MEMORANDUM ON INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM AND THE INTERNATIOAL RESPONSE
By
PAUL WILKINSON*
Professor of International Relations,
Chairman of the Advisory Board
For the Centre for the Study
of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV)
University of St Andrews
Is Al Qaeda Still an Organisation?
1. Al Qaeda is a transnational
movement of 'ism' rather than a traditional highly centralised
and tightly controlled terrorist organisation. Its worldwide network
of networks is bound together with a shared ideology, strategic
goals, modus operandi and fanatical hatred of the US and other
Western countries, Israel, and the government of the regimes of
Muslim countries which Al Qaeda's leaders accuse of being 'apostates'
on the grounds that they 'betray' the 'true Islam' as defined
by bin Laden
2. This network of networks
consisting of affiliated groups, operational cells and support
networks in over 60 countries gives the Al Qaeda movement a greater
global reach than any previous international terrorist network.
It also provides Al Qaeda with the flexibility and resilience
to adapt and sustain its global jihad in spite of the many severe
blows the movement has suffered. Al Qaeda's core leadership, communication
and training capabilities suffered major disruption and damage
when the Taleban regime in Afghanistan, which had provided Al
Qaeda with safe haven, was overthrown in autumn 2001. Since 9/11,
15 leading Al Qaeda militants have been captured or killed, and
over 3,000 suspected Al Qaeda followers have been arrested or
detained. Moreover, millions of pounds of Al Qaeda assets have
been frozen in the banking system. Yet despite all these setbacks
the movement has continued to recruit and raise more funds worldwide
and to commit atrocities such as the bomb attacks in Madrid and
London, massive suicide bombings in Iraq and the beheading of
hostages.
3. It is a dangerous illusion
to assume that because Al Qaeda's core leadership does not carry
out the detailed planning, organisation and implementation of
all the attacks carried out in its name the movement no longer
exists or has a purely marginal role. Bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri
provide the crucial ideological leadership and strategic direction
of the movement. It is they who inspire new recruits to join the
global jihad and to be ready to sacrifice their lives as suicide
bombers for the cause. Al Qaeda videotapes and websites demonstrate
the great importance they attach to propaganda. Recently they
have expanded into broadcasting their own news programme called
Voice of the Caliphate which attempts to use world events
to put over their movements' perverted doctrines. Al Qaeda's leaders
are well aware that they cannot rely on the mosques as the sole
channel for spreading their ideas. Clear evidence that they continue
to win the hearts and minds of those who are attracted to joining
Al Qaeda affiliated and cells around the world is the way the
websites of these affiliated groups swiftly claim the Al Qaeda
connection in their claims of responsibility for attacks, and
the Al Qaeda core leadership are so quick to claim 'ownership'
for successful attacks. However, there are some clear risks involved
in this decentralised network of networks structure. What happens
if there is a schism over strategy and tactics between leadership
and one of the affiliated? And what happens if a splinter group
challenges the leadership by defying its decrees? From what we
know of Al Qaeda's core leadership we can assume that they simply
do not have the manpower and weapons to suppress of overrule the
breakaway group. Another possible implication of the loose structure
of the Al Qaeda Network is that they may no longer be able to
plan and execute complex coordinated spectacular attacks on the
lines of 9/11, through some experts dispute this.
Aims, Capabilities and
Plans
4. The main aims of the Al
Qaeda movement are:
- to eject the US and its allies
from the Middle East and all Muslim lands;
- to overthrow existing Muslim
governments/regimes, on the grounds that they are 'Apostate' regimes
which betray the cause of the true Islam, as defined by bin Laden
and Zawahiri; and
- ultimately to establish a
pan-Islamist Caliphate to bring all Muslims under the rule of
an Islamist super-state.
5. Al Qaeda believes that
the use of the weapon of mass casualty terrorism and the belief
that Allah is 'on their side' will ensure that they win ultimate
victory. The aim of killing as many of their 'enemy' including
civilians, wherever and whenever the opportunity arises was spelt
out in bin Laden's notorious Fatwa of February 1998. It is Al
Qaeda's explicit commitment to mass-killing, so horrifically demonstrated
in its 9/11 attacks, that make it by far the most dangerous terrorist
network in the modern world.
6. What do we know of Al
Qaeda's capabilities? The key resource for any terrorist
organisation is its membership and their level of commitment,
training, expertise and experience. In attack after attack Al
Qaeda's network of networks has proved its ability to deploy large
numbers of operatives and to recruit more than sufficient new
members to replace those lost by capture and death in suicide
bombing or in armed confrontations with security forces. We should
remember that it only takes relatively small numbers to carry
out attacks which can kill thousands and inflict severe economic
damage and disruption. The 9/11 attacks were carried out by 19
suicide hijackers and a support network of a handful of people.
There is no evidence that the movement is unable to obtain the
funds and explosives it needs to carry out major coordinated mass-killing
suicide bombing attacks. There is overwhelming evidence from a
whole series of police investigations into Al Qaeda movement activities
that the local networks are not only carrying out the planning
and execution of operations: they are in most cases raising the
cash to fund such operations and obtaining the explosives and
other materials and vehicles or other equipment through thefts,
corruption and organised crime in their own areas. However, although
small scale terrorist bombing is a very low cost activity for
the local networks the cost of mounting a coordinated mass-casualty
attack may well be beyond the resources of a local network, and
hence shortage of funds may act as a significant barrier
to mounting more spectacular attacks. It has been estimated that
the 9/11 attacks cost Al Qaeda around $500,000. At that time this
was well within the financial capabilities of Al Qaeda's core
leadership. It is unlikely that they would find it so easy to
fund such a massively lethal and destructive series of attacks
today. The freezing of Al Qaeda assets in the banking system has
not been extensive enough though to deprive the Al Qaeda of all
its resources but It has compelled the terrorist leadership to
rely more than ever on local networks for the resources to carry
out local attacks.
7. By far the more important
capability for carrying out local attacks is the availability
of expertise, especially in bomb making, operational planning
and tactics. The Al Qaeda network's supply of well-trained and
experienced terrorist operatives has been enormously increased
as a result of the field experience provided in the Iraq conflict.
Foreign terrorists who have been involved with the Al Qaeda Jihad
in Mesopotamia led by the Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, are
now able to return to their countries of origin, including the
EU member states, battle hardened and with skills acquired and
honed in Iraq. It is also noteworthy that in recent weeks we have
seen tactics methods copied from the terrorist campaign in Iraq
being used in Afghanistan by Taleban and Al Qaeda- linked groups
and their Afghan warlord allies to attack. For example the terrorists
have rammed a vehicle carrying British personnel with a vehicle
packed with explosives. In another close parallel with Iraq the
terrorists have also started to mount attacks on recruits to the
newly-established Afghan Army.
8. It is possible to obtain
a clear idea of the Al Qaeda leadership's long-term strategy from
their writings. Zawahiri's Knights Under the Prophet's Banner,
for example, stresses the importance they attach to the dual strategy
of seeking to establish control over a base area within the heart
of the Muslim world while at the same time carrying the struggle
to the homelands of the US and its allies. The US military has
just announced that they have recently intercepted a letter from
Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Head of Al Qaeda in Iraq. Zawahiri
is confident that Al Qaeda will gain a victory in Iraq, and sees
this as the first step, the setting up of a Caliphate initially
in Iraq, but followed by waging Jihad in Syria, Lebanon, Egypt,
finally leading on to the destruction of Israel. The US Department
of Defence is convinced that his document is genuine, and, if
so, it provides an interesting glimpse of Al Qaeda's strategic
plans. The letter also reveals evidence of divisions within the
global Al Qaeda network. Zawahiri warns that Zarqawi's particularly
cruel measures such as the mass killing of Shia Muslims and the
beheading of hostages may alienate public opinion in the Muslim
world. If this letter is genuine, as the American government believes,
it confirms that the core leadership is unable to control all
activities carried out in the name of Al Qaeda. It also confirms
the point made earlier re schisms: such a major split on questions
of tactics suggests the possible development of deeper and more
lasting splits in the movement.
9. As for plans for specific
operations, alas we do not have adequate human intelligence on
the precise intentions of the operational planners, cell leaders
and support networks. However, we can learn from the investigations
carried out by police and judicial bodies into previous attacks
successful and failed, in order to learn more about their modus
operandi. We know enough from the case history to understand the
care and sophistication Al Qaeda network groups use to plan attacks.
A vivid example was the information found on an Al Qaeda laptop
computer captured in Pakistan which showed that the operations
planners were closely examining not only the details of the security
provided for key financial targets they planned to attack in the
US, but also the precise structure of the buildings in order to
decide on the type and strength of explosives to use. It is typical
of the Al Qaeda network to engage in detailed reconnaissance and
intelligence gathering in preparation for any major operation.
How the Iraq Factor has
been Exploited by the Al Qaeda Movement
10. One of the most significant
developments in the evolution of Al Qaeda since 2003 has been
the way the movement has exploited the allied invasion and occupation
of Iraq. Whatever view one may take on the decision to invade
Iraq it is simply ignoring reality to deny that the invasion and
occupation have been a big boost for Al Qaeda and a setback for
the coalition against terrorism. The invasion was a propaganda
gift to Al Qaeda because they could portray it as an unprovoked
imperialistic attack on a Muslim land. Al Qaeda poses as the defender
of Muslim lands and people everywhere. They used this as a recruiting
sergeant and as an opportunity for fund raising for their global
jihad. Moreover the conflict provided a rich concentration of
US and other western military and civilian targets in a country
which the militants could enter all too easily across virtually
uncontrolled borders. As this fragile experiment in establishing
a democratic government moved forward in Iraq, Al Qaeda has a
growing incentive to attack because the last thing they wish to
see in Iraq, or anywhere else in the Muslim world, is the successful
establishment of a democratic political system. Having failed
to prevent the free elections in January 2005 they are now desperate
to disrupt the efforts to secure and agreed democratic constitution
for Iraq and to provoke an all out civil war between the Sunnis
and the Shiite majority. This is what the brutal Al Qaeda bomb
attacks on Shiite civilians and clerics are designed to achieve.
11. It is absurd to suggest
that recognising the way Al Qaeda has exploited the war in Iraq
to its own considerable advantage in some way 'excuses' Al Qaeda's
terrorism. In my view there can never be an excuse for the use
of terrorism, whoever the perpetrators. Terrorism involves the
deliberate mass murder and injury of civilians and is a crime
against international law and humanity. However, understanding
more about the motivation of terrorists and how they are
attracted into extremist groups and groomed to be suicide bombers,
is a vital subject for research. 'Know thine enemy' has always
been a key maxim of successful strategists. How are we to unravel
the Al Qaeda if we do not understand what makes them tick? Nor
should we overlook unforeseen consequences of foreign policy decision-making,
especially when the key decision are taken by a more powerful
ally which may also have failed to anticipate and plan for the
implications of their policy for the struggle against international
terrorism.
International Efforts to
Combat Al Qaeda Terrorism
12. In spite of the setbacks
in the struggle against Al Qaeda described above there have been
some very positive developments in the international response
which need to be taken into account if we are to get a more balanced
assessment:
- In spite of deep divisions
among members of the Coalition Against Terrorism over the invasion
of Iraq international intelligence cooperation in counter-terrorism
especially at the bilateral level, has continued to improve. For
example, Spain, France and Germany have continued to cooperation
closely with the United States in sharing intelligence on the
Al Qaeda network despite their opposition ot Washington's policy
in Iraq.
- EU member states (especially
Spain, Germany, France and the UK) have shown considerable success
in using their criminal justice systems to try persons suspected
of involvement in Al Qaeda linked terrorism. The US government's
apparent determination to circumvent their own highly-respected
Federal Criminal Court system and to resort to detention without
trial for terrorist suspects is baffling and deeply damaging to
America's reputation as a champion of democracy and the rule of
law.
- One of the most encouraging
developments in international response has been the un-dramatic
but vital work of capacity building in the developing countries,
for example the assistance programme of the FCO in disseminating
expertise in anti-terrorism law, policing and intelligence work
and the work of the international agencies such as ICAO, IATA
and ACI in enhancing aviation security and of IMO in maritime
security.
- The valuable progress in
counter-terrorism made by the EU following the Madrid and London
bombings for example through the Europe Arrest Warrant mechanism,
and the enhanced intelligence sharing and judicial cooperation
procedures through EUROPOL, SITCEN, and EUROJUST. This cooperation
provides a useful model for other regional IGO's and it is particularly
encouraging that the UK has take a very useful role during the
British Presidency to further enhance the EU cooperation in this
key field.
Major Weaknesses in the
International Response to Terrorism
13. If asked to pinpoint
major weaknesses in the international response to terrorism I
would stress four massive problems:
- In view of Al Qaeda's serious
efforts to acquire CBRN weapons much more intensive efforts are
required to tighten and police the international arms control
and counter-proliferation regimes to enable them to encompass
prevention of proliferation to non-state groups. Far more than
changes in international treaties is required. We urgently need
powerful international agencies to police such regimes.
The IAEA is an encouraging, though far from perfect model. We
need to build similar mechanisms to deal with chemical and biological
weapons.
- Many governments still show
a lack of political will and courage to take an unambiguous stand
against terrorism whoever the perpetrators and whatever their
self-professed cause. There are no good terrorists. Terrorism
is a brutal attack on the most basic human right of all , the
right to life. It should be outlawed and suppressed wherever it
occurs. Until this happens we will continue to see more atrocities
like the 9/11 attacks, the Beslan school massacre, the Bali bombings,
the Madrid and London bombings and hundreds of other acts of mass
murder.
- There has been a tragic failure
to wage the battle of ideas against the extremists who preach
hatred and incite people to commit terrorism. All democratic governments,
including our own have a special responsibility to actively promote
democratic values, the role of law and human rights. Moreover
this cannot simply be accomplished by radio and TV programmes
and political speeches. Action counts far more than words in the
difficult world of upholding democratic values and human rights.
If the behaviour of democratic states flatly contradicts our stated
values we lose our credibility in the battle of ideas worldwide.
- Closely interwoven with the
battle of ideas against the promoters and preachers of terrorism
is the struggle to uphold basic human rights. While it is true
that some extreme human rights campaigners elevate human rights
into a totally impractical and irresponsible rejection of all
collective moral and political obligations that make the enjoyment
of human rights possible, most citizens of democracies and many
who are working to democratise their countries would be shocked
if we were told that some of our most cherished civil liberties
(e.g. habeas corpus, the right to a fair trial, freedom of speech,
freedom of religion, freedom of movement, freedom of assembly,
freedom of expression), were to be suspended in the name of state
security. If we throw away our basic liberties in the name of
dealing with the terrorism threat we will have done the terrorists'
work for them.
Conclusion
14. As Joseph S. Nye, Yukio
Satoh and I recommended in our Trilateral Commission report Addressing
the New International Terrorism (May 2003):
"Dialogues about the protection
of civil liberties in the face of security threats should be a
regular feature of the meetings of the home security officials
and should be reinforced by meetings of judicial officials and
parliamentarians. Assistance programmes must include attention
of human right issues. Not only are such values central to the
definition of the civilisation that we seek to protect, but overreactions
to insecurity that infringe civil liberties undercut the sort
of attractive power that is essential to maintain the support
of moderate opinion and to deprive terrorists from recruiting
new converts".
15. I can assure the Committee
that it is my firm belief that we can succeed in unravelling the
Al Qaeda network without undermining our civil liberties in the
process.
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