Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 120-139)

MR NIGEL CHAPMAN AND MS ALISON WOODHAMS

9 NOVEMBER 2005

  Q120 Mr Horam: As of today, you do not have responsibility for any television as such?

  Mr Chapman: That is correct.

  Q121 Mr Horam: It would be useful if we could have a note about the BBC's television services by comparison. For example, you said you thought it had 60 million viewership?

  Mr Chapman: I know for a fact that is what the recorded viewership of BBC World is.

  Mr Horam: By comparison, for example, with CNN and Sky News, that would be very useful. Obviously we cannot talk to you about them, but that would be very useful.

  Q122 Chairman: You are going to move into an Arabic television service, which is going to be funded through grant-in-aid?

  Mr Chapman: Yes.

  Q123 Chairman: I think in your memo you refer to a possible Persian television service?

  Mr Chapman: That is correct.

  Q124 Chairman: How much would it cost?

  Mr Chapman: We have not costed it yet. In the memo there is a mixture of a hard-costed proposal, which is going to become fact, if you like, as a result of the 30 million investment plan I talked about earlier on, and then aspirations, gleams in the eye, which need to be part of the discussions with Government in the 2007 spending round, and Persian television is in the latter category, not the former.

  Q125 Chairman: Presumably, given recent events in Iran, you would hope that the Foreign Office would look favourably upon this?

  Mr Chapman: Looking not so much in the context of British foreign policy but as a broadcaster, if we believe that it is really important that people have access to free and independent media in societies, then, looking at it objectively, the position of Iran at the moment, you make out a very strong case for Britain improving what it can offer in that regard. You also then have to look at the role of radio and new media, and, as I explained earlier on, one of the difficulties about Iran is that the access the BBC can get, both in news-gathering terms but also in terms of transmitting its radio properly to Iran, is extremely difficult. The notion that I can get an FM transmitter for the BBC Persian service into Iran is a non-starter at the moment. One of the ways you would be able to reach into that society would be through satellite television, because many people in Iran, increasing numbers, have access to satellite television. It would be one of the ways of making sure they were able to access the BBC's material and services. That is the broadcasting logic. I must stress this. The proposals I put forward for 2010 are based on a broadcasting logic. People try and paint them as a foreign policy initiative. I am a broadcaster. I understand broadcasting. I know what we need to do to have impact in markets. I know what the mix should be between television, radio and new media. That is where I come from. Therefore, when I decide to close a service or open a new one that is the logic on which I am basing the argument, if you like, because I know how people consume and use information in modern times.

  Q126 Chairman: But such a service could not happen at least for two or three years in any case.

  Mr Chapman: No, it would not. It would have to be funded by new funds during a spending review outcome. There is a limit to how far the World Service can go in reprioritising its existing budget in order to meet new ambitious challenges which it has to face if it is going to be effective. I think we have come a long way. The 2010 proposals are a 20% reprioritisation of the budget to cover both the investment plan of £30 million and also rising costs over this two to three year period. For any organisation that is a challenge, that is a tough call. We can do it, but I cannot keep on doing it. I cannot keep on doing 20%, 20%, 20%. You will end up then with no services left over, and that would not be appropriate.

  Q127 Mr Horam: One of the original reasons, as I understand it, why the first attempt to establish an Arabic service failed was that it was in partnership.

  Mr Chapman: That is right, with Orbit, the Saudi based distributor, between 1994 and 1996.

  Q128 Mr Horam: You would not go down that route again?

  Mr Chapman: No. The Arabic television service is a publicly funded free-to-air service. The operation the BBC ran between 1994 and 1996 was a commercial partnership backed with Saudi funds via the Orbit company. A very different set of circumstances. I think we learned some lessons from what happened between 1994 and 1996 (the questions many of your colleagues were driving at earlier on) which was about editorial independence and making sure we could cover the sort of stories you want us to cover.

  Q129 Mr Horam: That was a serious problem?

  Mr Chapman: It was a very serious problem. The reason why the short-lived Arabic television experiment died in 1996 was because of a disagreement about the coverage of Saudi Arabia, and, as a result of that, the Orbit company decided to no longer fund the production/distribution costs of this service. The BBC had no alternative then but to close it. We have all learned lessons from history. One of the lessons I think we have all learned is that that is not an appropriate way to fund an Arabic television service for anybody, but particularly not the BBC, and therefore the way you do fund it is through public money. You distribute using a range of satellite services where you pay for your carriage and people have free-to-air access to it if they have a satellite dish, and then you start with the right building blocks to maintain a service over a long period of time; and that is the very fundamental difference between what happened between 1994 and 1996.

  Q130 Mr Horam: That does, of course, constrain your expansion. You failed in 1996?

  Mr Chapman: We did not fail in one sense in 1996. We actually had quite a significant audience arising from the services in 1994 to 1996. We failed in 1994 to 1996, if you want to call it failure, because we defended our editorial principles and values. I think that was the right thing to do, and I think if we had carried on with a television service whereby we put out programmes which were not true to the BBC's editorial values, we would have failed in the long-term because people would not have trusted it.

  Q131 Mr Horam: You can only maintain your editorial principles through grant-in-aid. Is that what you are saying?

  Mr Chapman: Yes, that is my view, because we have looked at alternatives, we have thought about whether we could have done a commercially funded Arabic television service, but we came to the conclusion that was not an appropriate way to go, for the reasons you are alluding to, which is that if you want editorial independence, if you want the sorts of stories that we feel we ought to do without fear or favour, if you have commercial partners you cannot do that because they then threaten you with pulling the plug on your funds and say that is not what you want us to cover, and that then undermines the whole basis of your operation.

  Chairman: I think none of us would want a BBC television service that was like the Fox News.

  Q132 Andrew Mackinlay: Can I come back, Chairman, because I am still not comfortable with the reply you gave me earlier. It seems to me that whereas, quite rightly, our domestic services are covered by the Charter and independence and so on, there is a different relationship when it comes to tax-payers' money running this proposed organisation. I have some attraction for this, but it does seem to me that very early on you are going to run up against a situation where you have two legitimate but conflicting positions: one is the journalists, the editorial independents, who say, "We must report this", and that action being not consistent with the interests of the United Kingdom politically, and so the relationship is different. This is where it is the United Kingdom politically providing the funds for this service, and it seems to me you are going to immediately run into conflict inevitably, but one can see both positions. You do pump out what your journalists say because they are professionals and professionals of that region. They say, "This is news. This is what we should, from the point of view of our professional journalism and transparency, push out." The Foreign Office says, or the British tax-payer says, "What the devil. Am I paying for this?"

  Mr Chapman: Mr Mackinlay, all I can say about that is that the World Service has managed to ride that particular tide.

  Q133 Andrew Mackinlay: Yes, but for television.

  Mr Chapman: Yes, but this service falls under the broadcasting agreement that the World Service has with the Foreign Office, and in the first few paragraphs of that it is absolutely clear that the editorial independence of the output is treasured and guaranteed. This service falls fairly and squarely within that and, therefore, it will have to subscribe to our relationship with the Foreign Office in exactly the same way as the radio services do now. There is no different set of relationships here. That is why I have confidence that the Foreign Office, our funders, will respect that editorial independence, as they have done in relation to radio for many years, and new media as well.

  Q134 Sir John Stanley: Can I come to Nepal. I have a non-pecuniary interest as Chairman of the Nepal Parliamentary Group. First of all, can I thank you very much for your letter, which will be circulated to all members of the Committee, clarifying the exchange I had with Sir Michael Jay, when he came before the Committee, as to the extent to which the Nepali language services were not being cut in Nepal.

  Mr Chapman: That is right.

  Q135 Sir John Stanley: Since then you probably will have seen the written answer which I had from Dr Howells on 31 October, which is in front of the Committee now. I am sure you would agree that Nepal, perhaps above almost all countries in the world at the moment, is vitally in need of independent access to news, given the huge extent of Maoist control over a large part of the country and given, in the non-Maoist areas, the action that has been taken by the king and his government since 1 February this year to jam, most regrettably, a number of Nepali language services, and we now have the new media ordinance, which has just been promulgated. The question I would like to put to you is this. Is the Committee correct in assuming that all the cuts so far in Nepali language news services in Nepal are attributable to actions by the government and that there have been no actions by the BBC World Service to reduce their output?

  Mr Chapman: Absolutely correct.

  Q136 Sir John Stanley: Can I ask you almost the reciprocal question: given the huge needs in Nepal, is there anything further that you can do to increase access to BBC World Service news in Nepali in particular but also possibly also in the English language in that country?

  Mr Chapman: We did mount some extra programmes earlier this year when all the FM distribution in Nepali was curtailed by the king. We put forward extra short wave programmes in the morning to supplement those which we put out normally in the evening which are carried by the FM transmitters in Kathmandu and other parts of the country. We then stopped doing them because the situation eased and we got back to the status quo, if you like, whereby our partners in Nepal were able to carry the traditional durations, if you like: the evening programmes of our Nepali service. The Nepali service is a very small service. It has four people. It is a tiny service. It works extremely hard and effectively and I would pay tribute to them; I think they have done a fantastic job. The last thing on my mind is to cut them back—if anything, I want to strengthen them—and I am watching the situation very closely. If the situation turns to one where no FM rebroadcasting is possible of a Nepali service, either by Nepal radio or by our partners in other parts of the country, I will look very hard at reinstigating the extra programme that we put on earlier this year. It is a flexing position, we need to be variable about it, but the changes in the 2010 proposals are nothing to do with the Nepali service. The Nepali service—I absolutely take your central tenet—is a very important service for the people of Nepal in a society which is deprived of free and independent information, it is close to my heart and I am going to make sure it remains a strong service.

  Q137 Sir John Stanley: Could you tell us what assessment you have made as to the impact on the BBC World Service both in the English language and in the Nepali language of the Government's media ordinance that was promulgated last month?

  Mr Chapman: It is hard to provide precise figures about that. I take some comfort from the fact that something like 700,000 of the 800,000 audience for Nepali came through short wave, so that short wave was not interrupted by the ordinance, but I suspect that there was a growing audience coming through the FM distribution which has been strangled, if you like, because people cannot hear those programmes on FM at the moment. We have made representations about this. The English output is audible for the main in Kathmandu on FM, although there are times when bulletins are interrupted because there are certain items, particularly, I suspect, reporting on Nepal, that the authorities do not like people to listen to. The Nepali service, unfortunately, is not as widely available on FM as I would like it to be at the moment. It is available on some stations, but not on others. We carry on the fight to make sure that it is audible, and I very much hope that our partners will win their battle to make sure the BBC World Service can be heard on FM right across the country.

  Sir John Stanley: If you have any further information you want to give to the Committee as to the impacts of the media ordinance on the incidence of jamming that is continuing to take place, we would be grateful to have a note on it.[3]

  Q138 Mr Mackay: Mr Chapman, clearly you have got a very serious responsibility to protect your staff wherever they are stationed. Nevertheless, it was obviously deeply disappointing and regrettable that, due to harassment (and worse) of staff in Tashkent, you have had to suspend your operation in Uzbekistan. I wonder if you could tell us a little bit more about what happened and also give us an indication of when you might hope to resume service in Tashkent?

  Mr Chapman: We continue to provide services in Uzbek to the people of Uzbekistan through short wave, and medium wave distribution, so if you are a listener there, you are getting a basic service from us still, but, obviously, the degree to which we can report events inside that country is severely restricted at the moment. I could not have confidence, in the light of conversations going on at the moment, that the situation is going to get much better quickly. The BBC has a correspondent from London based in Tashkent at the moment on a temporary visa, and he is going about his business and reporting events there, but that is not a long-term relationship necessarily. It could be, but it may not be, depending on the authority's attitude. They may decide that they do not want him to stay or they do not want to give a replacement visa to somebody else, and then, of course, we would have nobody there reporting for the English output. In terms of the Uzbek staff, there were in the region of 12-15 Uzbek staff at various times based in the country. As a result of the harassment, which is exactly the right word, and the intimidation they have suffered for their reporting, we are in the position now where there will be effectively no Uzbek staff based there who can report for the BBC. They will either have to leave for their own safety, or they have resigned, or whatever. They just do not feel able to carry on, and they are having to keep an extremely low profile at the moment. Some of the things that have been said about the way our staff have behaved are a disgrace, in my view. The notion that we sent staff into Uzbekistan to ferment discord, or, that we had some prior knowledge of the events that were going to take place in other parts of the country when the protests took place against the government is nonsense. They were people based there going about their legitimate business. They were training staff. The reason there were slightly more people there than normal is that they were training and recruiting staff, and the authorities have added two and two and made 16, and the 16 is that they were there to ferment discord and report matters unfairly. What the state prosecutor said about the BBC Uzbek service is completely untrue and extremely unfair, and it is very damaging in the sense that it is personally damaging to both the people who came from London to report on events there and have had to come home, and, more importantly, the Uzbek staff who are based there, whom I have a great deal of concern for their own personal safety; and one of the reasons why we cannot carry on with them doing that reporting is because it exposes them to attack, harassment and intimidation which would not be a fair thing to ask them to do. However much I believe in the principles of freedom of journalism, there come a point where you cannot allow people to be in that position, and, despite having raised it with the President—I have raised it with the ambassador here in written correspondence—the answer I get back is that there is not a problem with this. Well, I am sorry, there is a very serious problem with this and it has meant that we are unable to carry out the extent of reporting that I would like to see the World Service do in Uzbekistan.

  Q139 Mr Mackay: That was an extremely helpful response, and I hope it goes without saying that this Committee is hugely sympathetic to your plight in Uzbekistan and I think we would appreciate, if it was possible, you keeping us informed of developments in writing. Meanwhile, as this increasingly vile regime continues, a regime of which many of us have a great deal of concern, I would be interested finally to hear from you what pressure the Foreign Office and ministers and the Foreign Secretary are putting on their opposite numbers in Tashkent to ensure that matters are righted as quickly as possible?

  Mr Chapman: I would have to offer you a note on that, because while they are clearly aware of the position, I am not precisely aware of how many meetings they have had with whom about it in recent times, but I am confident they share our concern about it, and the matter has been raised by the BBC and by other people. The difficulty I have is that the authorities there do not really recognise it as an issue.

  Mr Mackay: I think we feel that the relationship between our government and the vile regime in Tashkent is not entirely satisfactory, and I do not mean to draw you on that and you do not need to comment, but, in that context, it is very important that we do have a note on that, as you have just promised, so that we can put further pressure on ministers to act in your interests in Tashkent. Thank you.


3   Please refer to the supplementary note provided by the BBC World Service, Ev 72 Back


 
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