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UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL EVIDENCE To be published as HC 573-ii House of COMMONS MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE Foreign Affairs Committee
Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism
Monday 24 October 2005 MR JACK STRAW MP, MR DAVID RICHMOND and DR PETER GOODERHAM Evidence heard in Public Questions 55 - 141
USE OF THE TRANSCRIPT
Oral Evidence Taken before the Foreign Affairs Committee on Monday 24 October 2005 Members present Mike Gapes, in the Chair Mr Fabian Hamilton Mr John Horam Mr Eric Illsley Mr Paul Keetch Mr Andrew Mackay Andrew Mackinlay Mr John Maples Sandra Osborne Mr Greg Pope Mr Ken Purchase Ms Gisela Stuart Richard Younger-Ross ________________ Witnesses: Mr Jack Straw, a Member of the House, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Mr David Richmond CMG, Director General Defence and Intelligence, and Dr Peter Gooderham, Director Middle East and North Africa, examined. Q55 Chairman: Good afternoon everybody. This session gives us an opportunity to question the Foreign Secretary and senior officials about the foreign policy aspects of the war on terrorism. We are very pleased to have you before us, Jack, I know you have been travelling across the Atlantic, no doubt that might come up at some point in our questioning. Can I just ask you briefly to introduce your two colleagues? Mr Straw: On my left is David Richmond, who is Director-General Defence and Intelligence and on my right is Peter Gooderham who is Director Middle East and North Africa. Q56 Chairman: Thank you very much. If I can begin by asking about the current increase in terrorist attacks both in this country and worldwide. We have just got news of these appalling bombings in Iraq today. It is clear to us, and we had evidence last week from Peter Taylor and Professor Paul Wilkinson, that the fight against international terrorism is going into a new phase and is probably more difficult. Could you tell us, do you think we are winning in this fight against international terrorism and have things changed since the period around 9/11 to the current situation? Mr Straw: First of all, we have just had news of this bombing of a hotel in Baghdad, one which is used by journalists. The fact that there appear to have been at least 15, if not many more, fatalities indicates the indiscriminate nature of these terrorists, who really do not mind who they kill provided they kill somebody in the name of a totally perverted ideology. It is a further illustration of the evil which we are dealing with. I do not want to use the phrase that you used and it will be for historians to judge whether we have been successful in this overall fight. What I do believe is that the strategy which we have embarked on - which is dealing directly with terrorism in this country and anywhere else - where we have a direct involvement, indirectly by international engagement and sharing of intelligence and resources with our international partners, as well as seeking to deal with the causes of terrorism, for example, in the work we have done over many years to support the Middle East Peace Process, the very act in engagement of the United States and United Kingdom Governments, Colin Powell, Secretary Condoleezza Rice, myself in the Peace Process in respect of Kashmir, many other theatres, and the work which we and the UK Government are doing both with the Home Office and the Foreign Office to improve understanding of Islam and to give those who are of the Islamic faith greater confidence to stand up against these evil people; all of that is the only strategy that is sensible to follow. One other thing I simply say, in preparation for this session I was looking down a list of all the sites where there have been terrorist outrages over the last 12 years. It is everywhere: Tokyo, Saudi Arabia, Tanzania, Kenya, Aden, obviously the World Trade Centre, Karachi, Bali, Mombasa, Riyadh, Casablanca and Jakarta. This is a worldwide problem and it requires real international effort. Q57 Chairman: You referred to the causes, one of the things that strikes me is the way in which the people who justify these actions use all kinds of different excuses or reasons and one of the things they are very effective at is a propaganda campaign whereby they talk about events that happened in Timor or Kashmir, you mentioned, or the Middle East or even Andalusia and the 1450's in the period in Europe. Do you think we are doing enough to counter this propaganda? Mr Straw: I think we can never do enough to counter the propaganda, it is a most extraordinary moral relativism. We have to counter it and we have to say there are some absolutes in our society. Society cannot work unless we are clear what the differences are between good and evil and this terrorism is evil. I was reflecting on this in the context of the visit I made over the weekend to Birmingham, Alabama. They had the most appalling racism there which escalated until a church was bombed, four little girls got killed. You could offer explanations as to what was in the minds of the people who planted those bombs, but whatever explanations you offer you cannot conceivably justify that. You could offer explanations as to why there was a climate in which extremism came to the fore in Germany before the War and plenty of historians have said that the international community shared responsibility for making the situation worse than it might have been following the Treaty of Versailles. All that said, you cannot possibly excuse or justify Naziism. It was simply a straight forward evil and the evil that was being carried out was far greater than any of the problems it was designed to overcome; the same is true with this terrorism. What I know, having charted it before and after September 11, is that these people are so evil they will seize on any excuse or none. They will seize on an excuse, injustice in Palestine, injustice in Chechnya, injustice in Kashmir. Those excuses have gone and we are working very hard, certainly in respect of the Middle East, and in respect of Kashmir we have some influence, obviously it is for the Russian Federation to resolve the Chechnyan situation but if they have gone, they will seize on some other excuses. Now, for sure, in order to ensure that their recruiting sergeants are less successful, and for many other reasons, we need to secure a just settlement between the Israelis and the Palestinians in respect of the Middle East, and for example, between the Indians, Pakistanis and the Kashmiris in respect of Kashmir. We would be naive if we thought if we eliminated those problems, this infection will go, it will not. Q58 Chairman: We are spending billions of pounds in various theatres on military activities, Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere, yet we do not spend even a very small percentage of that on propaganda, communications, media. I will give you one example: the BBC Arabic television service which has not yet been established and would cost far less than we spent even in a very short period in pursuing the war in Iraq. Do you think we get our priorities right? Should we be shifting resources more into the other areas? Mr Straw: There will be an announcement by the BBC World Service tomorrow about the future of their programming. I do not want to pre-empt that, but I think this Committee will find that of interest. The second thing is that, however, we should not see the BBC as part of a "propaganda effort", there is a strong case for a BBC Arabic television service, but the BBC's credibility will be severely undermined if people thought that it was simply a mouthpiece of the British Government or even of the British Parliament. Yes, we fund it, it is on my vote but we have got to be very, very careful about the nature of the relationship in order to preserve that independence for the BBC which is a watch word around the world. We spend quite a lot of money - £10 million - on a programme called Engaging the Islamic World, which I do in my part of the Islamic world on a day-by-day basis. I have received none of this ten million, let me tell you. We spend £10 million and that is a big increase in the amount we have been spending in terms of engaging the Islamic world with all sorts of programmes, and we have given you details of those. I am also clear that if we want to engage the minds of people in the Islamic world we need to see better progress, for example on the Middle East Peace Process and, knock on wood, the prognosis is much, much better than certainly it was two years ago or a year ago. Q59 Ms Stuart: Can I follow on this. Given that it is an engaging of the minds in the long-term and we need to work with the BBC, and you say we have spent £10 million on this but we also need to build nation states in some areas like the Balkans, is it therefore wise for the Foreign Office to withdraw grant-in-aid for organisations such as the British Association of Eastern and Central Europe, which has got a proven track record in terms of money spent, it spends very little money, but does exactly what is needed and has shown that they can do it? Mr Straw: By pure chance, I am going to have a short meeting with Lord Radice straight after this session if it does not go on too long and I am not caught up in a vote. With particular grants-in-aid it is likely there will come a moment when there will be a judgment that maybe their usefulness has run its course, and that is the issue here. I need to talk to Lord Radice before coming to a final view. Ms Stuart: I think as a matter of record I had better declare that myself and a fellow Member of the Committee, Paul Keetch, are trustees of the organisation. Q60 Mr Purchase: Over centuries we have been used to dealing with people dissatisfied for one reason or another, usually because of some massive inequalities in the society the people inhabit. We have dealt with it because it is rational and we can say that we can create an improvement. Now we seem to be facing not a rational demand for improvements but a demand from a religion which will not be satisfied until its religion is accepted as the only religion throughout the world. Are we getting to a point where we might just expect terrorism to continue? We cannot prove that there is not a God and ask them to pack up their terrorism. Mr Straw: I do not think it is a demand from a religion. That is to admit that these evil people speak in the name of Islam, which no decent Muslim I know believes and none of the rest of us believe. There is overwhelming warrant from the Holy Koran to show that is simply not the case. If you are asking is this appetite for terror by some of these individuals ever going to be satiated, not by the key individuals I do not think. I think they are as fanatical - to use a comparison - as some of the Nazi leaders were at the end, they have tasted blood, they have enjoyed it, and get huge power from killing and they want it to go on and on and on. I think that we can succeed against their foot soldiers, both in dealing with it on a security basis but also in making it clear to people that this provides no hope whatever for them. If you go back to where you started, which was Iraq, we knew that there was likely to be an increase in terrorist incidents in Iraq right through the democratic process, the elections earlier in the year, the setting of the constitution, this referendum and then if the referendum leads to a yes, the full constitutional elections on 15 December. The terrorists are desperately trying to stop this democratic process taking place. Why? Because they know that if the democratic process in Iraq embeds itself then their opportunities to rule this country through terror rather than through democracy are much, much more limited. You will then see that some of those who for odd reasons fear or ---- Q61 Mr Purchase: What do they want? What is the demand? Mr Straw: For that you would need to go on to the website of al-Qaeda related apologist organisations, and there are many of them. Some of them want to establish a caliphate across the Islamic world, they want to exclude all infidel disbelievers. Bear in mind, however, that these people claim not only that everybody around the table - I do not see a member of the Islamic faith around the table - and those of us of other faiths are infidels but also those who do not follow their very extreme brand are also unbelievers. It is fanaticism on fanaticism. It is for that reason that there is increasing rejection by a vast majority of people in the Muslim community of this hijacking of their religion. Q62 Mr Keetch: Foreign Secretary, I want to turn to Iraq because obviously we are here to discuss the foreign policy aspects of the war against terrorism. I want to place Iraq in that context. Obviously you and I took a different view in the run-up to Iraq and you won the vote. I do not want to re-rehearse those arguments, nor do I necessarily want to go through the arguments about what is happening in Iraq at the moment. There are some very good signs of political process, there are some less good signs such as the bombings this afternoon, et cetera. I want to put Iraq in the context of that overarching war against terrorism. You were absolutely right when you said that terrorism had occurred before then and certainly after 9/11 President Bush assembled huge world support for that campaign. The front page of Le Monde said "We are all Americans now". My concern at the time, and my continued concern, is that Iraq has been a distraction from that campaign against terrorism that has led us down a path that has taken resources, money and effort that should have been concentrated on that much wider picture. Therefore, I firstly want to ask you, in the run-up to Iraq what was your assessment of that engagement on its effect on the war against terrorism? Did you actually believe that by invading Iraq it would improve the security situation in the United Kingdom and improve the war against terrorism? Or were you warned, or was there a suspicion, that this attack on Iraq by itself might in some way undermine the overall war against terrorism? Mr Straw: I never, ever believed that military action was a "distraction" from the war on terrorism, let us be clear about this. Also, bear in mind - you said you were not going to re-rehearse what happened but you have just done so - we only came to the decision about military action very late and very reluctantly. It was after the failure of the Security Council on 7 March 2003 to agree a Second Resolution, albeit the modified one which I put forward, and then the announcement by the French President on the tenth that whatever the circumstances he would vote no, that we were then into a situation when seven days later after the Cabinet's decision and then Parliament's decision the next day to take military action. I believed, and I still believe, that the military action that we took in Iraq was justified on the basis that was set out: non-compliance by Saddam of about a dozen Chapter 7 Resolutions. By all means read the speeches I made in the Security Council and the ones that I made in the House. That was the focus of what I spoke about. I do not happen to think this is an either/or. Also, although self-evidently there are, and remain, security challenges in Iraq, I believe that the only way we are going to get relative peace and security across the Middle East is through democracy. We are seeing the beginnings of this. Some of the things that have happened are quite remarkable, such as what is happening in the Lebanon. Who would have said that the Lebanon, whose nationhood has been and is still denied by Syria, it was run by Syria as a fiefdom, would now be emerging into full independence. Some of those who kept the Lebanon as a fiefdom are now under the most serious spotlight from the international community. Q63 Mr Keetch: I am sorry, I asked about our action in Iraq and the effect of that action against terrorism. Mr Straw: What I am saying is we are seeing the beginnings of a movement for democracy which I believe is the only sure way of eliminating terror and alongside that the lack of progress in the Arab countries, which is another cause or contributor to the environment in which terrorism can breed, is through democracy. We would not have got to where we have got to in Iraq, a release of Iraq from tyranny, and the most terrible tyranny, state terrorism, to a situation where just two and a half years later we are awaiting the results of a democratic referendum in which, according to the latest reports, nearly ten million people have voted; up from 8.6 million in January. It is going to be hard going in Iraq, the terrorism will continue for some time, but I also believe that historians are likely to judge that this has led to the establishment of a democratic and stable state. I would also add this: nation building is never easy. There are those who think what happened after the war was what was left of the German Government surrendered and then, hey presto, very quickly after that you had the building of a German state. That is not true. There were no national elections in Germany for four years. The Marshall Plan after two years arose because of the real concern about the chaos of reconstruction. Austria was under Allied rule for ten years and it did not become a nation for ten years. There was a similar situation with respect to Japan. In all countries which have emerged from such tyranny you are going to have a period of transition. All are different. I am not saying that Iraq is Germany or Germany is Iraq, but there are lessons from each. Q64 Mr Keetch: In terms of my question I assume that the Foreign office did consider what the effect of the war on terrorism would be by invading Iraq. Your assumption was that it would not make the overall war on terrorism worse. Mr Straw: In the run-up to as serious a decision as military action you are bound to look at all possible consequences. Did we believe that taking military action would make the overall terrorist situation worse? No, we did not. That was our judgment. Others around the system may have taken a different view but I know that we did not. Q65 Mr Keetch: I am grateful for that. We had some very interesting evidence last week from Mr Paul Wilkinson from the University of St Andrew's. Let me just quote what he said in his paper to us: "One of the most significant developments in the evolution of al-Qaeda since 2003 has been the way the movement has exploited the allied invasion and allied occupation of Iraq. Whatever view one may take on the decision to invade Iraq, it is simply ignoring the reality to deny that the invasion and occupation have been a big boost for al-Qaeda and a setback for the coalition against terrorism." What Mr Wilkinson is suggesting is that the images of British and American troops in Iraq are fuelling abroad what he calls a "domestic jihad" and increasing the unhappiness and frustration felt by Muslims in our own country and other countries and that process has increased and has made the overall war on terrorism worse. I presume you would disagree with that? Mr Straw: It is self-evidently the truth that al-Qaeda et cetera are exploiting what is going on in Iraq. They are also exploiting what is going on in Saudi Arabia, in Indonesia, in Egypt and in Russia. Q66 Mr Keetch: But there are not British troops there. Mr Straw: That is my point. There are no British troops there but they are exploiting them. Indonesia was against the Iraq War; it has suffered continuous al-Qaeda inspired terrorism. Saudi Arabia was not happy about the Iraq War; it suffered terrorism. Egypt was not happy about the Iraq War; it has suffered very recently serious terrorist outrages within its territory. The Russian Federation was against the Iraq War; it has had to deal with the most appalling terrorism. In each state these people seek to justify their terrorism by anything that they can find. On your point about is this affecting the Muslim population in this country, opinions will differ. I keep in very, very close touch with communities of the Islamic faith in my own constituency; if I did not I would not be here. It is the third largest Muslim population in a constituency proportionately of any in the country. There were several candidates at the last election, six against me. All six said they opposed the Iraq War, including a Conservative, let me say. This will all be in published official documents. All six said they opposed the Iraq War and all six said that the way to emphasise opposition, particularly among the Muslim communities, was to vote against me and vote me out of office. My majority went down from 9,000 to 8,000. I ended up with a very significant level of support amongst the Muslim communities. Why? Yes, if you did an opinion poll amongst the Muslim communities in Blackburn they would disproportionately say they opposed the Iraq War but they are not taken in by all this propaganda from terrorists, apologists for terrorists and others, and they were able to make a mature judgment. They could see what we had been doing in respect of the Middle East, in respect of Kashmir and much else, and came to the conclusion they did. Q67 Mr Keetch: I am grateful. The other answer to a question last week from Mr Taylor of the BBC was that Iraq was also providing a training ground for terrorists, that they were able to get involved in terrorism and then come back from there to Europe and, indeed, a senior French judge made a similar point last week. Again, is it your belief that people actively involved in terrorism against coalition forces in Iraq are gaining from that experience in their perception and then returning back to the United Kingdom and other parts of Europe? Mr Straw: I have to say - Mr Richmond can correct me if I am wrong - I have seen no evidence at all to suggest that people have been trained within Iraq and are coming back here. The potential areas of training and potential ---- Have you seen any? Mr Richmond: No. I think it is something that we worry about but we have not seen any evidence of it. Q68 Mr Maples: The Iraqi constitution has been rejected by the overwhelming majority in two of the Sunni provinces. If it is rejected in a third, which looks highly likely in Nineveh in the next two or three days, what are we going to do? Mr Straw: We say this is democracy and if you invite people to vote ---- Q69 Mr Maples: I have asked you what we are going to do if it is rejected. Mr Straw: We then allow the constitutional arrangements to go ahead. There will be elections in any event on 15 December. This is factored into the constitution. If a referendum fails it may be something which people regret but this is democracy. What we will also do is point out to Sunnis who may have been reluctant to have been involved in the elections back in January that it is far better for them to make use of democratic arrangements to resolve the conflicts which they have with the Shias and the Kurds than it is to support violence. This is democracy working. Q70 Mr Maples: Of course I understand it is democracy working but our collective policy has been to develop the constitution and to get it approved. If it is rejected and there are new elections for an assembly, are you saying that new assembly is more likely to be able to reach a constitutional settlement? Mr Straw: Even if the referendum passes and the constitution comes into force, there will have to be quite a number of further amendments made to the constitution almost certainly. I think that there is a provision - I can be corrected on this - that these changes would have to be put to a further referendum within four months. If there is not a yes vote then there will be a further interim government elected on 15 December and the constituted assembly has a year in which to come forward with changes to the constitution which will then go to a further referendum. Those who are busy seeking immediate stability, particularly those in the Shia and Kurdish populations, obviously would have wanted to see a yes vote. It is also the case, and we know this for certain, that there will be a very large majority of Iraqi voters who will have voted yes in the elections but this arrangement by which two-thirds of voters voting no in three provinces could block a constitution was agreed, ironically, for the benefit of the Kurds originally when the Transitional Administrative Law was developed in the summer of last year and there is no reason at all why other groups, particularly the Sunnis, should not be allowed to use it. You were then asking what I think will happen. What I think will happen is that there will be further negotiations between the Sunnis and the Shias to try to arrive at a solution satisfactory to both sides. Interestingly, things were moving in that direction in the run-up to the referendum so that there were further amendments made. They were supposed to be signed off in the middle of August but all through last month and the beginning of this month further amendments were made. We will see that process continuing, I think. Q71 Mr Maples: It seemed to me that it was entirely foreseeable that this was going to happen, the Sunnis not participating fully in the constitutional process, and that the result of this will be the deferral of a solution for at least a year, if not longer, and during that time the stability will get worse, which will encourage the terrorists into thinking that they have succeeded in one of their objectives, and the likelihood of the country breaking up into these three or perhaps more constituent parts will be far greater. Mr Straw: I do not accept that. Q72 Mr Maples: You do not think any part of it will break up? Mr Straw: First of all, we do not know what the result is going to be. It is clear that in Ambar 97 per cent of voters have voted no, we are told, and in Salahuddin it is 82 per cent. There is an issue at the moment about what has happened in Nineveh which is the area around Mosul, which is a mixed area, and we do not know whether or not there is going to be a yes or a no vote and, if it is a no vote, whether it is a no vote by two-thirds. I spoke to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan ---- Q73 Mr Maples: We are working on the basis of it if is a no vote, what will happen? Mr Straw: I spoke to Secretary General Kofi Annan yesterday and on Saturday about this because it is in everybody's interests that the process of checking should come to a close as quickly as possible. I do not accept your rather apocalyptic view about what is then going to happen. I just say this: you have to trust the people to come up with the result that they want. Q74 Mr Maples: The result they may want is three separate constituent states. Mr Straw: One of the things they are all agreed on is that there has to be a single Iraq. It is also fundamental to the international community. The Kurds are not campaigning for a separate Kurdistan. They know in any event the consequences of that in relation Turkey and Iraq would be very, very severe. If you talk to Mr Barzani, President Talabani and the other leaders of the state KDP, they know that whatever historical aspiration they may have had. The Shias also know that once a full democratic system of government is established, because they are 60 per cent of the population, where the politics turns on people being Shia rather than Sunni or Kurd, it is going to hold sway, so what on earth is in it for them to break up this country which anyway has been a single unity since the break up of the Ottoman Empire. My point back to you, Mr Maples, is this: from the point of view of the international community there is plainly a hope that the electoral and constitutional processes can proceed smoothly if there is a yes vote but if you give people a vote you have to accept the answer that they come up with. It is not the end of the world at all if the answer is no. It is anticipated in the drafting of the Transitional Administrative Law and in the constitution. Also, when I talk to our people in Baghdad what they say to me is in practice the difference between having a yes vote in terms of time and tidying up the constitution then and having a no vote and having to make some amendments to agree to a further consensus would not be quite as long as people anticipate. Q75 Mr Maples: They would be radically different outcomes. Can we turn briefly to Basra because we were congratulating ourselves until quite recently that we had done rather well in the southern part of Iraq and it was much more stable and we seem to have done that by working very closely with the main Shi'ite group. However, now we seem to have a situation in which the various Shi'ite groups and militias have fallen out among themselves stirred up by Iran which was not happening until a few months ago and the same animosity towards British troops is now being demonstrated there as it has been for two and a half years in the other parts of Iraq against the Americans. It seems to me that we have got almost as bad a situation there as the United States has got in the Sunni triangle. Mr Straw: I think it is very important not to generalise and that also applies to the areas under the direct control, as it were, of the American troops. American troops have got a relatively good level of consent in some provinces and some parts of some provinces and obviously poor consent in other parts. My understanding so far as Basra is concerned is, yes, there was a particular problem with this section of the Iraqi security forces and some dominant individuals, but it is by no means universal. I would also just say to you, Mr Maples, although I think all of us are very proud indeed of the way in which our troops have operated seeking to build consent, they have always made it clear that if necessary they will be very firm and very tough, and that was why they took the action that they did about three weeks ago. Q76 Mr Maples: Obviously we hope that will be the outcome. We now have a situation in which the insurgency seems to be worse in most Sunni parts than it has been before, the constitution is almost certainly, I would suggest to you, going to get rejected, and we now have chaos and fighting in Basra with Iran stirring up trouble there in a way that I do not think any of us had foreseen. Is it not really time that we admitted we went to war here for all the right motives but, nevertheless, there were not any weapons of mass destruction. We have fundamentally miscalculated and misunderstood the nature of Iraqi society and the potential for divisions within it and the potential for insurgency. Would it not help us to get from here to a satisfactory exit if we admitted that we had made those mistakes? Mr Straw: If we thought that, and evidently you do, yes, but I do not happen to think it. Q77 Mr Maples: You do not think we have made any mistakes? Mr Straw: That is a separate issue. If you are asking me whether I think we made any fundamental mistakes in the overall strategy, no, I do not. If you are asking me day-by-day whether there are things we could have done better with the benefit of hindsight, of course that is the case, it would be arrogant to say otherwise. You could come up with a catalogue of bad news but what you omitting in all of this is the most important message of all this year, 2005, which is this: the Iraqis have embraced democracy. People said we did not understand the nature of Iraqi society, meaning that we did not understand that they did not really want to be democrats; that they did not have any interest and they just wanted to be dominated by tyrants. Well, eight and a half million Iraqis proved those people wrong on 30 January, and 10 million proved them wrong again on 15 October. The Iraqis want what we take for granted, which is the right to run their own affairs; and it is called democracy. We are seeking to support that process, a process that is also backed by the United Nations. Although you are right to say that there were big divisions in the international community and nationally over the rightness or wrongness of military action, post-war we have been there on the basis of United Nations Security Council resolutions. The key resolution now, Resolution 1546, was passed in June last year unanimously, and it is that which provides the mandate for the multinational force and the electoral timetable and institutions. Q78 Richard Younger-Ross: Pursuing the point on Basra, I had the privilege to visit there just after the fighting finished and saw what an excellent task our Forces were doing. I have to say that they were clearly not fully prepared for the task in front of them, because the Government had clearly not thought about the fact that it needed extra DFID help and advisors in relation to police and other areas. However, the Forces did a magnificent job in dealing with the local tribal issues and working with the local community. There has clearly been a deterioration in the relationships between our Forces there and the local authorities. What is being done to build those bridges? Mr Straw: A great deal, and I can let the Committee have a detailed note about that, if you wish, Mr Chairman. Our people, both in the military and in the Consul General in Basra, as well as in associated government agencies like DFID, are alive to the need to have the best possible relationships with local leaders. As Mr Maples has indicated, part of what happened is that, in his phrase, some local leaders "fell out", and there is going to be a lot of vying for power because people see that power is shifting from the rather tyrannical arrangements that people knew about under Saddam and what has been there subsequently to democratic processes, which are far better but slightly less certain. There will therefore be a lot of vying for power going on, and that is what we have had to cope with. For reasons I have already explained to Mr Maples, I do not take an overly pessimistic view about the longer-term prognosis there. Q79 Richard Younger-Ross: Are we not in a position where the clerics and the extreme clerics will say, "They came here; they promised us water and electricity; they have failed to do those on time and they are still not working properly; they promised us this and that, and they have not delivered"? Are we not, particularly in terms of security, actually giving extra credit to the clerics to put us in a bad light? Mr Straw: There are two things: to the extent that the reconstruction process has lagged behind is all down to security. The other thing that has happened for the good - and this has been, again, a very big change in the last year - is that approximately 170,000 more Iraqi security forces have been trained up. Their ability to operate independently of the US, UK and other coalition forces varies considerably. There are two battalions that can operate entirely independently, but a great many can operate effectively with backing from the coalition. That has been a big change. The progress with the defence forces has been better than progress with the police in some areas where problems remain. On the point about the clerics, it is quite important to appreciate that some of those whom you describe as clerics are a very powerful, moderating force within Iraqi society, in this case amongst the Shia. Without Ayatollah Cistani's great wisdom and judgment, I think that we would be in a rather more difficult position. It is the nature of that society that a lot of the leaders are clerics. Let me say that it certainly was the case in my party, and in yours, for a very long time, that the protestants and non-conformist churches played a leading part in our - well, this is true! People used to say of the Church of England that it was a Conservative Party of prayer. It does not lie in our mouth to pretend that we are a wholly secular society where organised religion plays no part in politics, because it does play a very important part. Q80 Richard Younger-Ross: I very carefully used the word "extreme" before the word "cleric". I appreciate that a large number of them are working and are a moderating force. However, I am concerned that more power is being given to those who do not wish to see the sort of democracy that we wish to see, but wish to go back to the sort of democracy they have in Iran, rather than the democracy you described earlier. I fear that we will move towards a new Vietnam where these other groups, which cannot agree to the model of democracy -----Mr Straw: It is good for a headline in the liberal news, but it is complete nonsense. Q81 Richard Younger-Ross: Liberal Democrat! Mr Straw: It is complete nonsense. The parallels are about zero, with great respect to you. Just look at the fact that you have now got a UN-backed democratic process. There was not ever a single United Nations Security Council resolution in respect of Vietnam. Everybody is agreed in the Security Council about the strategy needed to put Iraq on a settled path. The two other things I say are these: there is not seen to be any particular appetite amongst Iraqis for setting up a structure similar to that in Iran. Although it is true that the majority of Iranians are Shia, and in the south and other parts of Iraq a significant proportion of the Iraqis are Shia, the Iraqis are Arab and the Iranians are not Arab, they are Persian. This division between the two is not accidental but is quite powerful, and there are other reasons that explain the nature of the Iranian constitution, about which I would be very happy to bore this Committee at some length. The Iraqi constitution states in the opening articles - and I paraphrase, but only a little - that it should take account of the Islamic heritage of Iraq; but it also states that it should take account of democratic rights and human rights. The architecture of the document is not one that makes this an Islamic state in the classical sense that you see in Iran or, in a different way, in Saudi Arabia. Q82 Mr Illsley: In regard to the Basra situation and the incidents on 19 September, just how big a disappointment was it that the newly-trained police forces seemed to be in alliance with the militias in the handing over of British troops to those militias? Mr Straw: It obviously was a disappointment. It was aimed at one particular section of the police force. There was disappointment, and we have to deal with that. We hoped that it would be otherwise. Chairman: We are moving to Iran now. Q83 Andrew Mackinlay: I will come on in a moment to IAEA Security Council's atomic weapons, but in recent weeks the Prime Minister, yourself and the Defence Secretary have indicated a fear that some of the ordinance and planning and preparation and some of the personalities involved in attacks upon British soldiers and coalition forces in Iraq and other malevolence around the region has been from Hezbollah or Iran. I note that you said at a press conference that the explosives that killed at least eight British soldiers originated from Hezbollah or Iran. That is pretty definite. Downing Street/the Prime Minister have been fairly strong, but in some parliamentary exchanges the Defence Secretary seemed to slightly pull back from that. I do not mean this in any spiteful way, as you would know, but there does seem to be a degree of ambiguity. I wonder if you could take this opportunity to share with us what you do know. Is it Hezbollah or Iran, and if it is the latter to whom does one look? At what level is this and to what extent are the fingerprints of the Iran regime on this? Mr Straw: There is a degree of ambiguity about this, Mr Mackinlay, because there is a degree of uncertainty about it. We believe, from forensic examination of these improvised explosive devices, that they are similar to or the same as those used by Hezbollah; and it appears that they can be traced back to Iran. We do not know about the timing and we do not know directly about any involvement by the Iranian Government, but it is sufficient for us to be concerned about it and we have made representations to the Iranian Government. I think I have probably said enough about that; we just state that there is not a continuation of these devices. Q84 Andrew Mackinlay: Turning to suicide bombers, there have been press reports, which are not vague reports, about how the regime and organs of the regime, including Iran's newly-installed Defence Minister, had both invited volunteers for suicide bombings and celebrated them. A celebration is planned on October 30 in Tehran, which, by definition, must have at least the tacit support of the regime, entitled Men of the Sun. They are going to celebrate suicide operations at this celebration, encouraging people to sign up for martyrdom-seeking operations. The Defence Minister has indicated support for this kind of activity. What do we know about this; what representations have we made; and is this not something that really puts that regime beyond the pale? There are very few regimes, and certainly they are regimes that you would not do business with, that are actively encouraging and promoting the concept of suicide operations around the world and around the region. Mr Richmond: It is worth remembering that they were using suicide bombers in the Iran/Iraq war, and it is quite a long tradition. These people have been celebrated, and there is a foundation that looks after wives and dependants and so on; so this is something that has existed in Iran quite some time. It is true to say that recently more publicity has been given to this, but you have to see what they did rather than what they wrote in their newspapers. Mr Straw: It is slightly more complicated because of the Iran/Iraq war. We look to the Government of Iran to take the same unambiguous view of terrorism that all other countries do. A point I often make to Iraqi interlocutors is that with their very active support and encouragement when I was Home Secretary, at the request of my then predecessor the late Robin Cook, I banned, under the Terrorism Act, the Iraq/Iranian terrorist organisation MEK - and it is still banned. I also banned in the same list the military wings of Hamas and Hezbollah. The Iranian Government give very active support to Hezbollah and some support to Hamas, and we think they should desist from that because you have to be unambiguous in your approach to terrorist organisations. That is a conversation that continues to happen with the Iranians. Q85 Andrew Mackinlay: And the PMOI were banned - or is that the MEK? Mr Straw: Yes. Q86 Andrew Mackinlay: I do not want to labour the point, but it seems to me that that should be revisited. Mr Straw: You are not supporting this terrorist organisation ----- Q87 Andrew Mackinlay: I am certainly not, no. Mr Straw: Okay. Q88 Andrew Mackinlay: But, equally, since ----- Mr Straw: Did NCRI fund ----- Q89 Andrew Mackinlay: The answer is "no", but the point is that I certainly think we should always revisit those which we ban. Mr Straw: There are provisions in the Terrorism Act 2000, if organisations want to make representations ----- Q90 Andrew Mackinlay: Perhaps I can go, as I promised you, to the question of development of nuclear weapons. The IAEA has been unambiguous in its condemnation of Iran for non-compliance. There is now talk about the matter being referred to the Security Council, which seems logical. The anxiety which some have is that it will go to the Security Council, and then there will be impotence; because if the Security Council stands by the IAEA and shows robustness, there is very little that the international community can do. Is that not the case? Where are we on this? How can we contain and control Iran on development of nuclear weapons? Mr Straw: First, let me just say where we are. We do not know for certain whether Iran is developing a nuclear weapons capability. What we do know for certain is that over a twenty-year period they failed to notify the IAEA of very large developments at Isfahan and Natanz of conversion and enrichment facilities and other matters. We also know that they were in close touch with A. Q. Khan, who is the man who was in the lead in developing the Pakistani bomb and who then decided to go into business selling nuclear weapons technology. We know they experimented in polonium and plutonium, and there is also a large question mark as to why they need such large fuel cycle facilities to create nuclear fuel when they only have one nuclear power station at Bushehr. That power station is being built under contract with the Russians, and the Russians are under contract to provide fuel for it; but they have no other power stations ready to go, and there are none in development either. Those are the question marks. You talk about impotence, but the record of the IAEA on Iran is one of the strength of the international community in support of one of the world's most important international treaties, the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Where are we? When we started this in the immediate aftermath of the Iraq war, Dominic de Villepain, Joschka Fischer and myself thought there was every prospect that Iran would exploit the divisions in the international community and carry on regardless. They have simply not done that, and we have been able to achieve a situation where the enrichment of uranium is suspended. That remains suspended. What we also achieved for a period was the suspension of the conversion facility at Isfahan. The Iranians made the decision to restart that on 2 August this year; and it is because of that that we have a problem. As you say, Mr Mackinlay, when this came before the IAEA board of governors there was a vote of 22 in favour of declaring Iran non-compliant. There was one against, which was Venezuela, and the rest abstained. That was quite a shock to the Iranians because they thought that the most votes we would muster would be 18, and in fact if Venezuela had not voted against we would have ended up with a consensus. That is where it is at the moment. Enrichment remains suspended and further conversations are taking place. I hope that it is possible to resolve this matter within the board of governors of the IAEA, but the statutes of the IAEA provide that if such matters cannot be resolved, then there can be a reference to the Security Council. As to whether that is necessary or when it would take place is a choice that we would make, and we would certainly not announce it in advance. Q91 Mr Pope: You have said on a number of occasions that it is inconceivable that military action would be taken against Iran, and whilst I am sure that is true at the moment, it presumably really is not the case if one looks to the future. I cannot see Israel, for example, standing by and allowing Iran to develop a nuclear weapons capability; and for that matter I cannot really see the United States allowing that to happen. My point is that it is not inconceivable. Mr Straw: Mr Pope, I speak for the British Government; I do not presume to speak for the Israeli Government; they have to make their own decisions. It was in the context of the nuclear dossier that I made those remarks. The second thing to say is that people need to chill a bit on this. Military action is not on anybody's agenda with respect to Iran, and that has been made clear repeatedly by the American Government and clearly by Condoleezza Rice yesterday at the joint interview I did with her from Birmingham, Alabama. It is simply not on the agenda. There is always a caveat entered on behalf of the President of the United States, who is also Commander in Chief, which I understand; but it is not on the agenda of the American Government and it is not on our agenda or anybody's agenda on the board of governors. My judgment is that we have to work extremely hard to resolve this by diplomatic means. What I do know is that where we are united - and we have been until very recently completely united - we can get a long way. I also know that the Iranians were surprised and a little chastened by the extent to which we got, not unanimous support in the last board of governors, but very significant and substantial support, which they thought would go their way. Q92 Mr Pope: The Committee visited Iran and went to Tehran and Isfahan about two years ago. It was quite a friendly visit, certainly in comparison to when we went to France at about the same time! Mr Straw: I shall make sure that our Ambassador in Tehran tells the Iranian Government that. Q93 Mr Pope: I know that you have invested quite a lot of time and effort personally in the UK relationship with Iran, but I just think that over the last two years things have deteriorated somewhat. There was the case of the British soldiers who were kidnapped in the Shatt al-Arab waterway. Mr Mackinlay has pointed out that there is compelling evidence that Iranian-produced or Iranian-financed weapons have been used against UK forces south of Iraq. It seems to us that our diplomatic relationship is not as good as it was two years ago when we went there. Would you characterise it thus and, if so, what can we do about it? Mr Straw: There has been a difficult period in the relationship between Iran and the international community; and just bear in mind that every move that the United Kingdom has made has been in concert with France and Germany, and through that E3 arrangement the rest of the European Union as well. If people say, "What is the point of EU foreign policy?" this is the point of EU foreign policy. Increasingly we have had the active support of the United States Government, backing our proposals. We are working at improving co-operation with the Russian Federation as well as other countries. Iran had elections; they were imperfect elections because of their constitutional system, but they produced a result in which President Ahmadinejad took office. It is a new government. I was present at the United Nations General Assembly when he made the speech that he did and set out his stall. It is a more difficult environment than it was two years ago; however, that is not a reason for abandoning the diplomatic route. You have to try and understand where the Iranians are coming from. Iran is a very proud nation, with a very fine past. It is also a nation which, for rather good reasons, has felt that it has been over-dominated by great power politics in turn by Russia, by the United Kingdom and by the United States; and that is part of their national consciousness, as is this very powerful sense of their own national dignity. You have to take that into account. The argument over the Non-Proliferation Treaty is complicated. The Iranians say: "Article 4 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty entitles us to the full panoply that is necessary to generate electricity by nuclear power." On the face of it, that is correct. However, there is an obligation under Article 2 not to do anything towards developing nuclear weapons capability. The intersection of these two comes at the point of the fuel cycle, and that is why there is such anxiety about the use to which the Iranians are intending to put the fuel that they would generate. That is what we have to work on. As far as I am concerned, and I think I can speak for the French and German Governments and for Javier Solana, we are just going to keep going on this. Q94 Mr Hamilton: Following on from what Mr Pope has just said about the possibilities of military action or otherwise against Iran, I am sure you will have heard of the Heritage Foundation, the right-wing think-tank in Washington ----- Mr Straw: Are they supporting me? Q95 Mr Hamilton: I do not think they are not supporting you. It has a great influence on President Bush's policies, and I am delighted to hear what Condoleezza Rice has said about the possibility of any kind of military action against Iran. However, as you may recall a few weeks ago, Dr Nile Gardiner, someone we met a couple of years ago in Washington, was on the Newsnight programme. He told Jeremy Paxman that it is about time we stopped using the carrot and waved the stick at Iran; in other words, we would have to do something quite radical to stop them developing nuclear weapons if they did not stop of their own accord. Are you worried by that? Do you think that is views are likely to penetrate the White House at some stage and force them into military action if Iran does not go along with the IAEA? Mr Straw: He has his point of view. Was that the programme that I was in? Q96 Mr Hamilton: No, it is one that I was on actually - helping you! Mr Straw: Thank you very much. Let me just repeat the position of the American Government, which was spelt out yesterday, and before, by Secretary Rice. She said that military action was not on the agenda of the United States at this time. She went on to say words to the effect that the United States Government had been giving support for the E3 process; they have done so, and we are very grateful to the United States Government for that support. Each resolution that we have had before the board of governors has also been actively supported by the United States. That is where we are. As I say, one can endlessly speculate. I think I have made our position fairly clear. I believe that the diplomatic route is the right one. It is not just about diplomacy across a table; it is about the pressure that one can exercise through the international community on a country like Iran. It could also be exercised on us in different circumstances. It is about the power of the United Nations system that we are dealing with here. Q97 Mr Hamilton: In other words, you are still wholly committed to constructive engagement, which is the British Government's continuing policy in Iraq. Mr Straw: Let me say that for all sorts of reasons sometimes it is hard going with Iran, but I happen to be committed to it, and I happen to think that it is far better than the alternative. Q98 Ms Stuart: If none of that pressure works, surely the minimum is the end of the Non-Proliferation Treaty? Mr Straw: It may be the end of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; it depends on the circumstances. Meanwhile, there are other challenges for the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Only three members of the United Nations have not signed up to the Non-Proliferation Treaty but they all have a nuclear weapons capability, so trying to deal with that is also something we have to factor into our approach. Q99 Mr Mackay: Foreign Secretary, I want to bring you on to another problem state in the region, namely Syria, whose regime, quite rightly, has had the international spotlight focused on it particularly in the last few days. I would appreciate your comments on the German Prosecutor's findings. We all recall that he was doing this at the request of the Secretary General of the United Nations, which confirmed that Syria was intimately involved in the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri in Beirut back in February, and that against the backcloth that the Interior Minister Kanaan seems to have conveniently committed suicide in the last few weeks and against a backcloth of the serious allegations, which appear to be very well-founded, that a significant number of members of Saddam Hussein's regime are being harboured in Syria with no effort to bring them to justice. Finally, there is the backcloth that security advisors say to us that almost certainly the Syrian border is the most porous and the most dangerous border with Iraq, and I would appreciate your comments. Mr Straw: The findings of the Mehlis Commission are very serious indeed. They are so serious that Secretary Rice and I have agreed that there should be a ministerial meeting of the Security Council, and we are currently fixing up a date for that very shortly, providing we can get other member countries on board for that. This report that I have in front of me requires an answer to the international community. You cannot have a member of the United Nations that has subscribed to the Charter of Human Rights, and much else besides, deciding that the way it resolves its problems is having people, at least at a pretty senior level, complicit in the murder of political opponents in a country that is regarded by every other member of the United Nations as independent; this is simply intolerable. We have to meet and decide what to do next in respect of the conclusions of the Mehlis Commission. There is also, let me say, business in respect of Resolution 1559. We are dealing with two resolutions here. Resolution 1595 was the one that established the Mehlis Commission and Resolution 1559 was an earlier resolution that required Syria to remove its troops and its penetration of Lebanon altogether. It has made some progress on that and has certainly removed its troops, but it still has to do a very great deal more, including recognising the Lebanon as an independent member of the United Nations, and put embassies into Beirut and exchange ambassadors. These are very elementary matters, but very important matters. On the second point you raised, Mr Mackay, about penetration of the border, you are right to say that this is the most dangerous and most porous border into Iraq. The Syrians have taken some steps to improve security and co‑operation across the border, but they have got to take many more. Dr Gooderham may wish to say something more about this. An associated point is that they have got to be categorical in ceasing to allow Syria to be used as a base for Hamas and Islamic Jihad. It is almost a joke in the Arab region, and regarded as such, when Syrian leaders say that Hamas and Islamic Jihad are not allowed to operate from Syria. I recently met a very well-known, senior Arab journalist, who got out his pocket book and said, "if I want to talk to leaders of Hamas or Islamic Jihad, I phone these numbers in Damascus; I am told that they have moved; I then leave a message and they phone me back within five minutes from Damascus." It is a charade but it is all part of the same problem. Doctor Gooderham: As the Foreign Secretary said, there is some evidence that Syria has taken some steps with respect to its border with Iraq, but the sense we have is that those steps have been half-hearted, grudging and tactical in nature. What we have been looking for is a strategic decision on the part of the regime in Damascus to get to grips with the problem of the insurgents coming in and out of Iraq and Syria; and so far we have not seen that. We continue to press for it. Q100 Mr Mackay: Foreign Secretary, that is an appropriately robust response that you have given, and I commend you for it. Does that mean that your answer on Syria is the same as the one you gave on Iran, when a colleague a few moments ago asked if we would take part in any invasion - that we would take part in any invasion of Syria or taking out certain key people from Syria? You were very specific about Iran and said that there were no plans, that it was not on the agenda; that we should cool it, calm it. Is that what you mean for Syria? Mr Straw: As I said, we are at the moment in discussion with the Americans and other partners and drafting a response that will go before the Security Council. Let us take these things one step at a time. Q101 Mr Mackay: That is a very interesting answer. The last question, which perhaps you can answer slightly more fully than that, is this. Your relationship with your opposite number in Damascus must be ----- Mr Straw: Dr Farouk al-Shara? Q102 Mr Mackay: They must be very ragged now in the light of this report. Is it worthwhile keeping up diplomatic relations at the moment with Syria? Mr Straw: As it happens, I have not seen Dr Farouk al-Shara since I saw him at the conference earlier in the year in Sharma Sheik. My judgment is that it is worth keeping up diplomatic relations with Syria, and I would certainly not wish them to be brought to an end unilaterally. We keep up diplomatic relations with a great many countries, for example Burma - although I am not comparing them directly - but we do so because we think it is worthwhile - and with Zimbabwe. Q103 Mr Purchase: The answer that Mr Mackay described as interesting was also unconvincing. People will be extremely concerned, following President Bush's remarks in regard to his view of Syria. We do need some assurance that it is not the intention of the British Government to be led by the nose into an attack on Syria. We have been there before, and many people would be very unhappy if they thought we were going there again. Mr Straw: Let me assure you, the issue - we are talking about diplomatic decisions being made within the United Nations system. There has been no discussion that I have taken part in with the United States about military action in respect of Syria - none whatever. I do not think it is on their agenda either; let us be clear about that. Q104 Mr Purchase: The President seemed to put it on the agenda. Mr Straw: Well, I provided the reassurance that Mr Mackay sought. Iraq was Iraq, and we supported - I know you did not, but the British Parliament supported the judgments that we made as a government in respect of Iraq. We did it in a very open way. We had three debates running from September 2002 to March 2003, with votes; and it could not have been done in a more open way. Again, we made our judgment, and we happen to think it was the right one. People can discuss, as it were, the counter factuals, and if we had not supported the United States I think the situation would have been altogether worse. That is where we are. On these other issues we are working very carefully and well with the United States Government. Judge them by the decisions they have made. With respect to Iran, judge the United States by the fact that it has given us increasing support for the E3 EU process notwithstanding the fact, as I was agreeing with Mr Pope, that the environment has become more difficult not less difficult. In respect of Syria we have a problem. It is a problem for the international community. Resolution 1559 was co-sponsored originally by France and the United States, with us coming in behind. France has been as much in the lead on this as has the United States. I have just come from a commemoration service at St Paul's Cathedral to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the foundation of the United Nations. What we all know about the United Nations is that where it works together it is a force for good, without the necessity for military action. In respect of Iraq, if we had ever been able to get that second resolution with an ultimatum, the chances are that we would not have had to go to war, as a matter of fact; but there we are! You do not have to have these on the agenda particularly where you have good, strong backing in the international community. Q105 Sandra Osborne: I would like to ask you about the issue of extraordinary rendition. In response to this Committee's report of last year on the war against terrorism, the government said that it was not aware of the use of its territory or air space for the purposes of extraordinary rendition. However, it appears that there is a growing body of evidence to suggest that the UK air space is indeed being utilised for this purpose, albeit mainly in the media. Some of the suggestions seem to be extremely detailed. For example, the Guardian has reported that aircraft involved in operations have flown into the UK at least 210 times since 9/11, an average of one flight a week. It appears that the favourite destination is Prestwick Airport, which is next to my constituency, as it happens. Can you comment on that? What role is the UK playing in extraordinary rendition? Mr Straw: The position in respect of extraordinary rendition was set out in the letter that the head of our parliamentary team wrote to Mr Priestly, your Clerk, on 11 March; and the position has not changed. We are not aware of the use of our territory or air space for the purpose of extraordinary rendition. We have not received any requests or granted any permissions for use of UK territory or air space for such purposes. It is perfectly possible that there have been two hundred movements of United States aircraft in and out of the United Kingdom and I would have thought it was many more; but that is because we have a number of UN air force bases here, which, under the Visiting Forces Act and other arrangements they are entitled to use under certain conditions. I do not see for a second how the conclusion could be drawn from the fact that there have been some scores of movements of US military aircraft - well, so what - that that therefore means they have been used for rendition. That is a very long chain! Q106 Sandra Osborne: The UN Commission on Human Rights has started an inquiry into the British Government's role in this. Is the Government co-operating fully with that inquiry? Why would they start an inquiry if there were no reason to believe that this was actually happening? Mr Straw: People start inquiries for all sorts of reasons. I assume we are co-operating with it. I am not aware of any requests, but we always co-operate with such requests. Q107 Mr Keetch: They are not flying under US military flags; these are Gulfstream aircraft used by the CIA. They have a 26-strong fleet of Gulfstream aircraft that are used for this purpose. These aircraft are not coming into British spaces; they are coming into airports. Some are into bases like Northolt, and some into bases like Prestwick. Whilst it is always good to have the head of your parliamentary staff respond to our Clerk, Mr Priestley, could you give us an assurance that you will investigate these specific flights; and, if it is the case that these flights are being used for the process of extraordinary rendition, which is contrary to international law and indeed contrary to the stated policy of Her Majesty's Government, would you attempt to see if they should stop? Mr Straw: I would like to see what it is that is being talked about here. I am very happy to endorse, as you would expect, and I did endorse, the letter sent by our parliamentary team to your Clerk on 11 March. I am happy, for the avoidance of any doubt, to say that I specifically endorse its contents. If there is evidence, we will look at it, but a suggestion in a newspaper that there have been flights by unspecified foreign aircraft in and out of the United Kingdom cannot possibly add up to evidence that our air space or our facilities have been used for the purpose of unlawful rendition. It just does not. Q108 Mr Keetch: I accept that, but if there were evidence of that, you would join with us, presumably, in condemning ----- Mr Straw: I am not going to pre-judge an inquiry. If there were evidence, we would look at it. So far there we have not seen any evidence. Q109 Richard Younger-Ross: Our former Ambassador to Uzbekistan, Craig Murray, has stated in a document to us: "I can confirm it is a positive policy decision by the US and UK to use Uzbek torture material." He states that the evidence is that the aircraft that my colleague referred to earlier, the Gulfstreams, are taking detainees back to Uzbekistan who are then being tortured. Is that not some indication that these detainees are being transferred through the UK? Mr Straw: It is Mr Murray's opinion. Mr Murray, as you may know, stood in my constituency. He got fewer votes than the British National Party, and notwithstanding the fact that he assured the widest possible audience within the constituency to his views about use of torture. I set out the British Government's position on this issue on a number of occasions, including in evidence both here and to the Intelligence and Security Committee. I wrote a pretty detailed letter to a constituent of mine back in June, setting out our position. As I said there, there are no circumstances in which British officials use torture, nor any question of the British Government seeking to justify the use of torture. Again, the British Government, including the terrorist and security agencies, has never used torture for any purpose including for information, nor would we instigate or connive with others in doing so. People have to make their own judgment whether they think I am being accurate or not. Q110 Mr Illsley: Foreign Secretary, the letter which you supplied to the Committee in March which gave the conclusion that the British Government is not aware of the use of its territory or air space for the purpose of extraordinary rendition was taken at face value by most members of the Committee at that time, before the election. We took that to mean that we were not aware of any extraordinary rendition, and that it was not happening. The press reports were therefore something of a surprise. Would our Government be contacted by any country using our airspace, taking suspects to other countries? Would we be asked for permission or would there be any circumstances where we would be contacted; or is it the case that it could well be happening but that our Government is not aware of it simply because we have not been informed, or our permission is not necessary? Mr Straw: Mr Illsley, on the precise circumstances in which foreign governments apply for permission to use British air space, I have to write to you, because it is important that I make that accurate. What Mr Stanton on my behalf said in the letter is exactly the same: why would I, for a second, knowingly provide this Committee with false information, if I had had information about rendition? We do not practise rendition, full-stop. I ought to say that whether rendition is contrary to international law depends on the particular circumstances of the case; it depends on each case, but we do not practise it. I would have to come back to you on that question. Chairman: We will expect a letter. Thank you very much. John Horam, Afghanistan. Q111 Mr Horam: Foreign Secretary, there are worrying signs of deterioration there, are there not? Mr Straw: Well, the situation ----- Q112 Mr Horam: Did you say there are not? Mr Straw: I am sorry, I am not quite sure what signs you are referring to. Q113 Mr Horam: The strengthening of the Taliban and al-Queda and the evidence that the sort of methods used in Iraq are now being used in Afghanistan. Mr Straw: There has been a terrorist problem in Afghanistan from the time that the Taliban were, in the main, defeated. When I visited Kandahar in the summer of 2003 there had been a bomb in a mosque the day before, and some people had been killed and a large number of people had been injured. Indeed, I saw many people who had been severely injured laid out in a field hospital in what had been the departures lounge of Kandahar International Airport - so this had been going on for some time. The better news, Mr Horam, is that there has been the presidential election. We have now had the parliamentary and provincial elections, with the final results expected by the end of this month. The first session of the parliament will be on 19 December, and that will mark the culmination of the political tract of the Bonn process. If you think about where Afghanistan was four years ago, this is a dramatic improvement. Nobody would then argue ‑‑‑‑‑ Q114 Mr Horam: I accept entirely that point, but equally the evidence we have to set against that is that there are clear signs that the Taliban and al-Qaeda are reviving, certainly in some provinces. Is that right? Mr Straw: I do not have the precise figures about Taliban activity. It is certainly the case that they are not completely defeated, and there remains quite a serious challenge. That is something we need to deal with, along with our American colleagues and those - as you know there are two operations; there is ISAFs and there is also Operation Enduring Freedom, which is based on Kandahar. Q115 Mr Horam: Presumably, the Nato Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer's argument that they must increase the amount of military capability there from 10,000 to 15,000 is presumably working on the assumption that unless it does that, the situation will get worse. Mr Straw: There is the issue of terrorism and there is also the issue of ensuring that the writ of the elected government runs. Q116 Mr Horam: They are linked, are they not? Mr Straw: They are in some areas and they are not in other areas. Q117 Mr Horam: They are linked in the problem areas. Mr Straw: In ensuring that there is effective order. As you will know, Mr Horam, we are proposing to do two things: we propose to put the ARC in from May 2006, and then to increase our total forces quite substantially. Q118 Mr Horam: Have you got a figure for that? Mr Straw: There is a figure but I am not certain whether I am at liberty to issue it, because it is a matter for my colleague John Reid. I am told sotto voce that an announcement will be given later this week. Q119 Mr Horam: Are we going to have to make a bigger effort to further improve the situation in Afghanistan? Mr Straw: Yes. Q120 Mr Horam: Are we going to make a big effort? Mr Straw: This is now becoming almost a cliché, but whilst in Iraq their fear is of occupation; in Afghanistan the fear is of abandonment. In Iraq ----- Q121 Mr Horam: How would you feel that the situation in Afghanistan has suffered as a result of their abandonment by the attention being drawn to Iraq? Mr Straw: No, I do not think that. Q122 Mr Horam: You just said it was, that ----- Mr Straw: I said that the Iraqis fear occupation. I am dealing with differences in the political and psychological make-up of the Iraqis as opposed to the Afghans. Whilst the Iraqis fear occupation, as I say - they wish that our troops to leave as quickly as possible once the security situation is better; in Afghanistan they fear abandonment because they saw what abandonment ----- Q123 Mr Horam: But they fear abandonment because we have abandoned them to some extent. Mr Straw: No, it is to do much more with what happened over a thirty-year period, when in fact the international community did abandon them in the mid seventies, and then in turns they were left to the devices of the Soviet bloc and then there was, as it were, this interim strategy of funding Mujahadeen, which then morphed into the Taliban; so it was not altogether satisfactory. I am simply making the point that this is a long-term commitment by the international community and by the UK, both in terms of money and in terms of our military presence; and there is going to be this announcement. Q124 Mr Horam: What do you think is the biggest problem in Afghanistan now? Mr Straw: Well, there are a number of linked problems. There is the problem of terrorism, of drugs, of corruption and of poor governance. Q125 Mr Horam: They are pretty big problems. Mr Straw: Of course they are big problems, but if you go to where the country started four years ago, these are problems that can be overcome. Significantly, the Afghans are embracing the idea of democracy, just as they are in Iraq. Q126 Mr Horam: But my point is, can you make the kind of big or significant increase in effort there to deal with the problems you have just outlined in Afghanistan, while at the same time being committed to a situation in Iraq, which is as difficult as it is? Mr Straw: Yes, and if you are asking me about troop numbers, obviously if you want detailed information you need to ask the Defence Minister. Although our commitment in Iraq remains substantial, our troop numbers are now well below 10,000; and bear in mind that at the height of the war there were 46,000 troops in theatre. The judgment of John Reid and of the Chief of Defence Staff is that the increase in troop numbers that will be announced for Afghanistan later this week is one that can be sustained - and that is their judgment not mine! Q127 Mr Maples: I wonder whether we could move to some other parts of the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia and Egypt. One of the things that this Committee has been interested in, and so has the Government, is the process of what one might broadly call Arab reform, reforming Arab countries, both in terms of their economy and in terms of development of government, human rights and governance. If we take those two specific countries - I know that there are others but Saudi Arabia and Egypt seem to me to be the most important - do you think we are seeing real progress? There may be different answers to the two questions, but are we seeing real progress, both in terms of economic and political reform? I do not mind how slow it is, but do you think things are happening? Mr Straw: I think there is progress being made. Egypt, as you will be aware, has begun multi-party elections. It has been slow process. Doctor Gooderham: In respect of Egypt, we have already had the presidential elections, and the country is now gearing up for the parliamentary elections, which will take place in three stages, three periods. I would agree with you: it is a significant development, what we saw both in the presidential elections and what we are now expecting to see in the parliamentary elections. There is clearly a development towards more democratisation in Egypt. Saudi Arabia of course is further behind, but it has now held municipal elections, and the government there does appear to be committed to what I think is fair to describe as an evolutionary approach to further democratisation in that country. I suspect that it will be fairly slow, but I think that the new King, King Abdullah, has gone on the record to say that they want to move this forward. Q128 Mr Maples: One of the things we have discussed before on this subject is the view that I take, and which I think a lot of others share, that there are some pretty fundamental things that have to be in place before democracy is going to work, for example the rule of law, a relatively incorrupt government, a private sector with a growing middle class, if one wants to put it like that. Are we seeing evidence of developments in good governance, lack of corruption, objectivity and the rule of law? Those seem to me in some ways to be more important than the actual elections, at least in this stage of the process. Doctor Gooderham: I think we are seeing patchy progress. We have to be realistic. Obviously, we would like to see more progress more quickly, but I think you can point to some countries where the processes are improving all the time. To refer back to what the Foreign Secretary said earlier, the fund that we have available in the FCO, the Engagement with the Islamic World Fund, and the £10 million that the Foreign Secretary referred to - we are using a lot of that money for precisely projects designed to bolster rule of law, the participation of women in the political and democratic processes in various countries in the region; so we are doing what we can. Q129 Mr Maples: I am sure we are doing a lot, but do you think there is a recognition on the part of the governments of Saudi Arabia and Egypt - and again there may be different answers on both - of the need to move down this track? If they want to become part of the mainstream world and become prosperous with growing economies do they recognise that these are essential ingredients; or do you think that that is not really how they see it, and that they think, "oh, gosh, I suppose we had better do something because the British and the Americans are pestering us about it"? Doctor Gooderham: No, I think that there are signs, particularly in Egypt, where President Mabarak has said repeatedly that this is the direction he wants to take Egypt in; but they will have to go at their own pace, and that is reasonable. They need to gauge how much progress they can make at each stage. Obviously, we have been doing what we can to encourage the process of democratisation. We are not alone; there is a G8 process that is active; but we are very careful to put that in the context of encouragement rather than trying to impose or direct, because that would clearly be counterproductive. Q130 Mr Maples: Do you think that in terms of economic development the governments of countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia look around the world and ask, "How is it that Malaysia, South Korea, China and India can start making this phenomenal economic progress, and we make none; if we did not have oil we would be bust"? Mr Straw: I think they do. That was the central theme of the report of the Arab intellectuals a couple of years, the seminal report by the United Nations Development Programme. Q131 Mr Maples: The Development Programme recognised that, but did the governments ‑‑‑‑‑ Mr Straw: They are increasingly recognising this. The figures are startling. For example, Hewlett Packard obtains more patents every two weeks than have been issued in respect of Arab countries over a twenty-year period. The intellectual impoverishment of this region is terrible, and increasingly Arab leaders are recognising that. I read a book over the summer, The World is Flat, by Tom Friedman, which spells out as a very useful synopsis of the challenge affecting the Arab region. Mr Maples is absolutely right to say that the countries in the Arab world were at least on a level with Malaysia, China and South Korea, if not doing rather better than them fifty years ago in terms of overall living standards. They are now way behind, and it is a really serious issue for them. However, there are signs of improvement. There was the joint conference on Saudi reform, which I chaired with His Royal Highness Prince Saud Al-Faisal in February. If you had said to me even a year ago that there was going to be this kind of joint conference, one would have been very sceptical; but it indicates an increasing commitment by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to its reform programme - that is a similar but different commitment by the government of Egypt. Chairman, can I crave the indulgence of the Committee? I had understood this session would last an hour or hour and a half, and I think others thought it would last two hours; and if it would finish in seven or eight minutes, that is closer to two hours than an hour and a half. Q132 Chairman: I think we will do that. We will see if we can get there. Can I ask about the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. You talked about impoverishment of people and lack of political progress. What is your assessment of the impact of the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza on the possibilities of political process going further; and do you think that will have any impact on terrorism in the region? Mr Straw: We welcomed, and I welcomed, the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. If your aim is a separate state for Palestine, you have to start somewhere, and you have to start, in my judgment, with the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. It is therefore a necessary - I am not saying sufficient - precondition for the establishment of that state. It is also a test for the Palestinian authority whether it has the capacity and the will to build up what would be an embryonic mini state. A great deal of effort is going in to support them in terms of security reform, and, through Jim Wolfensohn, a process of reconstruction; so it is a good step rather than the reverse. On the issue of terrorism, the quicker the Israeli/Palestinian conflict is resolved by political processes the quicker we can see an end to the terrorism that has so shattered lives on both sides of the green line. Q133 Chairman: Do you see a role for either the UK, the EU or some other international body in facilitating the ongoing process? Mr Straw: Are you talking about security forces? Q134 Chairman: Either as security forces or facilitating the negotiation process, given that the Israelis seem to be saying that there are not going to be any more dramatic unilateral steps, and that the Palestinians have got the election, and the Israelis have got a political power struggle within Likud. Can we and others internationally do something now to keep the process going? Mr Straw: We are doing, but I think it is important that we should not reinvent these structures. We have got the quartet arrangement now and it is working. There was a good meeting in late September in New York, which I attended, and we just need to keep that going. There was a very, very positive commitment all round the table, from the UN, from the Russian Federation from the US and the EU to this process and to the conclusions we came up with. In terms of whether there is a contribution that we can make, there are many contributions that we can make, and we are making them in many respects, including continuing support and advice to the Palestinian authority for security sector reform. We would also be willing to consider any requests that came in for other assistance. Q135 Mr Hamilton: Foreign Secretary, there is no doubt that the security barrier or wall, whatever you would call it, has helped the Israelis keep out some atrocities that might have happened had they not had it. The big problem is where it goes. We have had the Israeli High Court making judgments that the route of the wall, or plan for the wall, or barrier, has been entirely wrong, cutting off Palestinians from their own farmland. What can we do to ensure that if they continue to build this barrier they do not further create resentment amongst Palestinians and exacerbate some of the terrorist acts that are taking place? Mr Straw: If they did indeed build the wall away from the green line ----- Q136 Mr Hamilton: I am thinking about the way they are encircling East Jerusalem, for example. Mr Straw: Indeed. This will exacerbate tensions. However, there is a prior question here, which is the building of settlements, because the wall is not being routed in the abstract, it is being routed around settlements; and the great concern of us and of many others is the creation by the Israelis of facts on the ground. It is for that and for many other reasons that we feel so strongly against any further development in the E1 sector, which would lead to the complete encirclement of East Jerusalem. Even so, on current plans, access between East Jerusalem and Ramallah and the south will become more difficult, which is certainly of very great concern. What do we do? We keep up the pressure and keep talking to international partners, particularly the Americans, as I have done pretty continuously, and to the Israelis. Chairman: Andrew Mackinlay has indicated that he wants to come in. Can you be extremely brief? Q137 Andrew Mackinlay: I can, but this problem of timing has happened before - but I will move straight to my point. In the Former Soviet Union there are decaying lighthouses for example around the coast where there is material that can be taken by people who want to develop ----- Mr Straw: Like light bulbs? Q138 Andrew Mackinlay: No, and I am surprised you are quite flippant about that because there is material which could go into dirty bombs and there is clearly evidence about that. I am surprised you take that view, Foreign Secretary because - I am responding. There have also been reports that the market place for that is in the "Stans". Certainly there was quite a detailed and authoritative piece on the BBC PM Programme by Rod Broomby about this. It relates to what this Committee has drawn attention to in the past about the access to these materials throughout the Former Soviet Union - by way of example, lighthouses in remote places, which are looted - and also the fact that we are concerned about the "Stans" and we have not got representations for instance in Kyrgyzstan, where there is also the problem of Islamic refugees from Uzbekistan. In a sense, because we are under time constraints there are some related things here. One is the decay and access of stuff around the Former Soviet Union; second is the market place and the "Stans", and third is the absence of our representation in this very fragile country of Kyrgyzstan, which has this issue and the issue of the refugees from Uzbekistan. Mr Straw: Please put aside my flippant remark about light bulbs. We have done a great deal since the break-up of the Soviet Union to support the safe custody process, and so has the American Government. The programme has a name, which I have forgotten. We allocated a lot of money to this. I am not aware of - I do not recall seeing anything recently in which serious concerns were being raised about the security of nuclear arsenals in this ----- Q139 Andrew Mackinlay: Foreign Secretary, I am surprised because you know how ‑‑‑‑‑ Mr Straw: We can write to you. Q140 Andrew Mackinlay: There are sometimes authoritative articles in newspapers. Unusually, there was quite an authoritative item on a radio programme, which specifically dealt with the issues of the materials to which I have referred, the sources of them; and it specifically said about Kyrgyzstan, where we have not got representation. Mr Straw: We will write to you, and you can also have a note about representation in Kyrgyzstan. We are accredited there. Andrew Mackinlay: Yes, in Almaty, which is --- Q141 Chairman: I apologise if there was confusion. We were definitely expecting a two-hour session, concluding with a seven o'clock vote; but, clearly, somehow or other wires got crossed. I am grateful for you coming along and enduring nearly two hours. We look forward to seeing you again in a few weeks' time when you come and talk about the European Union presidency. To give you notice, I will be writing on behalf of the Committee concerning the report we produced on Cyprus and the response we received from your Clerk because we want to pursue that issue further at some point. We will not ask questions now. Mr Straw: I have let you have a detailed response to that. Chairman: Can I thank you and your colleagues, Dr Gooderham and Mr Richmond, for coming along. |