Written evidence submitted by Dr Caroline
Hoy, Department of Urban Studies, University of Glasgow
1. Significant changes have occurred in
Chinese society since the initiation of the reform programme at
the end of the 1970s. Some of the social and economic changes
have undoubtedly benefited many in the population. However, significant
disparities are appearing between those who have benefited from
the reforms and those who have not. One of the most significant
of these divisions is a geographical one between the developed
east coast and the west of the country. The north-western provinces
of the country represent a particular challenge as energy, ethnic
and development interests collide, especially in the province
of Xinjiang.
2. The Chinese government has recognised
that these social and economic divisions could lead to social
instability, and in 2000 established the Western Development Initiative
also known as the "Go West" programme. This was also
a response to the process of national fragmentation that had taken
place in the ex-USSR and Eastern Europe in the 1990s. Twelve provinces
have been targeted in this campaign: Gansu, Guizhou, Ningxia,
Qinghai, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Sichuan, Tibet, Yunnan and Xinjiang.
One of the major aims of the Go West initiative has been the construction
of major infrastructure projects such as an electricity network
and the West-East gas pipeline. Environmental protection, the
conservation of vulnerable water resources, economic restructuring,
the development of educational opportunities, and human capacity
are also part of the programme. Problems exist preventing fulfilment
of the project especially in terms of funding. The existence and
extent of corruption is also a problem and results in the diversion
of significant amounts of funds targeted for capital investments
and other activities.
3. Ethnic relations within China are important
as a result of the potential for unrest especially in provinces
that lie along international borders. Ethnic identity is complex
and fluid. The Chinese government uses a system of ethnic nationality
status that results in ethnic identity being subsumed to the Chinese
state. This system also allows for negotiation and development
of identity and position within Chinese society. Since the 1990s
greater investment has taken place in areas of China in which
ethnic minorities are particularly represented as a response to
the restructuring of Turkic/Muslim nations to the west of China's
borders.
4. The Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
and Secretary General of the Shanghai Cooperative Organisation,
Zhang Deguang has made specific reference to the "unique
geopolitical advantage" of Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region
(XUAR). However, as a result of its strategic geopolitical position,
comparative wealth of resources and multi-ethnic demography the
region also represents security concerns for the Chinese government.
5. The XUAR is a particularly complex area
and the only provincial level administrative region in which the
Han Chinese do not dominate demographically. The Han Chinese make
up 41% of the population and the Uighur, a Turkic-Muslim group,
45%. Other ethnic nationalities in the region include the Kazak,
Hui, Kyrgyz, Mongol, Dongxiang, Tajik and Xibe. Inter-ethnic relations,
not just between the Han and the Uighur, but also between other
population groups are problematic. State-sponsored migration of
Han Chinese to the province since 1949 has completely changed
the demographic balance in the province and has been resented
by the indigenous ethnic population. Migration is continuing to
change the relationship between population groups as, for example,
Uighurs migrate away from the region and informal migration of
Han from Sichuan and other provinces, seeking economic opportunities
absent in their own regions, continues.
6. The XUAR is characterised by uneven development,
urbanisation and inequality in benefits and financial investments.
There are also significant health problems in Xinjiang including,
but not limited to HIV/AIDS, that are compounded by the poor health
infrastructure, especially in rural areas in which most of the
ethnic population live, and the high cost of treatment. These
inequalities are felt particularly strongly by the Uighur population
that has concerns about their position, opportunities and issues
around human rights, religious freedoms, political representation,
economic development, migration and access to education and training.
7. The Muslim communities in Xinjiang are
not isolated and are linked to the Islamic communities in Central
Asia and beyond. The Chinese state is apprehensive about the nature
of religious practices in Xinjiang and the spread of Wahhabism.
As a result of the connections not just between religious belief
and ideological independence from the state, religion and terrorism,
but also to the further question of cession by Xinjiang from China,
the Chinese government controls religious practices in Xinjiang
to a high degree. This has created further strains between the
Chinese government, the Uighur and other ethnic populations.
8. Separatists are active within Xinjiang
and while some are recognised as having engaged in acts of terrorism
their numbers are small and the movement is divided. Large numbers
of people in Xinjiang have been held for security reasons by the
Chinese Government.
9. The Xinjiang Production and Construction
Corps (XPCC) was created from de-mobilised members of the People's
Liberation Army in the 1950s and is important in the province
for two reasons: its control over agricultural production and
the role the organisation plays in provincial stability. Much
government investment into Xinjiang is channelled through the
XPCC and it is a key route for Han migration into the region.
10. China is the second biggest user of
oil after the United States and has been a net-importer of oil
since 1993. China's economic future is dependent on secure and
increasingly supplies. The country's need for energy could impact
negatively on international demand and consequently, international
relationships.
11. National domestic energy resources are
small and have been exploited in north-western China since the
1980s. It is difficult to accurately address the extent of energy
reserves but the IEA currently estimates China to have reserves
equalling 18.26 billion barrels of oil. These are not significant
in global terms and not all reserves may be recoverable. As a
result, China has been seeking long term international energy
exploitation opportunities and supply routes that avoid vulnerable
points such as the Malacca Straits.
12. In terms of energy, China now has interests
in Iran, Sub-Saharan Africa, Venezuela and Azerbaijan amongst
others. The Chinese state failed to buy into the US market in
2005 but succeeded in buying the Canadian firm Petro-Khazakstan
in October 2005 through the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation
(CNPC). CNPC has been a key player in the development of the energy
industry both domestically and internationally along with SINOPEC
and CNOOC. All are state owned oil companies. CNPC is a 50% investor
in a China-Kazakhstan oil pipeline that started pumping oil in
December 2005.
13. One of the most notable developments
in Central Asia relations has been the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
(SCO) that was formed in 2001 from a group known as the "Shanghai
Five" established five years previously. It consists of China,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and
has formal contact with Afghanistan. It was originally established
to discuss border disputes but expanded to act as a forum for
counter-terrorism and the development of strategic interests.
Better relations with Kazakhstan has allowed China to expand its
energy interests more widely within Central Asia and invest in
exploration in the Caspian Sea. There are concerns that counter-terrorist
activities, associated with the expansion of relations through
the SCO, are being used to suppress Uighur opposition groups in
the region. China has signed extradition treaties with both Kazakhstan
and Kyrgyzstan that employed to extradite Uighurs to China.
14. Significant reserves of energy exist
in Central Asia but these are not uniformly distributed and the
region lacks the appropriate distributive infrastructure. This
has not gone unnoticed. In November 2005 the Electricity Regulators
Forum (CMERF) was formed by Azerbaijan, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz
Republic, Mongolia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to examine and share
lessons from energy provision and re-structuring in this industry.
15. Despite the existence of bodies such
as SCO and CMERF China, as the Kazakhstan example illustrates,
often prefers to engage in bi-lateral energy negotiations. There
are wider concerns in Central Asia, which extend to Russia, about
the extent to which China is seeking access to energy resources
and the consequent impacts on geo-political relationships. Regionally,
China is also in competition with Pakistan, India and Japan. Additionally,
the US has voiced opposition to China's expansion into the energy
markets in Central Asia. However, it is also true that co-operation
over oil, as in the case of the Kazakhstan-China pipeline where
Russia is making up the current deficit in supply, may lead to
more positive outcomes in the region.
16. Environmental pollution is a serious
and increasing problem in China and environmental quality is likely
to be further compromised with growth-oriented government policy,
eg encouraging the purchase of private cars. Such policies will
place further demands on the energy market. Continued economic
development will further stretch resources and the temporary industrial
shut downs in 2005 may become more common, damaging production.
China should be encouraged to conserve resources, develop alternative
energy industries and to share the benefits of economic development
more widely across the country as a matter of urgency.
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