Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Written Evidence

Written evidence submitted by Hazel Smith, Professor of International Relations, University of Warwick


  The thrust of my submission to the committee is that, given the openness in Washington DC to new ideas for resolving the Korean conflict, and given the comparative advantage of the UK with its diplomatic relations with the DPRK and its long-standing relations of amity with the United States, the UK should make more pro-active use of that comparative advantage in promoting and assisting peace initiatives in North-east Asia.

  The corollary of such an approach is that it is also necessary for the UK and the FCO to engage in some fresh analysis of the key security challenges on the Korean peninsula and some re-thinking of what might be the levers of change. The conclusion is that the UK government could engage in more imaginative multilateral initiatives, including the initiation and support of "backtrack" channels in support of the Six party talks. My further suggestion is that such diplomacy should take place in conjunction with another ally in the region, South Korea, which currently is taking much of the initiative and bearing much of the burden of keeping diplomacy alive in the interrelated nuclear, security and humanitarian crisis which persists in respect of DPRK relations with the rest of North-East Asia and which still has the potential to spill over into hot conflict. This paper also suggests some practical and immediate contributions that could be made by the UK government in support of medium-term peace initiatives.

The new mood in the United States

  Governmental inquiries in the United States into the failure of intelligence on Iraq resulted in an overhaul of intelligence services and a recognition that intelligence about a number of states of foreign policy concern was unreliable and of poor quality.

  Commentary in the US recognised that the potential for intelligence failure exists in respect to the Korean peninsula, mainly because of the alleged difficulties in obtaining reliable information and analysis of North Korean capabilities and intentions.

  The general concerns about intelligence weaknesses combined with the perceived failure of the U.S. government to make progress in either the denuclearisation of North Korea or of amelioration of human rights and humanitarian concerns has resulted in recent months in serious and relatively open debates in the institutions of government in the United States. These are taking place in Congress, the State department and the Intelligence agencies; as well as in the influential Washington DC-based think tanks and national media. The theme is how to break out of the current political impasse on Korea to achieve US goals and the international goal of peace and stability in North-east Asia.[121]

  For the United Kingdom, Korea is not the country of primary foreign policy interest in East Asia. China, Japan and to a lesser extent South Korea are of much more importance commercially. Politically and strategically the Korean nuclear crisis is understood, given the extensive US military and political interests in the region, as best left to United States leadership. As a result UK foreign policy positions in respect to Korea have, understandably, been dove-tailed rather closely with the governmental positions of the United States.

  UK activities have not, however, been identical with the activities of the United States. The UK established diplomatic relations with the DPRK in 1999 and has a resident ambassador in Pyongyang. The United States has not established diplomatic relations with the DPRK and has no direct channels through which it can officially communicate with the North Korean government. The Swedish embassy represents United States interests in the DPRK. The UK has a comparative advantage in working with the DPRK in that it has channels of communication to the government through its diplomatic presence that the United States does not. Thus far, however, the UK government has chosen to use these channels for information sharing rather than active diplomacy.

New data and analysis

  The "common knowledge" of the DPRK presented in the UK and international media is that this is a country of which nothing can be known. The conventional approach emphasises that normal analytical techniques cannot be used because of the absolute dearth of reliable information on which to found rigorous analysis. My own work (see bibliography) and that of policy analysts working for the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), the think-tank that advises the South Korean government on DPRK affairs, as well as the World Bank analysts working on the DPRK has demonstrated, however, that there is now enough material available on which to found substantive analysis and credible policy recommendations.

  There has been a major change in data accessibility on the DPRK since the early 1990s and the major reason for this is the country was forced to enter into substantial relations with international organisations, western governments and NGOs in the aftermath of the famine that occurred in the country in the mid-1990s. These organisations were more or less committed to principles of transparency and accountability and in order for the DPRK to obtain humanitarian and economic support the North Korean government also had to a certain extent to adopt these principles. Not all sectors of DPRK society have become more transparent—the workings of politics and government remain difficult to penetrate—but some sectors have become much less opaque, for instance the agriculture, nutrition, health and energy sectors have become very open indeed.

What does this information tell us about the security challenges of the Korean peninsula?

  Security analysis of the Korean peninsula has tended to focus on military challenges from the DPRK. The emphasis has been on coping with North Korea's alleged development of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons; its missiles development; the alleged potential for selling weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or components of WMD abroad; alleged links with terrorist groups and finally the potential threat from the large standing army of around one million people (of a population of around 24 million).

  The recent data available sheds light on these alleged threats but arguably, more significantly, allows us to re-orient our perceptions to take account of what might be more immediate and therefore more real threats to security on the Korean peninsula and therefore in the whole of North-East Asia. Immediate dangers include the risk of a nuclear accident in the DPRK; transnational crime and the unregulated marketisation now becoming institutionalised in the DPRK; and the continuing threats to lives and wellbeing for the vast majority of the North Korean population from hunger, poverty and joblessness—and, because of continuing chronic food deficits, the ever-present possibility of another famine.

  These latter sorts of dangers are sometimes termed "non-traditional" threats to security but this terminology belies their importance. They can be more a threat to regional and international security than military or "conventional" threats. A nuclear accident, for instance, would threaten more people in the DPRK and in the North-East Asia region as a whole with a more long-lasting deleterious outcome than that which would be the consequence of a limited conventional military action.

Nuclear weapons

  The extant evidence indicates that the DPRK has a nuclear research and development programme for nuclear energy and for weapons development. There is no evidence from any source that the DPRK possesses nuclear weapons. This is despite claims from US intelligence sources and the DPRK government that the DPRK possesses nuclear weaponry. This does not necessarily mean that the claims are not valid but it does mean that thus far there has been no independent corroboration of these claims. In most cases states are not understood as having a nuclear weapons capacity until and unless they have successfully tested such a weapon. The DPRK has not carried out such a test. Many South Korean sources remain skeptical over the DPRK's ability to carry out such a test—mainly because of the cataclysmic state of the economy that continues to suffer from an absence of all basic resources, including a regular source of electricity and uncontaminated and regular water supplies. The DPRK also continues to be without the industrial capacity to produce basic capital equipment.

  It is not clear what practical use a nuclear bomb would have for the DPRK as a weapon of war. The DPRK's foreign policy stance since the creation of the North Korean state in 1948 was primarily directed against South Korea and in support of unification of Korea on its own terms, if necessary by the use of force. Since 1999, however, North and South Korean governments have undergone a very rapid rapprochement and these days continue to engage in dialogue on economic, humanitarian, cultural, military and political matters almost on a day to day basis. In this vastly changed inter-Korean economic and political environment, it is not likely that North Korea would engage in offensive military action against South Korea.

  It is also difficult to see how the DPRK would justify using a nuclear bomb against those it sees as its own people in the South. Underpinning DPRK foreign policy objectives has been the philosophy that all Koreans belong to the same nation and race, only that the South Korean government is illegitimate. Neither could the nuclear fallout of any nuclear explosion in South Korea or anywhere in East Asia be separated geographically from the DPRK. North Koreans of all classes would suffer, including the leadership and their families.

  Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that the North would attempt to use a nuclear weapons against its adversaries, most specifically Japan or the United States, as this would result in annihilation of the North Korean regime given the heavy counter-attacks that would be made by the US and Japan. The DPRK has never shown any sign of expansionist tactics such that it would want to invade China or Japan, perhaps by using a nuclear bomb as an advance weapon. In practical terms it remains doubtful whether the DPRK has developed the actual capacity to launch a nuclear warhead using any of its current missile technology.

  It is likely therefore that the development of a nuclear weapon is either at the aspirational stage; or if developed is intended to be negotiated away in return for economic assistance.


  The DPRK has made advances in missile technology which for have allowed it to build and test missiles that can deliver a payload up to 500 kilometers. We know this because the DPRK has completed many successful test firings of these missiles. It has not been so successful however in developing medium and long range missiles. It has carried out only two tests of such missiles in the last twenty years; one on 1993 and one in 1998.  Given the parlous state of the economy and the lack of resource base in the civilian and the military sectors, it is unlikely that the DPRK has a stockpile of usable short-range, medium or long range missiles.

Chemical and biological weapons

  "Old" or worst-case analysis inferred from the demonstrable presence of factories designed to produce agricultural chemicals and fertiliser for the high energy intensive agriculture that is characteristic of DPRK farming, that these factories must be capable of dual use production of chemical and biological weapons and further that such weapons production and stockpiling must therefore be occurring. The sparse and uncorroborated testimony from a small number of defectors that might have given some credence to these inferences is very old and unreliable. Defector testimony in any society is always highly susceptible to exaggeration as individual defectors are under enormous pressure to demonstrate their usefulness to their new homeland. North Korean defector testimony, prior to the thawing of North-South Korean relations six years ago, was also routinely massaged by the South Korean intelligence services in order to support the image of the DPRK as an irrational and evil enemy.

  What the data that has become available to the international community over the past 10 years or more shows however is that much of the heavy industrial plant of the DPRK has been dismantled for scrap due to lack of energy supplies and other basic inputs; and that fertiliser and agricultural chemicals are hardly produced any more. Furthermore North Korea's relative agricultural recovery of the past two years is entirely dependent on transfers of South Korean fertiliser, supposedly on a loan basis but on such highly concessionary terms that no South or North Korean government official ever expects the North to pay back the South for these transfers. If the DPRK ever had a capacity to produce huge stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons we now know that it does not have this capacity today. Worst case scenarios based on out of date information about the North Korea economy combined with now also outdated and problematic defector testimony continue to provide, however, the foundations for western military and security analyst statements that the DPRK possesses a substantial chemical and biological weapons capacity.

Conventional forces and weaponry

  The North Korean army is a million strong. North Korean defence spending according to the figures from the London-based think tank, the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), show the DPRK's annual military spending at year 2000 at 2 billion US dollars. Such expenditure is dwarfed by its neighbours, -with Japan in the same year spending US$44 billion and South Korea US$12 billion. The US$ 95 per capita the DPRK spends on the armed forces covers food, clothing, housing, health supplies, as well as every aspect of what would normally come from a civilian infrastructure in a developed state—telecommunications, transport, food supplies and agricultural production, and industrial production for everything from weapons to clothing. IISS data assumed a formal exchange rate that in practice has been replaced by market rates since at least the mid-1990s. In 2000 the market rate for the won was conservatively 25 won per dollar and nearer 150 in practice—as compared to the 2.2 at the official rate. Taking the conservative market rate as the actual rate, DPRK per capita expenditure on its soldiers in 2000 was actually around US$8 a year. This expenditure is not enough to make for a powerful army.

  The DPRK possesses large amounts of artillery positioned close to the border with South Korea. This forward positioning as far as the South is concerned is defensive positioning as far as the DPRK is concerned, given that the South Korean border is just three hours travel by road from Pyongyang. North Korean conventional military hardware is old and probably rusting and suffering from lack of spare parts and inadequate maintenance, but there is no doubt that even a portion of this artillery could do considerable damage to Seoul and South Korea. This is the reason that South Korea maintains its military sending and has a policy of conventional deterrence against any conventional North Korean armed force attack. The South Korean armed forces possess modern armaments and a defence capacity that military analysts consider would be sufficient to defend the South against any attack from the North even without United States assistance.


  Despite its involvement historically in terrorist attacks against South Koreans such as the Rangoon bombing of South Korean politicians in 1983 and its alleged blowing up of a South Korean airline in 1987 as well as its abduction of thirteen Japanese civilians in the 1970s and early 1980s, the DPRK does not have any recent or current connections with global terrorism. Its dramatically improved relationship with South Korea since the June 2000 Summit in Pyongyang (when North and South Korean leaders met for the first time since the end of the Korean War in 1953) and its dependence on the South for economic and humanitarian assistance are also likely to preclude further such activities against the South.

  Similarly Kim Jong Il, the DPRK's head of state, has made an intensive effort to improve relations with Japan—resulting in two visits by Prime Minister Koizumi to the DPRK, an agreement to return Japanese hijackers residing in Pyongyang since the 1970s along with their families, and the return of the Japanese abductees and their families. The DPRK's non-involvement in terrorist activities was acknowledged by the Clinton Administration, which was in the process of taking the DPRK off its list of states that sponsor terrorism before it went out of office in 2001.

Non-traditional threats to regional peace and security from the Korean peninsula

  The real threats to regional security can best be understood as a product of the causal relationship between the economic devastation faced by the North Korean population since the early 1990s and the spill-over effects into neighbouring states of the rapid growth of unregulated primitive capitalism in the DPRK.

  The economic crisis that hit the DPRK in the early 1990s, with the loss of concessionary markets, cheap oil and technology transfers from the ex-communist states at the end of the Cold War is well-known. What is less reported is the consequent marketisation—without political liberalisation—that has taken place in the DPRK since the early 1990s. The state could no longer deliver food and basic goods before, during and after the food crisis of the 1990s, when nearly a million people died of starvation and malnutrition. The remaining 21 million survived through recourse to the primitive market that filled the economic allocation and distribution vacuum.

  The DPRK is now a nation of small and large business people. The state no longer provides enough for any member of the population to survive without individual entrepreneurship. Yet, at the same time, the state has not moved to create a regulatory framework to shape the workings of this mass of private economic activity. Thus there is little distinction between what is legal and what is illegal, what is legitimate and what is illegitimate. Corruption in this climate is simply a judgment made in terms of personal ethics. Everything is permissible as the legal system does not fully recognise—except in the very broad and basic legislation provided by the July 2002 "economic reforms"—that the foundations of the economic structure have been transformed.

Cross-border illegality and petty criminality

  One consequence of the DPRK's human security crisis is, as one North Korean residing in China told me in March 2005, "the rich are getting richer and the poor are getting poorer". The social safety net cherished under the Kim Il Sung development project has all but disappeared. Inequality and absolute poverty such as to keep the threat of starvation acute for probably the majority of North Koreans propel various kinds of crossborder illegality: economic migration to China, trafficking in women, armed robbery and night-time theft, and smuggling.

  The 30,000 or so North Koreans residing illegally in China are generally pushed into illegal migration by economic motives. Their actions are criminalised by both China and the DPRK, however, and they risk severe punishment on their return to the DPRK if they are considered to have been colluding with South Koreans and/or Christians in Yanbian, the border region that is home to China's Korean minority. Both groups are viewed by the North Korean authorities not as humanitarians, but as provocateurs whose major aim is to overturn the North Korean regime.

  Economic entrepreneurs make money out of trafficking girls and women as brides and prostitutes in north-east China—where single women are in short supply and where Chinese women are increasingly reluctant to enter into the hardships involved in rural living. So far, mainly small-scale cross-border operators have been responsible for the trafficking. Family, friends and local connections arrange the traffic—sometimes with connivance of the women. One North Korean woman who had introduced another to a Chinese man told me that "of course this is an insult to the woman and to the country [North Korea]. But it is better than living without food to eat."

  Another consequence of the country's continuing inability to feed its people and provide meaningful economic opportunities for its population is the general rise in crime in the country and, particularly important for regional stability, in the border area with China and Russia. Crime ranges from the nightly forays into China of North Koreans living near the border to steal food and supplies to the more sinister development of armed robberies on the Chinese side of the border. North Korean soldiers, for instance, robbed a bank in the border town of Tumen in north-east China last year and were caught by the Chinese police after they used the proceeds to buy and consume alcohol in China instead of immediately returning to the DPRK. Violent crime and property theft are carried out by small-scale operators and have not yet been linked to organized crime. Their prevalence is causing concern among local Chinese authorities, however, as they have caused a sharp increase in personal insecurity for local Chinese and Chinese Koreans.

  Widespread poverty and lack of internal regulation has generated widespread smuggling across the Chinese-North Korean border. Lumber is sold into China along with herbs and mushrooms. Smuggling is almost institutionalized with North Korean local authorities, businesses as well as individuals routinely carrying out cross-border trade in ways that aim to avoid Chinese and North Korean taxation.


  Transnational organised criminal gangs have taken advantage of the DPRK's human security crisis in that it is Chinese "snake-heads" or people smugglers who transport North Koreans from China to Seoul. This is a market-generated activity where the snake heads, who have the resources and contacts to make transnational operations between two and more countries possible, exchange their services with North Koreans who agree to pay a large part of the resettlement allowance they receive from the South Korean government once they are successfully located in Seoul.

  Incidentally there are clear gender dimensions to this transnational criminal market. The snake-heads prefer women clients as they consider that women are more likely to pay back the debt accrued. This may be the reason disproportionate numbers of women are turning up in Seoul among the latest waves of North Koreans who have actually reached South Korea.

The regional effects of technical meltdown

  The lack of internal regulatory capacity in the DPRK is not confined to economic legislation. The DPRK has no systematic technical arrangements for what is known in engineering parlance as "quality assurance" in any of its industrial or energy sectors. The major train crash in the DPRK in February 2004 that killed dozens of schoolchildren was as much due to the DPRK's inability to implement regularized safety procedures as it was to individual human error. This lack of capacity permeates all sectors. Its prevalence means that a nuclear accident is more likely than not given the recent resuscitation of the DPRK's nuclear reactors. The effects of a nuclear accident could not be confined to the DPRK: South Korea, China, Russia and Japan would suffer the consequences. A nuclear accident is a much more likely cause of a regional nuclear crisis than the launch of a nuclear weapon.

The balance of threat on the Korean peninsula

  "Old" security analysis tells part of the truth but it does so in such a way as to obscure other important truths. Conventional approaches reduce knowledge about complex security problems to a "one cause fits all" diagnosis that demonises the DPRK and makes it almost impossible to conceive of negotiating, let alone reaching any agreement, with such an irrational state. Conventional knowledge about the DPRK also presents worstcase scenarios as factual accounts. The conventional wisdom does anything but provide wise guidance for policy makers. Instead it exaggerates and skews data in such a way as to aggravate—rather than merely analyse—security tensions.

  On the military security front, it seems likely that the North has engaged in an intensive campaign of research and development of nuclear weapons to counter its conventional military weaknesses; including lack of military hardware and its insecurity as to the morale and effectiveness of its million strong military forces in the event of having to maintain a sustained military campaign. Its nuclear weaponry should be seen as a deterrence capability and also as negotiating leverage to have something to give away in return for assistance with economic development of the DPRK.

  The most immediate security threats emanating from the Korean peninsula and from the DPRK however arise from the tensions and contradictions of a society and state in economic and social transition without a resource base to underpin that transition or technical help from outside to help manage that transition.

Basing policy on new analysis

  Conventionally, security analyses of the DPRK has assumed that in the absence of reliable data about the politics and society of the country it is best to rely on worst-case assumptions about governmental capacities and intentions. Worst-case analysis is a perfectly legitimate exercise for military planners who must prepare for every eventuality.

  It is another matter, however when worst-case analysis is transposed as if it provide a factual base for political and social analysis. The new data and analysis now available to the careful analyst makes the necessity for substituting worst case analysis for rigorous evaluation of the data obsolete.

  UK policy planners should these days expect policy analysts to be able to chart change in DPRK domestic and foreign policies, at least since 1995 when the international community began to collect what are now huge amounts of DPRK data. Society and the economy in the DPRK today are explicable. The penal institutions for instance are exactly inherited from the 50 years of Japanese colonialism in the first half of the twentieth century. The legal system and philosophy is more or less modeled on the Soviet system. Cultural practices are almost identical to those in South Korea. Analysis of Korea that argues that the DPRK is unknowable is lazy and uninformed.

Recognising the dramatic changes in North-South Korean relations

  North and South Koran cooperation today takes place across different sectors of the economy and society. The North and South Korean military have jointly developed a plan to open up the heavily militarized and mined border between North and South such that a road has been built joining the two countries and a railway is also under construction. South Korea is the major provider of technology to the DPRK and along with China its major trade partner. In the nuclear crisis of 1993/1995, South and North Korea had little but the most formal and distant of communications. In 2006, North and South Korea have efficient methods of communication and the DPRK is progressively becoming entangled in a web of South-North Korea economic links that are essential for its economic redevelopment.

  There continues to be conflict over a number of different issues. The difference today is that there are numerous channels of dialogue through which conflict may be ameliorated and resolved.

The contribution of the UK government

  Fresh analysis allows us to look at potential policy interventions by foreign interlocutors including the UK government such as to respond to new challenges. More informed analysis would for instance permit the identification of possible common interests between the DPRK and the UK such as to facilitate diplomatic negotiations for peaceful settlement of outstanding disputes. Fresh analysis also allows for the identification of potential practical contributions by the UK government to the international goals of bringing stability to the Korean peninsula.

Technical assistance to promote the rule of law

  The UK has an interest in promoting human rights and the rule of law based on the principle of the individual having rights and protections over and against the state. The DPRK, as all the former communist states, has a legal system based upon protection of the interests of the state and the party over and above the rights of individual. We know, however, that since the mid-1990s the DPRK economy has been marketised (albeit without political liberalisation) and furthermore that the DPRK government understands that it cannot redevelop its economy without foreign capitalist investment. In these circumstances it is in the interests of the DPRK government, as it was for China some fifteen years ago, to adopt legal changes that would guarantee the independence of the legal system against the state so as to protect the interests of foreign investors.

  In China the consequences of the implementation of legal systems designed initially to encourage foreign investment has among other things resulted in increased civil liberties as individuals today are protected against the state by the same legal reforms originally designed to protect foreign business. Understanding the large changes in the economic organisation of society in the DPRK over the last 10 years can thus help engender new policy strategies for the UK government; in this case perhaps in a policy determination to provide technical assistance for legal reform in the DPRK.

Relations with the DPRK government

  Much more could be made of the diplomatic relations that have now existed between the DPRK and the UK for seven years. The DPRK embassy in London has been staffed with some of the DPRK's most senior and experienced diplomats who have excellent channels of communication to the most senior levels of the government in the DPRK. To date these channels have not been utilised by the FCO and provide somewhat of a wasted opportunity for UK diplomacy.

  Ambassador Ri Young Ho, the DPRK Ambassador to the UK, who is based in London, is one of the most senior of the DPRK diplomatic corps. Ambassador Ri was a senior negotiator for the DPRK in negotiations with the United States government during the first nuclear crisis of 1993-94.

  Minister Ri Si Hong, who has just left London after a two year positing, was the most senior North Korean official directly responsible for relations with the international organisation and NGOs from the beginning of the international presence in the DPRK I 1995 until he was posted to Britain.

  My suggestion would be for more intensive political interaction to take place with the DPRK embassy in London such as to promote and facilitate in any way possible the Six party talks on the Korean nuclear issue.

Technical assistance through UK educational institutions

  At the University of Warwick we ran a successful programme of academic exchange with policy analysts from the DPRK Ministry of foreign trade between 1999 and 2002.  We held and economic training workshop in Pyongyang and twice had visiting North Korean engaging in economic training at the University of Warwick. These small but fruitful exchanges were funded by FCO monies. These exchanges were built o the experience of this author in running for four years a British Council UK-China academic exchange network between 1993 and 1998.

  Subsequent to the nuclear crisis of 2002 all "development" monies were halted and funding was no longer available for our small educational exchange, despite the enormously positive feedback we had had on its achievements from the FCO and the DPRK government and enthusiasm from the University of Warwick to continue with the project.

  Having built contacts internally in the DPRK, we remain in the position of carrying out serious training workshops in factories in the DPRK for managers and entrepreneurs and of hosting qualified North Koreans with the requisite English skills at the University of Warwick for degree courses. These would include MBAs and MScs for engineers in quality assurance procedures as well as language and more general economics programmes.

  It has been argued that North Koreans do not have the requisite English language skills to study abroad. This is not our predominate experience of working with North Koreans. However we recognise the potential problem of language and have been ready to run two year programmes for qualified North Koreans; one year in English and one year in an MA/MSC programme.

  I continue to be asked by North Korean counterparts about the possibilities of North Korean students studying at Warwick. Due to lack of funding I am now redirecting potential North Korean students to universities in other countries that can provide funding.

  My suggestion is that the FCO and the British Council to promote a series of graduate student and professional exchanges with the DPRK similar to the successful exchanges promoted and funded by the British government with China between 1993 and 1998.  As with the China/UK exchanges these programmes should be led by academics and prospective students should be channeled through academic linkages.


  Hazel Smith—books and articles on the DPRK

  Hazel Smith, Hungry for Peace: International Security, Humanitarian Assistance and Social Change in North Korea (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005), pp 337.

  Hazel Smith, Asymmetric nuisance value: The border in China-Democratic People's Republic of Korea relations, in Timothy Hildebrandt (ed), Uneasy Allies: Fifty Years of China-North Korea Relations (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Asia Program Special Report, September 2003), pp 18-25.

  Hazel Smith, "The disintegration and reconstitution of the state in the DPRK" in Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff and Ramesh Thakur (eds), Making States Work (Tokyo: United Nations Press, 2005), pp 167-192

  Hazel Smith, "North Koreans in China: Defining the problems and offering some solutions" in Tsuneo Akaha and Anna Vassilieva (eds), Crossing National Borders: Human migration Issues in Northeast Asia (Tokyo: United Nations Press, 2005), pp 165-190.

  Hazel Smith, "Opening up" by default: North Korea, the Humanitarian community and the crisis, in Pacific Review, Vol 12 No 3, 1999, pp 453-478.

  Hazel Smith, Bad, Mad, sad or Rational Actor: Why the "securitisation" paradigm makes for poor policy analysis of North Korea, in International Affairs, Vol 76 No 1, January 2000, pp 111-132.

  Hazel Smith, La Corée du Nord vers l'économie de marché: faux et vrais dilemmas, in Critique Internationale, Paris, April 2002, pp 6-14.

  Hazel Smith, Overcoming Humanitarian Dilemmas in the DPRK, Special Report No 90, (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, July 2002), pp 16

  Hazel Smith, "Asymmetric nuisance value: The border in China-Democratic People's Republic of Korea relations", in Timothy Hildebrandt (ed), Uneasy Allies: Fifty Years of China-North Korea Relations (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Asia Program Special Report, September 2003), pp 18-25

  Hazel Smith, "North East Asia's regional Security Secrets: re-envisaging the Korean crisis", In Disarmament Forum, No 2, (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). 2005), pp 45-54.

  Hazel Smith, Crime and economic instability: the real security threat from North Korea and what to do about it, in International Relations of the Asia Pacific, Vol 5 No 2 2005, pp 235-249.

  Hazel Smith, "How South Korean means support North Korean ends: Crossed purposes in Inter-Korean cooperation", International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, Vol 14 No 2, 2005, pp 21-51.

  Hazel Smith, "Brownback's Bill will not help North Koreans", Jane's Intelligence Review, February 2004, pp 42-45.

  Hazel Smith, "Intelligence Matters: Improving Intelligence on North Korea", Jane's Intelligence Review, April 2004, pp 48-51

  Hazel Smith, "North Korean Migrants pose long-term challenge for China", Jane's Intelligence Review, June 2005, pp 32-35

  Hazel Smith, "North Korean Nuclear plant poses threat of Meltdown in North Korea", Jane's Intelligence Review, October 2005, pp 24-27

Hazel Smith

University of Warwick

16 April 2006

121   Much of this evidence is compiled from a series of recent publications identified in the bibliography. Back

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