia—arrived at the scene of the exercises. [44]

Formed in 1996 as the "Shanghai Five"—comprising Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan—in 2001, together with admitting Uzbekistan, the SCO was formalised as an international organisation. Until 2005 the SCO mainly dealt with regional security—in particular against the three "evils" of terrorism, separatism and extremism—as well as with economic cooperation. However, at its last Summit of July 2005, in Astana, Kazakhstan, the SCO proclaimed a radical change of course. The last few years the governments of the Central Asian member states—faced with the Western backed regime changes in Ukraine and Georgia, as well as with Western criticism of the Uzbek Government's beating down of the unrest in Andijan—increasingly saw their existence threatened, which forced them to choose for an alliance with Russia and China and diminishing the (economic favourable) relationship with the West. At the Summit this led to a final statement of the SCO members, in which (US) unipolar and dominating policies as well as foreign military deployment in Central Asia were condemned and the withdrawal of the (Western) military troops was encouraged. [45]This Declaration of the Heads of Member States has revealed a watershed in the SCO's range of policy from regional anti-terrorist activities to claiming an important position in the international arena in external security policy.

Besides the SCO's change of course, there was another significant development at this Summit. In addition to Mongolia, last July Iran, Pakistan and India have joined the SCO as observers. By admitting these three states as observers, the SCO now encompasses nearly half of the world's population. [46]Furthermore, in addition to Russia and China, India and Pakistan bring together four nuclear powers, whereas Iran possibly has the ambition to become one. Comprising a considerable territory in and around Central Asia, a large part of the world population and nuclear arms, the SCO has a formidable political and military potential with certainly will make an impact on the West.

The SCO as an instrument of Russia's security policy

For Russia's foreign and security policy the SCO is a rapidly rising organisation. In this regard, it is interesting to note that in none of the current highest security documents of Russia, the National Security Concept, the Military Doctrine and the Foreign Policy Concept—all formally approved by President Putin in 2000—the SCO, at the time called "Shanghai Five", was dealt with. It was only mentioned in the Foreign Policy Concept as one of the cooperating organisations in Asia. In "The priority tasks of the development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation", a security policy document published in October 2003, the SCO for the first time was brought up in detail. In this "Defence White Paper" the SCO was described as an important organisation for regional stability in Central Asia and the Far East, especially in countering military threats. For Russia the SCO apparently acts as a means to bring together different policy objectives. Not only China, but India and Iran as well have a special (economic) relationship with Russia. All three states are important actors in Russia's arms export. In addition to this, China and India are gaining a closer relationship with Russia in the field of joint, bilateral military exercises. Therefore, the fact that India and Iran recently have joined China in its cooperation with Russia within the SCO, could prove that the SCO serves as a platform for Russia's security policy. It is evident that the SCO is winning power, in particular since its Summit of last July. It is likely that this development of the SCO will further continue in the coming years. Russia will use this organisation, for instance to reduce Western (US) influence in its backyard of Central Asia which was accomplished in the aftermath of "9/11". In such a way, supported by China's rising power status, much more than the CIS or its Collective Security Treaty Organisation—consisting mainly of states dependent on Russia's security umbrella—the SCO will represent to Russia a vital instrument to achieve geopolitical objectives.

Assessment

If the portrayed developments continue, the West no longer will have the liberty of acting "without limits" in Central Asia. Russia and China will aim at developing the SCO—uniting important regional powers and China as a rising world power—into an organisation which the West has to take into consideration in its international endeavours, in particular in regions such as Central Asia, the Far East and the Pacific. However, in establishing the future position of the SCO, it is important to note that cooperation among its members and observers is essentially based upon a negative strategic objective: to counter US/Western influence. To a large extent common, positive targets are absent. For example, China is seeking markets and energy sources, Russia is eager to regain its leadership status within the CIS as well as that of a superpower in the international arena, and the Central Asian regimes consider the SCO as its guarantee for survival. Moreover, India and Pakistan are probably showing the West that they follow their own independent course and Iran's objective might be found in anti-Americanism. This mixture of possibly divergent objectives—for instance Iran's support of extreme Islamists which are a threat to the Central Asian states—demonstrates that they don't have much in common. Hence, it is not inconceivable that eventually deviating objectives of SCO member states and observers will cause a split in this organisation, which would paralyse its activities.

OUTLOOK ON SINO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

Russia's position

In the coming years Russia is likely to strengthen its ties with China. As was mentioned above, not only in the field of security but also in areas such as military cooperation, energy, (arms) trade and foreign policy, these states are seeking a closer relationship. Russia has more than once stated that closer relations with China is a geopolitical objective in order to strengthen Russia's global position. [47]Nonetheless, this close relationship with China could very well turn out to be for the short term. In its Far East Russia is facing increasing illegal immigration from China. Furthermore, Russia possesses energy sources which China desperately needs. Russia is well aware that China's growing economic and military importance could develop into a threat. An indication of Russia's concern towards China is possibly that at present in the Far East—after the first one was set up in Russia's primary area of insecurity, the North Caucasus—Russia allegedly is creating a second joint military grouping of defence forces and internal and security troops. [48]Since—in contrast with the area of Chechnya and Dagestan—in Russia's Far East there is no threat of Islamic extremism, the formation of a joint military command could only be related to a potential threat from China. In due course this so far hidden fear of China could cause Russia to draw back from China and to seek an intensification of political and economic ties with the West, even if this abandonment from China would mean that Russia has to accept Western influence in its backyard of the former Soviet Union.

China's position

China is "using" Russia for its military technology and energy resources. When China will have reached its current strive for independence in military technology and will have created alternative ways of gaining energy—for instance through Kazakhstan—China may well dump Russia. Moreover, China will continue to use its neighbours, such as Russia, the Central Asian states and other partners within the SCO, to strengthen its global position. If so required, China will not hesitate to use its power against one of its (former) partners, as is demonstrated by China's efforts do divert energy routes away from Russia.

Consequences for the West

The coming years the West will probably have to cope with increasing ties between Russia and China and subsequent policies contrary to Western activities in the Far East and the Pacific. To a certain extent the West itself is to blame for this rapprochement from Russia to China. All current Russian major security documents clearly demonstrate disappointment in the West for leaving Russia out of Western security policy. The climax of this mistrust has been NATO's war on Kosovo. Although Russian-Western relations since then have improved, the feelings of mistrust and disregard are still valid in parts of Russia's security elite and thus have resulted in closer ties with China.

In the longer run a possible security threat of a Sino-Russian coalition is expected to change. First, when China does not need it any more for energy and military hardware—and perhaps also fed by its fear for a powerful China—Russia might turn to the West for security cooperation. In any case it is very doubtful that the current Sino-Russian cooperation will develop into a solid security alliance, opposing the West. Secondly, the SCO contains too much diverging interests which will prevent it from becoming a dominating economic and/or military alliance. It is not improbable that the SCO will fall apart as a result of internal differences or a lack of a common course/threat. Therefore, in the longer run the SCO, alike Russia, is not likely to form a bloc with China threatening Western interests. Thirdly, conversely, China's emerging economic and military power will have to be taken into account. China will become a regional and possibly global power with capacities and policies that may counter Western influence not only in the Far East but elsewhere as well. Western security policy should be aware of this development. If China indeed achieves such a global position the West and Russia have a common ground to seek closer cooperation.

Dr Marcel de Haas

Lieutenant-Colonel, Royal Netherlands Air Force

Netherlands Institute of International Relations

14 February 2006