5. Memorandum submitted by the National
Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers
The National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport
Workers (RMT) welcomes the decision of the Home Affairs Committee
to hold an evidence session on the "issues arising from the
London Bombings".
RMT sends our condolences to the families of
those people tragically murdered as a result of the bombings on
7 July. Our members were on hand in the immediate aftermath of
the terrorist atrocities at Kings Cross, Russell Square, Liverpool
Street and Edgware Road to provide comfort and support to those
passengers who were injured, to evacuate stations and to de-train
passengers caught up in the bombings. RMT members also assisted
members of the travelling public on 21 July after the thankfully
unsuccessful terrorist attacks and in addition were working at
Stockwell station on 22 July when Jean Charles De Menezes was
shot dead.
The appalling events in July self-evidently
raise a series of important questions in relation to the safe
and secure operation of the London Underground. Since the attacks
RMT has held a number of useful meetings with the Mayor of London
where substantial agreement has been reached in relation to train
radios and staff numbers across the network. Progress has also
been made in relation to the Fire Precautions (Sub-Surface Railway
Stations) Regulations 1989 and discussions are also continuing
with the ODPM on this matter. We would nevertheless hope that
the issues which we will raise in our note assist the Committee
during the course of its deliberations.
THE HIDDEN
OBVIOUS AND
TYPICAL (HOT) PROCEDURE
The HOT procedure is used by LU staff to determine
whether packages and parcels left on the underground present a
danger to network operations. RMT believes that following the
terrorist attacks the procedure should be robustly and rigorously
applied to ensure the safe operation of the network and protect
the interests of the travelling public. It should not be used,
as some RMT representatives have reported to us, primarily as
a means to identify lost property.
We believe that the HOT procedure should be
applied in such a way as to ensure that the service is suspended
if an unattended item is within the line of sight of any running
line. In addition where security checks are carried out on the
seat tags in the passenger carriages and the tags are found to
be broken the train should not be put into service. Staff should
also be encouraged to take a robust attitude to packages left
on station platforms and in booking hall areas, with full evacuations
of stations taking place if staff believe that items are suspicious
and therefore potentially dangerous. During the course of recent
discussions the Mayor agreed that he would review the application
of the HOT procedures.
TRAIN RADIOS
The July terrorist attacks highlight the need
for an efficient train radio system which enables the driver to
be in constant contact with the Line Controller. It is essential
that in the event of an incident or emergency a communication
system is in place which stops the driver from proceeding towards
a dangerous part of the network and enables him/her to de-train
passengers at an appropriate safe and secure location. Regrettably
train radios all too often fail. Transport for London's 2005 report
into the second year of the PPP describes the Connect PFI train
radio replacement project thus;
In the last year both the Northern and Piccadilly
lines have suffered severe disruptions caused by the failure of
life expired train radio systems. It is therefore crucial that
the new system is delivered. This was originally due in October
2003. The programme is now running over budget and four years
late. Despite progress in the last year which saw enabling works
(to provide space and power for the new equipment) reach 82% of
completion and the radio system reach 60% of completion, performance
by the contractor is not good enough and there have been changes
in personnel and approach to expedite delivery.
RMT is concerned that the train radio system
remains inadequate. We believe that for reasons of safety a "no
radio no train" policy should be introduced by LUL and that
works should be undertaken as a matter of the highest urgency
to complete the introduction of the replacement radio system.
During the course of recent discussions the Mayor agreed that
trains should not be put into service with defective radios.
STAFF NUMBERS
LU staff played an essential role in the immediate
aftermath of the 7 July bombings. We believe that commitments
should be made by LU management not to reduce staff numbers across
the combine. This will ensure that in the event of future attacks
sufficient visible, well-trained staff are on hand to assist passengers
who might be trapped on trains and to safely and efficiently evacuate
stations. During the course of recent discussions the Mayor agreed
that there should not be any future overall reduction in staff
numbers.
GUARDS
The Committee will be aware that ridership on
the London Underground fell significantly after 7 July. Thankfully
passenger numbers are now beginning to climb again. RMT believes
that the travelling public should have confidence that their journey
will be safe and secure. We believe that visible, well-trained
staff should be present to provide information to the travelling
public and to offer assistance and support in the event of an
incident or emergency. We are therefore of the view that LU should
begin the process of re-introducing guards across the underground
network.
Whilst fully aware that guards are unable to
stop terrorist or suicide bombers they can help passengers to
de-train as safely as possible in the event of an emergency by
for example ensuring that they do not evacuate onto potentially
live rails. This is particularly important in the event of the
driver being injured or otherwise incapacitated.
At Shepherd's Bush on 21 July the second trained
member of staff on the train, who on that particular occasion
was travelling in the drivers' cab, was able to go through the
train to re-assure passengers whilst the driver was trying to
communicate with the Line Controller.
BREATHING APPARATUS
& DRIVER CAB
BULKHEADS
RMT believes that research should be commissioned
to investigate whether the introduction of breathing apparatus
for operational staff and measures to strengthen driver cab bulkheads
would increase safety and security in the event of future terrorist
attacks. During the course of recent discussions the Mayor has
agreed to examine our representations on this matter.
FIRE PRECAUTIONS
(SUB-SURFACE)
REGULATIONS 1989
The Fire Precautions (Sub-Surface) Regulations
1989 were introduced following the Fennell report into the November
1987 Kings Cross fire disaster in which 31 people died. The regulations
include wide-ranging fire fighting and precaution measures, including
means of escape, means of fighting fire, minimum staffing levels
and staff instruction/training, means of detecting fire/warning
of fire and fire resistance.
In 2004 the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister
(ODPM) proposed to replace the regulations as part of the Regulatory
Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2004. Following representations the
House of Commons Regulatory Reform Committee recommended that
the regulations should be retained. The ODPM agreed to accept
the recommendation until such time as guidance to replace the
regulations had been drafted.
The current position is that the ODPM wants
to repeal the regulations by February 2006 if they remain convinced
that the 2004 Fire Safety Order and new guidance does not decrease
safety on London Underground and the mainline stations to which
the regulations apply.
Despite this assurance RMT believes that the
July events make the protections contained in the provisions of
the 1989 regulations all the more essential. We remain concerned
that the proposed 2004 Fire Order reverses the burden of proof
in relation to the fire safety regime in force on the London Underground.
Currently London Underground Limited has to
satisfy the fire authority that a specific minimum standard at
a particular location is inappropriate, unnecessary or not reasonably
practicable. However the approach adopted by the 2004 Regulatory
Reform Order reverses this arrangement meaning that in the future
it would be for the fire authority to show that the employer has
failed to carry out a suitable and sufficient risk assessment.
In fact minimum standards apply to many other
hazardous situations. Indeed Article 24 of the new Regulatory
Reform Order recognises the need for them in response to serious
fire hazards.
Despite the claims that the current regime is
overly prescriptive RMT believes that the 1989 Regulations do
offer sufficient flexibility.
The current arrangements allow for modifications
to be made to the 1989 regulations if the employer can satisfy
the fire authority that a minimum standard at a particular location
is inappropriate, unnecessary or not reasonably practical. Current
legislation already requires a risk assessment to be carried out
in order to cater for the widely varying characteristics found
in each workplace. The 1989 Regulations merely prescribe minimum
standards upon which the findings of such an assessment should
be built. These minimum requirements are not blunt instruments
that impose disproportionate requirements upon the rail industry.
It provides for some flexibility in that the fire authority can
grant an exemption from many of the requirements where they can
be shown to be inappropriate, unnecessary or not reasonably practicable.
RMT believes that the ODPM should uphold the
necessary protections provided by the Fire Precautions (Sub-Surface
Railway Stations) Regulations 1989 and therefore keep the regulations
on the statute book. We believe that in light of the terrorist
attacks any attempt to remove the Regulations would disregard
the public's concern for safety and security on the underground
and mainline networks.
RMT thanks the Committee for taking the time
to read our note and hopes that the issues we have raised are
useful to members during the course of their deliberations.
6 September 2005
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