Written evidence submitted by Hazel Smith,
Professor of International Relations, University of Warwick
EXAMINING THE
ISSUE OF
SECURITY AND
STABILITY ON
THE KOREAN
PENINSULA
The thrust of my submission to the committee
is that, given the openness in Washington DC to new ideas for
resolving the Korean conflict, and given the comparative advantage
of the UK with its diplomatic relations with the DPRK and its
long-standing relations of amity with the United States, the UK
should make more pro-active use of that comparative advantage
in promoting and assisting peace initiatives in North-east Asia.
The corollary of such an approach is that it
is also necessary for the UK and the FCO to engage in some fresh
analysis of the key security challenges on the Korean peninsula
and some re-thinking of what might be the levers of change. The
conclusion is that the UK government could engage in more imaginative
multilateral initiatives, including the initiation and support
of "backtrack" channels in support of the Six party
talks. My further suggestion is that such diplomacy should take
place in conjunction with another ally in the region, South Korea,
which currently is taking much of the initiative and bearing much
of the burden of keeping diplomacy alive in the interrelated nuclear,
security and humanitarian crisis which persists in respect of
DPRK relations with the rest of North-East Asia and which still
has the potential to spill over into hot conflict. This paper
also suggests some practical and immediate contributions that
could be made by the UK government in support of medium-term peace
initiatives.
The new mood in the United States
Governmental inquiries in the United States
into the failure of intelligence on Iraq resulted in an overhaul
of intelligence services and a recognition that intelligence about
a number of states of foreign policy concern was unreliable and
of poor quality.
Commentary in the US recognised that the potential
for intelligence failure exists in respect to the Korean peninsula,
mainly because of the alleged difficulties in obtaining reliable
information and analysis of North Korean capabilities and intentions.
The general concerns about intelligence weaknesses
combined with the perceived failure of the U.S. government to
make progress in either the denuclearisation of North Korea or
of amelioration of human rights and humanitarian concerns has
resulted in recent months in serious and relatively open debates
in the institutions of government in the United States. These
are taking place in Congress, the State department and the Intelligence
agencies; as well as in the influential Washington DC-based think
tanks and national media. The theme is how to break out of the
current political impasse on Korea to achieve US goals and the
international goal of peace and stability in North-east Asia.[121]
For the United Kingdom, Korea is not the country
of primary foreign policy interest in East Asia. China, Japan
and to a lesser extent South Korea are of much more importance
commercially. Politically and strategically the Korean nuclear
crisis is understood, given the extensive US military and political
interests in the region, as best left to United States leadership.
As a result UK foreign policy positions in respect to Korea have,
understandably, been dove-tailed rather closely with the governmental
positions of the United States.
UK activities have not, however, been identical
with the activities of the United States. The UK established diplomatic
relations with the DPRK in 1999 and has a resident ambassador
in Pyongyang. The United States has not established diplomatic
relations with the DPRK and has no direct channels through which
it can officially communicate with the North Korean government.
The Swedish embassy represents United States interests in the
DPRK. The UK has a comparative advantage in working with the DPRK
in that it has channels of communication to the government through
its diplomatic presence that the United States does not. Thus
far, however, the UK government has chosen to use these channels
for information sharing rather than active diplomacy.
New data and analysis
The "common knowledge" of the DPRK
presented in the UK and international media is that this is a
country of which nothing can be known. The conventional approach
emphasises that normal analytical techniques cannot be used because
of the absolute dearth of reliable information on which to found
rigorous analysis. My own work (see bibliography) and that of
policy analysts working for the Korea Institute for National Unification
(KINU), the think-tank that advises the South Korean government
on DPRK affairs, as well as the World Bank analysts working on
the DPRK has demonstrated, however, that there is now enough material
available on which to found substantive analysis and credible
policy recommendations.
There has been a major change in data accessibility
on the DPRK since the early 1990s and the major reason for this
is the country was forced to enter into substantial relations
with international organisations, western governments and NGOs
in the aftermath of the famine that occurred in the country in
the mid-1990s. These organisations were more or less committed
to principles of transparency and accountability and in order
for the DPRK to obtain humanitarian and economic support the North
Korean government also had to a certain extent to adopt these
principles. Not all sectors of DPRK society have become more transparent—the
workings of politics and government remain difficult to penetrate—but
some sectors have become much less opaque, for instance the agriculture,
nutrition, health and energy sectors have become very open indeed.
What does this information tell us about the security
challenges of the Korean peninsula?
Security analysis of the Korean peninsula has
tended to focus on military challenges from the DPRK. The emphasis
has been on coping with North Korea's alleged development of nuclear,
biological and chemical weapons; its missiles development; the
alleged potential for selling weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
or components of WMD abroad; alleged links with terrorist groups
and finally the potential threat from the large standing army
of around one million people (of a population of around 24 million).
The recent data available sheds light on these
alleged threats but arguably, more significantly, allows us to
re-orient our perceptions to take account of what might be more
immediate and therefore more real threats to security on the Korean
peninsula and therefore in the whole of North-East Asia. Immediate
dangers include the risk of a nuclear accident in the DPRK; transnational
crime and the unregulated marketisation now becoming institutionalised
in the DPRK; and the continuing threats to lives and wellbeing
for the vast majority of the North Korean population from hunger,
poverty and joblessness—and, because of continuing chronic
food deficits, the ever-present possibility of another famine.
These latter sorts of dangers are sometimes
termed "non-traditional" threats to security but this
terminology belies their importance. They can be more a threat
to regional and international security than military or "conventional"
threats. A nuclear accident, for instance, would threaten more
people in the DPRK and in the North-East Asia region as a whole
with a more long-lasting deleterious outcome than that which would
be the consequence of a limited conventional military action.
Nuclear weapons
The extant evidence indicates that the DPRK
has a nuclear research and development programme for nuclear energy
and for weapons development. There is no evidence from any source
that the DPRK possesses nuclear weapons. This is despite claims
from US intelligence sources and the DPRK government that the
DPRK possesses nuclear weaponry. This does not necessarily mean
that the claims are not valid but it does mean that thus far there
has been no independent corroboration of these claims. In most
cases states are not understood as having a nuclear weapons capacity
until and unless they have successfully tested such a weapon.
The DPRK has not carried out such a test. Many South Korean sources
remain skeptical over the DPRK's ability to carry out such a test—mainly
because of the cataclysmic state of the economy that continues
to suffer from an absence of all basic resources, including a
regular source of electricity and uncontaminated and regular water
supplies. The DPRK also continues to be without the industrial
capacity to produce basic capital equipment.
It is not clear what practical use a nuclear
bomb would have for the DPRK as a weapon of war. The DPRK's foreign
policy stance since the creation of the North Korean state in
1948 was primarily directed against South Korea and in support
of unification of Korea on its own terms, if necessary by the
use of force. Since 1999, however, North and South Korean governments
have undergone a very rapid rapprochement and these days continue
to engage in dialogue on economic, humanitarian, cultural, military
and political matters almost on a day to day basis. In this vastly
changed inter-Korean economic and political environment, it is
not likely that North Korea would engage in offensive military
action against South Korea.
It is also difficult to see how the DPRK would
justify using a nuclear bomb against those it sees as its own
people in the South. Underpinning DPRK foreign policy objectives
has been the philosophy that all Koreans belong to the same nation
and race, only that the South Korean government is illegitimate.
Neither could the nuclear fallout of any nuclear explosion in
South Korea or anywhere in East Asia be separated geographically
from the DPRK. North Koreans of all classes would suffer, including
the leadership and their families.
Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that the
North would attempt to use a nuclear weapons against its adversaries,
most specifically Japan or the United States, as this would result
in annihilation of the North Korean regime given the heavy counter-attacks
that would be made by the US and Japan. The DPRK has never shown
any sign of expansionist tactics such that it would want to invade
China or Japan, perhaps by using a nuclear bomb as an advance
weapon. In practical terms it remains doubtful whether the DPRK
has developed the actual capacity to launch a nuclear warhead
using any of its current missile technology.
It is likely therefore that the development
of a nuclear weapon is either at the aspirational stage; or if
developed is intended to be negotiated away in return for economic
assistance.
Missiles
The DPRK has made advances in missile technology
which for have allowed it to build and test missiles that can
deliver a payload up to 500 kilometers. We know this because the
DPRK has completed many successful test firings of these missiles.
It has not been so successful however in developing medium and
long range missiles. It has carried out only two tests of such
missiles in the last twenty years; one on 1993 and one in 1998. Given
the parlous state of the economy and the lack of resource base
in the civilian and the military sectors, it is unlikely that
the DPRK has a stockpile of usable short-range, medium or long
range missiles.
Chemical and biological weapons
"Old" or worst-case analysis inferred
from the demonstrable presence of factories designed to produce
agricultural chemicals and fertiliser for the high energy intensive
agriculture that is characteristic of DPRK farming, that these
factories must be capable of dual use production of chemical and
biological weapons and further that such weapons production and
stockpiling must therefore be occurring. The sparse and uncorroborated
testimony from a small number of defectors that might have given
some credence to these inferences is very old and unreliable.
Defector testimony in any society is always highly susceptible
to exaggeration as individual defectors are under enormous pressure
to demonstrate their usefulness to their new homeland. North Korean
defector testimony, prior to the thawing of North-South Korean
relations six years ago, was also routinely massaged by the South
Korean intelligence services in order to support the image of
the DPRK as an irrational and evil enemy.
What the data that has become available to the
international community over the past 10 years or more shows however
is that much of the heavy industrial plant of the DPRK has been
dismantled for scrap due to lack of energy supplies and other
basic inputs; and that fertiliser and agricultural chemicals are
hardly produced any more. Furthermore North Korea's relative agricultural
recovery of the past two years is entirely dependent on transfers
of South Korean fertiliser, supposedly on a loan basis but on
such highly concessionary terms that no South or North Korean
government official ever expects the North to pay back the South
for these transfers. If the DPRK ever had a capacity to produce
huge stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons we now know
that it does not have this capacity today. Worst case scenarios
based on out of date information about the North Korea economy
combined with now also outdated and problematic defector testimony
continue to provide, however, the foundations for western military
and security analyst statements that the DPRK possesses a substantial
chemical and biological weapons capacity.
Conventional forces and weaponry
The North Korean army is a million strong. North
Korean defence spending according to the figures from the London-based
think tank, the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS),
show the DPRK's annual military spending at year 2000 at 2 billion
US dollars. Such expenditure is dwarfed by its neighbours, -with
Japan in the same year spending US$44 billion and South Korea
US$12 billion. The US$ 95 per capita the DPRK spends on the armed
forces covers food, clothing, housing, health supplies, as well
as every aspect of what would normally come from a civilian infrastructure
in a developed state—telecommunications, transport, food
supplies and agricultural production, and industrial production
for everything from weapons to clothing. IISS data assumed a formal
exchange rate that in practice has been replaced by market rates
since at least the mid-1990s. In 2000 the market rate for the
won was conservatively 25 won per dollar and nearer 150 in practice—as
compared to the 2.2 at the official rate. Taking the conservative
market rate as the actual rate, DPRK per capita expenditure on
its soldiers in 2000 was actually around US$8 a year. This expenditure
is not enough to make for a powerful army.
The DPRK possesses large amounts of artillery
positioned close to the border with South Korea. This forward
positioning as far as the South is concerned is defensive positioning
as far as the DPRK is concerned, given that the South Korean border
is just three hours travel by road from Pyongyang. North Korean
conventional military hardware is old and probably rusting and
suffering from lack of spare parts and inadequate maintenance,
but there is no doubt that even a portion of this artillery could
do considerable damage to Seoul and South Korea. This is the reason
that South Korea maintains its military sending and has a policy
of conventional deterrence against any conventional North Korean
armed force attack. The South Korean armed forces possess modern
armaments and a defence capacity that military analysts consider
would be sufficient to defend the South against any attack from
the North even without United States assistance.
Terrorism
Despite its involvement historically in terrorist
attacks against South Koreans such as the Rangoon bombing of South
Korean politicians in 1983 and its alleged blowing up of a South
Korean airline in 1987 as well as its abduction of thirteen Japanese
civilians in the 1970s and early 1980s, the DPRK does not have
any recent or current connections with global terrorism. Its dramatically
improved relationship with South Korea since the June 2000 Summit
in Pyongyang (when North and South Korean leaders met for the
first time since the end of the Korean War in 1953) and its dependence
on the South for economic and humanitarian assistance are also
likely to preclude further such activities against the South.
Similarly Kim Jong Il, the DPRK's head of state,
has made an intensive effort to improve relations with Japan—resulting
in two visits by Prime Minister Koizumi to the DPRK, an agreement
to return Japanese hijackers residing in Pyongyang since the 1970s
along with their families, and the return of the Japanese abductees
and their families. The DPRK's non-involvement in terrorist activities
was acknowledged by the Clinton Administration, which was in the
process of taking the DPRK off its list of states that sponsor
terrorism before it went out of office in 2001.
Non-traditional threats to regional peace and
security from the Korean peninsula
The real threats to regional security can best
be understood as a product of the causal relationship between
the economic devastation faced by the North Korean population
since the early 1990s and the spill-over effects into neighbouring
states of the rapid growth of unregulated primitive capitalism
in the DPRK.
The economic crisis that hit the DPRK in the
early 1990s, with the loss of concessionary markets, cheap oil
and technology transfers from the ex-communist states at the end
of the Cold War is well-known. What is less reported is the consequent
marketisation—without political liberalisation—that
has taken place in the DPRK since the early 1990s. The state could
no longer deliver food and basic goods before, during and after
the food crisis of the 1990s, when nearly a million people died
of starvation and malnutrition. The remaining 21 million survived
through recourse to the primitive market that filled the economic
allocation and distribution vacuum.
The DPRK is now a nation of small and large
business people. The state no longer provides enough for any member
of the population to survive without individual entrepreneurship.
Yet, at the same time, the state has not moved to create a regulatory
framework to shape the workings of this mass of private economic
activity. Thus there is little distinction between what is legal
and what is illegal, what is legitimate and what is illegitimate.
Corruption in this climate is simply a judgment made in terms
of personal ethics. Everything is permissible as the legal system
does not fully recognise—except in the very broad and basic
legislation provided by the July 2002 "economic reforms"—that
the foundations of the economic structure have been transformed.
Cross-border illegality and petty criminality
One consequence of the DPRK's human security
crisis is, as one North Korean residing in China told me in March
2005, "the rich are getting richer and the poor are getting
poorer". The social safety net cherished under the Kim Il
Sung development project has all but disappeared. Inequality and
absolute poverty such as to keep the threat of starvation acute
for probably the majority of North Koreans propel various kinds
of crossborder illegality: economic migration to China, trafficking
in women, armed robbery and night-time theft, and smuggling.
The 30,000 or so North Koreans residing illegally
in China are generally pushed into illegal migration by economic
motives. Their actions are criminalised by both China and the
DPRK, however, and they risk severe punishment on their return
to the DPRK if they are considered to have been colluding with
South Koreans and/or Christians in Yanbian, the border region
that is home to China's Korean minority. Both groups are viewed
by the North Korean authorities not as humanitarians, but as provocateurs
whose major aim is to overturn the North Korean regime.
Economic entrepreneurs make money out of trafficking
girls and women as brides and prostitutes in north-east China—where
single women are in short supply and where Chinese women are increasingly
reluctant to enter into the hardships involved in rural living.
So far, mainly small-scale cross-border operators have been responsible
for the trafficking. Family, friends and local connections arrange
the traffic—sometimes with connivance of the women. One
North Korean woman who had introduced another to a Chinese man
told me that "of course this is an insult to the woman and
to the country [North Korea]. But it is better than living without
food to eat."
Another consequence of the country's continuing
inability to feed its people and provide meaningful economic opportunities
for its population is the general rise in crime in the country
and, particularly important for regional stability, in the border
area with China and Russia. Crime ranges from the nightly forays
into China of North Koreans living near the border to steal food
and supplies to the more sinister development of armed robberies
on the Chinese side of the border. North Korean soldiers, for
instance, robbed a bank in the border town of Tumen in north-east
China last year and were caught by the Chinese police after they
used the proceeds to buy and consume alcohol in China instead
of immediately returning to the DPRK. Violent crime and property
theft are carried out by small-scale operators and have not yet
been linked to organized crime. Their prevalence is causing concern
among local Chinese authorities, however, as they have caused
a sharp increase in personal insecurity for local Chinese and
Chinese Koreans.
Widespread poverty and lack of internal regulation
has generated widespread smuggling across the Chinese-North Korean
border. Lumber is sold into China along with herbs and mushrooms.
Smuggling is almost institutionalized with North Korean local
authorities, businesses as well as individuals routinely carrying
out cross-border trade in ways that aim to avoid Chinese and North
Korean taxation.
People-smuggling
Transnational organised criminal gangs have
taken advantage of the DPRK's human security crisis in that it
is Chinese "snake-heads" or people smugglers who transport
North Koreans from China to Seoul. This is a market-generated
activity where the snake heads, who have the resources and contacts
to make transnational operations between two and more countries
possible, exchange their services with North Koreans who agree
to pay a large part of the resettlement allowance they receive
from the South Korean government once they are successfully located
in Seoul.
Incidentally there are clear gender dimensions
to this transnational criminal market. The snake-heads prefer
women clients as they consider that women are more likely to pay
back the debt accrued. This may be the reason disproportionate
numbers of women are turning up in Seoul among the latest waves
of North Koreans who have actually reached South Korea.
The regional effects of technical meltdown
The lack of internal regulatory capacity in
the DPRK is not confined to economic legislation. The DPRK has
no systematic technical arrangements for what is known in engineering
parlance as "quality assurance" in any of its industrial
or energy sectors. The major train crash in the DPRK in February
2004 that killed dozens of schoolchildren was as much due to the
DPRK's inability to implement regularized safety procedures as
it was to individual human error. This lack of capacity permeates
all sectors. Its prevalence means that a nuclear accident is more
likely than not given the recent resuscitation of the DPRK's nuclear
reactors. The effects of a nuclear accident could not be confined
to the DPRK: South Korea, China, Russia and Japan would suffer
the consequences. A nuclear accident is a much more likely cause
of a regional nuclear crisis than the launch of a nuclear weapon.
The balance of threat on the Korean peninsula
"Old" security analysis tells part
of the truth but it does so in such a way as to obscure other
important truths. Conventional approaches reduce knowledge about
complex security problems to a "one cause fits all"
diagnosis that demonises the DPRK and makes it almost impossible
to conceive of negotiating, let alone reaching any agreement,
with such an irrational state. Conventional knowledge about the
DPRK also presents worstcase scenarios as factual accounts. The
conventional wisdom does anything but provide wise guidance for
policy makers. Instead it exaggerates and skews data in such a
way as to aggravate—rather than merely analyse—security
tensions.
On the military security front, it seems likely
that the North has engaged in an intensive campaign of research
and development of nuclear weapons to counter its conventional
military weaknesses; including lack of military hardware and its
insecurity as to the morale and effectiveness of its million strong
military forces in the event of having to maintain a sustained
military campaign. Its nuclear weaponry should be seen as a deterrence
capability and also as negotiating leverage to have something
to give away in return for assistance with economic development
of the DPRK.
The most immediate security threats emanating
from the Korean peninsula and from the DPRK however arise from
the tensions and contradictions of a society and state in economic
and social transition without a resource base to underpin that
transition or technical help from outside to help manage that
transition.
Basing policy on new analysis
Conventionally, security analyses of the DPRK
has assumed that in the absence of reliable data about the politics
and society of the country it is best to rely on worst-case assumptions
about governmental capacities and intentions. Worst-case analysis
is a perfectly legitimate exercise for military planners who must
prepare for every eventuality.
It is another matter, however when worst-case
analysis is transposed as if it provide a factual base for political
and social analysis. The new data and analysis now available to
the careful analyst makes the necessity for substituting worst
case analysis for rigorous evaluation of the data obsolete.
UK policy planners should these days expect
policy analysts to be able to chart change in DPRK domestic and
foreign policies, at least since 1995 when the international community
began to collect what are now huge amounts of DPRK data. Society
and the economy in the DPRK today are explicable. The penal institutions
for instance are exactly inherited from the 50 years of Japanese
colonialism in the first half of the twentieth century. The legal
system and philosophy is more or less modeled on the Soviet system.
Cultural practices are almost identical to those in South Korea.
Analysis of Korea that argues that the DPRK is unknowable is lazy
and uninformed.
Recognising the dramatic changes in North-South
Korean relations
North and South Koran cooperation today takes
place across different sectors of the economy and society. The
North and South Korean military have jointly developed a plan
to open up the heavily militarized and mined border between North
and South such that a road has been built joining the two countries
and a railway is also under construction. South Korea is the major
provider of technology to the DPRK and along with China its major
trade partner. In the nuclear crisis of 1993/1995, South and North
Korea had little but the most formal and distant of communications.
In 2006, North and South Korea have efficient methods of communication
and the DPRK is progressively becoming entangled in a web of South-North
Korea economic links that are essential for its economic redevelopment.
There continues to be conflict over a number
of different issues. The difference today is that there are numerous
channels of dialogue through which conflict may be ameliorated
and resolved.
The contribution of the UK government
Fresh analysis allows us to look at potential
policy interventions by foreign interlocutors including the UK
government such as to respond to new challenges. More informed
analysis would for instance permit the identification of possible
common interests between the DPRK and the UK such as to facilitate
diplomatic negotiations for peaceful settlement of outstanding
disputes. Fresh analysis also allows for the identification of
potential practical contributions by the UK government to the
international goals of bringing stability to the Korean peninsula.
Technical assistance to promote the rule of law
The UK has an interest in promoting human rights
and the rule of law based on the principle of the individual having
rights and protections over and against the state. The DPRK, as
all the former communist states, has a legal system based upon
protection of the interests of the state and the party over and
above the rights of individual. We know, however, that since the
mid-1990s the DPRK economy has been marketised (albeit without
political liberalisation) and furthermore that the DPRK government
understands that it cannot redevelop its economy without foreign
capitalist investment. In these circumstances it is in the interests
of the DPRK government, as it was for China some fifteen years
ago, to adopt legal changes that would guarantee the independence
of the legal system against the state so as to protect the interests
of foreign investors.
In China the consequences of the implementation
of legal systems designed initially to encourage foreign investment
has among other things resulted in increased civil liberties as
individuals today are protected against the state by the same
legal reforms originally designed to protect foreign business.
Understanding the large changes in the economic organisation of
society in the DPRK over the last 10 years can thus help engender
new policy strategies for the UK government; in this case perhaps
in a policy determination to provide technical assistance for
legal reform in the DPRK.
Relations with the DPRK government
Much more could be made of the diplomatic relations
that have now existed between the DPRK and the UK for seven years.
The DPRK embassy in London has been staffed with some of the DPRK's
most senior and experienced diplomats who have excellent channels
of communication to the most senior levels of the government in
the DPRK. To date these channels have not been utilised by the
FCO and provide somewhat of a wasted opportunity for UK diplomacy.
Ambassador Ri Young Ho, the DPRK Ambassador
to the UK, who is based in London, is one of the most senior of
the DPRK diplomatic corps. Ambassador Ri was a senior negotiator
for the DPRK in negotiations with the United States government
during the first nuclear crisis of 1993-94.
Minister Ri Si Hong, who has just left London
after a two year positing, was the most senior North Korean official
directly responsible for relations with the international organisation
and NGOs from the beginning of the international presence in the
DPRK I 1995 until he was posted to Britain.
My suggestion would be for more intensive political
interaction to take place with the DPRK embassy in London such
as to promote and facilitate in any way possible the Six party
talks on the Korean nuclear issue.
Technical assistance through UK educational institutions
At the University of Warwick we ran a successful
programme of academic exchange with policy analysts from the DPRK
Ministry of foreign trade between 1999 and 2002. We held and
economic training workshop in Pyongyang and twice had visiting
North Korean engaging in economic training at the University of
Warwick. These small but fruitful exchanges were funded by FCO
monies. These exchanges were built o the experience of this author
in running for four years a British Council UK-China academic
exchange network between 1993 and 1998.
Subsequent to the nuclear crisis of 2002 all
"development" monies were halted and funding was no
longer available for our small educational exchange, despite the
enormously positive feedback we had had on its achievements from
the FCO and the DPRK government and enthusiasm from the University
of Warwick to continue with the project.
Having built contacts internally in the DPRK,
we remain in the position of carrying out serious training workshops
in factories in the DPRK for managers and entrepreneurs and of
hosting qualified North Koreans with the requisite English skills
at the University of Warwick for degree courses. These would include
MBAs and MScs for engineers in quality assurance procedures as
well as language and more general economics programmes.
It has been argued that North Koreans do not
have the requisite English language skills to study abroad. This
is not our predominate experience of working with North Koreans.
However we recognise the potential problem of language and have
been ready to run two year programmes for qualified North Koreans;
one year in English and one year in an MA/MSC programme.
I continue to be asked by North Korean counterparts
about the possibilities of North Korean students studying at Warwick.
Due to lack of funding I am now redirecting potential North Korean
students to universities in other countries that can provide funding.
My suggestion is that the FCO and the British
Council to promote a series of graduate student and professional
exchanges with the DPRK similar to the successful exchanges promoted
and funded by the British government with China between 1993 and
1998. As with the China/UK exchanges these programmes should
be led by academics and prospective students should be channeled
through academic linkages.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Hazel Smith—books and articles on the
DPRK
Hazel Smith, Hungry for Peace: International
Security, Humanitarian Assistance and Social Change in North Korea
(Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005),
pp 337.
Hazel Smith, Asymmetric nuisance value: The
border in China-Democratic People's Republic of Korea relations,
in Timothy Hildebrandt (ed), Uneasy Allies: Fifty Years of China-North
Korea Relations (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Asia Program
Special Report, September 2003), pp 18-25.
Hazel Smith, "The disintegration and reconstitution
of the state in the DPRK" in Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff
and Ramesh Thakur (eds), Making States Work (Tokyo: United Nations
Press, 2005), pp 167-192
Hazel Smith, "North Koreans in China: Defining
the problems and offering some solutions" in Tsuneo Akaha
and Anna Vassilieva (eds), Crossing National Borders: Human migration
Issues in Northeast Asia (Tokyo: United Nations Press, 2005),
pp 165-190.
Hazel Smith, "Opening up" by default:
North Korea, the Humanitarian community and the crisis, in Pacific
Review, Vol 12 No 3, 1999, pp 453-478.
Hazel Smith, Bad, Mad, sad or Rational Actor:
Why the "securitisation" paradigm makes for poor policy
analysis of North Korea, in International Affairs, Vol
76 No 1, January 2000, pp 111-132.
Hazel Smith, La Corée du Nord vers l'économie
de marché: faux et vrais dilemmas, in Critique Internationale,
Paris, April 2002, pp 6-14.
Hazel Smith, Overcoming Humanitarian Dilemmas
in the DPRK, Special Report No 90, (Washington DC: United States
Institute of Peace, July 2002), pp 16
Hazel Smith, "Asymmetric nuisance value:
The border in China-Democratic People's Republic of Korea relations",
in Timothy Hildebrandt (ed), Uneasy Allies: Fifty Years of China-North
Korea Relations (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Asia Program
Special Report, September 2003), pp 18-25
Hazel Smith, "North East Asia's regional
Security Secrets: re-envisaging the Korean crisis", In Disarmament
Forum, No 2, (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament
Research (UNIDIR). 2005), pp 45-54.
Hazel Smith, Crime and economic instability:
the real security threat from North Korea and what to do about
it, in International Relations of the Asia Pacific, Vol
5 No 2 2005, pp 235-249.
Hazel Smith, "How South Korean means support
North Korean ends: Crossed purposes in Inter-Korean cooperation",
International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, Vol
14 No 2, 2005, pp 21-51.
Hazel Smith, "Brownback's Bill will not
help North Koreans", Jane's Intelligence Review, February
2004, pp 42-45.
Hazel Smith, "Intelligence Matters: Improving
Intelligence on North Korea", Jane's Intelligence
Review, April 2004, pp 48-51
Hazel Smith, "North Korean Migrants pose
long-term challenge for China", Jane's Intelligence
Review, June 2005, pp 32-35
Hazel Smith, "North Korean Nuclear plant
poses threat of Meltdown in North Korea", Jane's Intelligence
Review, October 2005, pp 24-27
Hazel Smith
University of Warwick
16 April 2006
121 Much of this evidence is compiled from a series
of recent publications identified in the bibliography. Back
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