Written evidence submitted by the Council
of the British Association for Korean Studies
The Emergence of the People's Republic of China
as a Regional Power and its Impact on the International System
INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS
Although the past is not a certain guide to
the future, it is the only guide we have. To understand the "emergence"
of China in contemporary times, we must clarify the nature of
the historic cultural and political system of East Asia, to see
what patterns there are. An examination of the East Asian past
reveals the following general patterns:
1. East Asia (comprising China, Korea,
Japan, Vietnam, Tibet, and Mongolia) is a coherent cultural and
political sphere which has the area of "China" as its
cultural, political, and economic core area.
2. When "China" is strong
and stable, the region as a whole is stable.
3. When "China" is weak and
internally divided, the region as a whole is susceptible to war.
4. Contiguous areas to this core region
such as Vietnam and Korea have long been aware of their socio-political
context, and traditionally have developed strategies to accommodate
to Chinese power, while at the same time seeking to maintain their
own independence and sovereignty.
5. Tibet (which for a long period had
been an independent political entity) and Xinjiang are special
cases of internal Chinese colonisation. Both regions have been
vulnerable for reasons of internal division or simple military
weakness.
6. Historically, China is more prone
to autarky and limited access than it is prone to imperial expansion.
THE CULTURAL
AND HISTORICAL
BACKGROUND—CHINA
Chinese culture is the oldest continuous culture
on Earth, having a literary and canonical tradition (largely based
upon Confucian thought) stretching back at least to the fifth
century BC. Even today, the literary works which constitute this
canonical tradition can be read easily. Such accessibility to
classical thought and ideas has produced an extraordinary continuity
in literature and historical writing in the region. General social,
economic, and political views, as well as views and observations
about neighbouring peoples, became firmly established by the second
or third century AD and have accompanied, if not motivated, the
successive drives to unify politically the mainland under bureaucratic
autocracies.
Confucianism, the predominant philosophical
mode of East Asia, defined individuals as social entities, elaborated
an extensive moral system which limited governmental power, and
presented an economic system focussed on concepts of national
co-operative activity to ensure general popular subsistence. As
a consequence, politics has been dominated by responsibility being
vested in a regularised bureaucratic institution, recruitment
into which has been determined by objective examinations, which
in turn led to the creation of a non-feudal e[acute]lite class
(the so-called literati bureaucrats) and the emergence of a "meritocratic"
system of government.
Over the past two millennia, the key economic
zones of the world—China, the Indian Subcontinental world,
the Mediterranean world, northern Europe, and (latterly) North
America—have always included China. For most of the past
two millennia, the Chinese economy was the most advanced in the
world, triggering the onset of globalisation through the "Gold-for-Silk
Trade". The scale of the Chinese economy has usually dwarfed
all others, containing within its domestic sphere nearly every
known agriculturally-productive ecological niche, often possessing
the world's most advanced technology, and using transport systems
rivalled elsewhere only in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Although the standard of living in the Yangtze
River valley seems to have been on a par with northwestern Europe
until about 1800, from the mid- to late nineteenth century, Western
views of China have been blinded by a European obsession with
its own growth spurt, and by the actual decline and collapse of
one of the world's greatest political and economic powers, the
Qing dynasty (1616-1911) of China. From the mid-nineteenth century
to the mid-twentieth century, China passed through another period
of "dynastic change". However, by the end of the twentieth
century, it had again embarked on a stable growth path which will
probably take it through most of this century and beyond.
THE CULTURAL
AND HISTORICAL
BACKGROUND—KOREA
AND JAPAN
Naturally, the brilliance of "Chinese"
civilisation has had a profound impact on neighbouring nations,
especially "Korea" and "Japan" which, not
appearing as viable, coherent political entities until the fifth
("Korea") and the seventh ("Japan") centuries,
benefited from nearly a millenium of advanced "Chinese"
civilisation. The differences in socio-political organisation
among these three countries can be placed on a spectrum from "meritocratic"
(China) to "mixed meritocratic/aristocratic" (Korea)
to "aristocratic" (Japan). Throughout the East Asian
landmass, from the fifth century onwards a common East Asian civilisation
developed which was based upon a Confucian socio-political system
and the Buddhist religion. Participation in the culture of this
East Asian ("Chinese") civilisation was open to anyone
who could learn the rudiments of civilised thought and behaviour
(Confucianism), and who could master the language of the East
Asian cultural sphere (the written Chinese language).
The various nations of East Asia perceived that
they had a particular place within the common East Asian cultural
sphere, and were perceived in turn by the Chinese to have a certain
place within it. Partly, this has been the result of geographic
propinquity. Koreans have long shared a land border with China
and have accommodated themselves over the centuries to this fact.
Japan is an island nation, and thus could join the Chinese socio-political
ambit when it suited its purposes.
The Emperor of China was considered to be the
Son of Heaven and the symbolic centre of the East Asian socio-political
system, which was composed of a series of hierarchical relationships
amongst the nations based upon a model of ideal family relations,
a concept derived from Confucian philosophy. The emperor's mandate
to rule his nation ("China") was dependent on his ability
to keep the peace and to satisfy the subsistence needs of his
subjects—an key idea of the classical Confucian philosopher
Mencius (372-289 BC).
The rulers of Korea in "traditional times"
never presumed to refer to themselves as "emperor",
but only as "king". This usage reflects the fact that
although the Korean élite thought of themselves as "equal"
participants in East Asian civilisation, their socio-political
position in the family hierarchy was perceived to be that of a
younger brother to an elder brother. To do otherwise, would have
implied that they were making a political claim which would have
invited unnecessary Chinese interest and subsequent interference.
The Japanese ruler in "traditional times", however,
did refer to himself as "emperor". This was because
the source of his mandate was not based, as in China and Korea,
on philosophical concepts of service to the people, but on claims
to divine ancestry. However, except during a very early period,
powerful courtiers and aristocrats have prevented the Emperor
of Japan from ruling in all but name. The Japanese usage of the
term "emperor" for their ruler has long been accepted
by Chinese and Korean élites as an indication of ignorant
barbarism.
In terms of pure power, the Koreans have presented
the Chinese over the centuries with both a loyal ally and a determined
resistor to political assimilation. Korean policy towards China
has always been a negotiated activity, either on the battlefield
or by political accommodation intended to keep the Chinese out
of Korean affairs. From the late seventh century to the present,
the Chinese have rarely sought to control Korean territory, because
of this effective resistance. By the same token, the Chinese have
viewed Korea as a buffer state. Massive Chinese assistance was
provided in the 1590s to beat back a Japanese invasion of Korea,
and again in the 1950s to drive back the forces of the United
States and the United Nations.
When they have been able to do so, the Chinese
have committed massive resources to defend Korea—in alliance
with a Korean state—to drive military power away from their
Korean frontier. Again, when it has had the resources, China has
never allowed a hostile or potentially hostile power to dominate
Korea. However, China has almost never sought to dominate Korea
itself, being content that the peninsula is neutral or has a positive
attitude towards Chinese interests.
The Koreans have long appreciated these circumstances
and have profited from Chinese protection. When China has been
strong and stable as in the early Song (960-1126), Ming (1368-1662),
and Qing (1616-1911) periods, Korea has been at peace and has
prospered as in the early Koryo (918-1392) and the Choson (1392-1910)
periods. When China was strong (as in the Ming dynasty) and the
Japanese mobilised to attack (as in the invasion of 1592), the
Chinese-Korean alliance repelled them. When China was weak and
divided as it was in the late nineteenth century, the Japanese
sought to take advantage of the situation, seized Korea in 1910,
and then attacked China. Traditionally, the aggressive state in
Northeast Asia has been Japan, not China, and the Koreans have
always been allied with the Chinese. We should not expect that
this pattern will change. Although the Americans have provided
stability in the region since the end of the Second World War
in 1945, they can now retreat, because the Chinese and the Koreans
are strong enough to check the Japanese. This old equilibrium
is re-emerging and not to be feared, unless we fail to understand
the history and cultures of the East Asian cultural sphere and
end up by being excluded from it because of our ignorance.
IMPLICATIONS FOR
BRITISH POLICY
The greatest problem for British policy in the
East Asian region is the high level of ignorance about East Asia
which pervades contemporary British society. Unlike the United
States, Britain lacks a significant and successful East Asian
minority which can provide cultural background knowledge at all
levels. Consequently, it is imperative that we develop such high-level
expertise in our institutions of higher education. However, an
examination of the current record provides a dismal picture. Major
higher education institutions, such as the University of Durham
and the University of Stirling, have eliminated almost entirely
their offerings on East Asia, destroying long-held (Durham) or
nascent (Stirling) expertise. Even a flagship institution such
as the School of Oriental and African Studies in London recently
threatened to destroy its research infrastructure by eliminating
librarians with any specialist knowledge about East Asia in order
to replace them with what would be in effect "Tesco shelf-stackers".
The problem lies in the fact that the Government
and our higher education institutions have been driven by "managerialist"
views which consider long-term investment in strategic knowledge
industries (universities) to be foolish, because the current year's
budget might show a deficit. To try and develop long-term expertise
on East Asia with a workforce which can be sacked this year and
re-hired the next is to play a fool's game bred from the twin
delusions that any need for information can be provided by out-sourced
consultants, and the belief that the important diplomatic and
commercial people speak English anyway. In 1986, Sir Peter Parker
in his report Speaking for the Future: A Review of the Requirements
of Diplomacy and Commerce for Asian and African Languages and
Area Studies stressed the need to have a well developed cadre
of people in this nation who had a good knowledge of Asian and
African languages and cultures. It would appear that twenty years
on the lesson which Sir Peter taught us has still not been learned.
Not to have a significant financial investment in the creation
of a cadre of British citizens with a competent knowledge of East
Asia contradicts the commonsense approach which is taken towards
developing scientific expertise. If in science, why not here?
Because of our ignorance about the importance
of building up long-term expertise, we may say that in world historical
terms, East Asians are colonising us. How better to control a
people than to learn their language (English) and their culture
and hope that they remain ignorant of yours? One might think that
the recent "China craze" in Britain would be good for
East Asian Studies in general and Chinese Studies in particular.
However, not only are the actual resources which are currently
being committed to the development of the subject area risible,
but the focus of spending is almost entirely on the Chinese mainland.
This latter issue ignores the first principle of understanding
the context of any situation. One fears that the hype surrounding
this craze may be as transient as the wind.
Decision-makers seem to be lost in a dream of
a billion-plus Chinese consumers all buying a British widget.
This is fantasy. The challenge is not to make a widget which all
Chinese want to buy; it is obvious to anyone that it is the Chinese
who are making the widgets which we are buying by the shipload.
The challenge for us is to keep the East Asian nations—who
now trade among themselves more than they do with the rest of
the world, away from systems of autarky and closed trading spheres.
This means that the United Kingdom must move upstream and develop
expertise on East Asia so that the Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese
will look to Britons for sympathetic understanding, partnership,
and the trust which is bestowed on honest brokers.
This goal can be fostered:
1. by the guaranteed and continuing
Government support for all branches of East Asian Studies in the
nation's universities,
2. by Government encouraging businesses
and other commercial bodies to providebursaries for students doing
East Asian Studies, and by making it financially attractive for
them to do so, and
3. by Government encouraging businesses
and other commercial bodies to provide in-course or immediate
post-course internships for students who have studied a branch
of East Asian Studies. It should be made financially attractive
for businesses and commercial groups to provide these opportunities
as this training is in the nation's long-term interest.
Any successful short-term policy prescription
on East Asia will be dependent on the pursuit of a long-term policy
for the development of expertise on the region, as Sir Peter Parker
made quite plain twenty years ago. Without the commitment to such
a long-term policy of development, this nation will not only be
flying blind, but it will have no way of meaningful communication
with East Asians in the coming decades which increasingly will
be dominated by them, politically as well as commercially.
The Council of the British Association for Korean
Studies
President: Professor James
H Grayson
Immediate Past President:
Dr James Hoare
Secretary: Professor Keith
Pratt
Treasurer: Ms Susan Pares
Members of Council: Dr
Grace Koh, Dr James Lewis, Ms Jane Portal, Dr David Prendergast,
Dr John Swenson-Wright.
20 April 2006
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