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UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL EVIDENCE To be published as HC 768-iii House of COMMONS MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
Wednesday 3 May 2006 MR DOUGLAS ALEXANDER MP, MR ANTHONY SMITH and MR SIMON MANLEY Evidence heard in Public Questions 153 - 208
USE OF THE TRANSCRIPT
Oral Evidence Taken before the Foreign Affairs Committee on Wednesday 3 May 2006 Members present Mike Gapes, in the Chair Mr David Heathcoat-Amory Mr John Horam Andrew Mackinlay Mr John Maples Sandra Osborne Sir John Stanley Ms Gisela Stuart ________________ Witnesses: Mr Douglas Alexander, a Member of the House, Minister for Europe, Mr Anthony Smith, Director, European Political Affairs, and Mr Simon Manley, Former Head, Economic/Central Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, gave evidence. Q153 Chairman: Good afternoon everybody. Douglas, thank you for coming along today and agreeing to discuss the European Union in general. We have got quite a big agenda that we want to touch on. I would like to begin by going back to the British Presidency and asking you to give an assessment of how you think it worked out in the end and what the achievements were and what the failures were. Mr Alexander: Firstly, can I say it is a pleasure to be with the Foreign Affairs Committee. Perhaps I could just in the briefest sense introduce Simon Manley, who has served as Head of Economic/Central Europe within the Foreign Office, and Anthony Smith, who is our Director of European and Political Affairs. With your permission, Chairman, at appropriate points in the course of the evidence I may call on them for support. Reflecting back on the Presidency now just over four months since its conclusion, I would essentially begin at the beginning: what did we inherit? We inherited a Europe that was divided on the issue of the European budget after the June European Council under the Luxembourg Presidency, a Europe that was still coming to terms with the scale and significance of the rejection of the Draft Constitutional Treaty by voters respectively in France and in the Netherlands, and a Europe that was under an obligation, agreed previously at a European Council in December 2004, to open accession talks with Turkey on 3 October. The circumstance dictated that we had a fairly challenging agenda. If we take each of those issues in turn, I would argue that in what was ultimately agreed among the heads of government at the December European Council and what is now being followed through in the institutional process, we achieved what many regarded as being very unlikely, which was to find the common ground and consensus on the issue of the European budget, a matter I am sure you will wish to question me over this afternoon. On the issue of the broader constitutional future of Europe, given the rejection of the Draft Constitutional Treaty, I think there was clearly a consensus back in the June Council of 2005 that there needed to be a period of reflection. We began our Presidency, as was made clear by the speech that the Prime Minister before the European Parliament on the eve of the Presidency, determined that the period of reflection would not be seen as a period of stagnation and that was it was important to understand not simply the text and the judgment that the people in France and the Netherlands had reached on the text but also the broader context. That explains why we chose to use the informal heads of government meeting in Hampton Court in October to focus on those broader questions establishing in its broadest sense the challenges that Europe faced, embracing the very significant pressures of globalisation bearing down on the European Union and the European continent. I think, as was already manifest in the Spring Council of the Austrian Presidency, Hampton Court proved impressive both in some of the issues it addressed and the added impetus it gave to key areas of policy work of the European Union. There was the important and delicate work of securing the opening of accession talks with Turkey on 3 October. It is no secret that I came to the Europe job immediately after the election so it was my first exposure to negotiations of that sort. I have to say I learned a great deal working closely with Jack Straw in the course of September, the weeks immediately preceding the 3 October deal, and it is honest to say that there were various points, both in the preceding weeks and the preceding hours, where the barriers at times seemed insuperable. In that sense it turned out to be a negotiation that went literally down to the wire and the claim that the accession talks began on 3 October was achieved by using Greenwich Mean Time rather than Luxembourg time where the negotiations were taking place. I think by almost any standard the achievement of the opening of accession talks was adjudged to be of historic significance and is therefore one of the other elements of which we are very proud in the course of the Presidency. Along with those specific challenges that were dictated to us by circumstance, there were of course dossiers and areas of work which we inherited from the Luxembourg Presidency and that we were keen to see progress on, areas for example such as better regulation, advancing the Lisbon Agenda, and the other areas of work which no doubt we will have the opportunity to cover in the course of this afternoon's session. I would reflect on those six months of the British Presidency as being six months during which we did make solid and in some cases substantial achievements against a set of circumstance which did not appear propitious when we inherited the Presidency in July. Q154 Chairman: I recall being in the European Parliament on 4 October and in fact you were not able to come and speak to us at that time because you were still in the early hours doing the deal. As a Committee we have travelled quite a bit earlier this year and certainly when we were in Warsaw we got from the Polish parliamentarians a sense of some irritation, I think is probably the best way of describing it. There was a sense perhaps that they had bigger expectations of the British Presidency being more congenial to the newer Member States and they seemed to have some sense of disappointment. I would be interested in your take on how other Member States saw the outcome. Was our standing improved, was it raised as a result of the budget deal or Turkey, or did actually we in the process have to do things which meant we came out of it not as at the centre of Europe as we might have wanted to be? There was some press comment about that as well in some articles. It would be interesting to hear your take on that. Mr Alexander: Perhaps as the British Government Minister for Europe I am not the best person to offer an objective judgment on how others perceive our efforts. With the greatest of respect to our colleagues in the third estate, I do not take the metric of our success as being how some of the British newspapers report our performance. I think it is right to recognise that particularly amongst the new accession countries, the A10, there was a high level of concern after the failure to reach agreement on the future financing deal back in June under the Luxembourg Presidency and that concern continued in the course of the British Presidency. Again, there is something of a parallel here with the progress of negotiations on Turkey. I read with interest the evidence that Charles Grant gave before your Committee on the issue of the Turkish negotiations saying that there was some irritation amongst new Member States' foreign ministers (such as Poland) that there was not a greater level of consultation. During the 30 hours that we spent in Luxembourg I would simply say that it reflects well, I believe, on the experience and judgment of the Foreign Secretary how managed the paper flow was during those very delicate hours. Speaking candidly on the basis of the success that was achieved, I genuinely believe that had there been a more open process by which every iteration of papers was shared with every European foreign minister almost at any point preceding the final hours of negotiations, I would not be able to celebrate the fact that the opening of accession talks with Turkey was achieved on 3 October. The reason I cite that example was also it was a judgment to go late in terms of the future financing negotiations. That partly reflects the fact that the June European Council, which I attended, certainly manifested division and came close at times to manifesting animus. I think it was right to have a period immediately following the failure of the Luxembourg Presidency to secure agreement to have a pause during which officials such as Simon and others from the Treasury engaged in a detailed and unglamorous, but nonetheless ultimately important, task of speaking bilaterally to each of the other 24 members, indeed 26 including Bulgaria and Romania, to establish what were the parameters and the ground on which a deal could potentially be struck. That process continued through the autumn. On reflection, Hampton Court played a useful role in again giving a greater degree of commonalty of view as to the challenges that Europe faced in the future. Had we followed conventional orthodoxy and tabled Presidency proposals on the future financing very early in our Presidency, I am not convinced it would have made it any more likely that we would have succeeded. There is one issue in terms of other Member States in terms of the tactics that we deployed in terms of negotiation. Ultimately, the real test is not the tactics but the outcome and in that sense both on Turkey and on the budget I feel there has been a vindication by results. In terms of other aspects of our relationships with Eastern Europe, certainly the scale of funds that have been committed, the broad transfer of resource from west to east, has been achieved under the British Presidency proposals that were agreed. The consensus was secured back in December. Of course, these negotiations are inherently difficult. Every country is seeking to defend its national interests and every country is prone to see the negotiations simply in terms of a zero sum game. In that sense, rather akin to coming into government, you do not enter government simply to win the popularity stakes; you enter government to try and achieve important undertakings and I think there is a parallel there with the European Union. Q155 Ms Stuart: Can I take you back to the budget. I am interested in what you said about tactics and the tactics being justified by the outcome, but was not part of the problem that there were 24 Member States who said the British must give up their rebate and for a very long moment we said it was non-negotiable and then we did give up the rebate? Mr Alexander: Non-negotiable, as I recollect, was never language I used as the Europe Minister. We did claim that the rebate was justified on the basis of the prior anomaly, the fact of the structure of the European budget, both in terms of net receipts to the United Kingdom and also the continuing existence of the Common Agricultural Policy, we argued strongly and continue to argue and make the case for a British rebate. Of course, there was a focus, not least in the British papers, on the issue of the rebate, but I would point out that in June prior to the British Presidency it was not, as some would have you believe, the United Kingdom standing alone against a broad consensus of the European Union. There were five Member States who were unable to accept the Luxembourg proposals, but the consequence of the final proposals that were tabled by the Luxembourg Presidency late in the night in June was that the bar was set pretty high for both our politicians and our diplomats to argue that there should be a fundamentally different basis on which agreement should be reached. Essentially the previous Presidency proposals had involved a very significant contribution of funds in the context of a larger budget being contributed by the United Kingdom, although there was a significant share on the basis of radical changes to the rebate. As a consequence of that, part of our endeavours in the months following the failure to reach agreement in June was both to explain the correlation and the linkage between the abatement and the reason why the abatement came into existence, but equally to argue - and the Prime Minister was very clear on that as early as that speech he made before the Europe Parliament - that all the time he recognised we had a responsibility to make a fair contribution towards the costs of enlargement. I think that reflects the final settlement that we reached in December. Q156 Ms Stuart: There is a counter-argument that we should have put CAP reform on the table about two years before our Presidency and we could have negotiated earlier but that is as may be. Has agreement been reached now about what the size of the budget is between the Budget Commissioner and the European Parliament? Mr Alexander: Let me come to your first point in terms of the CAP and then I will come on to the reported comments of the Budget Commissioner. Again there is a judgment to be reached in terms of how best to effect the scale of reform that certainly we in the United Kingdom would like to see in relation to the Common Agricultural Policy. It was clear that we would not be able to secure the consensus that ideally I would have wished to see, which would have been for more radical reform of the Common Agricultural Policy. Undoubtedly, under Margaret Beckett's stewardship we did see significant progress on the sugar regime, which was one of the most anomalous aspects of the Common Agricultural Policy. I would argue that the achievement in relation to fundamental reform was not the final word but rather a platform on which those of us who remain committed to seeing fundamental reform of agriculture can build. The establishment of the review for 2008-09, which will look at all aspects of how the European Union raises it resources and then allocates them, provides us with a real opportunity in the course of the Presidency. There was a British Government paper tabled at the beginning of December which argued for the kind of agricultural policy that we would like to see Europe have in the future. I intend to make a speech in the weeks to come in Berlin on exactly that issue. It is an issue that we will continue to work and argue the case for but we have to secure the support of allies in that endeavour. That partly reflects the importance we attached not simply to the policy benefits of economic development in Eastern Europe which would be secured through the budget deal but also in terms of those countries in Eastern Europe which we would regard as being potentially natural allies in the cause of reform not just on agriculture but more generally in the European Union. I think it would have been contrary to our national interest to lose that potential alliance for reform within the Union by prejudicing their ability to access European funds, which of course is a very central focus of their concern at the moment. In terms of the reported comments of the Budget Commissioner, we are clear that the budget set out in the IIA will amount to €864 billion. We did not recognise, and, as you can imagine, when it was brought to my attention I tasked my officials very quickly to establish the basis on which our colleague in the Commission had come up with this figure of €900 billion. Frankly, we do not regard that as an accurate reflection of the budget. Our best efforts within the Foreign Office and speaking with colleagues in the Treasury to at least understand the basis on which this figure emerged, reflects, in our judgment, an attempt to say that certain items which have never been part of the main European budget, principally the European Development Fund, which I understand is €19.9 billion for the period 2008-13, should be added on to the European Budget. Other aspects - the annual flexibility instrument, the Solidarity Fund and the Emergency Aid Reserve - which no British Government, indeed the European Union itself has regarded at any point in any terms of our discussions either bilaterally with other Member States or indeed with the Commission as being part of the European budget as being lumped together in order to try reach a figure as high as €900 billion. Q157 Ms Stuart: Finally, you seem quite hopeful about the reviewing process by the Commission on the budget. If during those discussions in 2007-08 it was put on the table that the only way would be for the EU to raise its own resources, what would the British Government's position be on that? Mr Alexander: We have long argued that taxation is a matter for Member States rather than for the European Union. I know there was flurry of publicity at the turn of the year, there were certain reported comments, if I recollect, from the Austrian Chancellor, but we have not changed our position during the Presidency or post the Presidency. As a matter of principle we regard taxation as a competence of Member States. Q158 Sir John Stanley: Minister, perhaps I could turn to a housekeeping bit of the EU budget, one directly relevant to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. I expect your attention was drawn to the extended piece in The Sunday Times of 23 April under the heading "High Life of the EU 'stealth ambassadors'". It drew attention to the rising and substantial expenditure of EU taxpayers' money on the provision of ambassadorial residences for EU ambassadors. It says: "Houses are part of a growing property portfolio, housing a cadre of ambassadors who include Tim Clarke, the brother of the Home Secretary and John Bruton the former Irish Prime Minister ..." and it refers to the fact that there are now apparently 122 EU ambassadorial residences. Mr Bruton's 16-bedroomed mansion in Washington is featured and Tim Clarke's accommodation in Addis Ababa is described as "a splendid residence. The grounds can easily take 300 to 400 people." The question I would like to put to you is what degree of control is being exercised by our Foreign Office and our Foreign Secretary and our Foreign Office ministers about this burgeoning expenditure? As you are well aware, in this Committee we are taking a very close interest in the regrettable reductions of ambassadorial posts and ambassadorial residences as far as the United Kingdom is concerned, and it certainly goes against the grain, as far as I am concerned and perhaps for other members of the Committee, to see this huge expansion of both ambassadorial positions and ambassadorial residences by the EU. Mr Alexander: Firstly let me say I think it is something of a misnomer to describe these as ambassadorial residences and these individuals as ambassadors. It raises of course the question of the European External Action Service and we are very clear that the European External Action Service cannot come into effect without a Constitutional Treaty which would provide it with a legal base. Indeed, a European Foreign Minister was anticipated as part of the Constitutional Treaty. Given the status of the Constitutional Treaty at the moment that is not where we are. My understanding in terms of John Bruton - and indeed I cannot deal with all of the individuals, but many of the individuals that I am sure the piece reflects are Commission representatives. Do I believe that there is a role for having Commission representatives working internationally? Yes, I do accept that there is a role for the European Commission to be represented internationally in certain locations, but that raises an important question both of efficiency and of principle, which is do we in perpetuity hold on to a clear distinction between the Council of Minister and the European Commission. I have argued very strongly within the Foreign Office and elsewhere that it is important that we maintain clarity as to those inter-governmental aspects, CFSP, where it is appropriate for the Council of Minister to be represented discretely and separately from the European Commission. On the other hand, there is one particular case (which has been the subject of discussions with other committees in the House) where I am sensitive on the grounds of efficiency at to avoiding a situation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia of having an effective duplication of exactly the kind of residences and support infrastructure that the piece describes. In that sense I think it is an area where we do continue to examine the matter closely. I will take back the point that you have raised both for myself and also for the Foreign Secretary, but it is important to recognise that there is both Commission competence in certain areas of work and discretely and appropriately separate areas of responsibility for the Council of Ministers. Q159 Sir John Stanley: Minister, may I say how absolutely delighted I was, you are the first Minister in my experience on this Committee either under this Government or under the previous Conservative Government who has been willing to describe the term "EU ambassador" as misleading. I am delighted you have used that description, which is one I would entirely share as of course the EU is not a national state or a national entity. Perhaps you would like to follow this up with a note because you said it is misleading but it is the term which has been used by the Foreign Office for years. It has been used by other Foreign Office ministers in front of this Committee and it is used by FCO officials and ambassadors and high commissioners wherever we go. Would you like to let us have a further note as to whether Britain will take the lead in changing the terminology from "EU ambassador "to "EU representative"? Perhaps you can also give us a further note as to what is the degree of control the UK can have over the endless increasing designation of individuals as EU ambassadors and also over the increasing proliferation of EU so-called ambassadorial residences. It would be helpful to have further information. Mr Alexander: Of course I will be happy to write to you. Let me be very clear, the context in which this evidence session takes place is continuing discussion and continuing questioning as to whether the European Union intends on the basis of the Draft Constitutional Treaty to establish an External Action Service. I would make clear the context in which I make the remarks reflects the fact that, notwithstanding the manner in which those particular posts were reported in The Sunday Times, that should not be seen as prejudging the important issue which is dependent and consequential upon the ratification of the Draft Constitutional Treaty. Q160 Andrew Mackinlay: Just to pick up on this. I do not want to trespass into the issue of the external representation service or what it is at the present time, but it does seem to me that the article itself justifies a little bit of probing. We all recognise that people should have residences which are not demeaning; they should be appropriate and proportionate. On the face of it, it does seem that at least some of them - and I know the press choose the best examples for their story - is disproportionate. I wonder if in either that note or a separate note we could have a note of what the accommodation is and whether or not it doubles up as the office as well. I do find it painful at a time when we have not got any representation in a number of key parts of the world that the EU might have a disproportionate residence facility and/or highly prestigious office accommodation. I do think we are entitled to have that. If you can look into it, it would be useful, not that you could turf a person out, but it does seem to me that you or your successors may be able to counsel a little bit of restraint. Mr Alexander: The Council budget is scrutinised both by the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. I will certainly make enquiry at a higher level. Q161 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: One's thoughts at this time of the year turn towards the European Constitution because the so-called period of reflection is about to end. I and some other members are going to Brussels next week to attend the Inter-Parliamentary Conference which is transparently about trying to revive all or part of the European Constitution. What is the British Government's attitude to widespread calls to revive at least part of the Constitution, given that the Prime Minister signed it and therefore presumably is still in favour of the Constitution? Are you sympathetic to such a device? Mr Alexander: You are right, of course, that the Prime Minister signed it in Rome and the position of the British Government has not changed. In terms of the process of ratification in the United Kingdom our approach has also not changed. The means by which the draft constitution would be ratified here in the UK would be by means of a referendum. That being said, it is uncertain as to what would be the outcome of the period of reflection which takes place this June. We are in discussion with partners, particularly now post the Presidency, to establish the views of other Member States as well. Q162 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: I want your views. Do not please speculate on others' views; you are not responsible for them. We want your views on what the British Government thinks is right, particularly towards calls to so-call "cherry-pick" bits of the European Constitution. Mr Alexander: Let's take this issue of cherry-picking. There are two possible constructions that can be placed on that term of art. One description would be to say are there any elements of the Draft Constitutional Treaty which we would consider as being potentially important in and of themselves on the basis of the existing treaties, that is they do not require further treaty change? Have we ruled out any possibility of incremental improvements on the basis of existing treaty change? No, we have not. So, for example, on the issue of transparency or for example the issue of subsidiarity we have never said that we would be unwilling to look at further improvements consistent with Britain's national interests to the rules operating in the European Union. On the other hand, would we countenance at this stage seeking to implement elements of the Draft Constitutional Treaty requiring an alternative treaty base than the Draft Constitutional Treaty? No, that is not the discussion that we are having. Q163 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: So you have said you will contemplate making treaty changes but stopping short of the Constitution? Mr Alexander: With the greatest of respect, that is not what I have said. What I said was --- Q164 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: So you are ruling that out, are you? Mr Alexander: If you will allow me to chose my own words. Q165 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: One or the other, please. Mr Alexander: If you will allow me to answer the question, I will endeavour to do so. What we have said is the period of reflection continues. I anticipate that it may be that the period of reflection continues beyond June. Have we ruled out any incremental improvements, sensible rule improvements, on the basis of existing treaties? No, we have not. However, are we proposing at this stage such changes during the period of reflection? No, we are not. At the moment we are continuing to reflect, as befits a government during a period of reflection, on where the Constitutional Treaty now lies in the light of the decisions reached in France and in the Netherlands. Q166 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: Please, I understand you have not ruled out non-treaty changes as a way of improving matters but what we want to know is whether you are contemplating treaty changes of any sort at all, or is your attitude towards those demands from, say, the French Government that you will not allow any part of the Draft European Constitution to be brought in if it involves changes to the existing treaties? Is that your position? Mr Alexander: No, the focus of discussions in relation to treaty change, not just with the French but with other European partners, continues to be about the treaty changes anticipated by the Draft Constitutional Treaty. That is the focus and substance of our discussions. That being said, given the decisions that were reached both in France and the Netherlands respectively in referendums, I think the right response is not simply to carry on as if nothing had altered but instead to have a period of reflection. As I say, my personal view, and indeed the view of the Government, is that there may be cause for continuing that period of reflection, but that will be a matter to be discussed with our partners ahead of the June European Council, and that is the focus of our discussions at the moment. Q167 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: Sorry, you must give a clear answer. You have said that you are contemplating non-treaty changes, in other words rule changes that do not require amending the existing treaties. We all understand that. What I want to know is your attitude towards modifying, amending or changing the existing treaties in order to bring in parts of the Constitution. I take it from your answer just now that you are looking at this in an overall context but you have not ruled it out, or have you? Mr Alexander: Let me try and explain. The context is the period of reflection. The focus of our work during the period of reflection - and this was reflected in the Prime Minister's speech at St Antony's College at the turn of the year - is the practical improvements to the lives of European citizens. That was why we started the Hampton Court process and why we welcomed the fact that there was such a focus on Hampton Court at the last European Council meeting that took place in February. As a consequence of that, we believe and continue to argue to our European partners that the best use of this period of reflection is not simply to deliberate together as to why French and Dutch voters rejected the Draft Constitutional Treaty or the lessons that should be drawn from that, but instead saying as well as issues related to the text there are issues, undoubtedly as anyone with a passing familiarity with the French and Dutch campaigns will know, about the context. That is why we need to use this period to work with partners, including the French and others, to see what practically we can look to to meet challenges such as the challenges of diversity of supply and security of supply and a genuinely open European energy market. Q168 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: You must answer my question otherwise this is a completely fruitless exchange. I am talking about the suggestion very widespread from many Member States to amend the existing treaties in order to bring into effect parts of the Constitution. Please will you answer the question: are you ruling that out? Are you saying to the French and others, "We will not allow that incremental bringing in of the Constitution" and will we therefore confine ourselves to non-treaty based changes? Mr Alexander: I am being clear with you that while we could contemplate non-treaty change, incremental improvements of the rules - and that was made clear as early as the initial discussions immediately following the French and Dutch referenda - the focus of our work during this period of reflection, as reflected in our discussions with other European partners, is firstly the status of the Draft Constitutional Treaty in the light of the rejection of it by the French and Dutch voters and, secondly, the necessary practical changes that Europe needs to make - and, as I say, you do not need to take my word for it, read the speech the Prime Minister made to the European Parliament, read the speech he made to St Antony's College, Oxford, or the contributions the Foreign Secretary and others have made during our Presidency. We are absolutely sincere in saying, as the Prime Minister said back in February, "Don't start with the rules" - and with respect your question addresses the rules- "start with the reasons they are needed." That explains the approach we have taken to the period of reflection, which is an analysis of why the proposal was rejected, focusing not simply on a textual context. That is why during the period of reflection the main focus of our work has been driving forward that Hampton Court agenda. Q169 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: I am not interested in the main focus of your work. I am trying to get you to answer a simple question. I really think this is a fruitless exchange. I must say, I am very disappointed that this Committee cannot get a straight answer on the European Union. It is really quite a simple point which is extremely urgent, because the period of reflection is about to end. Chairman: We have other members who want to come in and we have other questions to ask. Mr Heathcoat-Amory: Can I ask you to try and help me to get some answers? Q170 Chairman: I trying to help the Committee to move through an agenda, and it is quite clear that you are not going to get a different answer to what you have had three times now. I am going to ask a different question. Thirteen Members States have now ratified. We are in a potential position where, by later in the year, another three or four states might have done that. At what point does the procedure come into effect whereby 80 per cent of the states have ratified and at that point we might be in a different position with regard to the status of the Constitutional Treaty? Mr Alexander: Candidly, I cannot anticipate where all of the other Member States who have not yet ratified the Draft Constitutional Treaty will go in terms of their own process of ratification. This will be a subject, I would expect, that will be discussed at the next informal foreign ministers meeting, which is due to take place later this month under the Austrian Presidency, where they have asked that this issue of the future of Europe be one of the main issues under discussion. I think probably we will have a clearer sense as to where we will be ahead of June and where the process of ratification rests after that meeting under the Austrian Presidency. Q171 Sandra Osborne: Douglas, part of the period of reflection and the necessary changes that should be made must surely be to engender a more positive view of Europe in the eyes of the people of Europe, including our own people. I notice that it has been reported that a British firm has been hired to look at how the EU could be re-branded. If I refer to your pamphlet, suggesting that that there has been a kind of malaise building up in Europe with regard to Europe over a 20-year period, would you agree that certainly in the public eye credibility is at a fairly all time low? What do you see is the problem with the branding of the EU and how could it be improved? Mr Alexander: With the great of respect, whichever British firm has been hired, I do not think it is an issue of branding, I think it is more one of politics. I find in my meetings, discussions, debates here in Britain that if you argue the pro-European cause which I espouse and base that case predominantly on past achievements of the European Union, considerable though I would argue that they are, all too quickly you end up with discussions of deregulation about the curvature of cucumbers, the sustainability of the British pint of milk or the British loaf of bread. I think, on the other hand, if you start the conversation from somewhere different, which is to say, are there certain challenges which any Member State, however effective and however powerful, can better meet by working effectively with partners in the 21st century, issues that I would say would include how to secure national prosperity in the globalising markets that we see, how to deal with the issue of monetisation, how to deal with the issue of counter-terrorism, even how to deal with the issue of environmental derogation, then I do not think it is difficult to bring these challenges to the fore, but if the European Union did not exist we would need to develop something akin to the European Union to allow us to work effectively and collaboratively together in addressing those challenges. In that sense, I think the case to be made for the European Union should be based not simply on past achievements but on its capacity to address future challenges. I also think, and this is reflected in the priority we attach to key areas of work coming out of Hampton Court, that it is vital that we meet citizens of the European Union on the common ground of issues that they are concerned about. A good example of that is the energy policy. There is no doubt that, prior to the Hampton Court meeting in October, there was some scepticism about the point of having an approach to energy that was European. I think fewer people, frankly, after the events in January where you saw the Russian/Ukraine dispute over gas, believed that it was not sensible for Europe to seek to work effectively together given the challenges that we face around security of supply and diversity of supply; so I am optimistic that a strong case can be made for Europe based not just on past achievements but on those future challenges. Of course, there is always more that can be done to make that case, but fundamentally I do not believe it is as much about branding as about the arguments for why Europe matters in the 21st century. Q172 Sandra Osborne: Yes, but do you think that people have felt in the past that the EU has dealt with far too many things, some of which are irrelevant to their every day lives, and that is why there is less credibility than perhaps there could be? Mr Alexander: I think there is a paradox here, in the sense that if you take some of the major decisions that are reached by, for example, the Commissioner around competition policy, there is no doubt that these are very significant decisions that have a very major impact on the lives and economies of Europe, but I tend to find that there is not a great deal of resiling from those decisions being taken at a European level, because I think people basically understand that, if you are going to have a single market with 460 million people, you need to have strong and effective competition policies to be able to police that market effectively. By contrast, I think there are, certainly in the way these issues are reported in the British newspapers, certain decisions where people do not have as clear a sense as to why Europe is engaged in the matter in the first place, and that is where, I think, in the past Europe has been vulnerable to some very bad publicity. It is, therefore, not a matter of the scale of the decision as much as people understanding the why of the decision as well as the outcome itself. Q173 Mr Maples: I wanted to ask you, going back to this question of cherry-picking or piecemeal implementation of bits of the Constitution, about the use of Article 308 of the Treaty, which, if I remember rightly, allows the Council, on the unanimous recommendation of the Commission, to do things which the Treaty does not provide for. If in the course of the operation of the common market it is necessary to attain the objectives of the community, they can use this catch-all phrase, which is very wide and allows legislation outside the Treaty. What I am concerned about is that that is being, or might be used, to implement bits of the Constitution. Are you aware of any bits of the Treaty that have been used to implement the Constitution? Mr Alexander: I am not aware, on the basis of your description, but maybe you could give me some more detail. Q174 Mr Maples: There was an Article in the Treaty, Article 308 of the TEC (Treaty Establishing the Community), which, in furtherance of pursuing the common market, allows the Council to be unanimous, on the recommendation of the Commission, to do things which are not otherwise provided for in the Treaty. That seems to me to be an Article which could be used, or might be used to implement bits of the Constitutional Treaty piecemeal. I wondered if you were aware of any parts of it that have been used. Mr Alexander: No. Q175 Mr Maples: Is the view of the British Government that that Article is for the furtherance of the common market, by which I think most of us mean the internal market, free trade, those sorts of aspects, the free movement of goods and people? Is the view of the British Government that that is what that Article is there to do and it is restricted to the furtherance of the common market? Mr Alexander: My own background as a lawyer makes me somewhat hesitant in offering an oral answer to you, given as I do not have the technological theory in front of me, so perhaps I could write to you on that one. Q176 Mr Maples: Would you, because the Article was, I think, used to sort of implement the Charter of Fundamental Rights which was in the Treaty and, I am sure you will recognise, whether or not it was a good idea or a bad idea, it was certainly one of the big things that was in the Treaty and one of the most controversial debates that we have had in the House. My understanding is that a European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights has been set up under Article 308 of the Treaty. Is that correct? Mr Alexander: My understanding was that the Fundamental Rights Agency did not have a legal base which was contingent on the Draft Constitutional Treaty, but I will certainly check that matter for you. Mr Maples: It seems that your official perhaps knows the answer to this question. Ms Stuart: Article 308 is a current article. Q177 Mr Maples: I do not want to describe it as a flexibility clause if there is another flexibility clause, but there is a catch-all article which allows European legislation to be brought. My understanding is that it was used to change the Racism and Xenophobia Institute to a European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights last summer. Is that correct? Mr Alexander: It reinforces my point, but I would be cautious of offering you an answer without being able both to look at the issue of the Fundamental Rights Agency and also---- Q178 Mr Maples: I think I am going to ask you to tell us in writing, but I want to ask one more question. If it requires unanimity, then presumably, if this Article were used to implement anything, whether it is part of the Constitutional Treaty or something else, then it would require the British Government's approval. Unanimity is something that we could veto readily if we wanted to? Mr Alexander: We will wait and set it out for you. Q179 Mr Maples: I would be grateful. You are obviously not briefed to answer these questions, fair enough, but I would be grateful if you could set out to the Committee firstly what is the United Kingdom's view of the remit of Article 308 and, secondly, on what occasions has it been used. You can go back as far as you like, but I am particularly interested in the last year or two, but I would also be interested in previous uses of the Article as to whether or not the British Government (either this Government or the previous one) took a view as to exactly its ability. If we were to find that for 40 years it was only ever used for economic things to do with the common market and then suddenly it is used, for example, for fundamental rights, then that would show a difference in policy. So, if you could set it out for us. I just want to make sure these things are clear, because sometimes we say these things and then we get a letter answering a different question. Could you set out what is the British Government's view of its remit and on how many occasions it has it been used. In particular, was it used to establish or to change the name of an existing agency to the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights? Mr Alexander: We will endeavour to do that. Q180 Andrew Mackinlay: I listened carefully to David Heathcoat-Amory's questioning of you which I actually enjoyed. I am completely at the other end of the pole to him, but I certainly deem myself to be pro European, enthusiastically so, similar to yourself, but it did seem to me, listening and watching you, that were you were handicapped by one thing. The British Government had gone along with this is fiction that the Constitution was needed, whereas what you probably would have wanted to say to David Heathcoat-Amory, which I invite you to agree with, is basically, "Come off it. You are not suggesting that there should not be any more treaty changes." The history of the European Union is organic change. There have to be treaties from time to time to deal with circumstances to make the thing work. Surely that should be the response, that you cannot rule out treaty changes to meet what is sensible and agreed negotiated arrangements to facilitate the good management and stewardship of the European Union. What you do not need is all the paraphernalia and hype of the Constitution, which, I put to you, is actually now a handicap to you, because we went down that road, but what there will clearly be, and you would encourage it because it is good governance, are sensible and agreed changes and they will inevitably involve some treaty changes. Mr Alexander: I suppose our exchange reflected the extent to which, with no disrespect to our absent colleague, the debate has moved on, in the sense that when I read the comment of the Prime Minister saying, "Don't start with the rules, start with the reasons; they are needed", I think perhaps the honourable gentleman had difficulty believing that we were sincere in saying the focus of the Union's work should not be continually and exclusively institutional change. We actually made it worse for him than he imagines. We actually believed what we said during the British Presidency that you should start with whatever are the reasons but sensible rule changes are necessary and have an appropriate focus on those issues, and that is why the work that we initiated at Hampton Court did not conclude at the end of the British Presidency, but we are pleased to see it being continued in entering the next period of European policy-making, and so we are absolutely sincere in saying the focus of any reflection should not be a period of simple institutional internal conversation but instead the opportunity to say why is it that there are questions of efficiency in the minds of citizens cross Europe about the added value of the European Union? What practical steps can we take, both as the Presidency and as a Member of the European Union, to advance those practical issues - for example, the issue of energy that I have spoken of? As I say, I think the exchange perhaps reflected a certain degree of scepticism in his mind that the Europe Minister could be sitting in front of him telling us that the first known priority of the British Government was not institutional change. Our authority is actually practical policies which affect and benefit the lives of citizens across Europe. Chairman: We move on to enlargement. Q181 Mr Horam: Fascinating and eclectic as the Constitution Treaty may be to aficionados, of which I take it you are not one---- Mr Alexander: You know me fairly well. Q182 Mr Horam: ----perhaps we can go on to broader themes, and particularly the issue of enlargement, because even there, a very important issue which Britain has played a major role in, there are slightly contrasting views. The Dutch Commissioner, for example, said the European Union should maximise at 27 members - it has 25 at the moment - which is a very small change, whereas, perhaps understandably, the Enlargement Commission is talking about not having a break, let us carry on with this process. Where does the UK Government stand on this? Mr Alexander: We have solidly continued to be strong advocates of enlargement. Let me explain why. I think, if you were to again take a broader view and take perhaps the most recent example, the accession of ten predominantly former Soviet countries in the European Union in 2004, championed initially by the British Government and by our Prime Minister, by any reckoning, that would be judged to be of genuine historic significance. Why is that judged to be of such historical significance? Because what we have managed to do is not simply grow the European Union and the single market but effectively helped change those societies and those economies for the better. I do not believe that we have concluded the capacity of the European Union to undertake that important work. I was strengthened in that conviction by the visit I paid to the Western Balkans during the Presidency where it was made very clear to me repeatedly, in country after country, that Membership of the European Union in those states has come to be seen as the equivalent to both modernity and normality. Whether, in fact, their revelation is to be part of the world's largest single market or to uphold the democratic norms of the European Union, it succours anything is as important as the changes that the prospect of European Union Membership can effect in those countries. Q183 Mr Horam: Good for them, but what about this question of the absorption capacity of the existing European Union? Mr Alexander: The absorption capacity has been there - if I recollect, it was part of the convening criteria - for many years, and, of course, that is one element of the conversation; but if you are saying is it good for Europe to have grown, for example, in the ten accession countries that I mentioned who joined in 2004, look at the respective rates of growth that have been achieved by those countries, look at the dynamism and vigour that they have brought to questions of the need for economic reform within the European Union, or, indeed, look at the diplomatic reach that a country such as Poland has brought to our engagement with a country like Ukraine at the time of the Orange revolution. I categorically believe that enlargement has strengthened and helped Europe in recent years, and I believe that the progress of future enlargement continues to hold out those potential positive gains in the future. Q184 Mr Horam: I am sorry to go back to the issue of the Constitution, but can we continue to expand Europe without any changes in the Constitution? Mr Alexander: The basis on which those countries entered in 2004 was, of course, not the Draft Constitutional Treaty, and, as somebody who took through the Bill in the Commons in the autumn in relation to Bulgaria and Romania, there are mechanisms outside of the Draft Constitutional Treaty by which enlargement can take place. Q185 Mr Horam: So you are in favour of that happening even if there is no constitutional change? Mr Alexander: I have not ever argued that the issue of enlargement should be seen as a mechanistic link to the fate of the Draft Constitutional Treaty. I think that the merits of enlargement stand on their own terms. Q186 Mr Horam: You recognise that that could mean a very large number of countries being added to the European Union, for example there are five in the former Soviet Union countries as well as Romania, Bulgaria and Serbia. That is a lot of countries. Mr Alexander: Of course, this is a discussion we which continue to have with our partners, but it is hard to envisage any enlargement as large, simultaneously, as the enlargement which took place in 2004 when ten came in. If you talk about enlargement then, in the light of the decisions that were reached on 3 October, you would also discuss Turkey, but on the Turkish Government's own estimation, it will be upwards of ten years before accession could be possible; so in that sense I think there is plenty of time both for the necessary conditionality to be achieved. You mentioned the Enlargement Commissioner. I think all your aids working at the Commission has done a great deal to strengthen the sense that there is a very clear sense of conditionality, rightly, around which countries have to work if they want to secure membership of the European Union. The way I described it when I was in the Western Balkans was to say that the bar on European Union membership has not been raised. On the other hand, the tolerance, I think, within the European Union (and I think your question reflects this) of countries slipping under that level of conditionality in order to secure membership has undoubtedly dissipated, and that is why I stand with the Commission in saying that we should have rigorous transparent procedures but that conditionality needs to be a central element of that discussion about enlargement. Q187 Chairman: How close are Romania and Bulgaria to meeting the bar, the threshold, the criterion? Is there not a danger that they will not meet it in 2007 and that you will have to bring the emergency procedure next month for at least one of them? Mr Alexander: To use a football term: the ball is at their feet. I was in Bulgaria on Thursday and Friday of last week. I met the Bulgarian Foreign Minister and discussed with him the progress that he and his government have been making, but all of us will be looking very carefully at the next Commission Report, which I understand is due out later this month on the 16th, and that will give us the basis on which a decision will be reached at the June European Council. Of course there was a previous Commission Report which identified particular areas of work. I do not, frankly, believe it benefits exactly the transparency and conditionality that I was just describing to your colleague for us to get into a running commentary on what the next report of the Commission is going to say. Frankly, I have not seen the report and I will give it very careful attention, as will my colleagues in the Foreign Office, when we receive it. Q188 Chairman: Can I put it to you that, if there is insufficient progress and it either becomes clear that one or both of them are not able to meet the criteria by 2008, that we would then be facing a very difficult situation within the European Union, given that there is an implicit assumption that automatically one or both of them will be---- Mr Alexander: A Treaty obligation? Q189 Chairman: Exactly. Where will we be if that is the situation, if Bulgaria or Romania or both of them are in some important respects, whether it is to do with judicial systems or whether it is to with corruption, whether it is to do with some other matters, not meeting the criteria? Mr Alexander: You are right in imposing the so-called super safeguard clause, which means that there could be a delay of 12 months from 1 January 2007/8, but, notwithstanding the existence of the super safeguard clause, and this was a matter that was discussed on the floor of the House in the course of the Bill here, there are considerable powers available to the Commission which would provide a degree of comfort to the rest of the Union if there were specific areas of concern still identified, notwithstanding the fact that the threshold had been reached for full membership. If it would be helpful, I will certainly set out for you our understanding of the powers the Commission have available to them. My understanding is that those powers were not used in 2004 against the A10 countries, but that does not diminish the fact that there are still powers available to the European Commission whatever the area of concern they continue to have. Chairman: That would be helpful. Can we move on to the Balkans? Q190 Andrew Mackinlay: After disagreeing with you, Chairman, I am very grateful you raised it. Of course, in 2004 there was the ultimate sanction that they might not come in. The difference between 2004 folk and Bulgaria and Romania is that under the Treaty Obligation they shall be in at 2008. There is a qualitative difference? Mr Alexander: In response to that, I would make a couple of points. One is, I think, partly through the experience of the 2004 accession there has been a strengthening of capacity within the Commission to actually benchmark and to judge candidate countries transparently, rigorously and effectively and, secondly, I think there is also an issue, not least because the potential membership involves both Bulgaria and Romania, where neither of the countries in question, and this is on the basis of discussions I have had with colleague ministers from both of these countries, want to be the country that finds they have not reached the deadline as quickly as the other country; so I think there are factors driving performance which were not there at the time of the 2004 accession. Q191 Andrew Mackinlay: For speed, can I say Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro and Serbia Montenegro: because there are three potential scenarios. Also news this afternoon, the European Union has closed talks with Serbia - I assume it is Serbia and not Serbia Montenegro; it is a bit unclear - on the question of Mladic. I wonder if you could give us a view of where we are at with regard Croatia. If Montenegro goes independent, presumably there will be at least an open invitation for them to fast-track meeting the criteria. What is the position regarding the breaking off of talks today, and is that with Serbia or is that the Serbia and Montenegro federation? Mr Alexander: I will start with the last point, because I issued a statement in response to the Commission decision today, which is available and is on the FCO website, in which I support fully the Enlargement Commissioner's decision to effectively disrupt the SAE talks, which is both for Serbia and Montenegro, not to give them the Constitutional position of a state of the Union ahead of the referendum. We fully support that, given that we believe Serbia and Montenegro have missed a number of self-imposed deadlines for full co-operation and it is a longstanding position with the British Government that we want to see Mladic and Karadzic brought to justice, and in that sense that explains the decision, which is one the British Government fully supports. In terms of if Montenegro gains independence from the State Union following the referendum, which I think is on 21 May, later this month, it is hoped that both countries will continue their commitment to make progress towards European Union integration. The current twin-track mechanism for the Serbia and Montenegro EU accession should facilitate this, but I cannot anticipate what will be out outcome of the referendum. Q192 Andrew Mackinlay: I am genuinely surprised by your response there. Presumably if Montenegro re-establishes its sovereign independence, it is a new ball game and they can apply and they can presumably anticipate, with regard to the British Government's reaction, the same facilities which are afforded to any other applicant or potential applicant? I think it is important for Montenegro to know that the British Government will not discriminate against an independent Montenegro. If they knock on the door, we will say, "Copenhagen criteria", and presumably there should be an opportunity to open negotiations? Mr Alexander: I can assure you we do not have a policy of discrimination towards anyone. What I will say is that I think it would be ill-judged of a Foreign Office minister at this stage, only a matter of days and weeks before the referendum, to anticipate what will be the judgment that will be reached by the people of Montenegro. In terms of other countries that you asked about, in terms of Croatia, obviously the opening of accession negotiations under our Presidency in the second half of last year we believed to be an important step, but it is now up to Croatia to work towards meeting those European Union standards and enable them to meet the standards in full before accession can take place, and, as you would expect, both the United Kingdom and the European Union is providing assistance to the Government of Croatia in those endeavours. Obviously, not least given the importance of full co-operation, the International War Tribunal, with the former Yugoslavia, as I mentioned, welcomed the capture of Ante Gotovina back in December and I think we reached the right decision to open negotiations with Croatia back at that 3 October meeting. Q193 Mr Horam: On Turkey briefly, which you regard as one of the two major tests of the Presidency, Charles Grant on European reform, when he came before the Committee, was very pessimistic about the situation there. He said on the one hand he did not think the Turks entirely appreciated this was not a negotiation - "The European Union says what it wants and either the country applicant agrees with it or not" - and, equally, it is clear there is opposition to Turkey amongst several countries and they could at any moment simply block any further progress under the various treaties. What is your view? Mr Alexander: I stand by my earlier theory that I think it was of genuine historic significance that that decision was reached on 3 October. I think it is the right decision, not just for Turkey but also for Europe, and I think we would have sent a very damaging signal if we had suggested that there was not the prospect of a European future for a country like Turkey and obliged it to turn elsewhere in terms of its future economic, social and political development. All that being said, I have never hidden the fact, and nor has the British Government, that there are very considerable challenges which Turkey will have to rise to in the years, and it will be many years of work, between now and that accession being achieved. Q194 Mr Horam: Would you agree with Charles Grant that they do not entirely appreciate these are not negotiations? Mr Alexander: I am not sure it is always helpful to pass comment on the conduct of other governments. As I say, the experience of the discussions prior to 3 October, both the weeks and the hours, suggest that the Turkish Government are strong negotiators, shall we say. That being said, the obligations under which they now operate are clear, and in that sense I would recognise that perhaps the sentiment underpinning Charles' statement, which is that, as a country that has been granted accession talks, the process for Turkey is exactly the same as for any other prospective Member of the European Union, the initial screening process, the opening of chapters and also the closing of chapters. Q195 Mr Horam: I think the underlying thought of Charles Grant (to limit your response) was that they are a proud nation and that when they realise what is happening, and the process may be very long, they may object? Mr Alexander: Well, let us not prejudge where the process will go. My understanding is that the screening process has now begun under the Austrian presidency. There are obligations, in particular the case was declared in September 2005 that Turkey must apply the Ankara Agreement Protocol fully to all Member States and the EU will monitor this closely and evaluate full implementation in 2006; so that will be a particular challenge facing Turkey in the course of this calendar year, but my understanding, and I spoke to officials in anticipation of appearing before you today, is that progress does continue to be made in terms of the formal processes of membership being taken forward essentially through European Chapters. Q196 Mr Maples: I want to pick up the Cyprus angle of Turkish membership issues. We have tail wagging the dog situation here in a really serious way and this Committee has taken quite an interest in Cyprus over the years, and we have produced a couple of reports on it. I wonder if you can tell us what is the state at the moment of the package that we have supported of both aid and transport links, trade links, physical trade links, I mean sea and air, into Northern Cyprus. Is that still stuck on a Cyprus veto or a threat of a Cyprus veto? Mr Alexander: In terms of the financial aid regulation, that has now been agreed and was an important first step forwards lifting Turkish/Cypriot isolation. There were concerns in terms of the timing of that, but in February that decision was reached in terms of aid. During the British Presidency, as I recollect, there had been continued discussions about our capacity to hold together the aid regulation with the trade regulation, but ultimately we were unable to secure consensus on that and the two were decoupled so that the aid regulation has gone through but the trade regulation still continues to be a matter for discussion. Q197 Mr Maples: When we had the Foreign Secretary giving evidence some time in the last 12 months, and I cannot remember exactly when, we split the trade links issue into area C1, C1B and E was, as I understand it, an EU issue, at least under EU competence and jurisdiction, air links having nothing to do with the European Union at all, and there was some confusion, I think, both among us and among those who were giving evidence to us as to whether countries could establish bilateral air links with Northern Cyprus or whether that had to be done multilaterally, and I think that confusion still exists. What I think is clear to most of us who have taken an interest in this issue, and I am not asking you to clarify it, but if you want to you are welcome to, was that the trade link was much more important to Northern Cyprus than the aid. I am sure that aid will be very welcome, but what Northern Cyprus needs is direct links to the outside world for its tourist business. I wonder if you can tell us if that is something that the British Government is pushing for and whether or not we have considered, and if so would be prepared to, allow bilateral air links to be established between the United Kingdom and Northern Cyprus? Mr Alexander: I hesitate to add to the gloom that clearly descended the last time this issue was raised on the Committee but my understanding of the key issue here is not so much the issue of individual countries as the designation of the airport, air carrier port, and can it be designated as an international airport, essentially, in order to be able to provide the necessary criteria for the arrangements which multilaterally are in place for international air travel. So the question turns in part on the designation of the airport as an international airport. Given that that has not been designated as an international airport there remain very complex legal difficulties, frankly, for any country, certainly multilaterally but, also, individually, in terms of flights operating internationally to the airport. Q198 Mr Maples: If you can answer the next question now that is fine but if you cannot I would be very happy to take yet another note from you on what are the procedures for authorising the airport as an international airport for these purposes. It would be ironic if Greece, of all countries, with its air safety record, were allowed to veto whether or not an airport in Northern Cyprus was designated for international travel. If you can answer the question now that is fine, but if you cannot ---- Mr Alexander: I will resist the temptation to even implicitly criticise one of our European partners, and provide a note. Q199 Mr Maples: Certainly, as Members of this Committee who did these two visits to Cyprus, we felt that the Greek-Cypriot Government did not negotiate in good faith with the Annan proposals, certainly after Papadopolous (?) became President and we have been comprehensively hoodwinked or taken for a ride over this and we have now got a situation where we have, inside the cabinet somebody who ought to have been firmly outside it until the Cyprus issue was resolved. Now inside they are in a position not just to use the EU in pursuit of its problems and the issues it has with Northern Cyprus but, also, to pursue, frankly, much more importantly from our point of view, over the negotiations for Turkish accession. It seems to me, and I would be grateful if we could have your response to this, that unless we start winning some of these arguments with Cyprus and we continue to allow the smallest countries in the European Union to dictate very important aspects of its policy and progress, we are simply storing up trouble of, at some stage, them stopping the negotiations for Turkish entry. Whether you are in favour of Turkish entry or not it ought to be decided on its merits and not because of some very small, regional, ethnic dispute on a little island in the Mediterranean. If we do not get tough with Cyprus, that, I suggest to you, is what is going to happen. It may not be you or this Government but somebody is going to have to pick up the pieces of this. Mr Alexander: Let me begin with where we stand in terms of the Annan 5. The Foreign Secretary, I understand, following his appearance before your Committee in December, at the turn of the year travelled to the Republic of Cyprus and, indeed, then visited the so-called TRNC and met with Turk leaders there. The reason that the Foreign Secretary made that visit was to reflect the concern that we do feel about finding a way forward in the dispute. Clearly, there was genuine disappointment in relation to the failure to achieve support on both sides of the island to Annan 5 in terms of the referendums, but nonetheless we continue to work with the Secretary General on this matter. Indeed, prior to the Foreign Secretary's visit there was a statement made by Kofi Annan welcoming the visit and encouraging the sides to participate therein. Since that visit that has been made by the Foreign Secretary there has been an agreement and I think this followed the meeting between Papadopolous and Kofi Annan and by communal discussions on common concerns, and obviously we welcome that. The reason I cite that is that, as you recognise, this is not simply an issue for the European Union. The process, in terms of a settlement, has been led through the good offices of Javier Solana (?) and we continue to support the Secretary General's efforts in that regard. On your subsidiary point in terms of the role of Northern Cyprus within the European Union, I suppose again I would return to October 3 as rather a counter-point to the one made in the sense that it is no secret that there were concerns raised by the country of Cyprus in the course of those negotiations, even in the final hours, but nonetheless on the basis of a great deal of hard work and effort both by our diplomats and, also, by the Foreign Secretary we were able to prevail and secure an opening of accession talks. I do think, given what I have said in terms of the need for transparency, conditionality and rigour in the process, Turkey deserves to be treated in exactly the same way - no more favourably and no less favourably - than any other candidate country, and that will continue to be our position and we will continue to argue that case within the European Union. Q200 Chairman: We have about ten minutes left and there are three areas that I want to touch on. You have touched on it already when you talked about the discussion about the external action service and developments, but can I put it to you that, in the absence of the constitution, with this arrangement whereby Mr Solana is in this strange position as being responsible to the Council of Ministers that putatively we would have had a different role if things had been different, is the effectiveness of the European Union and its external policy generally weakened or hampered by the current institutional arrangements? Mr Alexander: There is no question of Javier Solana becoming, whoever is successful as high representative, a new foreign minister without addressing that issue of the draft constitutional treaty. In terms of the effectiveness of the European Union projecting itself and its values internationally, I would probably cite the most salient example, which is that of Iran. If you look at the E3 process over recent months, initiated with the full support of other European countries, it seems to me a very good example of where there has been, notwithstanding the present arrangements within the European Union, a very effective European dimension to one of the biggest single strategic challenges that we face. Q201 Chairman: The EU policy is coming to a failure, really, with regard to Iran, despite all the great efforts and the fact that you are working together with the French and German Governments; ultimately, it has not succeeded. Mr Alexander: I have to say it is the first time it has been suggested to me that it is the fault of the European Union. Q202 Chairman: I did not say that. I am not saying it is the fault of the European Union, I am saying that despite all the prodigious efforts that went in it has not succeeded. Mr Alexander: I would not recognise that characterisation of the E3 process. I think if you look at the fact that since its initiation not just the British Foreign Office but, also, the German and French foreign ministries, not just the United States but, also, Russia and China, have come behind that diplomatic effort, it is evidence of the fact that others recognise the importance of the process. Of course that process is not concluded, of course there is a long way still to go but, nonetheless, I think it is an important contribution to a very difficult international issue. As I say, the fact that political directors, or P5+1, now are meeting in Paris today (they started meeting yesterday and they will continue to meet tomorrow) and there will be further discussions at ministerial level in New York next week evidences the fact that not just the United Kingdom but other countries recognise the E3 process as an important part of a continuing, developing issue in the international community. Q203 Sir John Stanley: Minister, I want to turn to a specific EU issue in connection with the occupied territories of Gaza and the West Bank. As you are aware, the White Paper said that during the UK Presidency the main objective for the European Union in the Middle East peace process was to support the work of James Wolfensohn, Special Envoy for Disengagement for the Quartet. A number of us, Minister, had an opportunity of having direct discussions with members of the Wolfensohn team when we were in Israel and the occupied territories at the end of last year, and if there is going to be, ultimately, a viable Palestinian State, which is the objective of the Government and the EU, (and I think there are grounds for huge doubts as to whether that is going to be achieved but if it is going to be achievable at all) it will require an efficient and easily usable crossing for Palestinians between Gaza and the West Bank. As you will know, that was an issue which was a matter of very, very detailed consideration by the Wolfensohn team. Predictably, I have to say, the Israelis were putting a great deal of difficulties in the way; they were making the suggestion that the transit between Gaza and the West Bank should perhaps only be by rail and they have even come up with a fantastical proposal that Palestinians should not be allowed to go on the surface at all but they should be only allowed to proceed by tunnel between Gaza and the West Bank. Can you assure us that the British Government and the EU have as a very high priority the policy of ensuring that the communication link between Gaza and the West Bank is going to be by road and that the Palestinians, to create the viable Palestinian State, must have ease of access, freedom of access, along that road, particularly given the fact that it is now Israeli government policy to hermetically seal off Israel from the occupied territories and are no longer going to be allowing Palestinians even to work in the State of Israel. Mr Alexander: Let me make clear, first of all, that given my European responsibilities this is a matter that is covered within the Office by my colleague Kim Howells as Minister for the Middle East, primarily, and, also, of course, by the Foreign Secretary. So it would not be for me in any way to alter the British Government's position. Of course, we have been very supportive both of the Quartet and, indeed, of James Wolfensohn's work and have valued the contribution he has made in recent months. In terms of our position in relation to the barrier, in terms of your description of hermetically sealing areas, the position is long-standing and clear and we have made representations directly to the Israeli Government on that matter. Equally, it is clear that we continue to believe that via the road map procedure the aspiration should be a viable Palestinian State, alongside a secure and safe Israel. Beyond that, it would really be a matter better directed to the Foreign Secretary or, indeed, my colleague Kim Howells, the Minister with direct responsibility for the Middle East. Q204 Sir John Stanley: Minister, I fully appreciate the departmental problems and that Ministers have specific issues, but you are here to represent the whole of your department. I fully understand you cannot address my specific question and we will be grateful for a full written note from you on the specific issue of British Government policy towards establishing a viable and easily accessed road link between Gaza and the occupied territories. Mr Alexander: It would be even more appropriate if I get such a letter from Kim Howells, the Minister with responsibility. Q205 Chairman: Can you also update us now on where we are with regard to assistance to the Palestinian people, given the EU decisions about Hamas, and how we can avoid mass starvation or deprivation in the Palestinian territories whilst, at the same time, not supporting Hamas? Mr Alexander: Again, our position remains that as set out in terms of the three key criteria set down by the Quartet: the adherence to prior international obligations; the renunciation of violence and the recognition of the State of Israel. It was the case that either at the end of last year or at the beginning of this year, during the period that the administration was being formed, there was additional support provided by the European Union, if I recollect correctly, agreed with the General Affairs Council, to support the Palestinian Authority, but we are very clear that the onus of responsibility now rests with the Palestinian Authority and the Hamas leadership to reach their own judgment in terms of those criteria that are set down. That being said, I understand that there will continue to be discussions within the Union and, principally, amongst foreign ministers on this issue of the need for potential humanitarian support notwithstanding the fact that we do not want in any way to remove the onus of responsibility from Hamas leadership to reach what we believe is the necessary judgment to adhere to those international norms and those international standards. Q206 Chairman: Do you not accept that there is a potential problem, in that the difficulties that will be caused to the Palestinian people will, instead of being blamed upon Hamas itself, be blamed upon the international community and may actually reinforce Hamas's hold and its political support within the Palestinian territories when, in fact, only 44 per cent of people voted for it? Mr Alexander: Yes, and we have been very clear and, indeed, the Foreign Secretary has been very clear, at the time of the elections in the Palestinian Authority, to make clear that our motivation was in no way to suggest that, as the Foreign Secretary said: the "wrong" decision had been reached. It is not for us to make those decisions; the right democratic way for those decisions to be reached is for a fair and free choice to be exercised by the Palestinian people. That being said, and accepting, as I say, that since then funding has been provided from the European Union in support of the Palestinian Authority, now that you have a Hamas-led government we are equally clear that the obligations set down on that Palestinian Authority by the Quartet continue to have to be answered, and in that sense, with respect, we have already made sure that there was transitional assistance provided immediately after the election. So I hope that we have answered the charge that you put to me. On the other hand, the question has still to be answered by the Hamas leadership of the Palestinian Authority as to whether they accept their responsibilities and the responsibilities contingent on being a democratic government. Chairman: I am conscious of time and there were a number of other areas we wanted to ask but you have to get away, I know that. Can I just touch on two or three areas and ask, perhaps, if you could send us a note on them. Firstly, the current position with regard to the neighbourhood policy and, specifically, the Ukraine, in light of the political changes there. Secondly, the security of energy supply within the European Union, and what the British Government's position is on that, including the German-Russian pipeline issue. Thirdly, on the point we have just been touching on, we also visited Rafah when we were there in November/December and saw the Italian-led EU operation there, which was doing an excellent job, and I would be grateful ---- Andrew Mackinlay: And Belarus. Q207 Chairman: ---- for your update on the position with regard to where Rafah is in this current situation between Mahmoud Abbas and Hamas. My colleague has mentioned Belarus as well. I am very sorry we have not had time to go through all those matters, and I am sure we will see you again at some point in the future. Thank you very much. Mr Alexander: Thank you very much. |