House of Commons - Foreign Affairs

Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Written Evidence

Written evidence submitted by Dr Key-young Son, University of Sheffield

THE RISE OF CHINA AND STABILITY AND SECURITY IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA

1. I am a lecturer of Korea's international relations at the University of Sheffield. I have written on strategic issues involving the Korean Peninsula and its neighbouring countries. My principal publication relevant to this memorandum is South Korean Engagement Policies and North Korea (London: Routledge, 2006).

2. The present memorandum is about one of the widely debated topics in the literature on East Asian security.[94] It is an exploration of two questions. Does China's rise pose threats to stability and security on the Korean Peninsula? And what policy options could we envision to ensure China's "peaceful rise"[95] and, with it, peace and security on the Korean Peninsula?

3. First of all, I would like to debunk the common misperception that the rise of China is tantamount to potential or clear-cut threats to regional security. In fact, it could take a plethora of different implications at least for both Koreas, which makes the dichotomy of viewing China's ascendancy as either good or bad an obsolete job. In particular, we should not discredit the fact that China's rise has made some positive contributions to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula through the maintenance of a status quo. That's why specialists in this region are debating the lingering Cold War structure in East Asia in spite of the historical progression into a post-Cold War era in the other parts of the world. For North Korea, which has been increasingly bullied by the powerful capitalist states around it after the collapse of the Soviet bloc, China's rise has served as a long-awaited buttress for its survival as an independent state. For South Korea, China is offering an opportunity to end its decades-long reliance on the United States in terms of security and economic affairs and reshape its identity as an independent regional power interacting dynamically with the United States, the world's sole superpower, and China, a potential challenger of US hegemony.[96] These observations draw on historical experiences, given the presence of the natural chemistry between China and Korea despite their love-hate relationship spanning several millennia. However, history does not tell a lot about the present question, because China had never risen peacefully before and the Korean Peninsula had been a cradle for relatively weaker kingdoms, which had been usual targets for invasion by emerging Chinese empires, unlike the modern-day South Korea, an economic powerhouse in East Asia. In contrast to the strong rivalry between China and Japan during the last several centuries, the geopolitical and cultural affinity between China and Korea adds a diametrically different dimension to their future relations. It does not mean that it is a matter of time before the Korean Peninsula would be sucked into the Chinese hemisphere politically and assimilated culturally, a development that runs decisively counter to the US's desire to prevent the rise of a hegemon in this part of the world, and contrary to the Korean people's long struggle to preserve their unique culture and independence against the tide of Chinese dominance. Three scenarios are possible. First, both North and South Korea might accept China's hegemony in the region and possibly establish a patron-client relationship, just as South Korea did with the United States. Second, Koreans might endeavour to check the rise of China, as they did historically for more than two millennia both successfully and unsuccessfully. Third, the two Koreas will muddle through sandwiched by the two power centres, China and the United States.

4. As adumbrated in the first scenario, China's presence is looming bigger and bigger over the Korean Peninsula. In fact, some experts started to express their concerns that the economies of the two Koreas have already become excessively dependent on China. China displaced the United States as South Korea's No. 1 trading partner in 2003.[97] The two countries have also deepened their political and military ties since the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1992. Without doubt, China is playing the role of a life line for North Korea as the main supplier of food and energy.[98] In fact, China's role, supported by South Korea, is effectively canceling out the US's attempt to undermine North Korea by means of economic sanctions. Already, as demonstrated in the six-party talks aimed to address North Korea's nuclear weapons programmes, China is playing a bigger role than the United States as a regional power broker in a complete reversal of its passive diplomacy of the past decade.[99] Just like the United States regards Latin America as its backyard, China has every reason to think that the Korean Peninsula should become its launching pad to greatness. For the time being, however, Chinese leaders appear to accept the US military presence in East Asia through its alliances with Japan and South Korea, as long as the United States plays a positive role as a stabiliser.[100]

5. In spite of China's rise as an economic and political power, both North and South Korea correctly recognise that the United States will remain the sole superpower for the foreseeable future. In the post-9/11 era, South Korea, in spite of some reluctance, has cooperated with the United States to transform bilateral security alliance to better serve the changing regional and international security environment.[101] As part of its global realignment programmes, the United States sought to restructure its military bases, scattered across the southern part of the peninsula, into two major hubs, while turning the infantry-based stationary forces into mobile forces deployable in the event of regional and global contingencies. Even though it recognise China's material power, North Korea still regards the United States as the only partner for security dialogue to resolve all outstanding issues, such as nuclear weapons programmes and a peace treaty, which could officially end the Korean War. Because of the existing institutional framework in the case of South Korea and the desire to obtain guarantees on its survival in the case of North Korea, the two Koreas hold sufficient reasons to develop and deepen relations with the United States.

6. Among the three scenarios, I believe that the third scenario is the most feasible, given the historical and political experiences of Koreans. History tells that Korea has remarkably maintained its independence from continuous invasions from China and Japan. It is true that both North and South Koreans are contemplating China's rise with some concerns. In particular, the South Korean government worries the possibility that the North Korean military, which has close ties with its Chinese counterpart, might launch a pro-Beijing military coup in the event of an internal power struggle in the future. Given the presence of an estimated 3 million ethnic Koreans in the northeastern provinces of China, the Beijing government also holds a suspicion that a reunited Korea might try to "recover its fatherland" as part of a "greater Korea". Given the historical experiences of repeated foreign invasions, the two Korean states hold a strong penchant to keep their political and diplomatic independence. So far, China's role of a stabilizer or a status quo keeper appealed to the two Koreas as a counterbalancing force against the US policy of regime change in North Korea. For the foreseeable future, it is highly likely that both North and South Korea are inclined to chart policies which might look like walking a tight rope, since the choice of one superpower for bandwagoning cannot guarantee their political and economic benefits. While the two Koreas will show patterns of hedging between the two powers, the United States and China are likely to employ various measures to court the two Koreas by seeking to expand their influences over their former enemies while trying to keep their allies in their sides.[102]

7. Therefore, China's rise offers both challenges and opportunities to North and South Korea. Those subscribing to the `China threat' scenario will shed light on a Sino-South Korean imbroglio in 2004 over the history issue involving the ancient Korean kingdom of Koguryo (37 BC-669 AD). The Beijing government tried to usurp a key part of Korea's history and claimed that Koguryo, which once ruled Manchuria, as well as the northern part of the Korean Peninsula, was "a regional government set up by an ethnic group".[103] After it touched off a strong anti-Chinese sentiment in South Korea, the Chinese government backpedaled and reached a compromise with the South Korean government in the direction of not escalating the controversy. It is meaningful that China had taken a step back rather than bullying South Korea. It might have been a wake-up call to China that any unnecessary troubles in bilateral relations will nudge South Korea further into the arms of the United States. Meanwhile, the Korea-related problems have helped to bring the United States and China to the negotiating table for strategic dialogue, as demonstrated in the four-party talks in 1997 aimed at replacing the Korean Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty and the six-party talks in 2003 aimed at addressing North Korean nuclear weapons programmes.[104]

8. We can think about both bilateral and multilateral options which could tie China down into bilateral and regional frameworks. In bilateral terms, there is more room for China if it wants to develop and deepen relations with both North and South Korea. In a modern era, Mao Zedong once declared that China and North Korea were "as close as lips and teeth". For South Koreans, the United States is still the destination of the largest number of students with 49,046 in 2002, but those studying in China increased dramatically to 36,093 in 2002 from 9,204 in 1999, brightening future relations between the two countries.[105]

9. In fact, the biggest source of instability in Northeast Asia is North Korea because of its nuclear weapons programmes and volatile political and economic situations. So far, different schools of thought have come up with different interpretations and policy subscriptions. Nevertheless, China's involvement in the management of North Korea's volatile security and economic affairs could be positive for the short term, even though there is a possibility of frictions or confrontations with South Korea over political influences and the share of the North Korean market in the long term.[106] Michael Green, former senior director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council, said in a parliamentary hearing that South Korea had been adamant on an option of engaging North Korea partly because it wanted to check China's rising influences over it.[107] Despite a series of doomsday scenarios, North Korea survived its worst economic and political instability in the mid-1990s. It is too far-fetched to think about its sudden collapse, now that it is recording positive economic growth for the 6th consecutive year since 1999, according to the estimates of the Bank of Korea.[108] Therefore, it is safe to presume that North Korea will survive as an independent state for the foreseeable future, depending on the successful transfer of power and economic transition from its command to market-oriented economy. In this vein, China's role looms large as a guarantor of North Korea's political and economic stability in spite of the phenomenon of what is called an "alliance fatigue".[109] Even though President Hu Jintao and other new generation leaders in Beijing are known to be less ideologically attached to their North Korean counterparts, China is unlikely to shift its positions towards North Korea, given the sunken costs, established institutional frameworks, and the Korean Peninsula's geo-strategic importance to China.

10. China has also sought to expand its ties with South Korea. In 2003, South Korea and China agreed to build a "comprehensive cooperative partnership", entailing military and security ties.[110] As early as 1999, the two countries agreed to hold annual talks on regional security issues.[111] Now that the two countries have exchanged high-level military officials annually, Defence Minister Yoon Kwang-ung said in 2005 that the Seoul-Beijing military exchange would be upgraded to the Seoul-Tokyo level.[112] In a visit to Seoul in April 2006, Chinese Defence Minister Cao Gangchuan discussed the establishment of a military hotline to prevent accidental armed clashes in the waters between the two countries.[113] Nevertheless, the United States is unlikely to abandon a set of established security arrangements it had painstakingly forged during the Cold War.[114] Within the boundaries of the current security framework between South Korea and the United States, China and South Korea are likely to advance their political and military ties for the foreseeable future. This is one of the reasons why the debate of forging the three-way alliance amongst the United States, Japan and South Korea looks fraudulent. Even though Japanese and South Koreans have personal chemistry between individuals, their states have never been friendly to each other, partly resulting from the gap in the perception of their identities (Any state on the Korean Peninsula has not regarded Japan as a hegemonic power in the region and, to many Koreans, Japan's colonial rule is a historical anomaly. Meanwhile, many Korean kingdoms of the past recognised China's hegemonic status in the region and established the patron-client relationship).

11. Meanwhile, China is testing the possibility of realising its interests by the means of multilateral approaches. In the areas of nuclear non-proliferation, China's role has been indispensable in the organizing of the 6-party talks to address North Korea's nuclear issues. In the diplomatic arena, China has been attending an East Asian summit annually, even though its attempt to form a regional grouping exclusive of the United States was partially diluted by the entry of Australia, New Zealand and India into the East Asian summit last year.[115] Despite the rivalries between China and Japan and other problems hampering the process of region building in East Asia, however, the United States has been one of the greatest obstacles since it did not want to see any drastic alteration of the current US-centred regional order.[116] At present, South Korea has been an active player in the efforts to form regional bodies in East Asia by seeking to play the role of a bridge between continental and maritime forces. Unlike Japan, South Korea has been in favour of building an East Asian community, exclusive of the United States, an area China could exploit in the future.

12. One trend is evident, which is a rising nationalism in East Asia. As part of its efforts to regain its status as a hegemonic power in East Asia,[117] China has resorted to nationalism to mobilize the masses in its relations with Japan. Nevertheless, China's nationalism has been nurtured by Japan's confrontational political actions, resulting from its inflexible political system, which still fails at least to meet Western standards: Japan has maintained a one-party rule for five decades and, in spite of its economic success, remains politically underdeveloped. For example, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, enshrining Class-A war criminals, have enraged Chinese and Koreans during the recent years. This shows that it is not easy to create an East Asian regional community in the same way that European states created the European Union. Nevertheless, both China and Japan are not a monolithic state. Different government bodies and organizations are testing the waters both bilaterally and multilaterally to maximise their national interests.

13. The above observations imply some policy suggestions, even though Britain is not a major political player in the region. Britain is the closest ally of the United States, as it fought in Iraq side by side with it. First of all, Britain needs to show to the United States that China's rise and its strengthened relations with both North and South Korea do not necessarily constitute imminent or potential threats to the US-centred regional order. Both North and South Korea have not been easy partners for China historically. If China's rise is a fait accompli, Britain can advise to the United States that it is more reasonable to think about inducing the state into acting responsibly in regional and international affairs. A self-fulfilling prophecy might be working here. Rather than thinking of China as a potential threat to stability, it is important to think that the state would pursue economic benefits aggressively for the time being, coupled with moderate political ambitions.[118] By the time that it reached the point of an economic superpower, the rationale goes that the Western world is able to transform China's worldview and domestic politics through the use of positive engagement strategies. Given the enormous military power of the United States, it is a bit premature to think that China would try to challenge the US interests militarily in such issues as Taiwan. Nevertheless, the United States should not give an excuse to China or become overly ambitious, just as it did during the Korean War.

14. Second, Britain can think about offering some policy advice to Japan in connection with some controversial history issues and their possible connection to future security matters. Historically, Britain and Japan have enjoyed close relations. Britain, calling to mind the two countries' largely good relations over a considerable period, could offer friendly advice to Japan on how to end the historical animosity and build future-oriented relations between former enemies. As mentioned above, the Yasukuni Shrine has been an irritant to the Sino-Japan and Korea-Japan relationships since Koizumi took power. Since Yasukuni has been the symbol of Japan's militarism, which engulfed the world in a tragedy of unprecedented scale in the 20th century, it is worthwhile considering that the British parliament, if not the British government, express its position regarding the issue. Japan is mindful of how Western states think, rather than how its Asian neighbours think. Britain's peer pressure might be working more potently than imagined. If remained unchecked, the incident could even bring both North and South Korea closer to China, given the deepening convergence of political and economic interests between them. In order to keep the balance of power, it is important to retain Japan as a relatively agreeable state to both North and South Korea. Otherwise, the political balance might tip dramatically in China's favour, with the United States being a bystander on bilateral issues between Japan and South Korea.

15. Third, Britain needs to engage China directly to induce the state to build constructive relations with both North and South Korea. Given the fact that Britain has managed to organise the Commonwealth Games with its former colonies, Britain could offer valuable lessons about China's future relations with its neighbouring countries. What the Chinese need is not just a good command in English, but the contents the English-speaking people have acquired through their historical interactions with the rest of the world.

16. Lastly, Britain needs to deepen relations with both North and South Korea. Britain was one of the first countries to accommodate President Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine Policy and announce its decision to normalise diplomatic relations with North Korea in 2000. Since then, Britain played a positive role, though limited, in educating North Koreans about English and current affairs. It is worthwhile expanding economic cooperation with both North and South Korea, possibly by making investment in an industrial complex, built jointly in the North Korean city of Kaesong by the North Korean government and a South Korean conglomerate, Hyundai.[119] It is difficult to pinpoint which British companies might be interested in investment in the industrial park, operated jointly by the South Korean government and Hyundai. However, the industrial complex offers unrivaled incentives and economic benefits in terms of the costs of labour and land, perhaps more than its competitors in China.[120] At present, the South Korean government is making all-out efforts to convince the United States that the industrial park project is an important step in offering a capitalist training to North Koreans and enabling North Korea to find an alternative source of income instead of resorting to the exports of weapons, counterfeiting, drug trafficking and other forms of internationally banned activities.

Dr Key-young Son

University of Sheffield

24 April 2006