Written evidence submitted by Free Tibet
Campaign
Free Tibet Campaign appreciates the opportunity
to contribute to this inquiry. Free Tibet Campaign stands for
the Tibetans' right to determine their own future. It campaigns
for an end to China's occupation of Tibet and for the Tibetans'
fundamental human rights to be respected. Founded in 1987, Free
Tibet Campaign generates active support by educating people about
the situation in Tibet.
Some of the information about human rights abuses
contained in this submission has been gathered by Tibet Watch
(a sister organisation to Free Tibet Campaign) which promotes
the human rights of the Tibetan people by providing accurate information
about the situation in Tibet, for the purposes of educating people
and engaging in international advocacy on behalf of the Tibetan
people. Note: One of Tibet Watch's Tibetan field researchers,
normally based in Dharamsala, India, will be in London during
the period of this inquiry, as well as two Tibetan nuns, both
former political prisoners; Gyaltsen Drolkar and Namdrol Lhamo.
This submission addresses the following issues
within the scope of the Committee's inquiry:
1. (i) Political and religious freedoms
and human rights in PRC including Tibet. A section is included
on economic rights (ii) and this is linked to the issue of China's
political and economic prominence in international affairs.
2. The roles of the United Kingdom and the
European Union in the region, including (i) the human rights dialogue,
the main strategy adopted by the UK and EU on Tibet (including
the status of China's "formal contact" with envoys of
the Dalai Lama) and (ii) other strategies.
Free Tibet Campaign's recommendations for action
by the UK were submitted previously, and attached here as an appendix.
Note: all references to Tibet include the
Tibet Autonomous Region or TAR (Tibetan: U'tsang Province) and
Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures and counties—as designated
by China—in Qinghai and Gansu (Tibetan: Amdo Province) and
Sichuan, Yunnan and Gansu (Tibetan: Kham Province)
1. POLITICAL
AND RELIGIOUS
FREEDOMS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS
IN TIBET
(i) Recent examples (among many) of incidents
that demonstrate the lack of political and religious freedoms
in Tibet and China include
Freedom of expression
In January 2006 news was confirmed of the names
and sentences of two monks and three nuns from Gansu Province,
arrested in May 2005 for the distribution and pasting of a protest
letter in Labrang monastery and neighbouring areas. The letter
reportedly called for the independence of Tibet, for China to
enter into negotiations with the Dalai Lama, and stated that China
should not host the 2008 Olympic Games until the Tibet question
is peacefully resolved. Two of the nuns, Tadrin Tsomo and Choekyi
Drolma, and one of the monks, Dargye Gyatso, were sentenced to
three years' imprisonment. The third nun, Yonten Drolma, and second
monk, Jamyang Samdrub, each received a sentence of one and a half
years. The arrests took place in May 2005. Testimonies gathered
by Tibet Watch from Tibetans who have previously been detained
by the Public Security Bureau in Labrang indicate systematic beatings,
the threat and use of electric prods during interrogation and
deprivation of adequate food.
Media Freedom
Reports from China suggest that media freedom
continues to remain a remote concept, despite hopes that China
would live up to a promise made in July 2001 that "the world's
media will enjoy full freedom to report on all aspects of China
if the 2008 Olympic Games is held in the city". (China
Daily, 12 July 2001, quoting Wang Wei, Secretary General of
Beijing bid committee.) With only two and a half years to go to
the Beijing Olympics, recent examples of incidents in China include
the arrest in September 2004 of New York Times researcher
Zhao Yan and the recent firing of editor Yang Bin from the popular
Beijing News in December 2005, for publishing articles critical
of the Chinese Communist Party. In early February the BBC reported
the death of Wu Xianghu, editor of the Taizhou Evening News,
who was attacked by some 50 police officers after the paper accused
them of charging illegal bike fees. In April 2005 Chinese journalist
Shi Tao was sentenced to 10 years in prison after Yahoo! gave
China information about his use of email to send information abroad.
(See more on Yahoo! below.)
Torture
In November/December 2005, the United Nations
Special Rapporteur Dr Manfred Nowak visited Tibet as part of his
fact-finding mission, which also included China and Xinjiang.
In an initial report at the conclusion of his visit, he said that
torture—whilst on the decline, particularly in urban areas—remained
widespread. Furthermore he "observed a palpable level of
fear and self-censorship, which he had not experienced in the
course of his previous missions". Dr Nowak praised China's
Ministry of Foreign Affairs for its co-operation with his visit,
but condemned other Ministries, including State Security and Public
Security for attempting to obstruct and restrict his efforts at
fact-finding. "The team were frequently under surveillance
by intelligence personnel and a number of alleged victims and
family members were intimidated by security personnel, placed
under police surveillance, instructed not to meet the Special
Rapporteur, or physically prevented from meeting him." Dr
Nowak is due to present his full report on China to the 62nd session
of the UN Commission for Human Rights, which meets in March and
April.
Despite Dr Nowak's findings, China has stated
on a number of occasions that addressing torture is to be a priority.
Chinese officials conveyed this message to the UK Government during
the bilateral human rights dialogue in June 2005 (though British
officials apparently failed to determine what this would involve)
and in July 2005 Xinhua stated that the Commission of Legislative
Affairs had "placed the revision of the Criminal Procedural
Law into its five-year legislation plan to prevent the widespread
use of torture to extort confessions." This announcement
followed a high profile miscarriage of justice; in April 2004
She Xianglin from Hubei Province was released after serving 11
years, when his supposedly murdered wife reappeared. In late 2004
China's Supreme People's Procuratorate reported to the NPC that
from January to August in 2004, "the prosecutor organs nation-wide
had probed and dealt with more than 700 cases related to illegal
detention and interrogation by torture." (Source Xinhua.)
Religious Crackdowns
China's Patriotic Re-education campaign was
re-launched in Tibet's main monasteries in early 2005. Originally
designed to instil loyalty to the State and Communist Party as
a pre-requisite for being a good monk or nun, patriotic "work
teams" also attempt to undermine the influence of the Dalai
Lama. It is important to note that, while visitors to Tibet may
report that Tibetans can be seen visiting the temples and monasteries,
apparently enjoying religious freedom, religious institutions
are very strictly controlled by management committees, and all
Tibetan officials are prohibited from following their traditional
buddhist traditions.
In November 2005 there were a number of incidents
at Drepung monastery in Lhasa during a patriotic re-education
campaign, that required participants to denounce the Dalai Lama,
resulting in the expulsion of at least five monks who refused
to co-operate. The incidents followed the death in October of
a young monk, Ngawang Jangchub, in mysterious circumstances. Following
the expulsions, large numbers of monks (reportedly as many as
400) gathered in the main courtyard of the monastery in a silent
protest. The monastery was closed for two days.
In July 2005 at Sera monastery in Lhasa, a prayer
ceremony was interrupted by police and the presiding monk expelled
and subjected to surveillance for one year. Jangchub Gyaltsen
was reading aloud a prayer request that included a reference to
the Dalai Lama. The author of the prayer request, a Sera monk
named Tsering Dondrub, has disappeared and may be in detention.
A three month patriotic re-education campaign had just concluded
at the monastery.
Control of Tibet's Religious Leaders
In October 2005 security was increased and tensions
were high at Ganden monastery near Lhasa, during a visit by teenager
Gyaltsen Norbu (referred to by Tibetans as "Panchen Zuma"—fake
Panchen). Tibetans remain loyal to Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, the 16
year old boy recognised by the Dalai Lama as the 11th Panchen
Lama, and who is believed to be held by the Chinese authorities
at an unknown location—possibly near Beijing—with
his family since May 1995. In recent months, China has stepped
up its promotion of its Panchen Lama, with state media carrying
increasing numbers of articles about Gyaltsen Norbu's statements
of loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party and "motherland".
Many of Tibet's most prominent religious leaders have fled into
exile and others, including Tenzin Deleg Rinpoche, have been imprisoned
(see individual cases below.)
Appointment of hard-line Party Secretary in TAR
On 27 November 2005 Chinese media announced
the appointment of Zhang Qingli as the TAR's new Party Secretary.
Zhang was formerly vice governor of Xinjiang Autonomous Region
(Uighur: East Turkestan), where political, cultural and religious
freedoms are severely repressed. Reuters described Zhang as a
political ally of Hu Jintao, stemming from their shared history
with China Youth League veteran.
Arrests following burning of rare animal skins
In February 2006 at least eight Tibetans are
currently in detention following a wave of burnings of the skins
of rare animals, including tigers and leopards. The events follow
a powerful appeal by the Dalai Lama at the Kalachakra teachings
in India in January 2006, that Tibetans should respect buddhism
and have concern for the environment and stop wearing the skins
of endangered animals. Burnings have taken place in Repkong, Amdo
(Qinghai), Lithang in Kham (Sichuan) and in Lhasa. The Chinese
embassy in the UK told Channel 4 news that the burnings were not
motivated by concern for the environment, but that the Dalai Lama's
purpose was to "disturb social order". The Dalai Lama
did not suggest that Tibetans burn the skins; the Tibetans have
themselves chosen this method of expressing themselves.
(i) Economic Rights with relevance to the
Political and economic prominence of PRC in international affairs
China's influence over international corporations
Free Tibet Campaign is concerned about the actions
of a number of internet companies such as Google and Yahoo! (see
below). Political leaders repeatedly claim that foreign business
can change China for the better, but these examples demonstrate
how China is changing foreign businesses for the worse. These
companies use the defence that they must operate within Chinese
law; however if they were to work together and take a stand on
the censorship apparently imposed upon them, their bargaining
power with China
Google: January 2006 launched a censored
search engine that prohibits access to sensitive topics including
the Tiananmen protests and Tibet. The satellite image service
"Google Earth" does not recognise the search term "Tibet"—until
recently the service did not recognise "Taiwan" either
but BBC online reported that Google had changed this after protests
from Taiwanese.
Yahoo!: As mentioned above, in April 2005
Chinese journalist Shi Tao was sentenced to ten years in prison
after Yahoo! gave China information about his use of email to
send information abroad. In response to expressions of concern,
the company said it was "distressed" by events, but
that Yahoo! China had "received a valid and legal demand
for information from PRC law enforcement authorities according
to applicable PRC laws and the procedures [they] had established
with Chinese law enforcement officials."
China's Western Development Strategy
China launched the Western Development Strategy
(WDS) in 2000, as a response to poverty in western China including
Tibet and the regional disparity this represents. In practice
it is amplifying the existing disparities and strengthening the
linkage between security issues and economic policy, and the projects
contained within the strategy are designed to consolidate China's
political control of Tibet. Yulu Dawa Tsering, the revered Tibetan
lama and independence campaigner who died in 2002, described the
WDS represented "a period of emergency and darkness".
From 2000-05, China claims to have invested 1.61 trillion yuan
(approx £115 billion: Source Xinhua, February 2006) in the
WDS, which has four priority areas for development:
(a) Large-scale interregional transportation
and communication infrastructure (A key component is the Gormo-Lhasa
or Qinghai-Tibet Railway—see below).
(b) Development of energy and raw material
industries.
(c) Construction of infrastructure for the
transfer of resources from west to east.
(d) Construction of soft infrastructure.
While projects in the first three categories
are proceeding with abundant resources from central government
funding and some international participation, funding for soft
infrastructure has not received the same attention despite official
claims to the contrary. The development of soft infrastructure
is exactly what Tibetans in rural areas need most urgently. These
include primary and secondary education, healthcare facilities,
rural secondary roads and irrigation outside the main valley systems
(see below).
The Gormo-Lhasa Railway
The railway, more than any other component of
the WDS, truly exemplifies the overarching emphasis on the extraction
of natural resources and the security and control of the TAR.
At a cost of over 30 billion Yuan (over £2 billion)—more
than double the combined total spend on education and healthcare
in the TAR in 50 years—the railway to Lhasa is one of the
centrally prioritised projects that are seen "as essential
to achieving a `stable' domestic environment and to national defence."
Former President Jiang Zemin said in 2001, "Some people
advised me not to go ahead with this project because it is not
commercially viable. I said this is a political decision"
(quoted in New York Times, 10 August 2001).
China announced on 15 October 2005 the completion
of track-laying across the plateau; the first of 1.142 km of track
was laid on 29 June 2001. Xinhua has announced that the Railway
will start to carry freight in March 2006 and that passenger services
will begin in July 2006. The speed with which the service is being
brought into operation is probably directly related to statements
made by Chinese scientists in February 2006 that climate change
could threaten the operation of the line—large sections
of which are constructed over permafrost—in as little as
10 years.
Free Tibet Campaign is concerned that the railway
will provide logistical support to the military, enable greater
and swifter in-migration of non-Tibetans to the area and facilitate
the exploitation of mineral resources contrary to the Tibetans'
economic rights. It will help realise China's explicit intention,
stated during the 1994 Third Work Forum on Tibet, to destroy Tibetan
resistance to the occupation.
Increasing Ethnic and Urban/Rural divides
Evidence of the increasing divide between sections
of the population in Tibet and in China as a whole, and the possible
impact on social stability in China, has been documented in a
number of recent publications.
State Growth and Social Exclusion in Tibet:
Challenges of Recent Economic Growth, by economist Andrew Fischer
(2005), states that the polarising dynamics of Beijing's current
drive to develop the Western regions of China, including Tibet,
combined with the influx of Chinese migrants into urban Tibetan
areas, is leading to increasing exclusion of the indigenous Tibetan
population in the development of their land. The report, which
uses official statistics from the TAR, shows how most of Tibet's
growth is driven by huge increases in the government administration
category of the GDP, which is both unsustainable and has virtually
no "trickle down" effect to the most vulnerable parts
of society. (Tibet Information Network reported that TAR government
sector salaries are the third highest in China, only exceeded
by those in Beijing and Shanghai.) Fisher's book also shows how
spending on health and education in the TAR—which represent
Tibetans' most urgent development needs—has declined in
percentage terms in recent years. Fischer concludes "as in
the past, military concerns probably guide much of the developmental
policies in the TAR, indirectly soaking up much of the subsidies
as well." Fischer recommends that China pursue a much more
proactive, affirmative and preferential policy towards Tibetans,
encompassing education, training, employment and business, and
combined with a variety of locally oriented infrastructure and
service developments.
Official statistic released in February 2006
show that rural residents in China earned on average 3,255 yuan
(approx £235) per head—with the urban average being
nearly four times this figure. In the TAR, the figures were more
stark: rural residents earned 2,075 yuan (less than £150)
whilst urban residents earned on average 8,411 (around £600)
per head. Whilst this is an absolute increase on previous years,
rural residents in the TAR are still living well below the UN's
"dollar a day" poverty line and remain well behind the
average rural household in China. The nation-wide statistics have
prompted Chinese officials to make "unusually stark warnings
about social unrest, saying corruption and inequality are driving
growing numbers of farmers to protest and violence" (New
York Times, 13 February 2006). In late 2005, China's Ministry
of Public Security announced that protests, demonstrations and
"mass incidents" grew to 87,000 in 2005, a rise of 6.6%
on the previous year.
UNDP's China Human Development Report (2005),
compiled by a group of Chinese researchers, has concluded that
China's urban-rural income inequality is perhaps the highest in
the world. The report points to other disparities between the
urban and rural populations; a resident of a rich Chinese city
may have a life expectancy of around 80; 10-15 years longer than
that of a Tibetan farmer. Twenty years ago, China was one of the
most equal societies on earth, but now ranks 90th out of UNDP's
131 nation Human Development Index.
China's role in international development
China's efforts to secure international influence
has raised the concerns of a range of NGOs about Beijing's model
of international development. An essay by Ben Schiller for Open
Democracy, published in December 2005, describes China's strategy
of extending soft credit to numerous countries in Africa, Latin
America and Asia, as well as building dams, airports, hotels and
other major infrastructure, with the aim of securing not only
energy supplies and developing its companies' interests overseas,
but buying influence and support which can later be called upon
in political fora, such as the United Nations Commission for Human
Rights. China's approach often courts repressive regimes and undermines
efforts to promote transparency and human rights.
2. ROLES OF
UK AND EU IN
REGION
It is the opinion of Free Tibet Campaign that
the emergence of China on the global stage and the lure of its
market has radically affected the way in which both foreign governments
and businesses engage with China, with governments increasingly
unwilling to criticise China over human rights abuses.
(i) Human Rights Dialogues
The main component of both the UK and EU's strategy
on human rights in Tibet is the bilateral human rights dialogue;
this supposedly biannual exchange of views on human rights between
officials from both sides has recently become more infrequent,
apparently at the behest of China, which is seeking to reduced
the number of sessions with foreign governments. It is also worrying
that a recent round of dialogue was led on China's side by a more
junior official, suggesting that China may be attempting to downgrade
the status of these sessions.
A number of countries have such bilateral exchanges,
generally resumed or initiated in 1997, at a time when many nations
were reviewing their relationship with China and the failure of
the UN Commission for Human Rights to pass resolutions on China.
Among them are Switzerland, Canada, Norway, Germany, Australia
and Hungary. The US and China are currently in talks to resume
their suspended dialogue. The UK's dialogue commenced in 1997,
whilst the EU's commenced in 1995, was interrupted in 1996 and
resumed in 1997. 2007 therefore will be the tenth anniversary
of many of these dialogues; an important opportunity for a major
independent review of their effectiveness as a strategy. Free
Tibet Campaign recommends that such evaluations to be conducted
by objective, accountable bodies, such as National Parliaments,
and requests the Foreign Affairs Select Committee to consider
taking on the task.
Tibet-specific objectives for the bilateral
dialogues include:
Promoting negotiations without preconditions with
Dalai Lama for a political solution
International pressure, particularly from the
United States, appears to have been a factor in the re-establishment
of formal contact between Beijing and representatives of the Dalai
Lama in September 2002 after a decade of stalemate. Tibetan envoys
and their aides visited Beijing and Tibetan areas in 2003 and
June 2004. A fourth round of dialogue took place in Berne, Switzerland
at the beginning of July 2005, just prior to the Dalai Lama's
70th birthday.
The Dalai Lama's envoys travelled to China for
a fifth meeting from 15-23 February 2006. The Presidency of the
EU issued a statement of support for this visit on 22 February.
On 25 February the Tibetan delegation issued the following statement
(extract) "|today there is a better and deeper understanding
of each other's position and the fundamental differences that
continue to exist in the positions held by the two parties. The
round of discussion also made it clear that there is a major difference
even in the approach to addressing the issue. However we remain
committed to the dialogue process and are hopeful that progress
will be possible by continuing the engagement. Our Chinese counterparts
made clear their interest in continuing the present process and
their firm belief that obstacles can be overcome through more
discussions and engagements."
In public, China continues to downplay the dialogue,
describing the envoys as Tibetans visiting in a "private
capacity". A cynical interpretation is that China is using
these visits as a political expediency to silence critics of its
Tibet policy. The Tibetan Government in exile is making considerable
efforts to build confidence and ensure that, if this contact represents
a genuine political opportunity, that the moment is not lost.
However there are so far insufficient indications that Chinese
leaders are genuine in wishing to work towards real negotiations.
China's pre-conditions to substantive negotiations
still stand. These are:
(a) the Dalai Lama must abandon his claim
for the independence of Tibet and stop all "splittist"
activities. (This he has done for the last decade.)
(b) the Dalai Lama must openly recognise
Tibet as an inalienable part of China;
(c) the Dalai Lama must recognise Taiwan
as one of China's provinces; and
(d) the Dalai Lama must recognise the government
of the People's Republic of China as the country's sole legitimate
representative.
When Tony Blair visited China in September 2005,
and during Hu Jintao's State Visit to the UK in November 2005,
Free Tibet Campaign urged the Prime Minister to ask Hu Jintao
to meet the Dalai Lama personally, in order to resolve the 55
year occupation of Tibet. However Tony Blair failed to raise Tibet
with Hu Jintao on either occasion. Free Tibet Campaign is of the
opinion that President Hu, both as China's most senior leader
and because of his personal history as Party Secretary of the
TAR, must be convinced of the value of direct dialogue with the
Dalai Lama. It is furthermore deeply disappointing that Tony Blair
failed to recognise the wider value of giving support to a freedom
struggle that is not only just, but wholly non-violent in its
approach.
Freedom of religion
As demonstrated in section 1, the relaunch of
the Patriotic Re-education campaign and China's continued control
of Tibet's most important spiritual leaders show how little progress
has been made in this area.
Individual cases
China has since 2002 released around a dozen
Tibetan political prisoners prior to the completion of their sentences.
These releases are often timed to coincide with Sino/US summits.
The individuals who have benefited from China's desire to curry
favour generally had a high public profile, due to active campaigns
on their behalf, and had their cases raised consistently by foreign
governments. Examples include musician Ngawang Choephel, nun Ngawang
Sangdrol and teacher Takna Jigme Sangpo, all of whom are now living
in exile, and nun Phuntsog Nyidrol who remains in Tibet. The vast
majority of political prisoners who are released from prison at
the end of their sentences fee Tibet; those who remain suffer
discrimination and surveillance; "living in the shadows"
as Ngawang Sangdrol has described it.
Some Tibetans are included on the UK and EU's
lists that are handed over during the human rights dialogue, as
well as during some bilateral meetings (for example Tony Blair
handed a list to Wen Jiabao during the UK/China summit in September
2005, which included an imprisoned monk from Drepung monastery,
Ngawang Phulchung, who has been detained since 1989). Other individuals
who regularly feature on such lists include:
Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, the 11th Panchen Lama,
detained since 1995. China has consistently denied access to the
Panchen Lama and his family, and provided very little information
about his circumstances. In 2000, during the UK and EU/China dialogues
in Beijing, Chinese officials showed, but did not hand over, photographs
purporting to be of Gedhun Choekyi Nyima. The Foreign Affairs
Select Committee pressed then Foreign Secretary Robin Cook about
why the UK had not made more effort to secure copies of the photographs.
The Foreign Secretary promised to try and the British Ambassador
wrote to request copies but the request was denied.
Tenzin Deleg Rinpoche, a senior Tibetan spiritual
leader from Kham, who received a suspended death sentence in 2002
for an alleged involvement in a bomb explosion in Sichuan Province.
Rinpoche's co-accused, Lobsang Dhondup, was executed in January
2003, in a move that the UK Government described in its Human
Rights Annual Report as "a breach of trust in the dialogue
process." Tenzin Deleg's death sentence was commuted to life
imprisonment in January 2005 but there are grave concerns for
his health, and China has not responded to calls by the EU that—due
to profound questions about the conduct of Tenzin Deleg's trial—his
case be reopened.
(ii) Other Strategies
Bilateral contacts
As discussed above, Tibet is occasionally raised
during Ministerial visits and exchanges. Disappointingly Tony
Blair failed to raise Tibet in three meetings with Chinese leaders
during the UK's Presidency of the EU. Persuading Ministers from
departments other than the Foreign Office to raise Tibet appears
to be challenging. Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott is currently
in China, but he appears to be reluctant to raise human rights
issues, let alone Tibet, in the course of his regular visits to
China and there is no evidence to suggest that this occasion will
be any different.
Free Tibet Campaign was hopeful that the creation
of the "Whitehall China Strategy" in the last couple
of years (under which regular cross-departmental meetings take
place at official and Ministerial level to discuss issues relating
to the UK's bilateral relationship with China) would offer more
scope for placing human rights on the agenda of Ministers across
government. However, there appears to have been a negligible increase
in the number of occasions that human rights and Tibet are raised
between UK Ministers and their Chinese counterparts.
Olympics
During a recent meeting with Foreign Minister
Ian Pearson, Free Tibet Campaign suggested that London's successful
bid to host the 2012 Olympic Games gave the UK a strong platform
from which to engage with China on key issues of concern ahead
of the 2008 Games. As fellow custodians of the Olympic ideals,
and with the responsibility of promoting the Olympic Truce (which
calls for non-violent conflict resolution), the UK should adopt
a special initiative to promote the dialogue between the Dalai
Lama's envoys and help China address serious human rights concerns,
including media freedom, before 2008.
Free Tibet Campaign believed that this suggestion
was positively received by Mr Pearson and hopes to hear more about
what plans are being developed to advance the proposal in the
near future. On 22 February, during the Deputy Prime Minister's
visit to China, Liu Qi, President of the Beijing Organising Committee
also called for enhanced co-operation and exchanges with Britain,
but these appear to be limited to logistical preparations for
the Olympic Games.
EU/China Arms Embargo
The question of the EU/China Arms Embargo being
lifted seems to be temporarily off the EU's agenda. Free Tibet
Campaign was greatly concerned at times over the last two years
that certain factions in the EU were actively responding to pressure
from China to lift the embargo. The UK has given very mixed signals
on this issue, with the Foreign Secretary expressing support for
an end to the embargo when questioned by the Quadripartite Committee
last January, before backing off, "not least because there
has been no progress on human rights" in the Spring (Jonathan
Dimbleby programme, 20 March). Given that the human rights situation
has remained poor throughout the period that the embargo was under
review, it was a welcome surprise extraordinary for Mr Straw to
suddenly use it as an excuse to maintain the embargo, although
there were clearly other reasons, such as China's decision to
pass an anti-secession law relating to Taiwan.
Press statements from officials within the European
Commission gave further cause for concern with public speculation
of what might be an acceptable gesture by China to "earn"
the lifting of the embargo. Amongst the ideas postulated included
China's ratifying the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, or releasing a number of high profile political prisoners.
Since China has already stated its commitment to ratify the ICCPR,
and has established a track record of the "gesture politics"
of releasing high profile prisoners in conjunction with important
summits (albeit with the US rather than EU), these are not appropriate
choices.
Free Tibet Campaign contends that there remains
no justification for lifting the EU/China arms embargo. Since
China regards the lifting of the embargo as a high priority, it
follows that to earn it, China should be prepared to make progress
on a human rights issue that it is not already committed to acting
upon. Furthermore, progress should be tangible rather than just
promised (ie real improvement in the lives of individuals rather
than a pledge by China to take action on an issue). Finally, since
the embargo was imposed in connection to Tiananmen Square, China's
efforts to have the embargo lifted should also be linked to this,
ie democracy.
Aid and development in Tibet
As has been described above, Tibetans are increasingly
marginalised in their local economy, and the rural (overwhelmingly
Tibetan) population in the TAR are among the poorest in all of
China. The rate of illiteracy in the TAR is the highest in China
at over 47%, and nearly twice as high as that of the second ranked
province (Qinghai).
Despite these figures, the UK and EU's involvement
in development projects in the TAR is minimal. The UK supports
long-standing basic education and water sanitation projects run
by Save the Children Fund in the TAR. Save the Children Fund are
also responsible for the education component of the EU funded
Panam Integrated Poverty Alleviation Project (to which the EU
has contributed 7.6 million Euros) near Shigatse; the project
was conceived by China to increase food production through improved
irrigation infrastructures and agricultural support. The agricultural
components of the Panam project have been controversial however,
and Panam is by no means the poorest part of the TAR, and Medecine
sans Frontieres pulled out of Tibet as the authorities refused
to permit them to work in the areas they defined as most needy.
There is great potential for the UK and EU to
give further support to appropriate and sustainable development
throughout Tibet, preferably delivered through NGOs who have expertise
in ensuring Tibetan-led community participation in the design
of projects.
Please see Appendix below for Free Tibet Campaign's
recommendations for action by the UK, which were submitted in
a memorandum sent to the Committee in November 2005. [49]
Alison Reynolds
Director
Free Tibet Campaign
27 February 2006
49 Not printed. See Foreign Affairs Committee, First
Report of Session 2005-06, Human Rights Annual Report 2005,
HC 574, Ev 111. Back
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